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Symposium: Workers' Rights and the New
Technologies
Introduction
That technology is a pervasive aspect of modern society is one of
the commonplaces of the day. Since the first Industrial Revolution less
than two centuries ago, technology has burgeoned and become the real
metaphysic of the twentieth century. What Jacques Ellul called tech-
nique-which is different from and, indeed, far exceeds technology it-
self--characterizes much of modern life. The intellectual disciplines of
economics and politics are no longer studied conceptually as political
economy. Instead, they have been technicized. So, too, has law. Little
of importance in the world does not depend in some measure on tech-
nology, even in its most restricted sense of man's mechanical means to
his ends.
Theoretically* at least, technology was a means to achieve certain
human goals. Today, however, it has reversed the means-ends equation
so as to become indifferent to all the traditional human ends and values
by becoming an end-in-itself. Technological change is considered to be
synonymous with progress, and the underlying assumption is that
through some variation on Adam Smith's invisible hand the public
good is furthered by uncontrolled new technologies. That deleterious
second-order consequences of those technologies can and do have sig-
nificant adverse effects is obvious. Consider, for example, the technol-
ogy that produced the nuclear bomb, or those that create pollution,
such as acid rain and toxic waste dumps.
Nowhere are the adverse consequences of new technologies more
apparent and more directly felt by millions of Americans and hundreds
of millions elsewhere than in the employment relation. Today, we are
enjoined to accept the notion that an acceptable rate of unemployment
is seven or eight percent of the work force. That may well be optimis-
tic, as corporate managers ever increasingly employ new technolo-
gies-and replace human beings. Some tentative movements toward
combating the adverse impacts of the new technologies have started,
mainly in the labor unions. Government thus far has not responded,
save to buy off some worker discontent through unemployment com-
pensation programs and the like. And corporate management has sin-
gle-mindedly pursued the bottom line of profit maximization, without
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regard to the human costs involved. One response to the second Indus-
trial Revolution, in which the United States is deeply immersed, has
been developed by the International Association of Machinists (IAM):
a workers' "Bill of Rights." It is set forth below, with an introduction
by the editors of democracy, where it first appeared and who have
kindly granted the Nova Law Journal permission to reprint it.
Copies of this workers' bill of rights were circulated to a number
of knowledgable observers, in law and economics, in political science
and sociology, who were asked to respond and comment upon the
IAM's proposal. This symposium, thus, is a contribution to the ongoing
debate about the terminal sense of the loss of work itself that is being
felt by so many who wish to have jobs and cannot, largely because of
the advent of new technologies.
The Editors
Technology's Politics:
International Association of Machinists
In the face of record unemployment, plant closings, and capital
flight abroad, America's business and political elite repeat a by-now
familiar refrain. To get American economic growth going again, they
say, we need to invest in new technology and to develop programs to
train the unemployed in the new skills needed by that technology. Crit-
ics have pointed to the paper entrepreneurialism of fast-profit-crazed
U.S. managers as one sign of the bad faith embodied in these propos-
als, but it is not the only one.
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization
of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs in
July 1981, William W. Winpisinger, President of the International As-
sociation of Machinists, pointed elsewhere: to the effects of the new
technology on skilled labor. The search for short-term profits has
dovetailed with labor-saving technology, but where machinists once op-
erated and serviced their machines, the new technology has encouraged
job fragmentation. Machinists have been replaced by low-skilled ma-
chine operators backed up by a relatively small number of specialized
service people. Unemployment has been one result of the new technol-
ogy, but another has been a lowering of the skill level of the average
worker.
The government, in the view of the Machinists, has aided and
abetted this process in two related ways. First, it has supported voca-
482 [Vol. 8
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tional and technical school training, which most often takes the form of
specialized training, rather than the more general training obtained
through collective bargaining-based apprenticeship programs. Secondly,
through efforts like the Department of Defense's "Partners in
Preparedness" program, the government has promoted reindustrializa-
tion programs without the benefit of public involvement and without
labor representation. The result has been reductions in health and
safety regulations, increased corporate tax incentives, relaxed environ-
mental restraints, and the encouragement of more labor-saving technol-
ogy. A circle is thus created that excludes the interests of skilled labor.
The machinists have responded with a proposed Bill of Rights that
would address the issues that are now shunted aside or ignored. The
text of that document follows.
Proposed Bill of Rights
Congress hereby amends the National Labor Relations Act, Railway
Labor Act, and other appropriate Acts to declare a national labor pol-
icy through a New Technology Bill of Rights:
I
New Technology shall be used in a way that creates jobs and pro-
motes community-wide and national full employment.
II
Unit labor cost savings and labor productivity gains resulting from
the use of new technology shall be shared with workers at the local
enterprise level and shall not be permitted to accrue excessively or ex-
clusively for the gain of capital, management, and shareholders.
Reduced work hours and increased leisure time made possible by
new technology shall result in no loss of real income or decline in living
standards for workers affected at the local enterprise level.
I
Local communities, the states, and the nation have a right to re-
quire employers to pay a replacement tax on all machinery, equipment,
robots, and production systems that displace workers, cause unemploy-
ment and thereby decrease local, state, and federal revenues.
1984] 483
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IV
New technology shall improve the conditions of work and shall en-
hance and expand the opportunities for knowledge, skills and compen-
sation of workers. Displaced workers shall be entitled to training, re-
training, and subsequent job placement or reemployment.
V
New Technology shall be used to develop and strengthen the U.S.
industrial base, consistent with the Full Employment goal and national
security requirements, before it is licensed or otherwise exported
abroad.
VI
New technology shall be evaluated in terms of worker safety and
health and shall not be destructive of the workplace environment, nor
shall it be used at the expense of the community's natural environment.
VII
Workers, through their trade unions and bargaining units, shall
have an absolute right to participate in all phases of management de-
liberations and decisions that lead or could lead to the introduction of
new technology or the changing of the workplace system design, work
processes, and procedures for doing work, including the shutdown or
transfer of work, capital, plant, and equipment.
VII
Workers shall have the right to monitor control room centers and
control stations and the new technology shall not be used to monitor,
measure or otherwise control the work practices and work standards of
individual workers, at the point of work.
Ix
Storage of an individual worker's personal data and information
file by the employer shall be tightly controlled and the collection and/
or release and dissemination of information with respect to race, reli-
gious, or political activities and beliefs, records of physical and mental
[Vol. 8
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health disorders and treatments, records of arrests and felony charges
or convictions, information concerning sexual preferences and conduct,
information concerning internal and private family matters, and infor-
mation regarding an individual's financial condition or credit worthi-
ness shall not be permitted, except in rare circumstances related to
health, and then only after consultation with a family-or union-ap-
pointed physician, psychiatrist, or member of the clergy. The right of
an individual worker to inspect his or her personal data file shall at all
times be absolute and open.
X
When the New Technology is employed in the production of mili-
tary goods and services, workers, through their trade union and bar-
gaining agent, have a right to bargain with management over the es-
tablishment of Alternative Production Committees, which shall design
ways to adopt that technology to socially useful production and prod-
ucts in the civilian sector of the economy.
1984]
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Technology, Labor Interests and the Law: Some
Fundamental Points and Problems
Warren J. Samuels, A. Allan Schmid, James D. Shaffer,
Robert A. Solo, and Stephen A. Woodbury*
I.
The symposium of which this essay is a part deals with technology
and law with particular reference to the interests of workers. Perhaps
needless to say but nonetheless important, each of the three top-
ics-technology, law and worker interests-has had a long history of
controversy about factual or positive and normative considerations. It is
not our intention, and certainly not our expectation, either to resolve
the thorny issues involved in the three topics and their interconnections
or to solve the difficult, complex, and delicate policy problems through
some concrete program or panacea. It is our objective to identify the
critical issues, something of what we know about them, and something
of what is involved in any effort to workthem out. We come, that is to
say, neither to propose nor to render complete policy analysis of other's
proposals but to advise as to what is involved, inevitably, in any efforts
somehow to reconcile, whether through law or otherwise, the conflicts
between technology and labor interests.
We believe that very deep and perennial questions are involved in
any discussion of the conflicts between technology and worker interests,
that these questions are involved even when not brought to the surface
and directly confronted, and that we ought to make them explicit as
part of our advisory, and informational, analysis. These questions in-
clude the following: Whose interests are to count, and how? Whose
interests are to be made a cost to others, and how? Who is to control
the introduction of new technology? Given the fundamental importance
of access to jobs, how can protection of employment be institutional-
* The authors are on the faculty of Michigan State University. Warren J. Samu-
els is Professor of Economics; Ph.D. 1957, University of Wisconsin. A. Allan Schmid is
Professor of Agricultural Economics; Ph.D. 1959, University of Wisconsin. James D.
Shaffer is Professor of Agricultural Economics; Ph.D. 1951, Michigan State Univer-
sity. Robert A. Solo is Professor of Economics; Ph.D. 1953, Cornell University. Ste-
phen A. Woodbury is Assistant Professor of Economics; Ph.D. 1981, University of
Wisconsin.
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ized? It is obvious that questions such as these involve fundamental
considerations of the organization and control of the economic system.
Although we do not propose specific solutions to the policy
problems inherent in our subject, our advisory analysis is predicated
upon certain ultimately normative premises which ought to be made
explicit: (1) That it is desirable to protect worker interests in employ-
ment. Not all such interests will be discussed, nor will the ones we do
discuss be treated equally. (2) That it is desirable to facilitate and pro-
mote technological innovation. Technological development historically
has been the critical factor in the improvement of living conditions for
all persons, particularly in the industrialized economies, and it remains
the, or at least a, prerequisite for the enlargement and enhancement of
the human welfare potential. (3) That it is desirable to maintain, even
to enhance, the openness and flexibility of the economic system in mat-
ters of structure and behavior. In relation to this we generally assume
the continuation of private enterprise-type economic system. We note
that these assumptions could be, and in the past often have been, used
in connection with analyses quite different from the one undertaken
here. For example, we will deal with quite fundamental points concern-
ing the definitions of inputs and outputs, distribution, and incentives, in
some respects at least quite differently from their conventional
treatments.
One additional assumption ought to be made explicit. We abstract
from the problem of inflation. We do this largely to render our task
manageable. We do not deny the importance of inflation as a problem.
We generally do feel that were political and economic wills propitious,
policies could be adopted to resolve the problem of inflation, including
the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, perhaps through
some combination of fiscal, monetary, and incomes policies together
with the (or some of the) policy options discussed below. (For example,
if inflation is due, as the theorists of incomes policies maintain, to the
contest over income and wealth, insofar as that contest involves the
struggle for jobs, then it is plausible to argue, or at least to suggest,
that resolution of the unemployment problem can possibly contribute to
the defusing of the contest in its engendering of inflation.) But espe-
cially we omit inflation as a problem because we want to discuss other
things. In doing so we do not intend to denigrate the difficulties of solv-
ing it.
Finally, we do want to stress the importance, both in the real
world and to our analysis, of the behavioral, structural, and market, as
well as perfomance consequences of the introduction of new policy ar-
[Vol. 8
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rangments. Indeed, the analytical and practical, substantive problems
of institutional innovation are no less, and perhaps much greater, than
those of technological innovation. There are, for example, market con-
sequences and problems consequent to institutional innovation. That
there generally is a difference between the two forms of innova-
tion-the consequences of technological innovation generally are not
given the same policy analytic treatment as are those of institutional
innovation (not that the latter all receive such treatment, by any
means), especially when questions of legal change are involved-is of
concern to us and accounts, in part, for the direction which some of our
advisory analysis takes.
Our discussion commences with consideration of the economics of
technological change in relation to unemployment, moves on to con-
sider certain fundamental matters of institutional organization and ad-
justment, then to consideration of a variety of policy options, and con-
cludes with the indentification of a problem for labor interests which,
while illustrative of the point made in the immediately preceding para-
graph, may be of far greater significance to labor in this country than
technological unemployment as such.
II.
The most conspicuous question concerns the relation of technologi-
cal change to unemployment. Looking at this question from an histori-
cal perspecitive one must be struck by the difference in view between
short term adjustment problems and long term progress. The fact is
that in the advanced industrial societies during the last century or so,
population has enormously increased, the fraction of the popuation ac-
tively engaged in production has decreased, the length of the work
week has substantially decreased, and real per capita income nonethe-
less has increased many times over. The principal factor which has per-
mitted these developments has been technology. The basic analysis with
regard solely to employment-unemploymnet involves several factors.
In the case of exogenous technological change, while such change
tends to be labor-saving, its effect on employment in the particular in-
dustry affected depends on several factors. Most important, it depends
on the labor-intensity of the industry, the more labor-intensive the less
the adverse impact on employment, and on the elasticity of demand for
the industry's output, the more elastic the stronger the demand for and
employment of labor. Labor-saving technological change results in
lower cost of producing a given level of output. If it is assumed that the
1984]
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price of the good reflects the cost of production, then price will fall with
costs, and the quantity demanded of the good will rise. Hence, the
more elastic the demand for the good, the greater will be the increase
in quantity demanded, in response to the price drop, and the more la-
bor, and other resources as well, will be needed to satisfy demand. As
for labor intensity, the more labor-intensive is an industry to begin
with, the more labor will be required to meet the increase in demand
after the technological change has taken place. That is, a given techno-
logical change will have a proportionally larger effect on employment
in an industry where employment is low to begin with, and a propor-
tionally smaller effect on employment in an industry where employ-
ment is high to begin with. Therefore, even within a industry subject to
labor-saving technological change, there is no necessary reduction in
employment.
Moreover, in the event that technological change does displace
workers from jobs, it is likely that workers will be reabsorbed in other
industries. The result will be greater output at lower factor cost, that is,
higher real per capita incomes permitted if not generated by technolog-
ical change.
In the case of induced technological change, where labor-saving
technological change is generated by expected future increases in wage
rates, not past increases, the outcome is the same as in the case of
exogenous technological change. More output is available at less re-
source cost after the technological change. Labor displaced from one
sector is reabsorbed in some other sector.
Such, in summary, is the standard economic analysis of the mat-
ter. It has the indisputable advantage of being highly consonant with
the long-term performance of the economy. There are, however, at
least two immediate assumptions which differentiate the short from the
long term. One is the reabsorption assumption; the other involves ad-
justment costs; and, of course, the two are related, although there can
be short term adjustment costs even absent reabsorption problems.
The assumption that displaced labor is reabsorbed elsewhere in the
economy is not always true in reality. Due to at least cyclical and
structural problems, there may not be the effective demand elsewhere
in the economy for the displaced workers to be reemployed. This means
that the improvements due to technology have serious hardship costs
for the displaced workers. The principal significance of this for both the
workers (and their families) and society is obvious: In modern society,
income is secured principally through access to jobs. In the absence of
jobs, there is typically much human suffering. If one understands the
[Vol. 8490
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objective of the economy to be the production of human welfare
through material productivity, not technological virtuosity or profit as
an end in itself, such a situation must be understood to involve eco-
nomic failure.
The traditional assumption of zero, or at most negligible, adjust-
ment costs also is dubious. Even with reabsorption of displaced workers
in other jobs, say, after a short period of frictional unemployment,
there are serious adjustment costs. While these are strikingly signifi-
cant for older workers. they are not necessarily negligible for younger
ones and their families. Unemployment due to technological displace-
ment may ruin a worker and his family's financial security. Relocation
from one region of a country to another, loss of one's immobile assets in
home and community, retraining from one set of job skills to another,
damage to personal identity and confidence as well as dignity, loss of
control over one's job situation-all these and other consequences of
technological unemployment constitute costs which must be reckoned
in any social accounting of the costs and benefits of technological
change. When these adjustment costs, which likely are not negligable
for many workers even in the best of times, are compounded by failure
of reabsorption, the human tragedy can be severe and both the family
and social consequences can be serious.
It is quite easy to make presumptuous pronouncements in such
matters. However, there are numerous subtleties and complexities.
Often what is transparently clear can be only one, and only a tempo-
rary, a manifestation of something much more dynamic. Often, too,
what seems congruent with one's, or with society's, interest by one cri-
terion may not be so by another which upon inspection may be given a
higher ranking. And critical to the entire process is the distributional
problem encompassing both power and outcomes.
III.
It perhaps ought to be acknowledged that, even in the absence of
problems of unemployment and adjustment costs borne by labor, tech-
nological change is not an unmixed blessing. The economy, ind indeed
society, has become increasingly fragile with the development of tech-
nology and its industrial applications. In particular, the ecological sys-
tems of the workplace and the larger community and the physical and
mental health of both working and nonworking populations, including
the as yet unborn, have become heavily dependent upon industrial
processes, the production of their necessary inputs, and the disposal of
1984]
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their products and byproducts, including wastes. The human welfare
potential implicit in higher production and higher productivity cannot
be reckoned solely on its own terms. While most contemporary discus-
sion takes place within a systemically and technologically laden con-
text, there are deeper, if more relativistic and elusive, considerations
which also must enter into contemplation and social decision.
The question of uncertainty and its implications also ought to be
acknowledged and, indeed, emphasized. The economic future is radi-
cally unknowable; our ignorance of it is due not to lack of information
but to the fact that the future will not exist and be knowable until it
happens, the result of the aggregate of our actions. No one, then, can
be certain of the outcome of technological change. People have differ-
ent subjective views of uncertainty and the costs and benefits likely to
be realized in the now-uncertain future. This difference of views, and
the underlying difference of viewpoints, casts doubt on any one group
having monopoly-like power in control of technological innovation.
Such results in an arbitrary and skewed distribution of costs and bene-
fits to the extent that the group with the power to make decisions acts
upon its own perception of costs and benefits. To define costs and bene-
fits is really to define for policy purposes people's property rights.
Union-generated work rules thus often are held up to scorn for their
adverse impact upon innovation and productivity. But these work rules
operate no differently than does management decisionmaking over the
adoption of new technology. Whereas union-generated decisions will
tend to effectuate certain worker interests, management-generated de-
cisions will tend to effectuate certain managerial, or corporate, inter-
ests, such as cash flow enhancement and/or timing of innovation vis-a-
vis depreciation of an existing plant. The future is made through giving
effect to such considerations. No one party takes into account in its
calculations of advantage all the costs and all the benefits of their deci-
sions. The introduction of technology will be controlled, whether by
worker interests or company interests; the former is more conspicuous
than the latter but both control innovation and the future, and in those
regards are functionally equivalent. In this connection it perhaps also
ought to be noted that there is by no means a complete set of rights
enabling full participation by all persons or parties in articulating their
preferences, for example, as to possible trade-offs between alternative
work rules, productivity (however defined), and the type of society peo-
ple may prefer to live in. In such matters people are caught in asym-
metrical adversarial, not exchange, relationships.
492 [Vol. 8
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IV.
Obviously critical to any discussion of technology and unemploy-
ment is productivity and, less obviously, critical to any discussion of
productivity is distribution. Distribution is important in its own right; it
also governs the level and pattern of production and of productivity
with respect to which any welfare implications apropos of technology
and unemployment will have meaning. We want in this connection to
make a number of points; each could bear considerably more amplifica-
tion than the present circumstance permits.
First, technology is both a dependent and independent variable.
Most discussion of the effects of technology, as on employment and
unemployment, take technological change as a given. Here we are prin-
cipally interested in how distribution affects the consequences wrought
by technological change. But technology also is a dependent variable;
even when denominated exogenous (vis-a-vis induced), it is generated
by operative factors one of which is power. The distribution of power
governs the allocation of resources to research and development whence
cometh new technology. The distribution of power helps govern the
adoption of technology. Considerations of power enter into the develop-
ment and adoption of technology, not productivity considerations alone.
Moreover, while technology can be perceived as an imperative force
driving industrial structure and evolution, extant technology does com-
prise an array of production alternatives. The very largest level plant is
not necessarily the most efficient. Choice between technologically mod-
ern production systems is not based solely on costs; considerations of
strategic advantage in a system of power also enter into the decisions.
Second, technological innovation is the principal vehicle of the pro-
cess of creative destruction deemed by Joseph Schumpeter in his work
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, to deeply mark the modern in-
dustrial capitalist system. There is creativity and there is destruction.
The creativity and the destruction are not always distributed propor-
tionally, indeed, they rarely if ever are.
Third, if the problem of technology in relation to material progress
and employment-unemployment is one of managing technological ad-
vance, that advance can be managed in different ways and in different
directions. Both the generation and the (creative and destructive) ef-
fects of new technology will depend in part upon the distribution of
power. The distribution of rights, governing whose interests will count,
for example, as a cost to others, will channel the cost-price structure in
terms of which costs and benefits will tend to be reckoned and with
1984]
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respect to which any utilitarian judgment thus reached will be tauto-
logical. A different structure of rights will lead to a different generation
or configuration of technology and a different set of market outcomes.
The management of technological advance will be a function of the
distribution of power and the rationalization of the outcomes of techno-
logical advance will be on terms generally presuming that distribution
of power.
Fourth, more broadly, it is true both that distribution is a function
of market forces and that market forces are a function of distribu-
tional, that is, structural factors. The actually achieved outcome in an
economy is not one that has been predetermined. It is the outcome of a
complex network of interrelationships and decisions at the bottom of
which is an existential circularity between structure and performance
at the core of which is distribution.
Fifth, unemployment therefore can be contemplated to be a func-
tion not so much of technological advance and displacement but of the
structure of power which channels technological change and develop-
ment. Any notion that unemployment is "natural" is specific, at best, to
the extant structure of power. There is no necessary reason in the na-
ture of the economy that technological change and employment be in
conflict. There is no reason why the power structure which channels
both technology and employment-unemployment cannot be altered to
enhance employment and to minimize the adjustment costs borne by
labor, whether or not the reabsorption assumption is found, or made, to
hold. Technology can be introduced in ways which cater to the interests
of those who would otherwise be injured. Barriers to entry can be
eroded if not totally eliminated; barriers to employment as such, for
example, on the basis of age, similarly can be reduced. To the extent
that unemployment is power-structure specific, unemployment can be
reduced through changes in power structure, changes which, among
other things, would take more into account the interests of those so
adversely affected by technology. The same point applies to unemploy-
ment due to other causes, for example, cyclical instability.
Sixth, there are several points to be made concerning productivity.
First, productivity is not only a physical matter. It is a matter of crea-
tion of value, for example, as "determined" through market forces or
through political decision, the supply and demand of automobiles and
pizza pies in the fomer instance and of bombers and missiles in the
latter. As such, productivity is highly, indeed ultimately, circumstan-
tial. An increase in the demand for a product, for example, will in-
crease the value productivity of the workers engaged in its production
494 [Vol. 8
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even if they do nothing differently. Second, productivity is a collective
phenomenon. Although our ideology and, to some extent, our economic
theory of distribution, which in this respect if in no other is heavily
influenced by our ideology, affirm distribution in accordance with indi-
vidual productivity, in reality what we produce and how much we pro-
duce is a function of a vast collective enterprise extending over several
generations. We receive individual factor incomes, wages, etcetera, but
those incomes represent in the aggregate both individual hard work and
the total productive organization and operation of society within which,
and only within which, that hard work can be effective. Considerations
of individual productivity cannot properly be invoked to counter pro-
posals for structural or distributional change in order to effectuate al-
terations in economic performance, for example, in unemployment.
Seventh, it should be clear that both the existence and the distri-
bution of the benefits and costs due to technological change are gov-
erned by the distribution of power. Corporate profits and costs, labor
gains and costs, the direction taken by the mediating role of govern-
ment (law)-these and other factors are given existential substance by
distributional or structural factors. Who receives what benefits and who
bears what costs are questions not written in stone but have "answers"
or "solutions" reached on the basis of the distribution of power and of
power play undertaken thereon. Power play determines whose interest
is protected and efectuated. Power play governs the circumstances and
the manner in which new technology is introduced, who gains, and who
loses.
Eighth, it should be clear that new institutions can be adopted to
channel the market and to affect the genesis and distribution of the
benefits and costs of new technology. Existing institutions are not writ-
ten in stone; they, too, have been the product of institutional evolution
and adjustment; that process continues. Whatever one may think of the
"self-adjusting" market, the market operates within and gives effect to
the institutions which form and channel it. "Productivity" as conven-
tionally reckoned emerges only within, and in a sense tautological with
and specific to, the institutions which form and channel the market and
the operation of the market as such. To judge proposed new institutions
deficient or inefficient on the basis of market outcomes (for example,
the extant cost-price structure) produced by the existing institutional
configuration is to give effect to the latter. Whereas a new institutional
structure would produce outcomes, including a new cost-price struc-
ture, by which the extant ones would be deficient. There is no
metacriterion by which conclusively to choose between them, although
1984] 495
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existential choices are made through decisions leading to institutional
alteration and adjustment.
Ninth, if the introduction of technology and the accrual of profits
therefrom are partly a function of the state of the law, which helps
govern power structure through determining relative rights, then it is
understandable that various interest groups will attempt to influence
the law in its governance of technology and profit. In the nineteenth
century, for example, capital accumulation was abetted by a legal sys-
tem which, in part through various legal defenses against worker legal
action, distributed the risks of production away from capital owners to
workers. This situation continued well into the twentieth century when
it was partly, perhaps substantially, altered through workers' compen-
sation statutes and various developments in tort and statute law estab-
lishing and sanctioning warranties and other modes of consumer pro-
tection. It is not surprising, therefore, nor is it novel in principle, for the
International Association of Machinists (IAM) "New Technology Bill
of Rights" to attempt to protect the interests of workers already in
jobs. But, if the nineteenth century approach achieved accumulation of
capital through the establishment of a privileged position for capital
owners, the IAM approach protects against unemployment through a
privileged position for the already employed, neglecting those who are
unemployed and who are not so well employed. To say that is not to
denigrate their proposal. Whatever "solution" to the continuing prob-
lem of technology and employment-unemployment is worked out, it will
come about largely through various groups doing what comparable
groups always have done, namely, seek to protect and effectuate their
interests. It is one of the ironies of the traditional reabsorption assump-
tion, however, that a tension exists between the frequently unrealistic
assumption of reabsorption capacity and the efforts, due in part to the
absence of reabsorption opportunities and in part to traditional internal
protectionist motives, to establish privileged positions. Still, the manner
and mode of the introduction of technology does bear on worker inter-
ests and is worked out through institutional rearrangements, and, it is
important to note, it is tendentious to call "privileged" what is the re-
sult of necessary efforts to (re)determine the institutions which govern
that manner and mode.
Tenth, it is important to note that when law abetted the accumula-
tion of capital through legal arrangements shifting risk away from cap-
ital to consumers and to workers, it was not some abstract category
"capital" which was maximized. What is called "capital" in all such
discussions is really a vector of a multiplicity of components and not a
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one-dimensional thing which can be given a simple and singular order-
ing. For example, machinery can be produced with greater or lesser
attention, through various design features and protective devices, to
worker safety, and with lesser or greater designed tolerance levels af-
fecting the use and safety of the finished product for consumers. Over-
all more "capital" in some sense was accumulated than otherwise
would have been, but it is important to recognize that the law affected
the structure of accumulation, and the structure of production, con-
sumption, and employment as well.
Eleventh, the distributional problem applies not only between capi-
tal and labor but also within the ranks of labor, particularly organized
labor. Trade unions, in their bargaining over wages, hours and working
conditions, for example, must contemplate the trade-off between total
labor remuneration and the employment level. All other things being
equal, a richer bargaining package may be enjoyed by the union mem-
bers who continue to have jobs but not by those who arguably are dis-
placed in the process as company management adjusts the size of its
workforce (level of employment) to the new price of labor. There is,
willy nilly, a distribution of benefits and distribution of costs. Not all
union members will be in the position denominated above as "privi-
leged." More will be said of this situation below.
Twelfth, it must be stressed that the protection by law, or for that
matter by contract, of one's interests is important to the enhancement
of one's opportunity set and realization of one's interests. It is better to
have rights than not to have them. Two additional points, however,
must be juxtaposed thereto. First, the rights and opportunities of one
party often tend to correlate with costs and denial of opportunities im-
posed on others. To say this, of course, is not by itself to denigrate the
protection of interests, through rights, for any party. It is, rather, to
state an existential fact and condition, thereby underscoring the neces-
sity of choice as to whose interests are to count, in part as a cost to
others. Second, the protection given by law and/or by contract to one
party's interests always is problematic and circumstantial, a function of
the operation of other rights and, inter alia, market conditions and be-
havioral responses. Thus, for example, protection of worker interests
within a firm, for those who continue to have jobs, may expose those
jobs, and the viability of the firm itself, to the competitive drive of
other firms who have been able to avoid the need similarly to protect
worker interests. Protection of interests in one firm or group of firms
actually may generate a market for those employers who can induce
workers to work with no or appreciably less protection of their putative
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interests, thereby enabling the new firms to outcompete with existing
ones. There are limits to the effectiveness of collective action at the
subgroup level, a lesson which historically led to the adoption of unem-
ployment compensation as a requirement at the national level in order
to prevent interstate rivalry, at the behest of intrastate business inter-
ests, reducing the scope and level of benefits. Within the private sector,
the "progressive" employer may be unable to compete with less socially
conscious firms.
Thirteenth, there is tendency to adopt a managerial[ist] approach
in considering questions such as those under review here. It is easy to
agree, or to see, that there must be an incentive system driving the
labor force. It is easy to assert some "natural" rate of unemployment
which operates to diminish our appreciation of the personal and social
cost of unemployment. It is easy to hypothesize the voluntary nature of
unemployment consequent to a view that given a willingness to accept a
lower wage rate there would be no unemployment, so that any unem-
ployment is voluntary due to a refusal to accept the lower wage rate.
But reality is much more complex than these positions tend to recog-
nize. Even with workers willing to accept lower wage rates, there may
not be jobs for them. The level of offered employment may be limited
by the level of planned output, which in turn may be adversely affected
by the condition of unemployment. Lower wage rates may only dry up
effective demand and, with it, jobs. Given that there always is an incen-
tive and reward system, the question is not whether to have one but
which one, a question to which we shall momentarily return.
V.
Most conventional analysis-partial static equilibrium
microeconomics and welfare economics-takes technology and input
and output definitions, among other things, as given. But one of the
consequences of technology is the reformulation of the meaning-the
very nature or economic significance-of inputs and outputs. New tech-
nology means new outputs, new forms of old outputs, and altered eco-
nomic significance or meaning of inputs. This is manifestly important
in its own right but it points to an even more fundamental and broader
underlying process: the definition of output. The output of the automo-
bile industry obviously is automobiles but to stop there, as does much
discussion, is unduly to narrow the scope of analysis and understanding.
The output of the automobile industry, what people seek and get from
it, includes not only transportation vehicles but jobs; incomes in the
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form of wages, salaries, and dividends; and, in a profound sense, man-
kind or humanity itself. As writers of different political persuasions
have pointed out, the principal product of industry is people, the nature
of the human being who is shaped and cultivated by industry. This is
an important philosophical point; it is of enormous cultural and ethical
significance. But it also is of vast practical importance. The output of
the automobile industry is the physical automobile plus some quantum
element of worker, consumer, and third-party safety. The effect of oc-
cupational and health safety regulation, of consumer protection legisla-
tion, and of environmental protection regulation is to redetermine the
legal definition of commodities. The "effective commodity" is what it is
because of the sum of and interplay between market and legal forces.
To maximize output, or the value of output, first requires a determina-
tion of the definition of output, and also of input[s], and this involves
determining whose interest is to be protected, in part by making them a
cost to others. This is done, in part, through legal rights or the func-
tional equivalent of rights, as in safety and environmental protection
legislation.
It has been appreciated for some time by all except the most naive
or reactionary that in the absence of protective legislation, workers
(and also consumers) will bear the brunt of market adjustments and
risk. Labor is particularly exposed to technological change and rarely
has the economic wherewithal to sustain the economic destruction vis-
ited upon it by economic creation. Even more generally, there are over-
head costs, to use John Maurice Clark's felicitious term, as described in
his book Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs, of labor just as
there are of capital. The cost of maintaining, of sustaining, and of
[re]training the worker and his progeny is important. They are as perti-
nent to the production enterprise--on the levels of both the individual
firm, or plant, and society as a whole-as they are to the family unit.
But these human capital costs are conventionally handled as consump-
tion costs. The production enterprise, insofar as it can depend on the
treatment of such expenses as consumption items by households, is able
to achieve the externalization of those costs every bit as much as it does
when it is able to pollute the air or water and shift costs to create
externalities for others. If external costs and benefits must be taken
into account in that area, so too must the displacement and other costs
of technological innovation and adjustment be reckoned in the
evaluation.
One way to do this is to include in the rights which define inputs
and outputs the costs, or the provision for the costs, of displacement
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and retraining of workers in the case of technological innovation. This
can be accomplished through negotiation or custom at the level of the
individual company or plant. But such a solution is exposed, as indi-
cated earlier, to the competition form those companies who are able,
for whatever reason, to avoid the internalization of costs, whether they
be of conventional externalities or of labor displacement, which can
readily be included among the other externalities. But whether it is
done, and however it is done, providing the protection is tantamount to
redefining inputs and outputs, here to include the internalization of cost
which otherwise and hitherto has been borne by households. A
"Worker Impact Statement," much as an environmental impact state-
ment (or what Kenneth Boulding has called for in The Economy of
Love and Fear, a distributional impact statement), would identify the
costs shifted to others by technological innovation and permit the hope-
fully rational deliberation of solutions to the problems posed thereby.
VI.
One of the arguments frequently encountered in discussions of ad-
justing the impact of technological change on workers is that any such
adjustments may have (undesirable) incentive-disincentive- effects
on workers. It is, as noted above, easy to adopt a managerialist ap-
proach, to more or less blindly consider the need to maximize output
and thereby to maximize pressures-rewards and incentives-on work-
ers to produce. But technological innovation is something to which
workers adjust; their actions and demands have some impact upon the
innovation process but they are not the critical actors. Moreover, there
always is some incentive system. The operative question is not whether
but which, whose, for what ends. Once it is recalled that incentive sys-
tems operate to maximize or optimize production of output, and that
the definition of output involves a necessary prior determination of
which/whose interests are to count as a cost to others, the objection
that any such redetermination of the definition of output will adversely
affect incentives to produce is tautological with and gives an effect to
the preexisting definition of output, whereas the critical point at issue is
precisely the definition of output thence to be maximized or optimized.
Stated differently but to the same effect, optimization requires a defini-
tion of that which is to be optimized and that, and not the role of in-
centives per se, is typically what is at issue. Too much of the static
conventional analysis obscures the process by which the ends of the
incentive system are determined as well as such questions (and their.
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respective and interacting governing processes) as who determines,
why, and with what consequences.
One must be wary not only of a managerialist perspecitve, in
which one assumes the position and point of view of the employer-man-
ager of labor, but also that of expert technician. Inasmuch as any de-
terminative decision regarding production and costs is predicated upon
some definition of output, and some disposition of potentially external-
ized costs, such as pollution or worker retraining, one must ask of the
expert advisor or expertise-based decisionmaker precisely on what val-
ues his decisions are predicated. These definitions are not fully given to
the engineer, scientist, lawyer, economist, or manager. They are made
through a process of decisionmaking which is profoundly influenced by
power, that is, by forces governing whose interests are to be made a
cost to someone else. That the someone else may not realize that they
are bearing costs due to the policy decisions of others, or that the some-
one else may somehow respond in one behavioral fashion or another,
does not negate the fact that for the moment at least the someone else
is in the disadvantaged position of having to bear costs visited upon
them by others. Rights structure and channel incentives, and rights can
be exercised, de jure or de facto, by technicians of various types who,
so far as they know or are concerned, are only doing their job.
VII.
The principal policy strategy which government can pursue is that
of full employment. There must be sufficient aggregate effective de-
mand to sustain a full employment economy. This must be combined
with other policies and programs, such as manpower retraining. Delib-
erate generation of unemployment in pursuit of the control of inflation
is extremely undesirable; it is much more an admission of failure than
of any success in combating inflation. Deliberate generation of unem-
ployment to control labor power in the market and in collective bar-
gaining also is extremely undesirable. It is inhumane deliberately to
deny through public policy access to jobs and income so necessary for
most persons. The active pursuit of full employment is not guaranteed
of success, especially in light of our correlative failure to contain infla-
tion and our experience with stagflation, simultaneously increasing
rates of both inflation and unemployment. Especially must we avoid, if
not utterly dispel, the laissez faire idea that problems will solve them-
selves, that the economy is at an optimal level or condition no matter
what the level of unemployment, because anyone can get a job if only
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they would lower their desired wage rate, so that if they are out of
work it is voluntary, not involuntary, unemployment. The fictions and
tautologies by which certain writers attempt to prove that the present is
the best of all possible worlds staggers the imagination. Policy must
promote a stable price level, full employment, and dynamic technologi-
cal change. Failure to promote and to achieve full employment denies
access to jobs and income for those who require such to live, absolutely
wastes productive capacity of the society, denies businessmen the op-
portunity to engage in profit-making activity, and destroys the ostensi-
ble fundamental raison d'etre of the economic system.
VIII.
One of the major points which we want to make is that the promo-
tion of labor interests vis-a-vis technology is not a simple matter. No
single partial solution is adequate nor is a general solution possible.
There are fundamental, systemic problems which cannot be solved
from only one perspective, nor only once for all time and for all people.
However, an array of partial solutions can be worked out. This brings
us to another major point of ours: Society, that is, the competing inter-
est groups which comprise society not all of which are equally well or-
ganized, must work out the array of partial solutions. The array which
is worked out will be a function of the power structure which governs
whose interests are to count. Inasmuch as it is precisely the question of
whose interests are to count-when interests centering on employment,
profit, and technology are in conflict-which policy must address, for
us to assert certain policies as conclusive (not to say effective!) would
be for us to assume whose interests are to count. This we refrain from
doing, in part because (and not surprisingly!) we do not agree on major
issues of strategy, in part because some of us are unwilling to be pre-
sumptive as to whose interests are to count. But this diffidence does not
completely disarm the policy analyst. We can articulate a variety of
options, a number of critical considerations, and the relevant experi-
ence of other countries, the latter without any assumption that institu-
tional transference between societies is either necessarily desirable or
easy.
We first note several critical considerations. The first is to under-
score the desirability of maintaining flexibility and openness. This is a
subtle matter, if for no other reason than that anyone could point to an
established right, for example, a property right, a collective bargaining
right, a contractual right, or a welfare entitlement right, and assert
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that the system would be more flexible and/or more open without such
a right and its protected interest. In every system there will be and
must be rights or the functional equivalent of rights. The issue is not
rights or no rights but which rights. Nonetheless the policy analyst can
attempt to identify the interests omitted or damaged by the institution-
alization of a right or, for that matter, the deinstitutionalization of a
right. (Regulation is the creation or logical equivalent of a right; dereg-
ulation engenders the opposite right.") Thus, one can distingush be-
tween the right to the job which one presently holds and the right to a
job. One can also distinguish between policies which protect the al-
ready protected,. and which may further burden others, and policies
which extend the range of protection. Thus, certain policies advocated
by the IAM proposals can be interpreted as protecting an existing labor
aristocracy while neglecting the unemployed and other rmployed work-
ers with differentially lower capacity to assert themselves. Such consid-
erations do not operate conclusively to rebut the IAM proposals but do
raise questions of who else's interests might also be protected. Some
policies, of course, protect both those already protected and those not
yet protected; and others protect the hitherto unprotected. Perhaps one
would want to avoid as far as possible a resurgence of neomercantilist
protectionism selectively pursued on the basis of power and influence.
Yet even here labor may well have been taught by organized business
which historically has pursued protection (and not always and probably
not most importantly through tariffs and quotas), often with the sup-
port of the particular industry's unions.
Second, we want to reaffirm the importance of the behavioral con-
sequences of any policy innovation or new institutional arrangement.
The most fundamental limit which we observe constraining the IAM
approach is that the firms which in good conscience attempt to cooper-
ate and pursue its noble goals may find themselves unable to compete
with other firms, domestic or foreign, which are able to introduce tech-
nology without the internalization of costs as prescribed by the IAM's
New Technology Bill of Rights. Such a predicament would threaten
the demise of the firms, the union, and the policy goals, as well as se-
verely damage the workers whose protection is sought.
This brings us to our third critical consideration. Do we want to
provide, or somehow work out, protection for workers on the level of
1. See Warren J. Samuels, A. Allan Schmid And James D. Shaffer, Regulation
and Regulatory Reform: Some Fundamental Conceptions, in W. SAMUELS AND A.
SCHMID, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 248-66 (1981).
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the individual firm, perhaps the individual plant, or on some more en-
compassing level? Many systems of worker protection around the world
are on an enterprise basis, for example, Japanese lifetime employment
guarantees and Soviet welfare benefits. This provides for greater local
flexibility but at the price of systemic inflexibility because one is reluc-
tant to leave an employer if one cannot transfer accumulated benefits.
There also is the problem addressed above of opportunities for other
firms to exploit benefit and protection differentials. Finally, there is the
problem that workers, and of course nonworkers, not covered by such
protective arrangements will not be protected at all, indeed may even
be the recipient of residual economic risk and injury. A comparable
consideration is that what will work, by some criterion, for large corpo-
rations may not work for small firms. This can be understood to be a
general problem but also one which is still more critical if the economy
is understood to be divided between a multiplicity of more or less price-
competitive and exposed firms, and relative few largely, but by no
means completely insulated, corporate giants who administer their own
profits and markets.
Our fourth critical consideration also is one on which it is easy but
extremely presumptuous to speak in a seemingly conclusive fashion.
Nonetheless, the point is important. With rights, we are tempted to
urge, must go obligations. Precisely what they are to be must be
worked out; certainly it involves the potential surrender of valuable ad-
vantages, perhaps even of rights. For illustrative purposes, were labor
unions to succeed in acquiring the protection sought in the IAM Bill of
Rights, arguably one could urge, in the name of greater economic flex-
ibility and openness, that dubious work rules be eliminated, that juris-
dictional disputes be severely moderated, that protectionist opposition
to patently beneficial technological innovation be reduced, and perhaps
even that restraint on wage increases be exercised, and that more use
be made of binding arbitration.
Ix.
Let us consider a variety of arrangements each of which arguably
possesses certain capacity to enhance the position of workers vis-a-vis
technological innovation. Let us also note that each arrangement may
have significance in terms of larger and/or different considerations
than those relevant to this discussion.
(1) One method of enhancing labor's position, specifically the posi-
tion of individual workers, is through the adoption of employee stock
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option plans (ESOPs). These can have the effect of both enhancing
worker interests in the financial and operating viability of the company
for which each works as well as securing a form of nonlabor income,
dividend income and appreciation from property. Of course, employees
can prefer the opportunity to pursue other investment, or consumption,
options. Indeed, the criterion of diversification of risks may suggest that
worker security portfolios not be heavily weighted in the stock of the
company for which they work. Moreover, such a solution can at best
cover only a modicum of insecurity and for only a fraction of the
society.
(2) Another. method is the creation, in part through the modifica-
tion of existing programs, of effective and honored programs which es-
tablish a social floor (or minima) below which worker income will not
be allowed to fall in the event of economic dislocation or disaster. A
society which recognizes the exigent necessity of a job in order to have
income will not only promote effective full employment policies but,
also recognizing the collective nature of productivity, will provide un-
employment compensation and perhaps other supplements in order to
maintain an effective floor of protection. This can occur apropos of both
cyclical and technological (and other structural) unemployment. To the
extent, paradoxically, that other programs are successful, such as full
employment and manpower training, such programs will be of gener-
ally secondary significance but of great personal importance for those
who must avail themselves of their benefits.
Much to the same effect would be institutionalization of a guaran-
tee of employment and adequate income. This could be achieved
through programs implementing government as the employer of last re-
sort and wage supplements. The point is to recognize and give effect to
an overriding social obligation to provide employment and income.
(3) Extremely important is the adoption of effective manpower
training and retraining programs. These programs must be directed to
and available for both the unemployed, or prospectively unemployed,
and the underclass who have as yet not been socialized into the labor
force. There must be general training programs, union apprenticeship
programs-whatever array is necessary to train, upgrade, retrain, and
modernize worker skills, skills which are necessary simultaneously for
the collective productive enterprise and for the individual earning of
incomes.
The United States has a long way to go in manpower training pro-
grams. Existing programs have often trained workers for jobs that were
not in increasing demand. Also, the "training" programs often involved
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little real training. Finally, the programs often failed to devote atten-
tion to placing workers in jobs. Retraining programs will have to be
redesigned to avoid the problems which have arisen in the past. Re-
training must be technically effective, for jobs which will exist, and in
an environment of adequate aggregate effective demand. Moreover, re-
training for the purpose of producing enhanced supplies of certain skills
should lead to the production of new output and not the driving down
of the wage rates of workers already in the market.
We must appreciate that job creation, through full employment
policies, and manpower retraining are very attractive, for the reasons
given above and also specifically because the displaced workers are
likely candidates for re-employment. But manpower retraining pro-
grams cannot be allowed to retain the image that they are for failures
or losers. Such programs must be recognized by all as a vital compo-
nent of the collective productive enterprise.
Other countries, principally in Western Europe, have developed
and utilized manpower training programs as part of larger national
ventures. In Sweden, for example, the combination of full employment
policies and manpower retraining programs (along with "subsidized"
income supplements) has meant that workers have come to share with
employers a recognition that technological proficiency is necessary for
domestic full employment, competitive position in foreign trade, and
profitable business enterprise. As in France, manpower training pro-
grams are coordinated with other collective efforts, private and public,
to channel investment and production in desired directions, thus gener-
ating training in advance and in anticipation of needs. Manpower train-
ing programs can be vital and contributing factor in a technologically
progressive society. They can be programs in which participation 'car-
ries no stigma of failure but rather the badge and prospect of continued
participation and advancement.
(4) Sweden, it also may be pointed out, has an array of public and
private arrangements which promote full employment and price stabil-
ity which generally have been quite effective in the past (although
somewhat less so in recent years). In addition to the usual array of
government monetary and fiscal policies, the Swedish government em-
ployes countercyclical public investment programs in areas of ordinary
public production of social capital, such as roads, public buildings, pub-
lic utilities, and so on. Local governments are accommodated by the
central government in participating in such programs. In addition, tax
laws provide lower corporate net income taxes for corporations which
set aside in an investment reserve fund monies which are spent or not
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spent in accordance with countercyclical policies and timing established
by the government. Thus, both public and private spending readily can
be generated to combat prospective contraction, and both spendings
cdn be moderated to combat prospective inflation, all with minimal
jockeying for legislative favor and largesse, because the enabling stat-
utes are already in place and ready for use.
(5) Certain Italian experience also is suggestive. In the Italian au-
tomobile supply industry, small firms which have developed through
subcontracting have generated both the learning of new skills by arti-
sans and the development of new technology and skills in nonautomo-
tive lines. These firms are centers of technological creativity in which
the workers themselves are prime movers. The implication is clear:
Notwithstanding the decline of the United States automobile industry,
there are thousands of skilled tool and die makers, machine shops, and
other firms which have constituted the infrastructure of the auto indus-
try. They comprise a resource which can be further developed and can
contribute both to the collective productive enterprise and to jobs and
career opportunities for the present and future generations of highly
skilled, indeed technologically proficient, workers. Conceivably this can
be part of a larger program to develop flexibility in production, variety
in outputs, and stream of innovation, with quality products now geared
to the mass market, now geared to special needs, all based on skills that
cannot be simply transferred or easily replicated or reproduced. This
can be done in large corporations but it also can be done, and perhaps
more readily, in small enterprise, thereby also nourishing competition,
a powerful base for high technology, production flexibility, capacity for
product modification, output diversity, and opportunities for innovation,
all with the universal further development and dense application of la-
bor skill. One also can envisage sets of geographically proximate if not
contiguous firms with complementary skills and capabilities, sharing
their skills and machine facilities informally and collaborating through
cooperative arrangements for the provision of jointly required inputs
and the production and marketing of jointly produced outputs. There
also is some relevant Japanese experience which can be drawn on in
such matters.
(6) Other Japanese experience is perhaps even more suggestive. In
addition to the (nonuniversal) practice of lifetime employment, apropos
of which workers are protected against technologically (and otherwise)
based dislocation by internal policies which effectively consider worker
incomes an overhead cost, workers systematically share in the net bene-
fits of technological innovation through biannual bonuses based on en-
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terprise profits. Workers are thus given protection in a manner which
at the same time constitutes incentives to promote technological inno-
vation, as is accomplished through other institutional arrangements, for
example, in Sweden.
It is possible to institutionalize through collective bargaining the
obligation of individual companies to retain workers except, perhaps, in
the most extraordinary circumstances of financial exigency. Doing so
would create incentives within the firms for the effective retraining of
workers. The problem here is that competitors not so obligated will
tend to have market advantages. This may suggest that legislation
could operate to institutionalize such arrangements in the large corpo-
rations, though the competitive problem would still arise in re small
competitors. The point is to create institutions with the socially func-
tional incentives.
In this and in other connections, it may be pertinent to point out
that Japanese and other Western European managers tend to have
longer profit horizons than does United States management, and per-
haps tend to devote somewhat less attention to short run cash flow and
to financial maneuvers greared much more to corporate power (and se-
curity) through diversificatory acquisitions often directed at cash flow
and much less to considerations of enhanced physical production.
X.
One of the principal concerns which seems to have led to the IAM
proposal for a New Technology Bill of Rights is the threatened dis-
placement of skilled workers. Surely the acquisition and utilization of
skills is satisfying to the worker and of value to society. Surely, too, the
premiums which skilled workers command are at least in part a func-
tion of their relative scarcity; if the supply of skilled workers were
larger, their utilization may be no less enjoyable, but they likely would
command lower relative incomes. Moreover, as is the case with the pro-
fessions, there may be a tendency for the skilled to use their skills as a
weapon over others; arguments predicated upon skill tend often to be as
presumptive as many others and to be used as reinforcers of established
power postions.
Perhaps the critical point, however, is that the continued develop-
ment of skills is more important than the maintenance of protected
markets for already acquired skills. Yesterday's skilled craftsman can
be today's and tomorrow's skilled technician, engineer, or programmer.
The robotic displacement of skills likely means demand for new skills.
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Once again the distinction must be drawn between the right to the job
which one is in and the right to a job. Surely, too, in a dynamic world
of technological innovation the already skilled tend to have the advan-
tage over the unskilled in regard to the learning of new skills, even
though they may prefer to maintain the status quo of their old skills,
sometimes also to the disadvantage of consumers.
If it is true, or to the extent that it is true, that the concern over
displacement of skills is a defensive reaction, such reaction may be
overceme or finessed by effective retraining programs both within and
outside of industry. Without denigrating the instinct of workmanship
engendered by skilled work and all the pride and joy that goes with it,
the critical problems arguably are, first, jobs per se, and, second, mini-
mal dislocation and adjustment problems. In a society in which such
problems were largely avoided, the progression from skill to skill
through retraining in response to technological innovation would be it-
self a matter of pride rather than the occasion for fear.
That workers, especially skilled workers, engage in defensive ma-
neuvers and arguments, is neither surprising nor indefensible. The pos-
session of skills constitutes the effective property holdings of workers
and there is no reason why they should be less interested in the defense
of their positions than any other owners of property.
XI.
Much of the IAM Bill of Rights amounts to further extension of
the participation by workers, or their representatives, in the decision-
making process of the organizations for which they work. There are
two important but contrasting points which we want to make here.
First, if one believes that individuals should participate in the making
of decisions which directly, and perhaps indirectly as well, affect them,
then worker participation in what hitherto has been the preserve of
management is to be applauded. Without economic democracy, it can
be and indeed has been argued, political democracy may be a sham. If
the boss' on the job has the prerogatives of the landlord of the feudal
past, the worker is still the hired hand, a second class factor of produc-
tion and, by extension, citizen and being. Second, however, it seems to
be the case that under worker-managed systems not all workers are
interested in taking advantage of opportunities to participate in deci-
sionmaking. A group of workers with an interest in managing tends to
assert itself and, what is more, to be willingly allowed to do so by the
other workers. Quite aside from other sources of managerial hierarch-
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ism, this development, which may or may not be inevitable, suggests
that worker participation in decisionmaking is important to workers
only to the extent that they do not have it and that when they have it
they take it for granted. Decisionmaking participation may have scar-
city value. But perhaps the problem needs to be restated. Perhaps the
problem is not whether every worker participates in decisionmaking but
that there is a system of worker participation and, moreover, that the
strong tendency for a class structure to develop in United States indus-
try be reversed. Managerial positions tend not to be filled by promo-
tions from the ranks of nonmanagerial workers. Both managerial work-
ers, who tend to consider themselves a class apart (which, because of
the careers of their fathers, and increasingly their mothers, and their
education, they culturally are), and workers, to whom their job is so
important, view each other with distrust and antagonism, each attempt-
ing to retain, if not to enhance, whatever advantages they already have.
If control over work, control per se, is the problem, then a new set of
mores, a new industrial common law, must be evolved which converts
what is now so much a zero-sum game into a positive-sum game. To
say that such should be done is not to establish how it can be done or
what the result will look like. As suggested earlier, the parties will have
to work out the solutions, not have them laid down for them by experts.
XII.
Although it is an abstract and trans-systemic matter, the funda-
mental underlying institutional problem is the existence in all econo-
mies of the wage system in which some persons work for other persons.
For all the rhetoric which accompaines socialist movements and social-
ist regimes, no socialist theorist or system has found a substitute for the
wage system. Some substitute system, which it is beyond our compe-
tence to construct, no doubt will have its own generic problems. But it
is important to understand that many of the problems addressed in this
article arise or acquire their specific form due to the universal predomi-
nance of the wage system.
XIII.
On a more practical level, the IAM is concerned about technologi-
cal displacement of its skilled membership. Other unions are concerned
about management calls for wage cuts and other concessions. It may be
that the more immediate threat to the union movement is a revitaliza-
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tion of the efforts by management to deunionize, or further deunionize,
United States industry.
XIV.
But there is another phenomenon which, it seems to us, transcends
both technological displacement and deunionization so far as the future
welfare of United States workers is concerned. This is the internation-
alization of the labor market to an extent never before realized and
probably never before contemplated. With the growth of the multina-
tional corporation, corporations no longer fully identify with their coun-
try of incorporation, with the country of citizenship of its officers, such
that it is sort of second nature for them to produce in that country and
hires its nationals. Multinational corporations now have a planetary ho-
rizon and will locate plants around the world using the same decisional
criteria hitherto used within a country, a principal difference now being
that foreign labor becomes increasingly substitutable for domestic la-
bor, thus forming, or taking advantage of a newly formed, world labor
market. The adjistment and displacement problems due to this are
likely to swamp those due to technological innovation, although, of
course, the two are not unrelated. One irony here, of course, is that
direct and indirect government subsidization of corporate foreign in-
vestment has contributed to these developments. So much for the
fiction and illusion that markets are immune from government action,
for good or bad.
XV.
We conclude thus. Jobs as a means of access to income are critical
for most persons. The consciousness of workers accordingly is focused
on their jobs, not on something designatable as "careers." For those
who organize production, whether they be capitalists, entrepreneurs,
managers or commisars, the economy is largely a game in which they
engage in moves and strategies in pursuit of more meaningful self-iden-
tity, prestige and status, income and wealth, and meritocratic career.
The game performs a social function[s]: it enables the production of
output with which people live and in the production of which they are
themselves produced. If the economic game cannot be conducted in a
way which provides jobs, income, and satisfaction for all, then it must
be reckoned a failure. Those who have advantageous positions in that
game risk more then they know or seem to realize. Considerations of
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both humanity and expediency militate in favor of deliberate efforts to
work out "better" solutions to the problems addressed in this article.
Ideology and power will work only so far.
Epilogue
One of the principal themes of this article is that the impacts of
technology are always mediated through social power, that it is power,
not technology per se, that affects employment-unemployment. We
would like to amplify the argument in the following manner.
First, there is an implicit assumption in the foregoing of a more or
less conventional industrial labor force and industrial technology. We
have not dealt with an important topic, namely, the way in which tech-
nology already has changed the United States economy and likely will
continue to do so in the future. We mean the development of a service
economy dominated by so-called high technology. A fundamental char-
acteristic of this newly developing economy is the increased role of in-
formation, including its creation, manipulation, control and concentra-
tion. The power structure which controls technology and the operation
of labor in the information society is likely to be quite different from
that operative in the past industrial or machine society.
Second, this means that technology itself has an impact on the
power structure and is not merely mediated through power. The tech-
nology of the future will place new and perhaps unique power in the
hands of certain persons and groups. This may be particularly impor-
tant if the culture of poverty operates to deprive the poor of the kinds
of socialization necessary to acquire the new cognitive skills required
for the information society.
Thus, on the one hand, power is capable of being reinforced by
technology, while on the other, technology may change power struc-
ture. The latter is one of the unintended social impacts of technology.
Third, while we focus on a broad, aggregate notion of technology,
we are aware, and indeed stress, that technology is not homogeneous in
its social impacts. While there are imperative aspects of technology,
there also are choice aspects of technology, that is, we often have a
choice of the specific instrumentation or adoption of technology within
a given aggregate technology. Thus there are certain combinations of
technological characteristics (smaller scale, less complexity, less cen-
tralization or concentration of power, etcetera) which have "softer" so-
cial impacts, while other "hard" impacts come from the same technol-
ogy with opposite characteristics.
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Fourth, we reiterate our assumption of a continuation of the pri-
vate enterprise-type economic system. We have focused our analysis on
technology not to avoid the more ideologically loaded issues of power,
stratification, and so on. Indeed, we have stressed power as both a de-
pendent and independent variable, along with technology itself. We do
not denigrate consideration of more fundamental change(s) in the eco-
nomic system than we have discussed-although we continue to stress
the great difficulties necessarily encountered in designing and predict-
ing the outcomes of such major changes, including the role of wishful
thinking.2
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Were the Luddites Necessarily Wrong?: A Note on
the Constitutionality of the "New Technology Bill of
Rights"*
Arthur S. Miller**
There is a war on, but only one side is armed: this is the es-
sence of the technology question today. On the one side is private
capital, scientized and subsidized, mobile and global, and now
heavily armed with military-spawned command, control, and com-
munication technologies. Empowered by the second Industrial
Revolution, capital is moving decisively now to enlarge and consoli-
date the social dominance it secured in the first ...
On the other side, those under assault hastily abandon the
field for lack of an agenda, an arsenal or an army. Their own com-
prehension and critical abilities confounded by the cultural bar-
rage, they take refuge in alternating strategies of appeasement and
accommodation, denial and delusion, and reel in desperate disarray
before this seemingly inexorable onslaught-which is known in po-
lite circles as "technological change."
-David F. Noble1
I.
Unemployment is something we can all grasp and under-
stand-and fear, too, for Homo sapiens has always been Homo faber
as well. People are significant in the eyes of others not so much for
what they are but for what they do. Meet someone for the first time at
almost any cocktail party and the inevitable question soon pops out:
"Where do you work?" or perhaps "What do you do?" In an ostensibly
classless society, one's occupation or vocation solidifies his status in so-
* Copyright 1984 by Arthur S. Miller. All rights reserved. This essay is based on
the author's work in progress, a book tentatively entitled Getting There From Here:
Constitutional Changes for a Sustainable Society.
** Adjunct Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law; Pro-
fessor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University.
1. Noble, Present Tense Technology, 3 DEMOCRACY No. 2, at 8 (1983).
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ciety. Work is the central factor of Western nations. Those who do not
work, unless they have been favored by fortune with inherited wealth,
are often scorned: They are called "welfare cheaters" or "bums." As
Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, Director of the London School of Economics, has
observed: "Labor at the center of society means that every aspect of
life must accommodate it-education, vacations, and retirement. In the
labor society education conforms to the discipline and demands of
work. Vacations serve as recovery periods, time to renew energies to
return to work refreshed. For progressive labor societies, at least, re-
tirement is a 'well earned rest after a lifetime of hard work.' "2 It is
beyond question that the United States has always been a "labor
society."
The essential question posed by the International Association of
Machinists (IAM's) "New Technology Bill of Rights" is how Ameri-
cans should adapt to the sudden end of such a society and its transmu-
tation into a society in which human labor has been largely eliminated.
The IAM believes that adaptation should not be left to chance or to the
vagaries of the "market." Theirs is a suggestion that affirmative gov-
ernmental action be taken to deal with a new situation in the human
condition. I will leave to others the question of the wisdom of the IAM
proposal. In this brief commentary I pose and seek to answer the ques-
tion of whether constitutional impediments exist that would bar the Bill
of Rights of the IAM from going into effect.
The short answer to that question is "no"-there is nothing in the
Constitution, as a document or as construed, that would invalidate
what the IAM proposes. Let me explain. I begin with several assump-
tions. First, the new technologies of microprocessing and computers
pose a clear and present danger to Homo faber. Mass man has become
obsolete, superfluous to the needs of the emergent politico-economic or-
der. Too many people are chasing too ,few jobs, a diminishing number
of jobs. No one quite knows what to do with surplus people, although
Professor Richard Rubenstein has developed some grim scenarios about
what might happen.3 Second, it is, as Jacques Ellul has maintained,
2. Dahrendorf, The End of the Labor Society, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, March
1983, at 28. Dahrendorf also says, "There is no cure for today's unemployment." Id.
3. R. RUBENSTEIN, THE AGE OF TRIAGE (1983); Rubenstein, The Elect and the
Preterite, 59 SOUNDINGS 357 (1976) (discussing "the rise of a mammoth, world-wide
superfluous population that can no longer emigrate to underpopulated regions of the
globe"). Rubenstein further comments:
[A]lthough Americans tend to regard technology as a means of solving
problems, the problem of surplus people in contemporary America is as
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"impossible to trust the spontaneous employment which men will make
of the available technical means." 4 The meaning is clear: positive ac-
tion should be taken to ameliorate the adverse consequences of new
technologies. Third, corrective action, should it come (which by no
means is certain), can derive only from government-the federal gov-
ernment. That is so because a holistic approach is indispensable, one
that encompasses the entire spectrum of man's position in nature and
his relationships with his fellow humans. No other societal institution is
capable even of considering, let alone undertaking, a program of com-
prehensive adaptation to what the scientists and technologists have
wrought.
I do not propose to prove those assumptions. They are self-evident,
and stated as givens in order to set the pattern for the ensuing brief
discussion of validity of one of the consequences of technological
change-the terminal sense of the loss of work itself by increasing
numbers of Americans (and others throughout the world). My net con-
clusion is that the advent of the new technologies requires a thorough
re-examination and reorganization of the political economy of the na-
tion-indeed, of the world. The New Technology Bill of Rights is a
proper step in that direction.
II.
The time has come for serious consideration to be given to the idea
that constitutions should be directed toward the reasonable satisfaction
of human needs and deserts, as well as merely establishing frameworks
of government and setting forth a set of negative limitations on what
government officers can do.5 What follows is in many respects a varia-
tion on a theme struck by Leon Duguit many years ago:6 "Any system
of public law can be vital only so far as it is based on a given sanction
to the following rules: First, the holders of power cannot do certain
things; second, there are certain things they must do." In recent de-
much the 'product' of technological rationality as are the automobile, the
computer and the nuclear bomb .... The threat of permanent economic
superfluity now confronts millions of American workers."
Id. at 358-59.
4. J. ELLUL, The Technological Order, in THE TECHNOLOGICAL ORDER: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA CONFERENCE 10, 25 (C. Stover ed. 1963).
5. This is the thesis of my book in progress, supra note *.
6. L. DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE 26 (H. Laski translation 1919).
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cades, all three branches of the national government have risen in some
degree to confront Duguit's challenge. Congress has enacted numerous
statutes, the sum of which is to institutionalize the American version of
the welfare state. The Executive has cooperated, in greater or lesser
degree, by putting those legislative commands into operational reality.
And the Supreme Court has constitutionalized those efforts to meet the
"must do" part of Duguit's formulation. The requirement now it to
face up to the challenge posed by the IAM.
Since enactment of the IAM proposal would constitute a struc-
tural change in government, a basic alteration in what I have elsewhere
called the Political and the Economic Constitutions,7 purists might ar-
gue that if it is to come it should be by constitutional amendment.
That, however, is not necessary. Amendment at best is a ponderous
blunderbuss ill-suited to the requirements of a rapidly changing nation.
That, it be noted, has been true since at least 1791, when the Bill of
Rights was added to the Document drafted in 1787. Only the four-
teenth amendment may be said to be of supreme importance. The other
fifteen vary in significance from the repealed eighteenth to the nine-
teenth (voting rights for females); those of any consequence could have
been put into law by innovative congressional action pursuant to section
V of the fourteenth amendment.
We have become accustomed to and by and large agree with the
notion of judicial exegesis of the Constitution. However much some
may disagree with specific constitutional decisions by the Supreme
Court, there can be no question that the Justices do sit as a continuous
constitutional convention. They progressively update the fundamental
law. Each generation of Americans writes its own constitution, having
received a tacit delegation of powers from the framers to do so. (The
Supreme Court also received a tacit delegation of powers from those
who drafted the Document of 1787.) And the Constitution has always
been relative to circumstances. 8 It could scarcely be otherwise. Govern-
ment and law are more reflective of social conditions than determinants
of those conditions-at least historically. Law, including constitutional
law, is less a priori than a posteriori.
The new technology poses constitutional problems. Can they be
7. Miller, Toward a Definition of "The" Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV.
633 (1983).
8. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGING CONSTITUTION
OF CONTROL passim (1981); A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL AcTIVISIM:
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982).
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met by means other than amendment? The answer can only be "yes,"
once it is perceived that the interpretation and development of the Con-
stitution is emphatically not a judicial monopoly. The myth system is to
the contrary: Under it, amendment or judicial exegesis are the only
legitimate ways to alter the fundamental law. But under the opera-
tional code of the American constitutional order the Constitution is
constantly in a state of becoming, altered not only by judicial decrees
but by certain legislative and executive acts.
A number of statutes can be viewed as "quasi-constitutional in na-
ture"; they sought to "clarify and define certain basic relationships
among the branches of government."9 At least the following statutes
fall into that category (although I see no reason to soften the label with
a "quasi"): the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
statute establishing the Federal Reserve Board, the Budget and Ac-
counting Act of 1921, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the
Employment Act of 1946, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the War Powers Resolution of 1973,
and the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. There may be
others, notably the National Security Act of 1947 and the National
Emergencies Act, but that listing clearly demonstrates that Congress
does indeed make constitutive decisions. Each of the statutes effected
something of a structural change in the nature of American govern-
ment; they delineate "structures and processes"'10 rather than setting
forth substantive policies.
As with Congress, so with the President: some of the Chief Execu-
tive's decisions or actions merit consideration as alteration of the Con-
stitution. The ready example is the warmaking power. Expressly vested
in Congress by Article I, and thus under the myth system solely a legis-
lative power, that notion was dealt a body blow by President Lincoln at
the beginning of the Civil War.1' Bit by bit since then-and even
before then-the White House has become the center of effective con-
trol over the use of violence. That is so even though Congress has
sought to retrieve some of its lost powers by the War Powers Resolu-
tion. Events since 1973 increasingly indicate that the Resolution is a
9. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 398 (10th ed.
1980).
10. Id. at 397.
11. For discussion, see C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948); Miller, Reason of State and the
Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MINN. L. REV. 585, 595-97 (1980).
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"paper tiger." 12 A constitutional shift of major proportions has taken
place.
By no means are Congress and the President always at logger-
heads. Many presidential actions, taken without express authority, get
at least tacit congressional approval through appropriations and other
means. Despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary, the norm be-
tween the branches is cooperation rather than conflict. Witness the
manner in which Congress routinely appropriated funds for waging a
presidential war in Vietnam. Witness also the establishment of the Na-
tional Security Agency by a still secret executive order. In both in-
stances, Congress did not dissent from presidential incursions on the
legislative turf. There is a further lesson: In general, the Supreme
Court goes along with congressional and executive constitutive deci-
sion-making. Examples are easily found: the Prize Cases, the Jones &
Laughlin decision sustaining the National Labor Relations Act, and
the brace of decisions upholding the Civil Rights Act.13 The Justices, as
Professor Martin Shapiro has commented, are part of the governing
coalition of the nation; and judicial independence exists more in the
myth system than in the operational code. 4
Enactment, therefore, of the IAM's proposed "New Technology
Bill of Rights" would embed into the law a statute that would ap-
proach the dimension of a constitutional amendment. It would basically
change the relationship of the workers to the "private" governments of
the nation, principally the supercorporations. There is nothing in the
proposal that would, under present doctrine, fail to pass constitutional
muster. A series of Supreme Court decisions beginning with the Gold
Clause Cases, passing through Jones & Laughlin and Katzenbach v.
McClung, and extending to United States v. Perez16 is proof positive
that existing law would validate what on first glance seems to be a
revolutionary proposal by the IAM. Given the requisite political will to
enact the proposal, it is wholly safe to forecast that the Supreme Court
12. For brief but insightful discussion, see Halperin, Declaring War, 9 FIRST
PRINCIPLES, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 12.
13. Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (1863); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
14. M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 34
(1981).
15. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294;
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would not invalidate it. The persistent and unresolved problem, of
course, is how to generate that political will.
No one expects either House of Congress to rush forward in full or
even partial acceptance of the proposal. That it merits full considera-
tion, and soon, should go without saying. Call it Luddism if one wishes,
but the point is not that, but of determining who should bear, if indeed
anyone should, the dreadful costs of adapting to a new economy. It cuts
against the grain of the constitutional commitment to "equal justice
under law" to say that displaced workers should alone shoulder the
brunt of the loss of work itself.
III.
If it is assumed, as it should be, that Congress is far from likely to
enact anything remotely similar to the IAM's proposal, does that end
the matter? Not necessarily. But it would be enormously difficult to get
something substantial done. Again, let me explain.
I set aside the notion that any one or even a combination of the
several states could do the necessary. A company can play off one state
against another and choose the one that maximizes the firm's interests.
Furthermore, since under Wickard v. Filburn and Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung'6 there is very little of economic importance that does not fall
within the ambit of the federal government's power to govern com-
merce, the constitutional hurdle of unduly burdening interstate com-
merce would have to be surmounted. There is little reason to expect
that the present-day Supreme Court, dominated as it is by corporation
lawyers, would validate, say, an attempt by the state of Ohio to prevent
runaway plants or to ensure that corporations, once established in the
state, stay there. Profit maximization is the primary, if not the sole,
goal of corporate management. An effort by any one state to enact the
IAM proposal for companies doing business within that state would
certainly engender hostile opposition from the entire business commu-
nity. That hostility, in turn, is not likely to allow the state to prevail
before the Supreme Court when lawsuits are brought, as surely they
would. The pro-business attitude of today's Court is illustrated in, to
cite only one decision, First National Bank v. Bellotti. 7
16. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
17. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See Miller, On Politics, Democracy, and the First
Amendment, 38 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 21 (1981); Wright, Money and the Pollution
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The ultimate need, if anything is going to be done, is for a great
national debate about the pros and cons of the new technology to take
place. How can it be started-and continued? "If there's ever gonna be
change in America, it's gonna be cause every community in America's
ready for it and-boom! There's gonna be a big tidal wave, and it's just
gonna crash down on Washington, and the people are finally gonna be
heard." 18 That "tidal wave" could create the necessary political will in
Congress. How can it be done? I venture, very tentatively and with full
cognizance of the inherent difficulties in the proposition, that the Su-
preme Court could, at least in theory, provide the catalyst for stimulat-
ing such a debate.
I have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court should strive to
make decisions that maximize human dignity.19 Just as in Brown v.
Board of Education the Warren Court struck a blow for the decent
treatment of black Americans and in Roe v. Wade the Burger Court
carried on that theme (holding that women should have the right to
control their own bodies),20 so it is here: The Court arguably can help
in achieving a smoother transition to the new society that is fast be-
coming the norm. It, of course, would not be easy. But since both
Brown and Roe can be read as official statements that precipitated
great national debates (on race and abortion), it would not be a novel
proposition for the Supreme Court to do something similar about the
societal impact of technology. Two ways theoretically exist: first, the
Court could attempt to impose affirmative duties on Congress and the
President to take appropriate action concerning technology; and second,
the corporation could be constitutionalized by updating the "state ac-
tion" doctrine, followed by finding that workers-those willing and
able-had a constitutional right to a job (in general, but not a specific
job). I shall discuss each in turn, repeating at the outset the admonition
that the ideas are proffered only tentatively.
of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 609 (1982).
18. S. TERKEL, AMERICAN DREAMS LOST AND FOUND 312 (1981) (quoting a
community organizer). See generally S. BOWLES, D. GORDON, & T. WEISSKOPF, BE-
YOND THE WASTE LAND: A DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE TO ECONOMIC DECLINE pas-
sim (1983).
19. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT ch. 11 (1982).
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A. Affirmative Duties on Government
I begin by acknowledging that for the Supreme Court to try to
impose affirmative duties on Congress and the President to deal prop-
erly and effectively with the impact of new technologies is not a partic-
ularly promising avenue to take. But it is worth exploring, even though
what immediately follows may be categorized as utopian thinking.
There is a value in such thinking,21 if only to encourage people to ele-
vate the level of their responses to new social conditions. The Supreme
Court has long acted as what Judge J. Skelly Wright once termed "the
conscience of a sovereign people." In recent decades-at least since
Brown v. Board of Education-the courts have become targets of pres-
sure groups, especially when the avowedly political branches of govern-
ment refuse or fail to act and deal with what are perceived by segments
of the citizenry as justified grievances.
Judicial interpretation (and enforcement) of affirmative duties of
government is by no means novel. In race relations, legislative reappor-
tionment, administration of the criminal law, and perhaps elsewhere, 2
obligations have been placed on governmental officers to do something
positive (as distinguished from refraining from not doing some-
thing-the time-honored ideal of constitutions as limitations on govern-
ment). Add the fact that since Cooper v. Aaron,23 and perhaps before,
it is widely accepted that the logically impossible has been by some
means known only to the Justices transmogrified into the possi-
ble-that a general principle can be inferred from one particular-and
it is apparent that the Court has indeed become a de facto third (and
perhaps highest) legislative chamber.
The argument, telescoped here,24 derives from (perhaps antedates,
although I know of no prior judicial statement) Chief Justice Charles
21. See W. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD ch. 2 (198). Professor
Galston maintains that utopian thought "performs three related political functions.
First, it guides our deliberation .... Second, it justifies our actions .... Third, it
serves as the basis for the evaluation of existing institutions and practices .... I am
convinced that no political theory that seeks to be practical can dispense with it." Id. at
14-15.
22. See Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 SuP. CT. REV.,
reprinted in A. MILLER, SOCIAL CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA'S
EVOLVING CONSTITUTION ch. 5 (1979).
23. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class
Actions: A Comment on the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L.
573 (1981).
24. For further discussion see A. MILLER, supra note 22, at chapters 4-5.
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Evans Hughes' opinion in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.25 There,
Hughes, dealing with the validity of a state's minimum wage legisla-
tion, said in part:
The principle which must control our decision is not in doubt.
The constitutional provision invoked is the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, governing the states, as the due process
clause invoked in the Adkins case governed Congress. In each case
the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage legislation
is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of
liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process
of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not
recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of
its phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty safe-
guarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the pro-
tection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is
thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regula-
tion which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in
the interests of the community is due process.
With that language, particularly the concluding two sentences, Hughes
changed the nature of liberty under the Constitution. "From being a
limitation on legislative power," Professor Edward S. Corwin ex-
plained, "the due process clause became an actual instigation to legisla-
tion of a leveling character."26 In effect, Hughes adopted without ac-
knowledgment Thomas Hill Green's concept of positive freedom and of
collective well-being. To Green, freedom meant "a positive power or
capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying. . .in
common with others." Freedom thus depends on the "help and secur-
ity" given by others, and which a person helps to secure for others.27 As
Chief Justice Hughes put it, the liberty protected by due process is in a
"social organization" that requires the protection of law against social
evils.
Do the deleterious second-order consequences of new technolo-
25. 300 U.S. 391 (1937).
26. E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 161 (1948).
27. T. GREEN, Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in 3
WORKS OF THOMAS HILL GREEN 365, 371 (R. Nettleship ed. 1900). See M. PHILLIPS,
THE DILEMMAS OF INDIVIDUALISM: STATUS, LIBERTY, AND AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW passim (1983).
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gies-mainly unemployment-require "the protection of law?" The an-
swer can only be "yes." What can the Supreme Court contribute to the
fulfillment of that requirement? As all know, the Justices have identi-
fied new rights outside of the constitutional text, both historically (as in
liberty of contract), 28 and contemporaneously. Privacy is the ready ex-
ample here; but there are others.29 Can a similar right be created in the
economic sphere? As we have seen, there is already an explicit govern-
mental commitment to maximize employment and to further the eco-
nomic well-being of Americans, seen, for example, in the Employment
Act of 1946 and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978.
For the Supreme Court to do the necessary-to, that is, require
political action "reasonable in relation to its subject"-would necessi-
tate judicial innovation of a high level. The orthodox doctrine of judi-
cial power under the Constitution requires that there be a justiciable
controversy before courts can act. Some person, preferably someone out
of work and wanting a job, would seek a court decree mandating that
serious attention be accorded to employment security, followed by ac-
tion which would affirm "every worker's right to be employed with de-
cent wages at some job or another-but not necessarily always at the
same job.""0 Or, in the plaintive language of a retired policeman and
former marine, "I don't think our system is all bad. . . .What I object
to is, there's no planning, I don't care how much money it takes. They
should put every guy that wants to work, to work." ' The implication,
of course, is that there should be a constitutional right to a job.
Merely stating such an idea does violence to the accepted norms of
judicial behavior under the Constitution. But is the notion really so ex-
treme? I think not, although I readily concede that there is little au-
thority, as lawyers understand authority, to buttress it. To my knowl-
edge, the only Justice of the Supreme Court who ever suggested as
much is the late Justice William 0. Douglas, who in 1955 asserted in a
Supreme Court conference: "There is a constitutional right in this
country for a citizen to have a job. There is a constitutional right to be
a policeman or a lawyer." 32 (The second sentence was an attempted
28. Lochnar v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) is the locus classicus.
29. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1982).
30. S. BOWLES, D. GORDON, & T. WEISSKOPF, supra note 18, at 275.
31. Quoted in S. TERKEL, AMERICAN DREAMS LOST AND FOUND 232 (1981).
32. Quoted in B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL: WARREN AND His SUPREME
COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 184 (1983).
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refutation of the Holmes dictum, followed by his disciple Justice
Frankfurter, that "there was no constitutional right to be a police-
man.")3 3 The basic principle that would have to be established (in-
vented) is that the liberty protected by due process includes a right to a
job; or perhaps more concretely, that the citizenry have property rights
in jobs. Recognition of such a due process right, when viewed ab-
stractly, is certainly no more extreme or revolutionary than the Su-
preme Court's unexplained flash of revelation in 1886 that a corpora-
tion-a disembodied economic entity-was a person within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment; or, for that matter, the 1973
similar revelation that a woman could have an abortion by invoking a
right of privacy (which, incidentally, meant that the Justices refused to
recognize that a fetus is a constitutional person). This is said, be it
noted, not to take sides on either question, but simply to mention the
obvious: that the Justices have found rights lurking somewhere in the
interstices of the Constitution that could not possibly have been in the
minds of those who wrote and those who ratified the Document and its
amendments. The Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments are
statements of legally-concretized decency aimed at government and
designed to canalize its relationships with the populace. Or as Justice
Frankfurter observed in 1949: "It is of the very nature of a free society
to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right.
Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined
within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed
the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights. '3 4 So, I suggest it is
here. Judicial exegesis, and expansion, of the Constitution is routine, as
Justice Byron White stated in 1966 and Justice William Brennan in
1980.
Consider, for example, such cases as Wesberry v. Sanders, Powell
v. McCormack, and Buckley v. Valeo,3 5 each of which dealt with Con-
gress as either actual or tacit defendant. Consider, too, the spate of
recent decisions-the landmark case in United States v.
Nixon36-- which are judicial interventions into the area of presidential
power and discretion. Taken in their entirety, they evidence a growing
33. Id. The Holmes assertion may be found in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bed-
ford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
34. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
35. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
36. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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willingness of the Supreme Court to intervene in both the national leg-
islative and the executive processes. Wesberry, for example, told the
House of Representatives (via the state governments) how Representa-
tives had to be elected; and Nixon was an order to a sitting President to
act as an ordinary citizen in criminal law matters. Add to Nixon the
Steel Seizure Case,37 which was really directed toward President Tru-
man, and it can readily be seen that the Justices consider themselves to
be a constituent part of government, equal in title and equal in dignity
to the other branches. Judicial legislation has become a commonplace.
The sticking points in present context are, of course, the questions
of justiciability and of enforcement. As for the former, the Court would
have to take a mental leap and make what Frankfurter once called a
"logically arbitrary but sociologically nonarbitrary" decision to find a
constitutional case or controversy. Not that the method would be any-
thing novel: Justiciability has long been characterized by judicial fiat.
As in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,38 the "reasoning," such as it is, to
justify finding or not finding justiciability (standing, etc.) usually is cir-
cular. That is accepted, with little opposition, as proper judicial behav-
ior. If, then, the National Treasury Employees Union could succeed in
a suit against President Nixon to enforce a statutory responsibility,"9 it
would take no major extension of that principle for courts to find justi-
ciable controversies in present context. The point, to be sure, is debata-
ble and also controversial. After all, if the Court in the Weber case
could determine the "spirit" of the relevant statute,40 why could it not
further determine that the spirit of the Employment and Humphrey-
Hawkins Acts gave someone the requisite status to have their provi-
sions carried into effect?
Enforcement is quite another matter. There is no present way that
the Justices can do more than try to precipitate a great national debate
that would, sooner or later, end in political action. The Justices, how-
ever, have long been America's first faculty of political economy, a vital
national seminar in which the nation's values are often first debated
and articulated. Could that "seminar" discussion be raised to the level
37. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
38. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
39. National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
40. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-06 (1979) (up-
holding affirmative action plan, despite statutory language prohibiting basing employ-
ment decisions on race).
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of serious consideration of a constitutional right to a job? A tribunal
that rose to the challenge of rectifying long-standing practices of racial
discrimination, that created a constitutional right to an abortion, that
eliminated the "rotten boroughs" of the nation, that stared, down a sit-
ting President, and that revamped the administration of the criminal
law, surely is capable of dealing with the problem of how the economic
rights of workers are to be determined under the Constitution."
That, of course, is constitutional heresy. I do not expect ready
agreement (in any degree) with such a proposal. But the Court has
always been deeply immersed in politics. To Judge Spencer Roane of
Virginia the decision of the Supreme Court in Cohens v. Virginia42 was
heretical: "It can only be accounted for by that love of power which
history informs us infects and corrupts all who possess it, and from
which even the upright and eminent judges are not exempt." To Roane,
the Cohens decision was "most monstrous and unexampled."4 3 It was
heresy when I was in law school to assert that judicial action could be
state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, but the
Court took the plunge in Shelley v. Kraemer and Barrows v. Jackson.4
In like manner, Justice Hugo Black outraged Justice Felix Frankfurter
when he maintained in Adamson v. California that the fourteenth
amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights as a limitation on the states
as well as the federal government.4 5 As all know, Black's heresy has
now become the conventional wisdom. Consider, furthermore, the
firestorm of disapproval that erupted when the Court held in 1954 that
black Americans were entitled to decent treatment in the public
schools. Roe v. Wade received a similar reaction. The point is that the
Supreme Court may have decided some issues that turned out to be
"self-inflicted wounds"; 46 but even so, it has emerged from the fray
41. See generally A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE PO-
LITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982). A contrary view may be found in
Abraham, Book Review, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 477 (1983); Rabkin, The Charismat-
ic Constitution, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall, 1983, at 142.
42. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
43. See C. WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 555
(1926).
44. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953).
45. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
46. The term comes from C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 50 (1928). Hughes listed the Dred Scott decision, Dred Scott v. Sanford 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the legal tender cases, Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
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seemingly stronger than ever. (None of the cases listed immediately
above falls into a category of a self-inflicted wound. Dred Scott's
Case47 is perhaps the chief example of such judicial behavior.)
The need, as has been suggested, is to generate a national debate
on what should be done about the adverse second-order consequences of
new technologies. My thought in this subsection is that the Supreme
Court (courts generally) could play an important role in stimulating
that debate. That, however, does not mean that the Justices could not
act in another direction also. The focus of the next subsection concerns
judicial recognition of the fact that corporations are "private" govern-
ments, the important actors of the Economic Constitution, and as such
should have duties placed upon them.
B. Constitutionalizing the Corporations
That the United States is a corporate society is one of the com-
monplaces of the day. It has long been recognized that "voluntary pri-
vate associations" play an important role in social affairs. I should like
at this time to single out the business corporation-and of the corpora-
tions, the giant firms-for particular scrutiny. These companies domi-
nate the private sector of the nation. Economically, that sector is a
triad, consisting of the corporate economy (the giants), the small-busi-
ness economy (much of which is also incorporated), and the nonprofits.
Each part meshes with the others, but the giants-the supercorpora-
tions-are paramount, even though they are numerically much smaller.
Those gigantic companies not only straddle the nation but usually oper-
ate throughout the world. They set the tone for and greatly influence
the entire economy, government itself, and, indeed, all of society.
My thesis is that supercorporations are both economic entities and
sociopolitical organizations that exist midway between natural persons
and the state; as such, they should be perceived as "private" govern-
ments and held answerable to constitutional norms. They wield signifi-
cant social and political power, but their constitutional legiti-
macy-their right or title to govern-has only a tenuous base. Rather
457 (1871), and the income tax case, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S.
601 (1895) as "three notable instances [in which] the Court has suffered severely from
self inflicted wounds." F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970) claims that
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) was another such wound. He, contrary to
Hughes, is not persuasive.
47. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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like the way that Copernican astronomy superseded Ptolemaic cosmol-
ogy, supercorporations have so eroded the premises of both classical
economics and its political counterpart, liberal democracy, that new
theories must be devised. Economists have yet to explain or to justify
such massive conscious economic cooperation. So, too, with lawyers and
political scientists: the corporation's place in the constitutional system
is far from settled. A new political economy has emerged in the United
States in this century, but ancient and outmoded ideas of politics and
economics still abide. "We are living in tomorrow's world today, still
using yesterday's ideas."4
The preponderant social invention of the past century,
supercorporations today occupy a place in society comparable in impor-
tance and influence to the Holy Roman Church in medieval Europe.
With enormous assets, often running into tens of billions of dollars,
they are concentrations of non-statist economic, and therefore of politi-
cal, power not before known in human history. Corporate giants cannot
avoid influencing human lives the world over on a scale similar to, and
at times even dwarfing, public governments. Accordingly, Dr. Willis
Harman maintains, "they face a demand that has historically been
made only of government-that they assume responsibility for the wel-
fare of those over whom they wield power."49 The question in present
context is whether that demand for corporate responsibility can be ful-
filled through judicial action. Corporations have rights under the Con-
stitution. Do they have concomitant duties? Corporations are constitu-
tional persons. As such, do they have duties analogous to but not the
same as those that natural persons have?
I answer those questions affirmatively. More specifically, I suggest
that the Supreme Court could not only constitutionalize the corporation
but could, following Chief Justice Hughes in the Parrish case, require
that the giant firms develop policies that would include the welfare of
the workers (as well as that of the stockholders). Again, I do not expect
the present Court to leap to the challenge (save to shoot it down); but
certainly the time has come to recognize the true nature of the
supercorporations and do what is reasonably necessary about their un-
doubted power.
To bring the supercorporations within the ambit of the state action
concept requires no major leap of doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court
some years ago moved tentatively in that direction. But that movement
48. H. CLEVELAND, THE MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 15 (1979).
49. Harman, The Coming Transformation, THE FUTURIST, Fall 1977, at _.
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was halted with the appointment of the Nixonites to the High Bench,
so that today it surely is accurate to say, with Charles Black, that state
action is a "conceptual disaster area"; and with Christopher Stone that
it is "now, more than ever, a shambles." 50 The reason for such concep-
tual disarray is not difficult to locate: the Constitution was drafted on
the assumption that only two important juridical entities ex-
isted-government and the natural person-but during recent years the
United States has moved into what James Q. Wilson has called "the
bureaucratic state."5' Few judges know quite how to deal with the ad-
mitted economic power of disembodied economic entities. The state ac-
tion concept may have made some sense during the nineteenth century,
when society's groups were small and decentralized; the public-private
distinction, Morton Horwitz asserts, was "a rough approximation of re-
ality" in the last century.52 Today's world is different.
Marsh v. Alabama53 is still in the United States Reports. It exists
as a time bomb ticking away awaiting a time when lawyers and judges
can perceive the obvious: that the corporations, as the principal exem-
plars of the Economic Constitution, are indeed private governments.
There is no need to labor the point. The rise of the group and the emer-
gence of a corporate, an organizational society, is plain beyond doubt.
Constitutions, thus, should consider all-whether public or nominally
private-who exercise significant power in the socio-political arena.
Over that hurdle, then the application of constitutional norms to
purported private entities follows as a matter of course. The very con-
cept of constitutionalism arose a few centuries ago as a means of com-
batting the overweening power of the political sovereign. Today we
have both political and economic sovereigns, which are ever increas-
ingly joined together in a form of corporatism, and the same type of
thinking that contributed to the growth of constitutionalism should be
applied to all organizations that wield significant social power. Profes-
50. Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14,
81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967). Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do
Public/Private Distinctions Matter? 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1484 n.156 (1982). See
generally Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine (1984)
(forthcoming in a legal periodical).
51. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall
1975, at 77.
52. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423, 1428 (1982).
53. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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sor David Ewing of the Harvard Business School observed in 1977:1"
During the first two centuries of United States history, the
trend was unmistakably to broaden the reach of the Constitution.
Universal male suffrage, the abolition of slavery, bargaining rights
for unions, female suffrage, the many extensions of due process to
people under arrest or surveillance-these and many other events
marked the ever-widening application of the Constitution. But the
Constitution does not yet penetrate the organizational sector, the
still-dark ghetto of American rights.
Ewing advocates that corporations (organizations, generally) be sub-
jected to the limitations of an organizational bill of rights. He main-
tains that during America's third century, one of the hallmarks of con-
stitutionalism "should be concern for the rights of employees." 55
What, however, are those rights? Professor Ewing's call is basi-
cally one of bringing due process-procedural due process-to the
workplace. He makes a persuasive case. The question posed in this es-
say is whether that conception can be carried a step further-into the
realm of substantive due process. A generation ago the Vice-President
and General Counsel of the Ford Motor Company, William T. Gossett,
maintained that corporate management "no longer represents exclu-
sively the interests of stockholders. With the passage of time, it must
develop a variety of devices and procedures to assure that its dealings
with other groups are fair and just. '56 The other groups Gossett had in
mind were employees, suppliers, dealers, customers and plant commu-
nities, "each of which has a separate claim on the corporation. 57
What, then, is "fair and just"? And how can corporate manage-
ment be stimulated to do more than pursue the single-minded goal of
profit? Gossett tells us that there are conflicts of interest among the
various groups in the corporate community; and then goes on to make
this relevant statement:58
One of the most dramatic conflicts of interest revolves about
54. D. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION: BRINGING CIVIL LIBER-
TIES TO THE WORKPLACE 217-18 (1977).
55. Id. at 218. See Miller, A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corpo-
rate Beast, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79 (1979).
56. W. Gossett, Corporate Citizenship 178 (1957) (reprint from the John Ran-
dolph Tucker Lectures, 1953-1956, Washington & Lee University).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 187.
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the decision of a large enterprise to move into a given community,
or out of it-particularly the latter. There have been numerous in-
stances where a single plant is the sole or major source of income
for an entire community, and a callous attitude toward the effects
of moving out could mean destruction for that community. The
narrow interests of efficiency and profit-making for the stockholder
might require such a move be made without delay. Yet the inter-
ests of local employees and the community might be so severely
prejudiced that the corporation could not in good conscience move
out without making every reasonable effort to mitigate the conse-
quence of its going.
The problem, thus, is that of catching the conscience of the economic
sovereigns-those who head the supercorporations. Courts are well
suited to take on that task. The principle involved can be easily stated:
Thou shalt not unreasonably harm members of the corporate commu-
nity. Or put in affirmative terms: corporate management's decisions
must take into consideration all segments of the corporate community,
not merely one (the stockholders).
Here, of course, is a legal no-man's land. But the moral principle
is clear, and can be translated into law by judicial decree. Consider, in
this respect, what the well-known corporate lawyer, Adolf A. Berle,
said in 1954:19
Power to deal at will with other men's property and occupa-
tion, however absolute it may be as a matter of technical contract
law, is subject to certain limitations. They still lie in the field of
inchoate law: we are not yet able to cite explicit case and statute
law clearly stating those limitations. We can only say that in this
field a matrix of equity jurisdiction is beginning to appear.
I do not wish at this time to do more than call attention to Berle's idea
of "inchoate law"; and then go on to suggest that in a few recent cases
the Supreme Court has, for the public sector at least, rendered a series
of decisions that evidence an emergent tendency-in Berle's language,
an "inchoate" tendency-toward finding a right to a job. In Elrod v.
Burns,60 for example, the Court held that a newly elected Democratic
sheriff could not fire some Republican employees simply because they
59. A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 82 (1954).
60. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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were members of another political party. And in Branti v. Finkel,"' the
Justices expanded the immunity of non-civil services employees from
patronage dismissals. Said Justice John Paul Stevens: "it is manifest
that the continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot
properly be conditioned upon his allegiance to the political party in
control of the county government." In Perry v. Sindermann,2 a non-
tenured college professor alleged an interest in continued employment,
"though not secured by a formal contractual or tenure provision, was
secured by a no less binding understanding fostered by the college ad-
ministration. 63 Sindermann asserted that the "college had a de facto
tenure program, and that he had tenure under that program," and of-
fered to prove that he had "no less a 'property' interest in continued
employment than a formally tenured teacher" at colleges with a tenure
system. 4 Sindermann prevailed.6
Are those decisions harbingers of things to come? That, of course,
is possible but not probable. Other recent decisions, such as Board of
Regents v. Roth and Bishop v. Wood,6 point in a contrary direction.
The most that can be said is that the issue has not really been settled.
It is in flux. My position is that of Justice William Brennan in the
Bishop case: "There is certainly a federal dimension to the definition of
'property' in the Federal Constitution,16 7 a sentiment that Justice Ste-
vens, writing for the majority, called "remarkably innovative." Brennan
believed that state discharges implicated a constitutionally protected
liberty interest.
I believe that there is much to be said for the Brennan position.
That it has not yet commanded a majority, save in such decisions as
Elrod, Branti, and Sindermann, means that the Court is still searching
for a doctrine (or doctrines) that would control public employment situ-
ations. If the Elrod principle is carried over into the private govern-
ments of the nation, then something approximating a constitutional
right to a job would be in the making. Or if not a right to a job, at least
a right that, once hired, a person must not be treated arbitrarily.
61. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).Id. at 519.
62. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
63. Id. at 599.
64. Id. at 600.
65. Id. at 601.
66. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341 (1976). See generally Van Aistyne, Cracks in "The New Property: Adjudicative
Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977).
67. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 343.
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A brief word by way of conclusion: The IAM proposal presents
critical questions about the nature of the American political economy. I
believe that Robert A. Dahl was correct when he recently observed that
"the commitment to corporate capitalism needs to be reconsidered.
Earlier, when the framers had discussed their fears about majorities
that might invade the rights of minorities, more often than not they
mentioned rights to property. Their reasoned justification of a right to
property, if they held one, would no doubt have been Lockean. Yet the
Lockean justificition makes no sense. . .when it is applied to the large
modern business corporation." 68 Historical capitalism is dying; of that
there can be little doubt. What will replace it is by no means certain at
this time. Capitalism today is ever increasingly collectivist in nature,
which means that its economic decisions Are made politically. It is not
a stable system, as the IAM proposal evidences. For that reason, and
perhaps for others, many nations today are moving toward nationaliza-
tion. State-owned companies are on the rise. Professors Monsen and
Walters tell us, throughout Western Europe.69 "European govern-
ments," they show, "now have a direct ownership stake in over half of
Europe's largest companies." Those firms, plus the more market-ori-
ented enterprises in the East, pose a direct challenge to American in-
dustry. How United States firms will react is one of the crucial politico-
economic-that is, constitutional-questions of the day. The rise of the
new economies will have to be met, in some form or another, by the
United States. I believe that the consequence will be a growing form of
an indigenous type of corporatism.70 If so, then the public-private dis-
tinction is on its way out. And it becomes all the more important that
proposals such as the "New Technology Bill of Rights" be given com-
prehensive and respectful attention by those who wield effective power
in America.
Finally: I do not wish to be placed in the position of using constitu-
68. Dahl, On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United
Statese, in BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE, 71, 90 (1. Howe ed. 1982).
69. R. MONSEN & K. WALTERS, NATIONALIZED COMPANIES: A THREAT TO
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1983).
70. See A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION passim (1976); Miller, Toward a Definition of
"The" Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 633, 691-700 (1983).
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tional arguments as a form of "desperate legal acrobatics."' 1 Surely,
however, the relationship of the populace-in present context, that of
the workers-to the public and private governments of the nation is an
important constitutional question. (Can someone name another that is
more important?) If the IAM proposal necessitates the complete re-
examination of the political economy of the nation, then such a scru-
tiny is long overdue. Furthermore, as Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes once observed, "Behind the words of the constitutional provi-
sions are postulates which limit and control. '72 One such postulate, I
suggest, is a surpassingly important human need: the need to be
needed. If the Constitution should, as has been suggested above, evolve
into one that fulfills human needs and human deserts within environ-
mental constraints, then the requirements of Homo faber should be
recognized and realized. Government, I maintain, has no other purpose
than to make every reasonable effort to see that human needs and
deserts are in fact satisfied. More specifically, if "our constitutional sys-
tem rests on a particular moral theory, that men have moral rights
against the state, '78 I maintain that high among those "moral rights"
is that of a constitutional right to a job.
71. Levinson, Book Review, 57 TEx. L. REV. 847, 858 (1979).
72. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1943).
73. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147 (1977).
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Technology, Unemployment and Genocide
Richard L. Rubenstein*
The impact of technology on the processes of production affects
every aspect of American life, and most especially the long-range em-
ployment prospects of the American worker. Unfortunately, this devel-
opment is seldom given the consideration it deserves by political deci-
sionmakers. Whether or not we regard as practical the proposals
incorporated into the workers' Bill of Rights proposed by the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, it is the merit of the proposal to focus
our attention on the need for a coherent national response to the prob-
lem of technologically-induced mass unemployment. Given the limita-
tions of the current symposium, it is obviously impossible to deal with
every aspect of the question. I therefore propose to limit myself primar-
ily to a consideration of the relationship between unemployment and
genocide.
I take genocide to mean the calculated and premeditated extermi-
nation of a target population on the initiative of political authorities.
Mass unemployment and genocide can be seen as related phenomena.
Both are consequences of the rationalization of the economy and soci-
ety which has characterized the modern period. Put differently, both
are outcomes of the modernization process. Briefly stated, it is my hy-
pothesis that the worldwide transformation of the traditional, subsis-
tence agrarian economies to economies in which all forms of production
have been progressively rationalized has resulted in the rise of mass
populations entirely redundant to any conceivable production process
and the bureaucratic and technological structures required for their
elimination.
A program of mass extermination can be seen as a state-sponsored
program of population elimination. Genocide is by no means the only
method available to public authorities to implement such a program. It
is, however, the most radical. Official encouragement of mass emigra-
tion, colonization schemes, imperialist ventures, mass expulsion, and
apartheid policies have served as alternative methods employed by state
authorities to eliminate an unwanted target population. Moreover, a
* Robert 0. Lawton Distinguished Professor of Religion, Florida State University;
President, The Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, Washington, D.C.
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population targeted for elimination need not itself be vocationally re-
dundant as long as its riddance is perceived to be a benefit by political
decisionmakers. For example, a scarcity of job slots can easily lead to
conflict concerning the distribution of available work. In the past, some
governments have actively encouraged the departure of employed mem-
bers of a minority group so that unemployed members of the dominant
majority might secure the newly-vacated positions. In those cases in
which the targeted minority was unwilling or unable to emigrate, the
governments in question have often resorted to harsher methods of pop-
ulation elimination. This was the case in Poland in the 1930s where the
Polish government saw the elimination of Poland's 3.5 million Jews, all
of whom were publicly declared to be "surplus," as a necessary mea-
sure for making jobs available for Poland's woefully underemployed
non-Jewish population.'
Similarly, during Germany's post-World-War II Wirtschaft-
swunder, or economic miracle, millions of foreign workers from Spain,
Italy, Yugoslavia and Turkey were invited to migrate to Germany as
Gastarbeiter or guest workers to fill the jobs Germans were unwilling
or unable to take. Today, the German economy can no longer absorb
the foreign workers and considerable agitation has developed for send-
ing these workers and their families back to their native countries. Be-
cause of the still-fresh memories of Auschwitz, no responsible German
official has actively supported the compulsory expulsion of the Gas-
tarbeiter. Nevertheless, there is widespread sentiment in Germany that
somehow the unwanted and unneeded foreigners must be encouraged to
depart. While this development may seem unrelated to the problem of
genocide, the connection becomes clearer if we keep in mind that offi-
cial encouragement of mass emigration and genocide have the same
objective, namely the elimination of a target population, although there
is obviously a vast difference in the method of implementation. Unfor-
tunately, where public authorities perceive the objective to be a matter
of necessity, failure to achieve the objective by relatively mild methods
may lead to the employment of radical methods, especially in a period
of acute social stress.
Nor have public authorities always exempted members of the ma-
jority ethnic group from their programs of population elimination when
1. This problem is discussed by CELIA S. HELLER, ON THE EDGE OF DESTRUC-
TION: JEWS OF POLAND BETWEEN Two WORLD WARS (1977).
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the targeted group was perceived as redundant to the community's la-
bor needs. Thus, during the nineteenth century large numbers of En-
glishmen, Italians and Germans were encouraged to emigrate by their
own governments. With the modernization of both the agricultural and
industrial sectors of the European economy, governments preferred to
encourage emigration rather than face the social costs of a large, dis-
content, indigenous unemployed population. In many instances, author-
ities gave paupers funds sufficient to make the journey to North
America but not to return.
A civilization that loses as many people through emigration as Eu-
rope did between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of
World War I is a civilization in crisis. The statistics give us some idea
of the dimensions of the crisis: between 1875 and 1880 as Europe was
in the process of rapid industrialization, approximately 280,000 persons
emigrated annually. The figure increased to 685,000 annually between
1880 and 1885; between 1885 and 1890 the annual average was
730,000. In the peak year of 1910, two million people left Europe! Nev-
ertheless, the crisis of modernization and industrialization was some-
what disguised by" the fact that there were vast areas available for Eu-
ropean settlement and peoples of European origin enjoyed an absolute
technological superiority over non-European peoples well into the twen-
tieth century. This enabled Europe's surplus human beings: (1) to ex-
pand over very large areas of the earth with only minimal resistance
from the indigenous populations; (2) exploitatively to dominate most
European peoples, utilizing their labor and natural resources under
conditions extremely favorable to the Europeans; -(3) to create and
maintain an industrial civilization in which most non-Europeans were
customers rather than competitors. These conditions permitted a far
greater expansion of the economies of the European peoples than would
otherwise have been the case had all of the peoples of the world mod-
ernized simultaneously. Europe's technological headstart also permitted
the absorption of more Europeans in the work force than would have
otherwise been the case. Nevertheless, in spite of the never-to-be re-
peated advantages enjoyed by the Europeans, the continent was unable
to escape the horrendous social dislocations of World Wars I and II,
the Russian Revolution, the Spanish Civil War, Italian Fascism and
National Socialism.
Unfortunately, the problem of the mass population redundancy
that plagued Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is now
besetting most of the developing and developed nations alike. At pre-
sent, the United States is engaged in a great national debate concern-
1984]
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ing the nature of our response to the political upheavals taking place in
Central America. There is general agreement that the roots of the po-
litical upheavals are to be found in the population explosion and the
region's high unemployment.3 Indeed, the report of the Kissinger Com-
mission discusses this issue under the sub-title, "Modernization and
Poverty." Similarly, millions of Mexicans, rendered unemployed by the
rationalization of Mexican agriculture and Mexico's population explo-
sion have attempted to enter the United States in search of any kind of
work. In so doing, they are acting as have other immigrants throughout
the history of the United States.
Nevertheless, both the United States and the world at large are
very different than what they were even a decade ago. Perhaps the
most important single new fact is that the peoples of European origin
are no longer technologically superior to non-Europeans, especially the
peoples of the Orient. In addition to Japan; South Korea, Taiwan, Sin-
gapore, and Hong Kong have demonstrated a phenomenal capacity to
compete with the West in developing a type of technological civilization
originally endogenic to the west and exogenic to the Orient.4 Moreover,
while Americans reflect on how to respond to Japanese industrial com-
petition, they are almost completely unaware of the imminent challenge
of South Korean competition. Within a very short time South Korea is
likely to be one of the world's most important technological producers.
This development is bound to have profound repercussions on the
American economy. Whatever the outcome of the ongoing technologi-
cal transformation of Asia, a transformation which is likely to benefit
the United States as a Pacific Ocean power far more than Europe, it is
obvious that societies of European origin can no longer solve the prob-
lem of surplus people by exporting them. This is especially true of the
United States which was for many decades the solution rather than the
problem.
Ironically, Adolf Hitler was one of the first European political
leaders who understood that the problem of surplus people could not be
solved by emigration. He states this with special clarity in a book
3. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR VALUES IN PUBLIC POLICY, CENTRAL
AMERICA IN CRISIS: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION; see also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA 22-25 (January 1984).
4. See Roderick MacFarquar, "The Challenge of Post-Confucian Asia," The
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known in English as Hitler's Secret Book.5 As we know, his "solution"
included genocide and wars of enslavement and extermination. Instead
of exporting its surplus population to the New World where their de-
mographic strength would be lost to the fatherland, Hitler proposed
that Germany create a Lebensraum, a living space, on her eastern fron-
tier by conquering and uprooting the indigenous Slavs. As we know, in
the case of the Jews of Germany and Eastern Europe, they were exter-
minated outright. By vastly enlarging her territory, Germany could find
a place for her surplus millions within her own borders. Hitler was de-
termined that, whoever might be rendered redundant by advances in
technology and population growth, it would not be healthy Germans.
A number of writers on the problems of black people have also
understood the connection between unemployment and genocide. Sid-
ney Wilhelm and Samuel Yette have suggested that at some time in
the future an attempt might be made to exterminate America's unem-
ployed blacks.6 Both writers have been accused of extreme paranoia.
Such accusations miss the point. The problem of surplus people can be
handled with relative ease in times of prosperity. The apprehensions
expressed by these writers concern what might happen in a period of
acute scarcity and social stress.
Let us consider the kind of scenario in which mass population
elimination might become a tempting policy option. In a period of
acute and seemingly insoluble hardship a future administration might
conclude that a mass surplus population no longer serves the national
interest even as a reserve labor force. As the micro-processor revolution
accelerates, the value of unskilled labor is bound to diminish signifi-
cantly in any event. If such a time of crisis ever comes, the problem of
surplus people will admit of only a limited number of solutions. These
boil down to redistribution of resources and work opportunities or some
form of population elimination. The latter could involve the repatria-
tion of "illegal" immigrants, whose number will have grown as the eco-
nomic crisis worsens, mass warfare, and in the most extreme cases, ac-
tual extermination. As we have seen, in the past, governments have
preferred to eliminate people through emigration rather than by the
redistribution of resources. Absent the opportunities for emigration
available to Europe in the nineteenth century, an American population
5. A. HITLER, HITLER'S SECRET BOOK (1983) (especially pages 13-25 and 70-
74).
6. See S. WILHELM, WHO NEEDS THE NEGRO? (1971); and F. YETrE, THE
CHOICE: THE ISSUE OF BLACK SURVIVAL IN AMERICA (1971).
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elimination program, if ever initiated, would have fewer humane op-
tions. It would also be even less inhibited by any residual sense of com-
munity in view of the class, racial, ethnic, and ideological divisions, as
well as the depersonalized instrumental business and bureaucratic ethos
that pervades American public life. One might also note that native
American Indians can, with justice, claim that there has already been
an American population elimination program of major proportions.
It is this author's very tentative conviction that an American popu-
lation elimination program would not employ large-scale death camps
as its major instrument as did the National Socialists. Mass warfare
would appear to be a more tempting policy option. Even the National
Socialists and the Turks did not resort to outright extermination pro-
grams until they found themselves in the midst of a major war. In a
severe crisis, desperate political leaders might first be tempted to lead
the nation into war, perhaps only partly aware that they were more
interested in destroying the enemy than in reducing their own surplus
people. Elsewhere, I have argued that at some level the British, French,
and German high commands in World War I intuitively understood
that millions of their own soldiers had been rendered superfluous by
industrial civilization and that such monstrous battles as Verdon and
the Second Battle of the Somme, in which a total of 2.3 million men
were lost by both sides, can be understood, to some extent, as exercises
in state-sponsored programs of population elimination.
7
Moreover, after a major war the reconstruction period can lead to
a relatively prolonged period of prosperity and full employment. This
was undoubtedly the case between the early 1950s and 1974. Thus, war
might be perceived by policymakers as having the double "advantage"
of eliminating surplus people and, by its very destructiveness, paving
the way for a post-war boom of long duration. There is, of course, a
major constraint -in the use of warfare to eliminate surplus people,
namely, the unpredictable extent of nuclear damage. Unfortunately,
even that constraint might be overlooked by public authorities faced
with a desperate and apparently insoluble social crisis. Perhaps the re-
cent resurgence of a mass peace movement in the advanced industrial
nations reflects a widespread intuition by millions of human beings of
their potential superfluity and expendability in a period of rising
unemployment.
There is much more that can and must be said on the issue of
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unemployment and genocide. I have endeavored to deal with the sub-
ject in greater depth elsewhere.8 In the present context, the urgency of
the situation which has prompted the International Association of Ma-
chinists to propose a workers' Bill of Rights should be apparent. The
merit of the proposal is that it addresses the very real crisis facing
skilled American workers, especially in industries where microprocessor
technology is likely to displace the vast majority of even the most
skilled workers. Its weakness lies in its overly narrow focus on the
American scene. In December 1983 this writer inspected the machine
tool factories of Tong-il Industry Ltd. in Changwon, Korea. I saw a
huge factory complex turning out computerized lathes, universal cylin-
drical grinding machines, vertical/horizontal milling machines and
other machine tools. I also saw a new factory in which the tools could
be manufactured by robots. Every computerized advance in manufac-
turing technique was being employed. The products were state of the
art. They will undoubtedly compete with American products in the
world market with every promise of a high degree of success.
There is simply no way that American manufacturers of compara-
ble products can remain in business unless they automate to the same
degree as the Koreans and the Japanese. Moreover, there is no way
that state or Federal authorities can tax or otherwise penalize Ameri-
can manufacturers who automate, as the workers' Bill of Rights pro-
poses. Indeed, under the best of circumstances, American manufactur-
ers are going to find it difficult to remain in business unless they
employ every conceivable labor-saving device available. Nor is there
any certainty that there will be "labor cost savings" or "gains resulting
from the new technology" to be shared with the workers, as the work-
ers' Bill of Rights implies. On the contrary, given the cost advantage of
the Japanese and the Koreans, whatever savings result from automa-
tion will have to be used to keep the American product competitive on
the world market. Moreover, even if displaced workers are given train-
ing, it is by no means certain that there will be jobs in which to place
them.
In short, there is an air of economic unrealism about the proposed
workers' Bill of Rights. Nevertheless, the problems which moved the
Machinist union to make the proposal are real and must be dealt with
by government, capital and labor acting in concert if we are to survive
as a responsible and humane society. Our fundamental problem is how
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we can turn our productivity into a social asset capable of enriching
both the material and spiritual aspects of our society. If we ignore the
problem, we will in effect continue a line of development that has the
effect of rendering millions of our fellow citizens vocationally redun-
dant and socially useless.
I have only begun to formulate what I believe to be the indispensa-
ble preconditions for meeting the crisis. I can therefore only offer the
briefest suggestion of what, in my opinion, my be required: (1) In order
to remain competitive in the world market, especially in the face of
ever more sophisticated competition from the Orient, American indus-
try will have no choice but to utilize state-of-the-art automation to the
full extent of its availability and economic feasibility. (2) Alternative
forms of meaningful activity, such as university study to the graduate
and post-doctoral level for an ever-expanding student population of all
age groups, must be fully funded by public authorities. No other insti-
tution has demonstrated the ability to provide large masses of people
with an alternative to the labor market which is as meaningful as that
offered by American colleges and universities. Age ought to be no bar-
rier to participation in any degree program. (3) American primary edu-
cation must become at least as competent as that of Japan, Korea, Tai-
wan and Singapore in imparting the tools necessary for work and
leisure in a high-tech era. (4) As manufacturing processes become ever
less labor-dependent, plans ought to be devised for the sharing of avail-
able work opportunities by a maximum number of workers even if this
results in a significant reduction in the length of the normal work week.
(5) Immigration laws should be stringently enforced. It will be difficult
enough for American society to cope with the problems of its own citi-
zens without being compelled to cope with those of its neighbors. Nev-
ertheless, some provision must be made for the continued recruitment
of talented foreigners for American industry and education. (6) As the
value of labor inevitably diminishes with the continued use of sophisti-
cated technology, some means of permitting labor to share in the fruits
of capital must be devised. Put differently, productivity must enhance
rather than diminish the well-being of the average citizen.
These ideas are obviously tentative and incomplete. Indeed, they
may be as unrealistic as the workers' Bill of Rights. What is important
is that serious attention be given now to the problem of technology andf
unemployment. Failure to do so will lead sooner or later to a cata-
strophic situation in which the worst-possible-case scenario I have out-
lined above is likely to be viewed by policymakers as the best possible
case. Lest the scenarious seem extreme, I must remind my readers that
[Vol. 8544
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they have already taken place in this bloodiest of all human centuries.
What we seek to avoid is not a first instance of monumental tragedy
but a repetition. It is for that reason that I welcome the Machinists'
proposal. It is as good a starting point as any.
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The Case of the Burnside Foundry*
Mary Gibson**
In this article we explore the right to refuse an unsafe assignment. We
argue that an effective right to refuse is a necessary condition for in-
formed consent to workplace hazards. Noting that the right to refuse,
as well as any other rights that workers have by virtue of being work-
ers, is empty if one does not have a job, we go on to explore the claim
that a person has a right to a job. We conclude by observing that the
same considerations which support the claim that they have a right not
just to any job, however demeaning, meaningless, routine, or boring,
but to useful and challenging work.
The Burnside Foundry in South Chicago:
February 14: Six workers are sent home by the company for
refusing to work on the furnace floor, where pools of water up to
three inches deep have been collecting in tapping pits.
February 15: The six men return to work. They know that if
any of the 3200 degree molten metal being poured from the fur-
nace into a ladle were to make contact with the water on the floor,
a tremendous explosion would rock the foundry. The company says
that it will remove the water from the floor.
February 16: Molten steel is being poured from the furnace
into the ladle. The ladle jams. Two maintenance men, Steve
Mihalik and Lawrence Stiff, go to work on the jammed ladle.
Neither has any protective clothing, face shield, or flame retardant
equipment which the company is required to provide.
Suddenly the ladle unjams. The hot liquid metal spills over the
side. In the tapping pit below, the three inches of water there is
instantly turned into a mass of steam, expanding in volume more
than one thousand times. Massive energy is released, spraying hot
metal in all directions, and Mihalik, Stiff, and 18 other workers in
* This is an excerpt from the author's book entitled WORKER'S RIGHTS (Rowman
& Allanheld, 1983). The editors thank Ms. Gibson and the publishers for giving the
Nova Law Journal permission to reprint it. The chapter appears here exactly as in the
original; full citations to those sources parenthetically referred to in the text can be
found at the end of the excerpt.
** B.A., Hunter College of the City University of New York; Ph.D. (Philosophy),
Princeton University; Associate Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University.
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the area suffer severe burns over their bodies.
The evening of February 16: Steve Mihalik dies
from. . .burns over 90 percent of his body.
February 25: Lawrence Stiff dies, and shortly afterwards fel-
low steelworkers Albert Chisholm, Jr. and Lewis O'Daniel also die.
Stiff, Chisholm and O'Daniel are black.
In the aftermath of the explosion at Burnside, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) officials conducted a
two-week investigation and then announced their findings. They
found that the company had not taken adequate precautions to pre-
vent the explosion of February 16th and levied a fine of $42,000
and ordered the company not to reopen for production until all vio-
lations are corrected.
David Marshall, secretary of the grievance committee of Local
1719, pointed out that the union has filed more than 50 grievances
in the past year on safety related problems, and that a year ago
two men were badly burned when the ladle overturned due to de-
fective bearings. Two years ago, Marshall added, a worker was de-
capitated at Burnside when a moving crane whose operator could
not see the man, swung it against him.
"The safety Committee has to have more power to deal with
the company at the shop level," said Marshall. "We should be able
to file charges, levy fines against the company when they violate
the safety of the men, and set a time limit of eight hours for the
company to correct unsafe working conditions, with the men being
paid their regular hourly rate of pay while they wait for the com-
pany to make the necessary changes."
James Balanoff, director of District 31, USWA, labeled the
deaths at Burnside "murder," and pledged that "if I do nothing
else, I am going to bring these companies into the 20th century."
Balanoff said there have been nine deaths in District 31 plants
in the past year, with eight of them in the South Chicago area.
Workers in the steel mills, coal mines and other industries are
demanding stronger contract clauses on safety and health; espe-
cially protection for workers who refuse to work under unsafe con-
ditions. In addition, many workers are asking why management of-
ficials who are responsible for overseeing the carrying out of safe
working conditions, should not be held liable when workers suffer
death or injury due to unsafe jobs. . . .[from an article by Herb
Kaye, Daily World, March 15, 1979]
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Steel
In addition to burns, explosions, and myriad other accidents, steel
foundry workers may be exposed to silica dust, carbon monoxide, resins
such as phenol formaldehyde, hydrocarbon, coal tar pitch, lead (for
leaded steel), galvanizing chemicals, noise and heat stress (Scott, 1974
41). Let us look briefly at the effects of a few of these hazards.
Silica dust causes silicosis, a scarring of the lungs which causes
them to become progressively inelastic, making it more and more diffi-
cult to breathe, and preventing passage of oxygen to the blood. The
scars may join together and form larger scars, which may occupy the
entire lung. This process, called progressive massive fibrosis, is often
accompanied by increased susceptibility to tuberculosis and other lung
infections. The heart, due to the strain of pumping blood through in-
elastic lungs, becomes enlarged and fails to pump effectively (Stellman
and Daum, 1973, 167-69).
According to Rachel Scott, "Three foundries in Muskegon, Michi-
gan, employing thirty-five hundred to four thousand men, have for
years produced about four hundred new cases of silicosis annually. Ten
percent of the entire workforce, in other words, was disabled every
year" (Scott, 1974, 41).
Carbon monoxide is a colorless and odorless gas so one can be
exposed with no way of knowing it. It attaches and binds itself chemi-
cally to hemoglobin, the blood component that normally carries oxygen
in the blood. If body tissues do not receive a constant supply of oxygen,
they stop functioning and die. The brain is most susceptible, and early
symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning are the results of brain mis-
function due to lack of oxygen. Acute symptoms: headache, then throb-
bing headache, reddening of the skin, dizziness, dimness of vision, nau-
sea, vomiting, and at higher concentrations, coma, suffocation, and
death. Long term, low dose effects: headaches, dizziness, decreased
hearing, visual distrubances, personality changes seizures, psychosis,
palpitations of the heart with abnormal rhythms, loss of appetite, nau-
sea and vomiting (Stellman and Daum, 1973, 164-65).
Coal tar pitch causes dermatitis accompanied *by pains, swelling,
rash, and blisters, skin cancer, including scrotal cancer, lung irritation,
and may occasionally cause pulmonary edema (Stellman and Daum,
1973, 193-94).
In the coke ovens powdered coal is converted into coke, a hard,
dense fuel that is used to charge the steel furnaces. This is the dirtiest
workplace in a foundry. Coke oven workers risk excessive exposure to
1984] 549
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coal tars. They develop cancer of the scrotum at a rate five times that
of the general population. They also develop cancers of the lung, blad-
der and kidneys at rates greater than the general population (Scott,
1974, 45). A study begun in 1962 and published by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor in 1974 examined the health records of 100,000 steel-
workers at 17 plants. Among its findings were the following: Coke
workers as a group are two and one-half times more likely to die of
lung cancer than steelworkers who do not work in coke plants; after five
years on the job in the coke plant the lung cancer rate rises to three
and one-half times the normal rate; for workers on top of the coke bat-
teries with five years on the job, the death rate is ten times higher than
normal (Spencer, 1977, 224; Scott, 1974, 45-46).
Considering these facts, it is important to note that while the over-
all percentage of blacks in the workforce in basic steel is 22 percent, in
the coke oven area it is 90 percent. Of all black coke oven workers, 18
percent were in full-time topside jobs, compared to 3.4 percent of white
coke workers (Safer Times, July/August, 1978, 3).
Heat stress takes various forms, depending on the conditions of
exposure, degree of activity, and individual body response. There are
four types of acute reaction: heat stroke, heat exhaustion, heat shock,
and heat fatigue.
Heat stroke involves a sharp rise in body temperature accompa-
nied by confusion, angry behavior, delirium, and even convulsions. The
skin is warm and dry, and there is no sweating. It can be fatal.
In heat exhaustion, or heat fainting, the victim feels tired, giddy,
and nauseated, and may feel chilly. There may be rapid, shallow
breathing, a weak, slow pulse, and moist, clammy, cold, pale, or even
bluish skin. The blood pressure is low because the blood vessels all over
the body are dilated, and there is not enough blood to circulate through
these enlarged vessels.
Heat shock is a form of heat exhaustion common in healthy per-
sons working in a hot environment to which they have not become ac-
climatized. The body loses excessive amounts of fluid and/or salt due to
inefficient sweating. There may be insufficient fluid in the body to
maintain circulation to all organs. Lack of salt may result in heat
cramps, weakness, nausea, headache, fatigue, and dizziness. The victim
becomes irritable and suffers muscular weakness.
Heat fatigue is characterized by the lassitude, irritability, and
easy fatiguability that are familiar hot weather sensations. "A person
with heat fatigue does not work as well, produces less, makes more
mistakes, and has more accidents. The feelings get worse if the fatigue
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is not relieved by rest. Heat fatigue may affect a person's personal rela-
tions on the job and at home as well. Thus in addition to paying a
physical price for working in a hot environment, a worker will pay an
emotional price" (Stellman and Daum, 1973, 128).
Prolonged exposure to a hot environment results in a process called
acclimatization. The process takes from four to six days and is most
effective in young people; older people never acclimatize to heat com-
pletely. Changes occur in the circulatory system and in the volume and
composition of sweat. Dilation of the small blood vessels of the skin
allows the heat of the blood to be transferred through the skin back to
the environment. This increases the work load for the heart since blood
must be pumped through a larger total circulation area. To compensate
for this increased work load, the blood vessels to the liver, stomach, and
intestines constrict. The liver is sometimes damaged by lack of oxygen
resulting from prolonged active work in a hot environment (Stellman
and Daum, 1973, 123-28).
Discussion
Let us begin this discussion by picking up the thread of an issue
that links the first three chapters and, less directly, the fourth as well.
In the first chapter we raised the question whether the Cyanamid case
could be called a case of sterilization without informed consent, due to
lack of genuine consent. In the second chapter we raised the same
question concerning the Oxy case, this time due to lack of information.
We went on to explore the more general right of informed consent to
risks and hazards one is exposed to on the job, and its implications for
the right to know. In this chapter we shall look at the implications of
the right of informed consent to risks or hazards on the job for the
issue of the right of workers to refuse an unsafe work assignment.
It is not clear from the report of the Burnside Foundry case
whether any of the workers who were sent home on February 14th for
refusing their assignments were among those killed or injured on the
16th. It seems likely that some of them were the same, but that is not
really important. What is important is whether the workers had a right
to refuse to be subjected to a risk of what they believed to be a high
probability of serious injury or death, and if so, what the bases of that
right are, and what the right entails.
Workers have been dismissed (and told they had quit), fired for
insubordination, suspended without pay, sent home without pay for the
remainder of a shift and told not to return until ready to do the job,
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had disciplinary letters placed in their files (which can later be used to
justify firing, not promoting, etc., on the grounds that a person is unco-
operative or a troublemaker)-all for refusing assignments they be-
lieved to be unsafe. The arguments to justify these responses on the
part of employers seem to be one or more of the following:
1. The employee accepted the job. This is part of the job. Therefore,
the employee should do this or (a) be considered to have quit, or
(b) be fired for insubordination for refusing to do the job he or she
was hired to do.1
2. If workers are permitted to refuse assignments, plant discipline will
break down and chaos will ensue. Therefore, workers who refuse
must be let go or otherwise disciplined.
3. To pay workers who have refused an assignment on the grounds
that they consider it unsafe would be to pay them for not working
rather than for working, and surely that no employer is bound to
do.
4. If workers had the right to be paid in such circumstances, that
would be tantamount to a right to strike with pay, and surely work-
ers do not have that right.
In the first argument, the assumption seems to be that in accepting
a job a person agrees to carry out any assignment falling within that
job, so to refuse an assignment is a breach of the employment contract.
There are at least two possible responses to this argument.
The first response is to deny that the unsafe assignment is part of
the job. An assignment that poses a serious threat to life, health, or
safety cannot be said to fall within the definition of any job except for
those where extreme risks are expressly understood in advance. Even
so, this is a matter of degree. Coal miners daily face risks most workers
do not face simply by entering the mines. But if a tunnel ceiling has
not been properly inspected and repaired, the fact that they have
agreed to the risk of working underground cannot be used to argue that
they breach that agreement if they refuse to enter a shaft that does not
meet legally required-or other reasonable-safety standards.2 A stunt
1. In either case (a) or (b), if the employer's version is accepted, the worker is
precluded from collecting unemployment insurance in many states. One cannot collect
in most states if one quits voluntarily or is fired "for cause."
2. It is neither necessary nor sufficient that a legal safety standard be violated
before a worker may be justified in refusing an unsafe assignment. A violation may not
be serious and may pose no immediate danger, hence, the assignment is not unsafe in
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person agrees to accept risks that other actors are not expected, and
would rightfully refuse, to face. But if a stunt person regards a particu-
lar stunt as poorly designed, or believes crucial safety equipment to be
defective, he or she can rightfully say that those risks are not part of
the job. According to this response, a crucial premise of the first argu-
ment is denied.
The second response does not deny that the assignment in question
is part of the job. It points out that the employer has the legal and
moral and often contractual obligation to provide a safe and healthy
work environment. So it is the employer, not the employee, who has
breached the employment agreement or contract.' Still, many collective
bargaining agreements contain grievance procedures, and a worker who
alleges that the employer is in violation of the contract is normally ex-
pected to file a grievance and proceed with his or her assigned work.4
This approach is obviously inadequate in the case of a serious and im-
mediate threat to life, health, or safety. Thus it is the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat that supports the right to refuse. Such refusal
is not itself a breach of the employment agreement, however; rather it
is a response-the only adequate response available-to a breach by
the employer.
Either way, there is no justification for claiming that, by refusing
an unsafe assignment an employee either breaches the employment
agreement or is insubordinate.5 It cannot be that, in accepting a job,
one consents to all risks and hazards that may be encountered in that
job. To be meaningful, the right of informed consent must apply at two
the requisite sense. So violation is not sufficient for justified refusal. On the other hand,
there may be no specific standard covering a particular hazard which nevertheless
poses a serious and immediate threat. In such a case, I claim, refusal is justified; so
violation is not a necessary condition for justified refusal. So far, I am not talking about
the legal status of the right to refuse; we shall come to that later.
3. Even if there is no written contract, or no explicit mention of health and safety
in an existing contract, presumably fulfilling one's legal obligations as an employer may
be understood as implicit in any employment agreement.
4. Unless the union agrees in the contract to give it up, workers do have the right
to strike over contract violations. But we are talking now about an individual or several
individuals refusing a particular assignment, not about a strike.
5. Insubordination is generally accepted as, and is explicitly recognized in many
union contracts, as grounds for dismissal. (In most contracts, management has the
right to fire for just cause, and in many 'just cause' is spelled out as including insubor-
dination.) This reflects the traditional view that strict plant discipline is an important
employer prerogative. It is revealing that failure to be subordinate should be grounds
for voiding what purports to be a voluntary contract among equals.
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levels. Before accepting a job and while remaining in it, one has the
right to the information needed for informed consent to the risks that
the job entails. One must also have the right to refuse a particular as-
signment one believes to constitute a serious and immediate threat to
one's life, health or safety. And note that the right to know is an indis-
pensable part of the right of informed consent at both levels. Both the
right of informed consent and the right to a safe job are, in practical
terms, empty if the price of refusing an unsafe assignment may be
one's job. Indeed, these rights, along with all other rights of workers,
are relatively empty in the absence of an effective right to a job. This is
so in several ways, as we shall see below.
We have, I believe, disposed of the first of the employer arguments
against the right to refuse. But what of the second argument, that if
workers are permitted to refuse assignments, plant discipline will break
down and chaos will result? We might look at the experience else-
where, for example in Canada, where legislation passed in seven prov-
inces during the 1970's guarantees the right to refuse:
Fears by management that health and safety issues would be
exaggerated out of proportion or used to further other collective
bargaining goals have not been borne out. In 1500 cases of work
refusal in Saskatchewan, all cases were considered to be legitimate
by Saskatchewan authorities. Experience has also shown that the
increased worker participation in making actual operational deci-
sions on health and safety has reduced potential for industrial con-
flict, in addition to raising awareness about about safety.[NJCOSH
Newsletter, May 1979, 1]
In Saskatchewan, the right to refuse is held by individual workers,
though groups of individual workers can exercise it together. The
worker or any member of the legally mandated union-management
health and safety committee can call in an inspector to arbitrate if
there is a dispute. (According to provincial officials, that occurs in
fewer than five percent of the cases.) The inspector is required to
render a decision as soon as possible, usually within twenty-four hours.
If an employer feels that the worker did not have "reasonable grounds"
to believe the situation was "unusually dangerous," the employer must
prove it before disciplinary action can be taken. The employee must
receive normal pay and benefits until the issue is settled. Even so, Jen-
nie Smyth of the provincial safety division reports,"The right to refuse
has been underused rather than overused. There have been many situa-
tions we hear of later in which people should have refused but were
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afraid to" (Witt and Early, 1980, 25).
Workers in Sweden also have a strong right to refuse. Individual
workers have the right to refuse dangerous work, and the government
mandated safety committee (more than half of whose members must
be elected by nonsupervisory employees) can shut down unsafe opera-
tions.' They can be overruled only by a government inspector. Even if
overruled, no worker can be punished for exercising the right to refuse
unsafe work or stop an unsafe operation unless the action was taken in
bad faith. Swedish central labor confederation attorneys report that
they know of not a single case in which a worker has been prosecuted
for deliberate abuse of these rights. Since the right of safety commit-
tees to stop dangerous work went into effect in 1974, use of it has re-
sulted in the intervention of government inspectors only about twenty-
five times per year in the country's 160,000 workplaces (Witt and
Early, 1980, 25).
Considering that the right to refuse is vital to the effectiveness of
the right to a safe job and to the right of informed consent to job
hazards, the case against the right to refuse would have to be very
strong indeed to justify its denial. That some unjustified refusals might
occur would certainly not be sufficient reason. Yet there seems to be no
reason to assume that workers would abuse the right to refuse, and
experience where the right has been in effect for some years argues
against the assumption. Thus the second employer argument fails.
The third argument is not directed against the right to refuse it-
self, but against the obligation of employers to pay workers who have
refused an assignment on the grounds that it is unsafe. One potential
buttress for this argument, that paying workers who have refused
would lead to massive abuse of the right to refuse, is not plausible in
light of the Canadian and Swedish experiences. Thus the argument
must rest on the claim that it would be an injustice to the employer to
require that a worker be paid after refusing an assignment, for this
would require the employer to pay the worker for not working.
Many union contracts in the United States actually provide for the
6. These committees also have the following rights: to veto any plans for new
machines, materials, or work processes for health and safety reasons; to decide how to
spend the company health and safety budget; to approve the selection and direct the
work of the company doctor, nurse, safety engineer, or industrial hygienist; to review
all corporate medical records, monitoring results, and other information on hazards;
and to decide how much time they need to do their safety committee work, all of which
must be paid for by the company (Witt and Early, 1980, 22).
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right of a worker to refuse an unsafe assignment, but do not guarantee
that the worker will not sacrifice his or her earnings by doing so.' The
result is that the right is seldom invoked. In the course of discussing
one case in which it was successfully invoked at a Republic steel plant,
Charles Spencer writes:
Article Twelve reads: "If an employee shall believe there ex-
ists an unsafe condition. . .so that the Employee is in danger of
injury. . .the Employee shall have the right. . .to be relieved from
duty on the job in respect to which he has complained and to re-
turn to such job when the unsafe condition shall be remedied." It's
not as simple as it reads. It's a bewildering and uncoordinated pro-
cedure that can be disastrous to any worker who invokes it. In the
thirty years it has been a part of the union contract, it has never
[until this occasion] been successful in correcting a single unsafe
working condition-which accounts for the shift towards depen-
dence on federal government intervention. Almost identical provi-
sions are written into all union contracts, and the experience has
been much the same.
Requesting to be relieved from duty until an unsafe condition shall
be remedied runs into such hurdles as (a) Is there really an unsafe
condition? who says so? (2) What's to happen to the workers "relieved
from duty" if there's no other work available? They can't be paid for
staying home. (3) Who shall decide if the unsafe condition has actually
been remedied? (4) What happens to the other workers who aren't
complaining and are willing to continue on the job?
There had been numerous instances at this plant where workers
who invoked Article Twelve and requested to be relieved from duty on
the job until an unsafe condition is remedied were "furloughed" for
several weeks, during which they were not paid a penny and in the
meantime other workers were assigned to and performed the same job.
If the newly assigned workers had refused, they, too, could have been
disciplined, even discharged. Although Article Twelve provides for the
Company to reassign workers to another job when they invoke Article
Twelve, it is the usual contention of the Company that no other job is
available. (Spencer, 1977, 213-14).
7. This is true for large international unions such as the Steelworkers
(U.S.W.A.), but many smaller unions have only recently begun to get any safety provi-
sions at all into their contracts. (Even if all union contracts did have such provisions,
that would cover only about 20 percent of the U.S. workforce.)
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Another more subtle way in which workers are discouraged from
exercising the right to refuse is explained in Rachel Scott's report of an
interview with Ken Bellett, a steelworker at Bethlehem's Lackawanna
plant:
The men themselves sometimes "forsake safety," he said, to
make production. "Most workers are on some kind of incentive pro-
gram. Every department has a different kind of incentive. Foremen
are also on incentive and top management have a bonus system.
Under contract terms, a man can refuse to do the job because it's
unsafe. The guy will holler but then go ahead and do it. Otherwise,
he's going to lose money that day. It's going to affect his earnings.
If it means shutting down a whole department, the other guys will
shoot you." The result is that often rather than shutting machinery
down for repairs, maintenance workers have to work"while it is op-
erating. [Scott, 1974, 57-58]
Recall that two days prior to the fatal explosion at the Burnside
foundry six workers were sent home for refusing to work near the pools
of water in the tapping pits. Six workers lost their pay for the remain-
der of a shift, the unsafe condition was not corrected, and four workers
lost their lives. Workers generally cannot afford to continue to refuse
until a job is made safe. In part this is because, as long as it is the
worker who is bearing the cost, if the employer can keep the operation
going without the worker in question, the employer need be in no hurry
at all to correct the unsafe situation. And a worker whose refusal would
result in the shutting down of an operation faces not only his or her loss
of earnings, but that of his or her co-workers as well. So the employer
can rest assured that this will rarely happen.
In view of these considerations, it seems clear that the right to
refuse an unsafe assignment cannot be effective unless (a) the worker's
normal pay is continued after the refusal, (b) some person or group
representing the workers, such as a safety steward or safety committee
has the power to shut down an unsafe operation with no loss of pay to
the affected workers, and (c) incentive programs such as those de-
scribed by Bellett are eliminated or somehow revised so that workers
are not constantly forced to make a trade-off between safety and earn-
ings. Condition (c) appears be be necessary both directly, and as a nec-
essary condition for (a) and (b).
A worker can, of course, complain to OSHA to get an unsafe situ-
ation corrected, but there are several reasons why this is no substitute
for a strong and effective right to refuse. First, although OSHA at-
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tempts to inspect within twenty-four hours situations in which the area
director determines that there is a reasonable basis for the claim of
"imminent danger," there is always some delay. The potential length of
delay has been greatly increased by the Supreme Court's 1978 Barlow
decision ruling that an employer may require an OSHA inspector to
obtain a search warrant before entering the premises. If the worker
stands to lose pay during that time, he or she is still in the position of
choosing between economic loss which the worker may not be able to
afford and doing the unsafe job for some period of time until an inspec-
tor arrives. If the inspector finds an imminent danger, he or she asks
the employer voluntarily to abate the hazard and remove endangered
employees from the area. If the employer refuses, OSHA, through the
regional solicitor, applies to the nearest Federal District Court for ap-
propriate legal action. Thus the potential for substantial delay is clearly
present.
In addition, OSHA gives top priority only to inspecting situations
where the area director determines that there is reasonable basis for
the claim of "imminent danger." An "imminent danger" is defined in
Section 13(a) of the OSH Act as "any condition where there is reason-
able certainty that a danger exists that can be expected to cause death
or serious physical harm immediately or before the danger can be elim-
inated through normal enforcement procedures" (Nothstein, 1981, 295-
96). A "serious violation," which is not top, but third priority for in-
spection, exists under Section 17(k) "if there is a substantial
probability that death or serious physical harm could result. .. "
(Nothstein, 1981, 347). There are obvious difficulties in distinguishing
in practice between an imminent danger and serious violation, so de-
fined. A boiler about to explode is an imminent danger, but a boiler
dangerously in need of repair could explode now or could rumble along
for another six months or more. That it was about to explode is, I
would guess, in the vast majority of cases, known only after the fact.
Moreover, there are other problems about what constitutes an immi-
nent danger. Health hazards, for example, are imminent dangers under
the Act if there is a reasonable expectation that toxic substances or
dangerous fumes, dusts, or gases are present and that exposure to them
will cause irreversible harm to such a degree as to shorten life or cause
reduction in physical or mental efficiency, even though the resulting
harm is not immediately apparent (Nothstein, 1981, 296). Yet when
the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union claimed
that pools of mercury on the floor of an Allied Chemical factory repre-
sented an imminent danger, and showed that at least twenty-five work-
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ers in the area had symptoms (tingling in hands and feet, tremors, irri-
tability, drowsiness, loss of memory, and sore gums) or chemical
evidence of mercury poisoning, the Department of Labor ruled that
"imminent danger" applied only when there was a "risk of sudden
great physical harm. . .like a boiler explosion" (Stellman and Daum,
1973, 12).8
For these reasons, and because it seems to me that "substantial
probability that death or serious physical harm could result" can be
sufficient to warrant refusal, I believe that a worker's right to refuse
cannot be limited to imminent danger situations. It must apply also to
serious violations and to serious hazards that are not violations of spe-
cific OSHA (or other relevant) standards. But in the case of a serious
violation, not only will there be a longer delay before an inspection, the
employer will normally be given some period of time (possibly days,
possibly months) in which to correct the violation while continuing in
operation. An employer can then appeal any aspect of the citation, ar-
guing, for example, that the situation is not a violation at all, or that it
cannot be corrected in the time allotted. This can drag the process out
still further. Or an employer can simply fail to correct the violation, the
fine that may result usually being much less than the cost of correction.
Now one response to all this is that OSHA's enforcement system
should be strengthened. There should be more compliance officers, and
8. Stellman and Daum report on the effects of mercury as follows:
. . .Whenever it is left open to the atmosphere, mercury vapor will be
present.
Mercury is stored mainly in the kidneys, but its most striking effects
are on the nervous system. A person with mercury poisoning can develop a
slight tremor of the hands and no longer be able to write properly. Before
that, there may be emotional problems such as anxiety, indecision, embar-
rassment, and depression, and also excessive blushing and sweating. Mer-
cury poisoning can lead to speech disorders and loss of coordination. The
victim may develop a staggering gait. Serious changes in mental ability
and personality may occurt. The expression 'mad as a hatter' refers to the
fact that most hatters used to become crazy after practicing their profes-
sion over the years. The mercury they used to soften the felt in the hats
poisoned them and eventually drove them mad.
Mercury also affects the vision and the eye reflexes. It particularly
affects the mouth and teeth, causing loose teeth and sore gums. The kid-
neys may also be damaged.
These serious and often irreversible effects make it imperative to pre-
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they should have, and use, greater enforcement powers, especially in
the case of imminent dangers and serious violations. This is certainly
true.9 But such enforcement should be a complement to an effective
right to refuse.
It is worth noting in this connection that there had been an OSHA
inspection several months before the fatal explosion at the Burnside
foundry. Workers had pointed out to the inspector the pools of water in
the tapping pit. The water was not cited as a violation in the inspection
report (CACOSH Health & Safety News, Vol. 6, no. 8, 1). Yet, after
the explosion, OSHA officials conducted a two-week investigation and
among the violations cited were these:
-Workers were required to work with and transfer molten
steel and slag from furnaces to ladles where the material could con-
tact water and wet surfaces.
-Water was allowed to seep into the tapping pits by improper
maintenance of ground water draining systems and ineffective seal-
ing of pit sides and bottom.
-During the weeks preceding February 16th, the furnace tap-
ping pits were not cleaned, thus allowing water pockets to occur
and increase the amount of water which would not be pumped out.
-The company did not provide adequate personal protective
equipment to prevent exposure of maintenance workers to the
hazards of burns.
-Repairs to a defective ladle tilting mechanism were at-
tempted while the ladle was suspended over the tapping pit. [Kaye,
1979, 22]
The company was ordered not to reopen until all the violations were
corrected.
One point this illustrates is that in many ways the workers them-
selves are the real experts concerning health and safety problems and
hazards in their workplaces. They are there all day, day after day, year
9. In 1980, OSHA had enough inspectors to inspect each workplace once every
eighty years; average fines were less than $60 per violation, and standards to control
the tens of thousands of toxic substances were being issued at the average rate of fewer
than three per year (Witt and Early, 1980, 21). These figures can be expected to drop
drastically during the Reagan administration.
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after year. They see, hear about, and experience directly the accidents,
near misses, headaches, sore throats, difficulty breathing, and the rest.
Providing workers with whatever technical training is necessary, and
empowering them to enforce their right to a safe and healthy work-
place by means of an effective right to refuse an unsafe assignment,
and to shut down an unsafe operation, is thus an eminently sensible
approach to workplace health and safety. It cannot work, however, if it
is not backed up by government intervention and enforcement in dis-
puted cases. A strengthened OSHA enforcement system is needed as a
complement. This would be a primarily preventive approach in two
senses. It would be more likely to prevent injuries, deaths, and illnesses
than a system which can only respond more slowly and often after the
fact. In addition, the more effective the power to shut down an unsafe
operation, the less likely workers would be to have to use it in order to
get hazards corrected.
To illustrate, let us look again at the Swedish experience:
The degree of incentive for managers to reach agreement with
workers on health and safety issues depends, of course, on the rem-
edies available to workers. ...
Since the right of safety committees to stop dangerous work
was established in Sweden in 1974, use of it has required the inter-
vention of government inspectors only about twenty-five times per
year in the country's 160,000 workplaces. All parties interviewed
agreed that this low figure was mainly a reflection of the effective-
ness of the threat of using that power, and not a reflection of work-
ers' reluctance to use it or of ignorance of their rights.
According to Bo Feldt, chief union safety committee member
at the 12,000-worker Volvo plant at Goteborg:
We have over 200 safety stewards in the plant and
their strength is in their ability to go to the foremen and
say, "Do that or I stop the job." The foremen usually do
it-whatever it is. If the men stop work, even if the gov-
ernment comes in and says work should continue, they
can't be punished. But our experience has been that
most of the stops have been correct stops. [Witt and
Early, 1980, 25]
As we have seen, all of the incentives presently at work in our
system seem to weigh against the employee exercising the right to re-
fuse, and against the employer responding by correcting the condition
promptly when the right is exercised. The requirement that employees
be paid in the event of a refusal or a shutdown of unsafe work should
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help to shift that balance, removing a strong disincentive to workers'
exercising the right to refuse, and providing an incentive for the em-
ployer to act promptly to correct the condition so as to prevent or end a
shutdown.
But, it may be objected, if there really is no other available work
to assign the workers, would it not be unjust to require the employer to
pay them? If it is unjust, then even if it would probably have desirable
consequences, it may not be justifiable. The objection has not been
satisfied.
My response is that it is not unjust. A worker is hired to do a job
and shows up prepared to do it. He or she has a right to a safe environ-
ment in which to do the job. If that is not provided, the employer has
failed to fulfill the employment agreement, as I argued in response to
the first employer argument. What would be unjust would be for the
worker, who has fulfilled his or her side of the agreement, to be forced
to bear the financial loss resulting from the employer's failure to do the
same.
Now it will be objected that I am assuming that the worker's
claim that the assignment is unsafe is true, but often that is just what
is at issue.
It seems to me that the worker must be given the benefit of the
doubt in this situation. For one thing, it is his or her life that is at stake
if the condition really is unsafe. The right of self-determination re-
quires that a decision so importantly affecting his or her life be made
by the individual. Moreover, the right to refuse could not be effective if
the worker stood the chance of losing pay, or even his or her job, be-
cause the situation is later found not to have been unsafe. The worker
might, of course, be right and still be "found" wrong. Or the worker
may be wrong but have had good reason to believe the situation unsafe.
So long as a worker believes in good faith that doing the work assigned
would seriously threaten his or her life, health, or safety, the worker
has, I claim, the right to refuse until the assignment is shown to be
safe.
There may, of course, be occasions where a worker sincerely be-
lieves an assignment to be unsafe but does not have what other in-
formed persons would regard as good reasons for that belief. I want to
claim that the right to refuse without punishment or loss of earnings
applies in such a case through an inspection and appeal process such as
that outlined below. The distinction between good faith belief and good
reason for the belief is implicitly recognized by not claiming for every
individual worker the right to shut down an operation he or she believes
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to be unsafe. The individual worker has the right to refuse for him or
herself, and to have a trained safety steward or committee with the
power to shut the operation down. Obviously, there may be difficulties
in determining that an individual's belief is sincere in the absence of
what informed and reasonable others regard as good reason for the be-
lief. Nevertheless, I am sure that there could be cases in which the
belief was obviously sincere, though ill founded. Partly because of this
indeterminacy, the burden should be on the employer to show that a
refusal or stoppage was not in good faith.
None of this would be an undue burden on the employer if the
issues could be resolved quickly. The Canadian and Swedish laws pro-
vide a model for how this can be accomplished. We need (a) prompt
inspection and resolution of any disputed refusal or shutdown situation
(within twenty-four hours, say); (b) an accelerated appeals process
available to both employer and workers (another twenty-four hours);
(e) workers' pay and benefits continue as usual; (d) workers not subject
to penalty for being wrong., but only for acting in bad faith; and (e)
any penalty to be imposed only after the employer has demonstrated to
the satisfaction of the appropriate reviewing body that the refusal or
shutdown was not in good faith.
That such a system is not unworkable seems amply demonstrated
by the fact that some like it are in operation elsewhere. That it would
require the commitment of additional resources to health and safety
administration is probably true. But again, the experiences in Canada
and Sweden do not suggest that such a system would result in an un-
manageable flood of refusals. Some such system seems a necessary con-
dition for an effective right to refuse an unsafe assignment, which in
turn is a necessary condition for satisfaction of the right to a safe job
and the right of informed consent to job hazards.
What of the employer argument that the right to be paid after
refusing an assignment would be tantamount to a right to strike with
pay?
The right to strike is the right to engage, with one's co-workers, in
the concerted action of withholding one's labor in an attempt to achieve
some common goal. The withholding of labor here is an economic tool
or weapon used in an attempt to wring some concession from the em-
ployer, or force the employer to honor some right of the employees on
pain of loss of income resulting from halted operations. This right is
guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
commonly called the Wagner Act.
Section 502 of the Wagner Act states: "Nor shall the quitting of
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labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally
dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such em-
ployee or employees be deemed a strike." This distinction seems to me
well-founded. In the case of refusing an unsafe assignment or shutting
down an unsafe operation, workers are not using their refusal in an
attempt to get the employer to honor their right to a safe job (though
one may hope that it will have this effect). They are simply exercising
their right to a safe job, which they cannot do, under the circum-
stances, without withholding their labor. The right to a safe and health-
ful workplace includes the right not to be exposed to unreasonable risks
to life or health. So, in the same way that one exercises one's right not
to incriminate oneself by refusing to answer questions one would other-
wise be obliged to answer, one can exercise one's right to a safe and
healthful workplace by refusing work assignments that involve unrea-
sonable risks to life or health-assignments one would otherwise be
obliged, under the employment contract, to accept. The withholding of
labor is not used as an instrument or weapon at all in such a case. The
purpose of such a refusal is not to bring economic pressure to bear on
the employer; it is simply to avoid exposure to unreasonable risk.
Thus we must distinguish between refusing an unsafe assignment
and shutting down an unsafe operation on the one hand, and striking
(including striking over health and safety issues) on the other. A strike
over health and safety issues might occur in an effort to get strong
health and safety provisions in a contract, or to enforce existing legal or
contractual health or safety provisions that are being violated, where
the violation does not present a serious and immediate threat to life,
safety, or health. Workers might strike to obtain access to information
needed for a research or educational project on health and safety. Fi-
nally, workers may have shut down an operation they deemed unsafe,
and gone through a process such as that outlined above, with inspec-
tion, ruling, appeal and final ruling. This much, I claim, they have the
right to do without loss of pay, and this much does not constitute a
strike. If now, they are dissatisfied with the final ruling and want to try
to get the employer to make the repairs or changes they deem neces-
sary for a safe operation, they may strike in an effort to achieve this.
I have argued that workers have a moral right to refuse an unsafe
assignment and to have an individual or committee representing work-
ers empowered to shut down an unsafe operation, and they have a right
to these things without loss of pay. I have attempted to counter em-
ployer arguments against the right to refuse and against the right to be
paid after refusing. I shall now report, briefly and without comment,
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the current legal status in the United States of the right to refuse.
In 1973, the Department of Labor issued Interpretive Rule
1977.12(b)(2) which states that under the OSH Act an employee may
refuse an assignment if the employee's apprehension is
of such nature that a reasonable person, under the circumstances
then confronting the employee, would have concluded that there is
a real danger of death or serious injury and there is insufficient
time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger
through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels.
The regulation prohibits employer discrimination against workers who
exercise this right.
Employers continued to take action against workers who refused
assignments on safety grounds, and challenged the regulation in result-
ing court cases. They argued that when Congress passed the OSH Act
it rejected a provision which would have authorized workers to refuse
unsafe assignments without loss of pay, and that the regulation would
grant workers the right to strike with pay. They warned that the right
to refuse would foster disharmony in the workplace, invite continuous
labor unrest, and even industrial combat. Lower courts had ruled in
conflicting ways on various cases involving the right to refuse, so the
legal status of the right was in limbo until February 26, 1980.
On that day the Supreme Court ruled on a case stemming from a
July 10, 1974 refusal of two maintenance workers employed by Whirl-
pool to climb onto a guard screen suspended twenty feet above the
work area. Several workers had been injured in falls through the
screen, and two weeks before the refusal another worker had fallen to
his death. OSHA had ordered the screen repaired, but no repairs had
been made. When the men refused, they were sent home for the re-
maining six hours of their shift and letters of reprimand were placed in
their files.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the interpretive regula-
tion, saying that it "clearly conforms to the fundamental objective of
the Act-to prevent occupational death and serious injuries." "It would
seem anomalous," wrote Associate Justice Potter Stewart, "to construe
an act so directed and constructed as prohibiting an employee, with no
other reasonable alternative, the freedom to withdraw from a work-
place environment that he reasonably believes is highly dangerous."
The letters of reprimand were ordered withdrawn as they violated the
prohibition against discriminatory action. The Court declined to rule on
the issue of the six hours' pay the two men lost, saying that issue was
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"not before the court." The pay issue was sent back to district court to
be reheard in the light of the Supreme Court's ruling."0
There is, as far as I know, no legal provision for workers, whether
individual workers, safety stewards, or committees, to shut down an
unsafe operation, though some union contracts may contain such provi-
sions. The original version of the "imminent danger" clause of the
OSH Act allowed compliance officers to close down an operation in
which an imminent danger was found. But the final version requires
that, if the employer will not shut down voluntarily, OSHA must go to
federal court.
Let me close this part of the discussion by trying to pull together
what we now can say about the notion of informed consent. It probably
is not possible to specify sufficient conditions for informed consent ei-
ther in general or in relation to specific sorts of risks or activities such
as workplace hazards, participation in scientific experiments, undergo-
ing surgery, and so on. There are too many different kinds of factors
which could be present in individual circumstances and which could
undermine the adequacy of information or the genuineness of consent.
One could not hope to think of all such possible factors and deal with
them in advance. But, if what has been said on the subject in this and
the preceding chapters is correct, we can say what several necessary
conditions are for informed consent to job-related hazards or risks:
1. The offer to the potential or actual employee that he or she may
accept or keep the job must not be a coercive offer. (There may be
different accounts of what constitutes a coercive offer, as we noted
in Chapter One, but that the offer must not be coercive for consent
to be genuine should not be controversial.)
2. The employee must not be unnecessarily unfree to a high degree,
as that notion is sketched out in Chapter One, with respect to the
choice of whether or not to accept or keep the job. (This claim is
more likely to be controversial.)
3. The right to know must be satisfied in at least all four of the as-
pects discussed in Chapter Two. (Another aspect of the right to
know will be proposed below.)
4. The right to refuse an assignment believed by the worker to present
a serious and immediate threat to life or health must be effective.
10. This account of the case and ruling is compiled from the following sources:
In These Times, March 12-25, 1980; Home News, February 27, 1980; LOHP Monitor,
Vol. 8, No. 2, March-April 1980; Daily World, February 28, 1980.
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This requires that the workers not be subject to discipline, loss of
job or earnings, and that a person or group in the workplace, repre-
senting workers, be empowered to shut down an unsafe operation
without loss of pay to the affected workers.
Two additional candidates for inclusion are the right to advance
notice of, and the right to veto or require changes in proposed new
machinery, materials and work procedures for health and safety rea-
sons. These rights are held by the Swedish joint safety committees
mentioned above, which must have a majority of their members elected
by the non-supervisory employees. These rights are clearly related to
informed consent, but it might be argued that they go somewhat be-
yond the notion of informed consent into the more general area of self-
determination, that is, participation in decisions which importantly af-
fect one's life. In defense of the claim that they do come under in-
formed consent, it might be pointed out that, without these rights, new
machinery, materials, and processes often are introduced into the work-
place with little or no prior notice, so that workers have no opportunity
to explore, in advance of using them, what the risks and hazards might
be. Hence, they cannot be said to have been accorded the right of in-
formed consent with respect to these new factors introduced into the
work environment. Moreover, once the new equipment or process is in
place it may be impossible-it will certainly be more difficult and ex-
pensive-to make appropriate changes or choose a safer alternative. I
would, therefore, claim that the right to advance notice is clearly a
necessary condition of informed consent. The right to veto or require
changes in plans might go beyond informed consent, but only on the
assumption, or to the degree, that conditions (1) and (2) on the above
list are satisfied. Indeed, I would add that the worker must not be un-
free to a high degree, whether or not that lack of freedom was
necessary.
Remaining in a job after a new hazard has been introduced can be
said to constitute consent to that hazard only if a worker is free to quit.
The fewer alternatives available to a worker, for whatever reasons, the
less free that worker is to quit. The less free the worker is to quit, the
more is the right to veto or require modifications in proposed new
processes or materials a necessary condition for consent.
I said above that the right of informed consent and the right to a
safe job, along with all other rights of workers, are relatively empty in
the absence of an effective right to a job. Let us now explore some of
the ways in which this is so.
First, the rights to informed consent and to a safe job have no
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application in the case of a worker who cannot get a job at all.
Second, the right to a safe job, or any other right, is empty in the
absence of effective guarantees against reprisals resulting from the ex-
ercise or attempted enforcement of the right. Employers are prohibited
from discriminating against employees for exercising the rights guaran-
teed them under the Occupational Safety and Health Act and under
the National Labor Relations Act. But workers know that employers
can and often do cite other reasons for a dismissal or other disciplinary
action, and there is no way to be sure one will get a favorable ruling if
one contests the action. Most important, the employer's position
prevails unless and until it is overturned by the relevant authority. And
such a process will take months at a minimum, more likely years. The
employer has every incentive for dragging the case out in the hopes
that the worker will become discouraged and drop it. Meanwhile the
worker is without any means of support, and all benefits such as health
insurance are cut off. The prospect of back pay in the event of a
favorable ruling, especially since one cannot count on it, is no help in
paying rent and buying food. Thus the threat of dismissal is an ex-
tremely powerful deterrent to a worker's exercising any rights against
the employer's wishes, despite legal "safeguards." Reversing the bur-
den of proof, so to speak, in dismissal and other discipline cases could
go a long way toward alleviating this problem (and would, in effect,
acknowledge that workers have a right to due process in disciplinary
matters generally, and property rights in their jobs which may not be
set aside without due process)."1
In general, a strong union is much more effective at ensuring that
workers may exercise their legal, as well as their contractual, rights
than the courts or government agencies. The latter are useful, even es-
sential, to a union's efforts in many cases, but they often are not very
useful to the individual without union representation. This is so in part
because of the problems of burden of proof and delay mentioned above,
in part because, if the individual still has his or her job, filing a com-
plaint is likely to bring further reprisals, including possible dismissal, in
11. In West Germany, the Protection Against Dismissals Act, passed in 1969,
bars the "socially unjustified" dismissal of any worker after a probationary period of
six months. The law is enforced by labor courts whose effectiveness originally was un-
dermined by long administrative delays (up to five and six years in some cases). Now
the unions can veto any individual discharge for "cause," and the worker stays on the
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part because the individual is unlikely to have access to the kind of
experienced legal advice and assistance needed to see the effort through
successfully, and finally because the personal, emotional, as well as
financial, cost of pursuing such a matter on one's own can be
unendurable. Thus, effective rights relating to unionization are fre-
quently necessary conditions in practice for the enforcement and exer-
cise of even those rights provided by law for all workers whether or not
they are union members. It is no wonder, therefore, that rights relating
to unionization are among those rights the exercise of which is most
likely to result in reprisals, as we shall see in the next chapter.
A third way in which the right to a job can be a necessary condi-
tion for the enforcement and exercise of other rights is that, in addition
to individual workers facing the threat of dismissal or other disciplinary
action, an entire workforce may face the threat of a shutdown or run-
away shop. Getting OSHA, or other agencies at local, state, or federal
levels, to set and enforce strong standards for the protection of the
health and safety, or other rights, of workers is no victory for those
workers whose employers' response is to pick up and move to a city,
state, or country with weaker regulations, or none at all. Just like the
individual worker who faces the threat of dismissal for refusing an un-
safe assignment, workers who face the implicit or explicit threat of a
shutdown or runaway shop in response to health and safety demands
confront the choice: risk your life and health or your job.12 This is not
an idle threat. Between 1969 and 1976, fifteen million jobs were lost as
a result of plant shutdowns. (DeCarvalho, et. aL, 1981, 1). And, of
course, the difficulties of an individual worker who loses his or her job
are multiplied by much more than just the number of workers affected
by a whole plant closing. The prospects of finding another job in the
area are far worse. An entire community can be devastated by the clos-
ing of a major plant.
I do not deny, by the way, that small and economically marginal
businesses may sometimes be forced to close by even relatively small
increases in costs. The Small Business Administration does make low
interest loans to help small businesses finance costs of compliance with
health and safety regulations. More should be done along these lines. It
should not fall on the workers to sacrifice their health and safety to
12. Employers are prohibited from threatening to shut down or move in order to
discourage unionization or to influence contract negotiations. They are not prohibited
from warning of or predicting a potential shutdown or move. For employees, the pros-
pect is threatening either way.
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save their jobs. These small and marginal businesses are not the main
problem in the current wave of shutdowns and runaways, however. Ac-
cording to MIT economist Bennett Harrision, "Globetrotting corpora-
tions will close profit-making plants if they aren't profitable enough,
and if they can make more elsewhere." He notes that Sperry Rand
closed a plant in Herkimer, New York because it wasn't making a 22
percent return-on-investment. Large conglomerates make money by
buying out an independent company, "milking" the profits out of it,
and then shutting it down. Then they get federal and state tax breaks
for investing in new equipment and relocating. A study of the New
England economy by Harrision and a colleague revealed that 100,000
businesses closed in New England between 1969 and 1976, costing a
million jobs. Big corporations account directly for 15 percent of the
shutdowns and over half of the job losses. But, in addition, many of the
small independent businesses that close down do so in the wake of cor-
porate shutdowns rippling through their communities (Dreier, 1980,
18).
Even a strong and militant union is largely defenseless against this
threat, given the current legal situation in the United States. Our laws
generally protect a company's right unilaterally to make all "invest-
ment" decisions. Yet this right is increasingly being questioned in view
of the effects of such decisions on the lives of so many others. When the
United Steelworkers of America filed suit to block a plant closing in
Youngstown, Ohio, the court said:
This Court has spent many hours searching for a way to cut to
the heart of the economic reality-that obsolescence and market
forces demand the close of the Mahoning Valley plants, and yet the
lives of 3500 workers and their families and the supporting
Youngstown community cannot be dismissed as inconsequential.
United States Steel should not be permitted to leave the Youngs-
town area devastated after drawing from the lifeblood of the com-
munity for so many years.
Unfortunately, the mechanism to reach this ideal settlement,
to recognize this new property right, is not now in existence in the
code of laws of our nation. At this moment, proposals for legislative
redress of economic relocation like the situation before us are pend-
ing on Capitol Hill. Perhaps labor unions, now more aware of the
importance of this problem, will begin to bargain for relocation ad-
justment funds and mechanisms and will make such measures part
of the written labor contract. However, this Court is not a legisla-
tive body and cannot make laws where none exist--only those rem-
edies prescribed in the statutes or by virtue of precedent of prior
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case law can be given cognizance. In these terms this Court can
determine no legal basis for the finding of a property right.13
The court here clearly recognizes the existence of a moral right of
workers to their jobs. The right referred to here is a kind of property
right, acquired, presumably, by working at a particular job. Legal rec-
ognition and protection of this right is a necessary condition for the
protection of other worker rights. As the existence of this right becomes
more widely recognized, there will no doubt be much controversy over
precisely what it amounts to. I shall not attempt to resolve that ques-
tion here. It may be useful, however, in thinking about the question, to
see how some other countries are handling it, and what some proposed
legislation in the United States looks like.
Sweden, West Germany, and the United Kingdom all have na-
tional legislation regulating plant closings and reductions in force (lay-
offs). Typically, corporations are legally required to give advance notice
to the national employment service, the union or works council, and the
individual employees likely to be affected before closing a plant or dis-
missing workers for economic reasons. The amount of notice varies
among the countries, and depending on the number of workers affected
and the body being notified. Before implementing such a decision (and
in some cases, before finalizing it), the company must negotiate with
the employees' union or the plant's works council concerning possible
alternative plans as well as the timing, distribution, and compensation
above the statutory minimum for any layoffs that do take place. If no
agreement can be reached, the matter goes to arbitration. Workers are
entitled to time off with pay to look for new jobs, and for retraining in
addition to severance pay, the minimum amount of which is established
by statute and is pegged to the amount of time the worker has been
employed by the company. In some cases the combination of notice and
negotiation results in an alternative to the proposed closing or cutback
being found. Often, the process is stretched out sufficiently so that a
planned reduction is handled by attrition and no dismissals are neces-
sary. When workers do lose their jobs, the proportion of income re-
placement provided by statutory unemployment benefits in the three
countries is far higher than in the United States, payments to their
Social Security accounts are continued on their behalf, and medical
coverage, provided by the national health care system, continues. Inter-
13. Steelworkers, Local 1130 v. U.S. Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 103 LRMM
2925, 2931 (N.D. Ohio 1980). Quoted in DeCarvalho, et al. 1981, 1-2.
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estingly, the United States is the only industrialized country besides
South Africa without national health insurance. 4
The National Employment Priorities Act was introduced in the
United States Congress in 1979. If enacted it would require advance
notification by companies planning to close or relocate plants. The
amount of notice varies from six months to two years, depending on the
number of employees to be affected. A National Employment Priorities
Administration would be created within the Department of Labor. The
Administration would investigate any proposed closing or transfer and
recommend ways to avoid the closing or to minimize its impact on em-
ployees and the community. Employees would have the right to transfer
to another facility of the same company at the same rate of pay. All
relocation and retraining costs would be paid by the company or the
federal government. If transfers were not available, the employer would
be required to pay affected workers severance pay amounting to 85 per-
cent of their average wage minus unemployment compensation for up
to 52 weeks. Retraining programs would be provided for affected work-
ers. Workers over the age of fifty would have the right to retire on
reduced benefits. Pension and health insurance payments for all af-
fected workers would be guaranteed for one year. The affected commu-
nity would receive a mandatory one-time payment of 85 percent of the
resulting annual tax loss.
Less comprehensive bills have been introduced in several state leg-
islatures, including those of Ohio, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Il-
linois. Clearly, federal legislation would be preferable, as states and
municipalities often end up competing with each other, to the detri-
ment of all of them, by offering concessions to businesses, such as tax
abatement schemes, lax environmental standards, anti-union "right to
work" laws, and a generally "favorable climate for business," in order
to attract companies (and hence jobs) or persuade them not to leave.15
14. Information in this paragraph is from Economic Dislocation, Joint Report of
Study Tour Participants, 1979, UAW, USWA, IAM.
15. Under section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, states may enact laws prohibit-
ing the negotiation of union security clauses in union contracts. A union security clause
provides that all employees within the bargaining unit must join the union after the
probationary period for newly hired workers, usually thirty to ninety days. This makes
it much easier for employers to break a union by hiring anti-union employees who, by
both example and argument convince others to become "free-riders." Many southern
states have such laws, resulting in the lowest percentages of unionized workers in the
country and the lowest wages in the country-promoting opponents of these laws to
call them "right-to-work-for-less" laws. (See Chapter Four for further discussion.)
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The textile industry, for example, has virtually deserted New England,
relocating either in the "Sunbelt," where few workers are unionized
and wages are the lowest in the country, or in "developing" countries
such as South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philipines. In these countries,
repressive regimes friendly to U.S. business guarantee low wages, a
well-disciplined workforce, and few or no health and safety or environ-
ment regulations. Indeed, the lure of these countries, where daily wages
correspond to hourly wages in the United States, is so great that even
the "Sunbelt" is losing some eighty jobs due to plant closings for every
one hundred jobs created there (Economic Notes, Vol. 48, No. 5).
Thus it is necessary that workers' rights be nationally and indeed inter-
nationally, guaranteed and protected if workers are not to be faced con-
stantly with the threat that enforcing and exercising their rights as
workers may cost them their very jobs.
Another approach to the protection of workers' rights to their jobs
in the face of plant closings is to guarantee them and/or their commu-
nity the right to buy out or take over the closed plant and run it them-
selves. This often would not be feasible, however, even if corporate co-
operation and access to initial capital were available. One reason for
this is that, as we saw above, corporations, especially conglomerates,
often run a plant into the ground, failing to reinvest profits in necessary
maintenance and modernization, siphoning them off into more profita-
ble investments instead. So the doctrine that the owners of a business
concern have the sole right to make decisions concerning the invest-
ment of profits from that business permits a company to let a plant
deteriorate, while extracting profits from its operation, and then to
abandon the plant-along with the employees and the community that
have sustained the business-when it is no longer profitable. Clearly, if
the right of workers to their jobs is to be protected, some restrictions on
such investment decisions are needed.
Where feasible, however, this approach could be an important
complement to legislation such as the National Employment Priorities
Act. There are several possible variations of this approach, which could
be applied individually or in various combinations."6 One variation
would involve additional legislation requiring a corporation that has de-
cided to close a plant to sell the plant to the workers or worker-commu-
nity coalition if they choose to buy it, and providing for feasibility stud-
ies and grants or no-interest loans in cases where a feasible plan exists.
16. These variations are set forth in DeCalvalho, et aL, 1981, § VI.
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Another variation would be nationalization. While this has been fairly
common in other countries, in the United States government financial
support, while increasingly accepted, has generally allowed for the con-
tinuation of prior corporate management. Under this proposal, the
workers or worker-community coalition would manage the plant.
A third variation would be an expanded use of the eminent domain
doctrine, whereby a city could condemn a property and take it over for
the public good, including specifically to insure job opportunities. Ac-
cording to the doctrine of eminent domain, the former owners must be
compensated, but the proper value may be determined by a jury of
community residents.
A fourth variation is where workers facing a shutdown seize a
plant and continue operating it on their own-either permanently or
until some other way is found to keep it open. This variation might well
be a necessary step, in practice, toward getting any legal recognition of
workers' rights to their jobs. Historically, workers have had to exercise
their rights independently of, and frequently in defiance of, the law in
order to gain legal recognition and protection of those rights. As we
shall see in the next chapter, this was true of both the right to organize
and the right to strike-and many government employees must still
defy the law to exercise their right to strike.
These approaches to protection of a property right of workers in
their jobs, though only partial, would be an important step toward es-
tablishing recognition of such a right, and recognition of a correspond-
ing limitation on the right of a corporation to make investment deci-
sions without regard for their impact on the lives of workers, their
families and communities.
But there are several reasons why I want to say that the right to a
job is more than a property right. Or, to put it another way, in addition
to the property right of a particular worker in a particular job, there is
a more general right of a person to a job. One reason I want to say this
is that the property right in a job does not apply to a person who is
unable to get a job in the first place. But I believe that person has a
right to a job.
Also, it seems plausible that the property right in one's job is
vested, so to speak, over time-becoming stronger the longer one works
at the job. This idea appears to be reflected in the standard union con-
tract provision that distribution of layoffs be by inverse seniority, and
in severance pay scales that are pegged to both rate of pay and number
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of years on the job.17 This seems appropriate when weighing the claims
of particular workers to particular jobs. But the worker with low se-
niority who keeps getting bumped off one job after another may put in
many years of work without ever acquiring a strong property right of
this sort in any job. Like the worker unable to get a job in the first
place, the right of this worker to a job is not adequately represented as
a property right in a particular job.
Moreover, it is, I think, commonly believed that if a property right
is (legitimately) overridden, that right is adequately recognized, and its
holder adequately compensated, if the full monetary value of the prop-
erty is paid him or her. If this is correct, then if a (legitimate) plant
shutdown results in a given worker becoming permanently unemployed
(because unable to get another job) his or her property right in the lost
job would be fully compensated if the appropriate proportion of pro-
jected earnings (up to 100 percent with sufficient years on the job)
were replaced. This might be done by some combination of unemploy-
ment insurance, severance pay and early pension, adjusted over time to
reflect as far as possible cost of living and wage increases that would
have been received on the job.
There are at least two ways in which this wage replacement would
not satisfy the worker's right to a job, even though it may well sat-
isfy-or compensate for-the property right in the lost job. First, if the
worker had been on the job only a short time, his or her property right
(assuming that it is vested over time) would not amount to much. And
if he or she is unable to find another job, this small amount does not
compensate hiln or her for the opportunity to earn a living that the lost
job represented. But if that amount is supplemented, say by welfare
payments (justified by subsistence rights rather than job rights), so that
the person has an adequate living, would there be any reason to say
that his or her rights were not fully satisfied? I think there would, and
this is the second way in which wage replacement would not satisfy the
right to a job. Even a worker who receives 100 percent of projected
income based on his or her property right in the lost job has a right to a
17. There are, of course, consequentialist considerations in favor of these prac-
tices, too, and these may be part of what gives rise to the property right and gives it
this particular shape. A worker who has worked at a job for many years is likely to be
older and have more difficulty finding another comparable job. One who has worked at
a job for several years is likely to be settled and have heavy home and family responsi-
bilities. But if these considerations were directly responsible for the practices men-
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job, a right which is not satisfied by wage replacement. Persons have a
right to subsistence even if they cannot make a positive contribution to
society. But they also have a right to make a positive contribution if
they can.18 The sense that one is making a contribution is a necessary
condition of self-respect.
People need to feel that they are useful, productive members of
society. This is not only a necessary condition of self-esteem and self-
respect, but of mental and physical health generally. 19 Thomas Cottle,
a sociologist and psychologist at Harvard Medical School, has studied
the emotional impact of unemployment for fifteen years. He calls un-
employment "a killer disease." "In our culture, working is close to the
center of life. Our culture teaches that if you don't work in an accept-
able way, then you're supposed to be depressed. And when job loss
lasts. . .a million symptoms show-tooth decay, kidney failure, alco-
holism, sexual infertility." Moreover, he says, the unemployed suffering
mental health problems often do not seek help. "A lot of people want to
go for help, but they don't want to bear the extra burden of feeling that
along with being out of work, they're also crazy."20
Research by Dr. Henry Brenner of Johns Hopkins University for
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress showed that every long-
term one percent increase in unemployment means: a 4.1 percent in-
crease in suicides; a 3.4 percent increase in admissions to state mental
hospitals; a 5.7 percent increase in homicides; a 4 percent increase in
admissions to state prisons; and a 1.9 percent increase in deaths from
cirrhosis of the liver resulting from alcoholism (Brenner, 1976, V). A
recent study of workers affected by a plant shutdown revealed a suicide
rate thirty times that of the general population (Cobb and Kasl, 1977).
18. The Swedish approach to job loss places highest priority on finding the af-
fected worker another job, rejecting the notion that early retirement, even with full
pension, is an adequate substitute for a job. This shows a commitment to the idea that
persons have a right to make a productive contribution to society. As a result, unem-
ployment in Sweden is just over 2 percent (Economic Dislocation, 10, 12, 15). Even
this is too high.
19. As I am using the terms, "self-esteem" and "self-respect," these attitudes
toward oneself are distinct but related. To esteem someone is to hold that person in
high regard, to have a favorable opinion of him or her. To respect someone is to ac-
knowledge his or her dignity as a human being. According to the standard view, all
persons are owed respect, even if one holds some of them in low esteem. I suspect that
it is psychologically impossible fully to respect someone whom one holds in very low
esteem. In any case, I am sure that very low self-esteem undermines self-respect.
20. Quoted in an Associated Press article by Jane See White, the Home News,
New Brunswick, NJ, October 4, 1980.
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Other studies have shown that unemployment is not only a source
of psychological stress in itself, but also a cause of other stresses, such
as having to move, becoming separated or divorced, all of which are
correlated with higher rates of mental illness. Losing a job can set in
motion a vicious cycle of other personal catastrophes that are much
more difficult to handle for people who lack both the material and the
emotional resources that a decent, stable job provides. Increased infant
mortality and increased child abuse have also been linked to
unemployment.21
It is, of course, likely that these effects would be ameliorated
somewhat if loss of income did not accompany loss of one's job. But
income, or other means of providing for subsistence (even at a fairly
high level of material well-being) would not satisfy the need for a sense
of oneself as a productive, contributing member of society. For most
people in our society, that sense is inextricably tied to holding a job.22
That is what it means to most of us to "pull our own weight." And it is
this sense of oneself as a productive, contributing member of society
that I claim is necessary for self-respect, self-esteem, and mental and
physical health generally.
It may be objected that people do not have a right to self-respect
or self-esteem, or to mental and physical health generally. So how can
the fact that a job is a necessary condition for these lead to a right to a
job?
We do not have rights to these things because, important as they
are, they are not things that other people, or society as a whole, can
provide or guarantee. But society can provide or guarantee some of the
necessary conditions for them, such as adequate shelter and nutrition, a
safe and healthy home and work environment, access to adequate
health care (both preventive and interventionist), educational and other
opportunities to develop knowledge and skills and undertake challeng-
ing tasks. To these, I claim, we do have rights. And, in our society at
least, the right to a job is one of these rights.
These same considerations, moreover, lead to the conclusion that
the right to a job must be understood, not as the right to just some job
21. Annual report of the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity,
1979, excerpted in the America Federationist, October 1979.
22. This need not be so in all societies. There could be and there have been
societies where there is nothing like a job, as we know them, to be had. Persons would,
I suppose, still have the need for a sense of themselves as productive, contributing
members, but it would take different forms in different kinds of society.
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or other, however pointless, demeaning, and unchallenging, but the
right to a job involving useful and challenging work.
In a paper discussing several studies of the mental health of work-
ers in various kinds of jobs, psychologist Charles Hampden-Turner
says:
Perhaps the most detailed and perceptive study ever made of
the condition of American workers was that of Arthur Kornhauser
(1964) who studied Detroit automobile plants along with other
smaller factories in the area. He used a measuring index of
"Mental Health." Those with "Low" Mental Health typically suf-
fered at least two psychosomatic symptoms. They had low self-es-
teem, periodic feelings of depression, poor social relationships, un-
controllable anxiety reactions, strong hostilities, chronic distrust,
and poor life satisfaction. The absence of such symptoms, plus a
positive feeling of self-worth and strong friendships, constituted
"High" Mental Health [Hampden-Turner, 1973, 33].
Only 34 percent of workers in large factories had high mental health
(compared to 51 percent in small factories, 69 percent in nonfactory
and 76 percent in white collar jobs). Moreover, the 34 percent with
high mental health were mostly skilled workers, all with more than six
years of steady employment and relatively secure seniority rights. The
percentage of workers with high mental health correlated with job skill
levels as follows: Skilled 58 percent; Semiskilled 35 percent; Repetitive
semiskilled 10 percent; Repetitive, machine-paced, semi-skilled 7 per-
cent. Only those with very similar pre-job characteristics were used in
making this comparison, so these differences cannot be attributed to
social background or education.
Hampden-Turner also reports the conclusion of a paper reviewing
seven studies of worker satisfaction and dissatisfaction: "Karsh con-
cluded that satisfaction is bound up with the degree to which the
worker can exercise his own judgment on his job and the extent to
which he can control the conditions affecting his work" (Hampden-
Turner, 1973, 39).
A special task force appointed in 1971 by the then Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, Elliot Richardson, said in its report:
We have sufficient evidence about the relationship between
work and heart disease, longevity, mental illness and other health
problems to warrant governmental action. That jobs can be made
more satisfying and that this will lead to healthier and more pro-
ductive workers and citizens is no longer in doubt. [Work in
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America, 1973, 114]
In a paper entitled "Meaningful Work" (1982), philosopher Adina
Schwartz argues that commitment to an ideal of autonomy for all per-,
sons leads to the claim that no one should be employed in routine, re-
petitive jobs in which workers decide neither the overall goals of the
enterprise nor how to perform their own jobs. She says that an individ-
ual achieves autonomy "to the extent that he/she rationally forms and
acts on some overall conception of what he/she wants in life," and she
argues that the empirical literature strongly supports the claim that
autonomy, so understood, is undermined by such jobs. To achieve au-
tonomy, people need to have opportunities to frame their own goals and
decide how best to pursue them. Not having such opportunities at work
undermines people's motivation and ability to be autonomous in the
rest of their lives. She quotes Arthur Kornhauser in support of this
claim:
Factory employment, especially in routine production tasks,
does give evidence of extinguishing workers' ambition, initiative,
and purposeful direction towards life goals. . . .[Kornhauser;
1965, 252]
The unsatisfactory mental health of working people consists in no
small measure of their dwarfed desires and deadened initiative, re-
duction of their goals and restriction of their efforts to a point
where life is relatively empty and only half meaningful. [Korn-
hauser, 1965, 270]
It is, I think, significant that the same conclusion emerges from a
commitment to the idea of autonomy on the one hand, and from the
more mundane-sounding commitment to guaranteeing, as far as possi-
ble, the necessary conditions for mental and physical health on the
other. Schwarz's conception of autonomy includes, and goes beyond,
self-determination, as I have been using the latter idea. As we have
seen in this discussion and in earlier chapters, the right of self-determi-
nation both supports and is supported by health and safety rights. If, in
addition, we are, or should be, committed to promoting autonomy, then
we have another argument for the self-determination of workers in
their work. It may not be an independent argument, however, for I
suspect that something like Schwartz's conception will turn out to be
the only plausible and coherent account of autonomy, and I futher sus-
pect that autonomy, so understood, is an important, perhaps the most
1984] 579
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important, aspect of mental health.
To sum up this part of the discussion, there are several ways in
which health and safety rights and the right to a job are connected.
The right to a safe job is empty if the cost of refusing an unsafe assign-
ment is one's job. It is also empty if the cost of strong legal and/or
contractual health and safety provisions is a shutdown or runaway
shop. The right to a job arises as a necessary condition for self-respect,
self-esteem, and mental and physical health generally. The right to a
useful and challenging job arises both as a necessary condition for
mental and physical health and from the right to a safe and healthy
job. Finally, a commitment to promoting autonomy also provides sup-
port for the right to useful and challenging work.
An exploration of the implications of the right to useful work
would involve us in assessing what gets produced in our society and
why. (Why are steelworkers and autoworkers, out of work as a result of
plant closings or cutbacks, not employed in production to meet urgent
human and social needs such as mass transit? Why are construction
workers out of work when there is an urgent need for housing-both
the renovation of existing stock and the building of new?) Exploring
the right to challenging work would require us to look at how the work
that is done is carried out, as we have begun to do here.
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Keeping Capital and Jobs at Home
Deborah Groban Olson*
The International Association of Machinists' (IAM) proposed
New Technology Bill of Rights is a fine concept because it clearly ad-
dresses the key new technology issue for workers which is: Who will
benefit from the new industrial revolution? How can workers gain con-
trol over the process instead of being its casualties, as they were of the
first industrial revolution? Yet the proposed Bill of Rights, as a United
States law, would only be applicable to technological changes being
made in the United States. Workers' rights to negotiate over technolog-
ical change, even under the proposed New Technology Bill of Rights,
are limited by management and stockholder decisions regarding the al-
location of capital. Crucial decisions about if and where to invest capi-
tal in new plants and equipment are not touched by this new Bill.
Various plant-closing bills1 have been introduced which seek to re-
quire companies to give adequate notice, provide adequate reasons for
closing plants, or to pay significant sums to aid workers and communi-
ties injured by plant closings. This legislation is intended to serve as a
deterrent to such closings and to give workers and communities time to
persuade the employer to stay, to find alternative uses for the facility
and work for the displaced workers. Many European countries have
such laws which they have used successfully to prevent unemployment
while assisting industries changing to more modern methods of produc-
tion.2 In recent years the United States political climate has not been
right for passage of such legislation. Politicians fear plant-closing legis-
lation will create a bad business climate and cause more businesses to
leave, despite the success of such legislation in Sweden, West Germany
* B.A., J.D. Univ. of Wisconsin. The author is a practicing attorney and Execu-
tive Director of Michigan Employee Ownership Center.
1. See W. SCHWEKE, PLANT CLOSINGS: ISSUES, POLITICS AND LEGISLATION
BRIEFING BOOK (1980), for a description and comparison of the National Employment
Priorities Act of 1979 and a variety of state laws and proposals.
2. See UNITED AUTO WORKERS, UNITED STEEL WORKERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, JOINT REPORT OF THE LABOR UNION STUDY
TOUR PARTICIPANTS: ECONOMIC DISLOCATION (1979). See also Bellace, An Update on
European Economic Community Law, 171 Daily Labor Report A-4, E-1-6 (Sept. 1,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Bellace].
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and the United Kingdom.' However, similar ideas are currently being
circulated under the concept of "Industrial Policies."4
Unless and until some legislation exists in the United States which
makes it difficult for companies to move plants to lower wage areas,
they will continue to do so.' It is not simply that plants in the unionized
frostbelt are moving to the lower wage, non-unionized sunbelt. Many
sunbelt states have lost plants to overseas low wage countries.6
"Whereas labor costs might vary by ten percent between regions within
the United States, the variation between the U.S. and the Third World
might be eight or nine hundred percent."'7 "A General Motors (G.M.)
employee in Kenya is paid $102.00 per month, in South Africa, $2.25
3. See generally supra note 2.
4.
The AFL-CIO urges the creation of a National Reindustrialization Board,
consisting of representatives of the public, labor and industry, which would
recommend the priority and magnitude of reindustrialization to be under-
taken in various industrial sectors and geographic regions, in light of the
national economic and security interests .... The Board should be em-
powered to direct the activities of a Reindustrialization Finance Corpora-
tion (RFC), which would make or guarantee loans or participate in loans
made by private lenders to finance reindustrialization projects approved by
the Board.
Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council on Reindustrialization, in Chicago, Illi-
nois (Aug. 20, 1980).
5. B. BLUESTONE, B. HARRISON, AND L. BAKER, CORPORATE FLIGHT: THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC DISLOCATION (1981) [hereinafter cited as
BLUESTONE].
6. Id.
[B]etween 1969 and 1976, frosthelt firms destroyed about III jobs
through plant closings for every 100 new jobs they created, while compa-
nies in the South and West shut down 80 jobs while opening 100.. .but
the Frostbelt-Sunbelt movement is not the whole story. In fact, there is
now a great deal of evidence pointing to disinvestment from the South as
well, jobs either lost or moved out of the country entirely. Surprisingly, the
rate at which manufacturing plants have been closing is actually higher in
the South than anywhere else; from 1969 to 1976, the odds that a plant
which employed more than 100 workers in 1969 would be shut by 1976
were better than one in three in the South. Part of what is happening in
the South, thanks to the international growth of corporations. . .is the
continuing movement of capital outside the U.S. Southern states would
seem to be experiencing-in a much more compressed time period-the
same 'turnover' of capital. ..as the north has experienced.
Id. at 15-16 (emphasis in original).
7. Id. at 52 (emphasis in original).
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per hour, and in Brazil (where GM fired 1,000 workers last year be-
cause they refused to give wage concessions), $1.80 per hour."8
Many previous concerns regarding plant location have been radi-
cally alleviated or eliminated due to the advances in telecommunica-
tions and computer technology which have occurred in the past ten to
fifteen years. Ford Motor Company, for example, has just completed a
new ten million dollar computer center in Dearborn, Michigan, a sub-
urb of Detroit. During the day five thousand Ford engineers and tech-
nicians across North America plug into the system, and at night their
counterparts in England, Germany, Switzerland and Spain have access
to the same information and thus work on the same project. Respond-
ing to basic decisions made in Dearborn, Ford staffers throughout the
world are able to relate to one another as if they were in the same
room. 9 Ford's new "world" car is a product of this type of computer
technology. Although Ford touts it as an "import fighter" in the United
States the car's parts are made in twelve countries throughout the
world, from Yugoslavia to Brazil.
General Motors will be producing four-cylinder engines for their
world cars in five countries, with no single country producing more
than one or two of the three engine types involved. This type of produc-
tion arrangement provides GM and Ford with considerable leverage
should an unexpected strike or shutdown occur in any single country.10
In the event of a strike or work stoppage, the present state of computer
technology allows GM and Ford to transfer work to another location,
even in another country. Companies in the United States have already
utilized this new technological capability to move work from a plant
experiencing a work stoppage, "struck work," to another plant."1
8. G. Horn, 25 C.E.R.P. Newsletter 2 (Sept. 1983) (published for limited circu-
lation by UAW C.E.R.P. Committee, Montrose, Michigan).
9. Address by H. Shaiker, Conference on the Auto Industry, Wayne State Univ.
Weekend College (March 28, 1982).
10. Shaiken, The New World Car, Detroit Downsized U.S. Jobs, The Nation,
Oct. 11, 1980.
11. Die work is the easiest for a company to move around and is facilitated by
the organization of world car production. It allows manufacturers to bypass labor trou-
bles. It is conceivable for a company to send a tape from a reprogramable robot welder
in Dearborn to a new plant in South America, which does not have skilled tradesmen,
to aid in the set up of an offshore operation. NC machines doing machining or die-
making can definitely transfer that more readily. Unbeknownst to UAW leadership at
the time, in a 1976 tool and die strike GM took computer tapes from the Cadillac
Seville striking unionized tool and die shops and, reportedly, sent them to other places,
even into the GM Flint, Michigan die making program. Interview with Bob King, Pres-
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Several studies have shown that prevailing wage levels, work force
skill level and amenities of life for executives are important factors in
plant location. Government regulations are less important except to the
extent that they increase the "social wage," and tax incentives are not
significant.1 2 In the past it was necessary for a manufacturing company
to balance these factors in some fashion and to locate someplace which
accommodated all these needs. However, it is now possible to accom-
modate all these needs either in separate places or to obviate some of
them by the use of new technology. Using systems such as Ford's Dear-
born computer center, corporations can retain their executive, technical
and management personnel in the United States while utilizing foreign
labor.
Specifically, by use of computer controlled production processes
and computer and telecommunication links between plants and man-
agement, the corporation can obtain most of the information and con-
trol it needs with very few managers or technicians at the production
site. Computers can maintain records on a worker's attendance and
time his work."2 Robots can be reprogrammed to do different work
without any mechanical retooling,14 and many computer controlled sys-
ident of UAW Local 600 by Steve Babson (April 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as King
interview].
12. BLUESTONE, supra note 4, at 64-76.
13. This has been a major concern of the Communications Workers of America
in their technology negotiations. See, e.g., C. Heckscher, Second Annual Summer
School on Extending Workplace Democracy, University of Michigan (Aug. 1, 1981).
14. The Robot Institute of America, an industrial trade group, defines a robot as
[a] reprogrammable, multifunctional manipulator designed to move mate-
rial, parts, tools, or specialized devices through variable programmed mo-
tions for the performance of a variety of tasks.
Reprogrammable and multifunctional are the key words. Factories
have long used automatic machines (like bottle cappers) to mass-produce
goods, but these devices could only perform one task at a time. New work
routines required new machinery or extensive retooling. The industrial ro-
bots now being installed have control and memory systems, often in the
form of minicomputers. These enable them to be reprogrammed to carry
out a number of work routines and, when necessary to be reprogrammed to
carry out even more.
The Robot Revolution, Time, Oct. 8, 1980, at 72, 75.
Take a welding machine in the stamping plant. The fixed mechanical parts
of that are not that adaptable, but the control system is tremendously
adaptable. You can sit there and in 30 seconds or a minute you can
reprogram in there a different sequence of welding operations, different
heats and things like that. Whereas, before if you wanted to make some
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tems can troubleshoot their own problems,15 eliminating the need for a
skilled maintenance person. Unlike past automation which involved sig-
nificant investment in hardware that became obsolete over time and
was expensive to replace, a reprogrammable robot can be taught new
tasks without major changes in its hardware. Its old function may be
changed by a simple, inexpensive change in its computer program'6 -a
major changes you might have to do some rewiring or put some new con-
trols in. You do not have to do that now.
King interview, supra note 11.
Flexible manufacturing systems-FMS. . .consist of computer controlled
machining centers that sculpt complicated metal parts at high speed and
with great reliability, robots that handle the parts, and remotely guided
carts that deliver materials. The components are linked by electronic con-
trols that dictate what will happen at each stage of the manufacturing
sequence, even automatically replacing worn-out or broken drill bits and
other implements.
Measured against some of the machinery they replace, flexible manu-
facturing systems seem expensive. A full-scale system encompassing com-
puter controls, five or more machining centers, and the accompanying
transfer robots, can cost $25 million. Even a rudimentary system built
around a single machine tool-say, a computer-controlled turning
center-might cost about $325,000, while a conventional numerically con-
trolled turning tool would cost only about $175,000.
But the direct comparison is a poor guide to the economies flexible
automation offers, even taking into account the phenomenal productivity
gains and asset utilization rates that come with virtually unmanned round
the clock operation. Because an FMS can be instantly reprogrammed to
make new parts or products, a single system can replace several difference
conventional machining lines, yielding huge savings in capital investment
and plant size.
Bylinsky, The Race to the Automatic Factory, Fortune, Feb. 21, 1983 at 51, 53.
15. The maintenance done on robots would require less skill than the
maintenance done in the past. Many of the computer systems now are
designed to do a lot of their own troubleshooting. If something is wrong,
you can ask the computer a question or ask the programmable controller a
question and it will tell you an answer. Whereas, before you would have
had to use your own brain to figure it out and to follow through a number
of logical processes, now the computer can do that. In some cases, rather
than repairing, say, some relays or changing some wires, you might go in
and pull a whole computer board out, plug in another one and send the
bad one to the manufacturer.
Ndw that the computer does its own troubleshooting, the computer repair person must
be highly skilled but the machine operators and maintenance personnel need less skill.
Therefore, fewer skilled workers are needed overall. King interview, supra note 12.
16. The Pragma A-3000 is a $110,000 robot licensed by General Electric to as-
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task which can be handled by telecommunication between computers
and requires few on site skilled personnel.
If a wage differential is significant enough to offset the disadvan-
tages of long distance, management can continue to enjoy the advan-
tages of suburban life in the United States while running plants in
Asia, Latin America or other low wage areas. Limited skill in foreign
workforces can be overcome more readily by use of computer controlled
processes and reprogrammable robots. Therefore, until there is a more
uniform wage scale around the world, or until there is legislation limit-
ing plant relocation or foreign investment, regulation of the introduc-
tion of new technology in the United States will have limited efficacy in
preserving jobs in this country. The New Technology Bill of Rights
proposal is important because it aims for greater worker control over
technology. But in addition to proposals for control over technology,
more attention must be paid to obtaining control over capital invest-
ment decisions.
Much has been done in the area of union control over investment
of pension funds since Jeremy Rifkin and Randy Barber first wrote The
North Will Rise Again, Pension, Power and Politics in the 1980's.
Since its publication the AFL-CIO and many of its affiliates have
adopted positions favoring increased union involvement in the invest-
ment and control of union pension funds.17 Yet the idea of employee
ownership has generally been shunned by the United States labor
movement,18 although there have been a number of recent union exper-
iments with it. Unions have had some bad experiences with worker
ownership, such as South Bend Lathe Corporation where workers gave
up their pension rights to get one hundred percent of the stock in their
company, but they did not receive voting control over the stock.19 Such
cases show that worker ownership is a mechanism which can be used to
limit rights gained by unions. However, with increased experience un-
ions are learning how to use employee ownership mechanisms to give
semble a compressor valve unit from twelve separate parts. Its two arms do totally
different jobs at once. It produces 320 units per hour without mistakes making it
roughly the equivalent of ten human workers. It can easily be reprogrammed to assem-
ble TV sets or electric motors or, theoretically, just about anything. Time, supra note
15, at 72.
17. See INDUSTRIAL UNION DEP'T, AFL-CIO, PENSIONS: A STUDY OF BENEFIT
FUND POLICIES (1980).
18. Olson, Union Experiences with Worker Ownership, 5 WIS. L. REv. 729, 737-
38 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Olson].
19. Id. at 747-752.
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employees control over their workplaces commensurate with their in-
vestment and risk. Some examples of successful employee ownership
efforts include Rath Packing Company,20 Hyatt Clark Industries,21 At-
las Chain Company,22 O&O Markets,23 and Eastern Airlines."
The European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market)
is making serious efforts to maintain controls over multinational firms
which operate in Europe by enacting in member states uniform or con-
forming legislation which covers many areas including labor relations.
In the 1970s they enacted directives which were adopted by all member
states concerning: equal pay for work of equal value; requirements that
employers "consult" with worker representatives before any collective
layoffs "with a view towards reaching agreement" on ways of avoiding
or reducing the number of permanent layoffs and of mitigating the con-
sequences of terminations; safeguarding employee rights by requiring
consultation with employee representatives prior to any transfers or un-
dertakings including acquisitions, mergers and takeovers of businesses
or part of a business; as well as provisions on occupational safety and
health.25 There are two proposed EEC directives, the Vredling Initia-
tive and the Fifth Draft Directive on Company Law which, if adopted
by member states, will greatly expand worker representatives' knowl-
edge and involvement in making major corporate decisions.
The Vredling Initiative would impose a duty on employers of com-
panies with one thousand or more employees in any configuration
within all the EEC countries to provide yearly information to their em-
ployees' representatives yearly without the need for a specific request
for the information. 6 Where an employer proposes to take a decision
which is liable to have serious consequences for the interests of its em-
ployees in the EEC, the employer will be required to forward precise
20. Id. at 753-759.
21. Id. at 760-763.
22. Collins, Atlas Chain Employees Close to Plant Takeover, Scranton Times
(Sept. 11, 1983).
23. D. CLARK & M. GUBEN, FUTURE BREAD: How RETAIL WORKERS RAN-
SOMED THEIR JOBS AND LIVES (1982) [hereinafter cited as D. CLARK & M. GUBEN].
24. Loeb, Eastern Air Says 3 Unions Agree to Concessions, Wall St. J., Dec. 9,
1983; Salpukas, Eastern's Unions Agree to Pay Cut and Accept Stock, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 9, 1983; Barber, The Wage Investment and Union Role in Management Agree-
ment At Eastern Air Lines (IAM's press release background information, Dec. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Barber].
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information to the subsidiaries concerned "in good time before the final
decision is taken. 12 7 Local management must transmit the information
to the worker representatives who are to be given at least thirty days to
review it before the action can be taken. The worker representatives
have a right to consult with local management regarding the informa-
tion.2 8 The recently revised Fifth Directive applies to public limited lia-
bility companies employing more than one thousand persons.29 Member
states can elect to have one or two-tier board structures. If a two-tier
structure is used, the member state must provide that at least one-third
and at most one-half of the seats on the supervisory board will be filled
by employee representatives. In a one-tier board, nonexecutive mem-
bers would appoint the executive members of the board. At least one-
third and not more than one half of the nonexecutive members of the
board would be employee directors. Two other alternative models are
also permitted which would achieve the same type of participatory
rights as these two proposed directives.30
Labor law in the United States makes no attempt to control multi-
national firms in any of their actions outside the country and does not
give workers any right to a voice in the types of decisions, such as plant
closings and layoffs, on which European worker representatives are al-
ready consulted. There is no serious legislative effort underway to ob-
tain anything like the Vredling or Fifth Directive rights for American
workers. However, in the United States, collective bargaining has fre-
quently been a stronger tool than in many European countries because
under section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act3 1 a union here
is recognized as "sole collective bargaining agent." Therefore, we must
look to collective bargaining as the most promising immediate source
for innovation in obtaining more employee control over investment and
disinvestment decisions in the United States.
The recent pact between the IAM and Eastern Airlines is a very
good example of an attempt to obtain many of the Vredling and Fifth
Directive rights through collective bargaining. In December, 1983,
Eastern Airlines entered into a precedent-setting agreement with its
workers and their unions after the unions were allowed to make a com-
27. Id.
28. Bellace, supra note 2, at E-2, 3.
29. Id.
30. Id. at E-3, 4.
31. Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Compar-
ative Study From An American Perspective, 28 AM. J. CoMP. L. 367 (1980).
[Vol. 8
109
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Keeping Capital and Jobs
prehensive analysis and audit of Eastern's financial conditions:
Eastern workers agreed to invest 18 percent of their wages (22 per-
cent in the case of pilots) in return for one-quarter of the com-
pany's outstanding stock and a new form of 'profit sharing' pre-
ferred stock. In exchange, theV secured a broad range of new rights
to participate directly in management of Eastern: from member-
ship on the Board of Directors, to unlimited access to financial in-
formation, to participation in decisions concerning the business
plan and capital expenditures, to involvement in the design of new
facilities, to innovations in a number of day-to-day issues affecting
individual workers.32
The parties refer to the one year agreement as a "trial partnership"
between Eastern and its workers which was agreed to after six years of
constant confrontations involving threats of bankruptcy, strike break-
ing, and default. If the union role in management provided by the
agreement is effectively implemented, the unions and their members
will have achieved an entirely new level of authority and a significantly
expanded role in the operations of the company.
This agreement could represent a watershed event in the relation-
ship between labor and management in the United States At the least,
this agreement provides unions a new threshold they can demand com-
panies meet when approaching workers for financial relief. If a com-
pany is serious about obtaining this relief, it must be willing to give
back something of value (like a significant ownership share in the com-
pany) and it must be willing to give over to its workers a range of
powers, rights and responsibilities that have previously been strictly the
prerogatives of management. Specifically, the Eastern agreement pro-
vides for: (1) employees to place eighteen percent of their salaries in a
wage investment program to purchase twenty-five percent of Eastern's.
common stock and to purchase $260 million in participating, preferred
stock (which has a liquidation preference ahead of common stock and
is convertible to common); (2) employees to provide increased produc-
tivity savings (however, all contractual work rules and benefits have
been maintained); (3) Eastern to work with labor on revision of its bus-
iness plan; (4) Eastern to work with labor on its financial restructuring
program; (5) ongoing union review of business plans, major capital ex-
penditures and expansions; (6) union right of appeal to Eastern's Board
32. Barber, supra note 24.
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of Directors; (7) continuing unlimited access to Eastern's financial in-
formation; (8) IAM-designated member on Eastern's Board of Direc-
tors; (9) job security and reduction of outside work contracts; (10) joint
review of labor-management relations; (11) participation of union in
design of facilities; (12) joint review of supervisory and lead roles and
functions; (13) implementation of effective employee involvement pro-
gram; (14) joint board for IAM pension fund; (15) full disclosure of
consultant hiring; (16) joint review of employee benefit plan
administration.83
While it is too early to tell if all of this will work as designed, this
ambitious plan includes the types of disclosures required by the EEC's
Vredling Initiative. The board representation is not as great as that
required by the Fifth Directive, yet the ownership of twenty-five per-
cent of the stock in a publicly traded company is a very significant
interest. However, it is the vast array of other agreements which clearly
show the value to the union of obtaining virtually total disclosure and
of proposing a true partnership with an employer seeking concessions.
Although when a union or group of unions is willing to get into the
driver's seat of a company and help run it, it does take on some risks,34
it also has much more control over decisions which affect job security.
For example, in the Eastern agreement union representatives are in-
volved in reviewing all consultants and outside contractors hired in or-
der to determine if union members might be able to do that work and
save both jobs and money.
In 1980, Wendell Young, President of United Food and Commer-
cial Workers International Union (UFCW), Local 1357 in Philadel-
phia, began investigating employee ownership as one of several new ap-
proaches to the problem of plant closings and job security for his
members. He found the lack of notice of plant closings to be the great-
est obstacle to solving work loss problems. In their 1980 negotiations
with Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A&P), UFCW locals 1357
and 56 gave up their cost of living allowances (COLAs) in exchange
for an agreement by A&P to give twenty days advance notice of any
proposed store closings and first right of refusal for employees to buy
the stores.
In July of 1982, A&P announced the closing of twenty-two stores
in the Philadelphia area. The union proposed an employee buyout of
33. Id.
34. Olson, supra note 18, at 780-814.
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these stores. 35 A&P reconsidered, sold two of the stores to the employ-
ees and created a new subsidiary, Super Fresh, in the twenty others
and in a total of fifty-six stores in the Philadelphia area. The Super
Fresh stores have an extensive program of worker involvement in man-
agement, a reduced fixed wage package and a unique profit-sharing
plan. Super Fresh contributes approximately one percent of the gross
annual sales per store (which keeps its labor rate at nine to ten per-
cent) to an employee controlled trust fund.36 Sixty-five percent of the
fund is distributed to employees as cash bonuses, and thirty-five percent
is contributed to the employee owned and operated investment fund, to
provide start-up capital loans for democratically controlled employee
owned businesses in the Philadelphia area. The fund expects to receive
$400,000 from the Super Fresh profit-sharing plan in the fiscal year
ending in July 1984. This fund will be augmented by leveraging in sev-
eral ways. It is a member of the Small Business Administration's Phila-
delphia Small Business Investment Corporation through which it can
obtain three to fourfold leveraging on money it invests in employee
owned businesses. The fund is also seeking loan guarantees, rather than
grants, from foundations and corporations.37
The two A&P stores purchased by former A&P employees and
members of Locals 1357 and 56, were reopened as employee-owned
and operated. Each of the two is a separate cooperative. They work
together and intend to form a service cooperative for themselves and
any additional employee owned stores or businesses in the area.38 All
the employees in these stores are union members. They have negotiated
a contract with the UFCW which is similar to that of other organized
supermarkets in the area. Joe Osner, meat manager of one employee
owned store, says:
We are doing better than we expected. We are competitive. We do
not feel any conflict of interest with the union. If it were not for
35. Presentation by Wendell Young, President of UFCW Local 1357, the Na-
tional Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) and Coalition Against Plant Shut-
downs (CAPS) Conference in Los Angeles (March 4, 1983). See also D. CLARK & M.
GUBEN, supra note 23.
36. Telephone interview with Jay Guben, Director of O&O Investment Fund
(July 20, 1983). Super Fresh Markets & UFCW Locals 56 and 1357 Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements (Signed May 12, 1982).
37. Telephone interview with Jay Guben, supra note 36.
38. Telephone interview with Andrew Lamas, Staff Attorney, Philadelphia Asso-
ciation for Cooperative Enterprise (PACE) (July 26, 1983).
1984]
112
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss3/12
Nova Law Journal
them, we would have no jobs. They got the consultants and negoti-
ated with A&P for the sale to us. We are successful. The union is
successful. We owe them a lot, and we work together well. I have
heard the theoretical question raised, 'If the workers own the store,
who needs the union? Won't they decertifyT' But I have yet to hear
one word on decertification from anyone here. We are out to prove
that workers can run a successful business. The union has done
nothing but help. 9
The O&O Markets model chosen by the UFCW is intended to trans-
late the Mondragon, Spain industrial cooperative model into a union-
ized American context. 40 The UFCW's Wendell Young stated this goal
as follows:
It would have been of no long term benefit to the Union to help
create jobs that would undercut the jobs of other UFCW members
in the same industry. This concern for continuity meant that the
model that evolved would necessarily have to be sensitive to the
presence and prerogatives of organized labor in whatever area of
the economy in which it is applied.4'
Rath Packing pioneered the concept of using employee stock own-
ership plan (ESOP) financing and a one vote per person voting trust to
hold and vote the employees' controlling interest in a bloc. The initial
goal was to preserve jobs and keep the business going, retaining the
pension plan and master collective bargaining agreement wage stan-
dards, while taking temporary wage deferrals to be repaid through
profit-sharing.42 However, in September 1982 Rath terminated its pen-
sion plans 43 and in 1983 filed a Chapter 11 petition seeking to renegoti-
ate its collective bargaining agreement with the UFCW. Rath's later
troubles were substantially caused, however, by having one of the oldest
facilities in a seriously troubled industry, excess capacity, and the loss
of a line of credit.44 Thus, the Rath structural model should still be
39. Telephone interview with Joe Osner, Meat Manager, President of the Board
of Directors of the Front Street O&O Market, and President of the Board of Directors
of the O&O Fund (July 20, 1983).
40. D. CLARK & M. GUBEN, supra note 23.
41. Id. See introduction by Wendell Young, at iii.
42. Olson, supra note 18, at 753.
43. Id. at 759-60.
44. Warneke, Rath: Reorganization May Save Iowa Plant, Omaha World-
Times, Nov. 10, 1983.
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seen as a valuable model of a cooperative employee stock option plan.
In situations which are not employee buyouts, employee ownership
is frequently used as a type of employee benefit because of the tax ad-
vantages available to employers. Employee ownership may be a limited
tool for obtaining worker control over investment decisions and new
technology, simply because workers do not have the capital to com-
mand an important voice in most corporations. However, since the tax
laws first made employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) advanta-
geous45 to employers in 1973, their use has grown enormously. There
are over 5,000 ESOP companies in the United States46 Many large
firms have some form of tax credit or tax-deductible ESOPs (General
Motors, Ford, Chrysler, McLouth Steel, Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel,
Pan Am, Eastern, Western, and Republic Airlines, to name just a few).
Most of these plans provide for a pass through of stock voting rights to
the employees. The more traditional ones, such as the Ford and Gen-
eral Motors tax credit ESOPs, simply serve as another fringe benefit,
and provide for individual members to vote their allocated stock.4 7 Pan
Am 8 and Eastern provide for union representation on the board of di-
rectors. The Chrysler plan 9 gives union members a fifteen to twenty
percent interest in the company which is the largest single bloc of
Chrysler stock, although it is not designed to be voted conveniently as a
bloc. Douglas Fraser, retired United Auto Workers Union (UAW)
president, sat on the Chrysler Board. So far the UAW has not con-
vinced Chrysler to make that seat one which is appointed by the union,
however the union has asked for more board representation in negotia-
tions. 50 The above are important initial efforts to gain some permanent
voice over crucial corporate decisions in exchange for union wage con-
cessions. However, the examples of Eastern Airlines, the United Food
Workers, and Rath Packing show that much more can be done to ob-
tain worker and union control over corporate decisions. Stock owner-
ship can be a useful tool especially if it can be voted as a bloc. First
right of refusal to buy facilities, advance notice of proposed closings or
sales, creation of an employee owned and operated investment fund,
45. Olson, supra note 18, at 732-737 nn.1-5, 15.
46. C. ROSEN, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: ISSUES, RESOURCES & LEGISLATION, A
HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS (1981).
47. Olson, supra note 18, at 773.
48. Id. at 778.
49. Id. at 775.
50. Interview with Douglas Fraser, former President UAW at Wayne State Uni-
versity, Detroit (Dec. 14, 1983).
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and continuous information and input into corporate decisions aimed at
decreasing contracting out are other useful tools.
In order to stem the tide of capital flight, more must be done to
obtain local control over capital assets and investment decisions. It is
on these decisions that job security ultimately depends, whether or not
new technology is involved. Employee ownership is not the only way to
significantly increase involvement in such decisions. Many other forms
of codetermination or worker involvement in management exist. But
most of those which involve worker participation in making investment
decisions without ownership are mandated by legislation, as in the case
in certain Western European countries.5 1 Since such laws do not yet
exist in the United States, American workers and unions need to
broaden bargaining horizons to protect themselves. They should utilize
the concept of employee ownership and negotiate for other controls,
such as those on contracting out, to preserve existing capital resources
in this country before a significant amount of those resources are per-
manently invested overseas. Over the past fifteen years an enormous
number of American firms have expanded overseas because low foreign
wages are attractive and new technology made foreign expansion easy
to do so. This trend is not likely to end unless it is curbed by legislation
on plant closings, local content and tax laws which do not encourage
foreign investment. The governments and labor organizations in the
EEC countries have determined that labor involvement in making cor-
porate decisions at the highest levels is essential to balance the needs of
the worker population against the needs of the corporations. The same
is true in the United States. However, the political process here has not
advanced to such an understanding. Therefore, private action by Amer-
ican workers, unions, organizations, and concerned communities is nec-
essary to preserve a viable capital base in this country since many
United States-based corporations no longer need to produce their goods
here.
51. INT'L LABOUR OFFICE (ILO), WORKER PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS
WITHIN UNDERTAKINGS (1976 and 1981). See also Bellace, supra note 2.
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New Technology: a Catalyst for Crises in Collective
Bargaining, Industrial Discipline and Labor Law
A Personal Account of Williams v. Pacific Maritime
Association and International Longshoremen's Warehousemen's
Union*
Stan Weir**
Eighty-two San Francisco longshoremen, myself among them,
were fired from their jobs on the same day in 1963. The purpose of this
article is to report from a participant's viewpoint this event; the events
leading up to this mass firing; its context in the automation of the long-
shore industry; and the subsequent litigation, lasting until 1981, which
was generated by these discharges.
I. The Firing
While we longshoremen who were the objects of these firings were
at work on June 19, 1963, letters were delivered to each of our homes.
They contained notices that we had been "deregistered" (discharged)
as full-time employees of the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA), an
employers' association. Somewhere in the port of San Francisco in the
preceding weeks we had been tried, found guilty and received the maxi-
mum sentence-economic capital punishment-all by secret process.
These events resulted in the first mass firing of longshoremen repre-
sented by the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union (ILWU) since that union was founded in the general west coast
maritime strikes of the 1930s. It also marked the first time that the
ILWU had ever been party to the discharge of dock workers.
*384 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for defendants and ordering trial); 421 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1970) (sus-
taining trial court rulings dismissing individual defendants and claims for punitive and
exemplary damages); 617 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101
(1981).
**Publisher Singlejack Books, San Pedro CA. Former Instructor, Labor Educa-
tion Programs, Univ. of Illinois.
116
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss3/12
Nova Law Journal
Written under the letterhead of the Joint Port Labor Relations
Committee (JPLRC) of the PMA-ILWU, the identical and unsigned
discharge letters did not specify charges. Instead, they told us only that
the firings had been accomplished "pursuant to the provision of #9 of
the 'Memorandum of Rules Covering Registration and De-registration
of Longshoremen in the Port of San Francisco. . . . Such de-registra-
tion was based upon the determination of the Committee that you have
violated the applicable rules." Upon studying this provision, we discov-
ered that it contained a list of all the "applicable rules," ten of which
outlined specific violations; the eleventh, and last rule, allowed the gov-
erning parties to fire "for any other cause." This failure to specify
charges was a violation of the Memorandum of Rules which contained
in its text a model of the letter to be sent as notice of de-registration. In
the appropriate position on the model was a blank space under which
were the instructions, "Here list the charges."
In addition to this omission, the joint committee's letter of June
19, 1963 addressed to each of us read:
In the event that the Joint Labor Relations Committee re-
ceives within fifteen days after the date of this letter, a detailed
written statement signed by you, satisfactorily demonstrating that
there is no ground for your de-registration, and requesting a hear-
ing, you will be given a hearing, at which time you may show
cause, if any you have, why such de-registration should be
rescinded.
Even had we been willing to endure the submission, it was impossi-
ble for us to write demonstrations of our innocence as asked, or in any
other form, for we were denied a list of charges. The ILWU had a
national reputation as a progressive union yet every concept of demo-
cratic due process was being violated. There was no precedent for what
was happening to us and, although we knew that the rank and file exer-
cised limited power, we were witnessing a complete reversal in the ba-
sic role of a union. This was not the result of some veiled form of grad-
ual bureaucratic drift; the top officialdom of the ILWU was
collaborating with employers, literally doing management's job out in
the open by institutionalized means. The joint parties to the collective
bargaining agreement obviously felt free to select victims and then de-
sign new rules to dispose of them in brazen disregard of long-estab-
lished procedures.
At least twenty-five of us who received the deregistration notices
responded by asking for an immediate hearing. All requests were
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granted and appeal hearings were set for July 9, 10, and 11, 1963, in
the cargo shed on Pier 24 of the Embarcadero in San Francisco. Our
attempts to learn the charges and prepare a defense continued to prove
futile. Union officials would not meet with us or answer our phone calls,
registered letters or telegrams. A state of confusion, with many con-
flicting rumors, existed within the general membership of ILWU San
Francisco Local 10. The joint committee had accomplished the firings
without making the identities of the victims known to the rest of the
bargaining unit. Since the rank and file were no more organized than
we there was no vehicle for communication between them and those
who were terminated.
In an effort to exhaust all possibilities, on July 7, I sent the follow-
ing telegram to R.R. Holtgrave, then Secretary of the JPLRC, with
copies sent to ILWU International President Harry Bridges and PMA
President Paul St. Sure:
RECEIVED YOUR LETTER NOTIFYING ME THAT I AM
TO HAVE HEARING JULY 1 1TH. I WILL BE PRESENT
BUT YOU HAVE NOT YET TOLD ME THE CHARGE YOU
INTEND TO TRY ME FOR. I AGAIN REQUEST YOU SO
INFORM ME AND NOT FORCE ME TO APPEAR WITH-
OUT PREPARATION.
Holtgrave's answer by return wire on July 9th, became the one break
in the official silence that lasted until the opening day of the hearings.
It read:
YOUR UNION IS YOUR EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REP-
RESENTATIVE ON YOUR GRIEVANCE. UNLESS YOU IN-
TEND TO PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY WITH THE EM-
PLOYERS UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT YOU SHOULD CONSULT WITH
YOUR UNION REGARDING THE HEARING.
Section nine of the amended National Labor Relations Act, com-
monly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, allows employees to bypass their
union and to process their own grievances with management on an indi-
vidual basis. This was of no use to us because our fight was to get union
representation, not get away from it; to get collective protection and
put an end to the vulnerability we were experiencing as individuals. In
a last ditch effort just hours before the appeal hearings, I sent a copy of
Holtgrave's wire to Local 10 President James Kearney along with an
appeal for representation and the provision of charges. Even though
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Holtgrave's response designated the union as the terminated dock
workers sole legal representative, I received no reply.
On each of the hearing days the scene in the waiting room outside
the makeshift hearing chambers on Pier 24 had a "death row" atmo-
sphere. We gathered by numbers as instructed and awaited our turns.
None of us was broke or broken, but the experience was taking its toll.
There was none of the good humored banter that is commonplace at
dock worker gatherings. We had all now experienced unemployment
for three weeks. It was futile to file new job applications without listing
our employer for the previous four years. The PMA had denied our
unemployment insurance claims on the ground that we were "voluntary
quits," that is, we had followed a course of conduct that we knew could
end only in termination of employment. There was a silence among all
of us at the hearings because the futures of whole families were about
to be determined. Many of us could not expect to ever again find em-
ployment that equaled our chosen occupation. Ninety percent of our
number were black. They, and others as well, faced the specter of re-
turning to their marginal jobs of pre-waterfront years. We too had tem-
porarily withdrawn to that "low" which is the hope for individual
escape.
The door to the hearing chamber opened. A sergeant-of-arms
stuck his head out and called a name. One of our men answered, rose
stiffly and went inside. The door opened again a few minutes later and
another name was called. But what had happened to the first man? It
wasn't hard to make an accurate guess. As each hearing concluded the
appellant was being ushered out a rear exit, down an alternative stair-
way and off the pier. For us, the contrivement exposed the true nature
of the hearings and made us angry. When my turn came I entered and
took the lone chair facing the judges on the other side of the long table.
Local 10 President James Kearney and business agents Joe Perez and
Dick Harp nodded hello to me but R. R. Holtgrave of the PMA and
his two assistants did not look up from their papers. These six com-
prised the Joint Port Labor Relations Committee (JPLRC). It was
they who had signed the official deregistration notices. Now they were
acting as their own appellate court.
The biggest unknown for me, in that room at that point, was the
presence of eight or nine other men. The man in the boW tie seated at
the center of the table I guessed to be Richard Ernst, head counsel for
the PMA. The younger man next to him was obviously an assistant. In
the next seat was Tommie Silas, formerly a local union business agent
with a longtime reputation as an errand runner for Harry Bridges.
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Both Silas and the other former Local 10 official next to him had
stacks of paper in front of them, but Kearney and the other union offi-
cials did not have a scrap. Clearly, it was Silas and his colleagues who
were being cast in the role of prosecutors yet they held no elected of-
fice. Where did they get the authority?
My memory began to provide some possible explanations. These
men were members of the Joint B List Committee who five years ear-
lier had processed our applications and interviewed us along with about
seven hundred others who were being recruited to the industry. The
formation of this committee was viewed by some longshoremen as a
defeat for Local .10. Previously, from the beginning of the union, Local
10 had held substantial control over entry to employment in the port.
With the establishment of the Joint B List Committee, control over
hiring was now in the hands of the employers and the leadership of the
international union. I surmised that the B List Committee must have
been the body that tried us in secret and decided to discharge us. In
process were the beginnings of a move by the international union to
essentially eliminate Local 10's control of the grievance procedures by
which firings had been held to a minimum. Local 10 President Kearney
had thus far refused to make an issue of it before the rank and file. To
avoid open battle he was rubber stamping the victories of the PMA.
The mass discharge was going to remain a smokescreen for a continued
power grab, as will be seen later in this text.
JPLRC Secretary Holtgrave confirmed my chain of deductions. In
his role as hearing chairman he read to me from a list of rights and
instructions for appellants and stated that I was not to be allowed
counsel, the right to face accusing witnesses, nor the opportunity to
produce witnesses in my own behalf. I would be informed of the gen-
eral area of the rule infraction that I had committed, but I could only
learn the exact detail of the charges by going to the Joint PMA-ILWU
Records Office two weeks later. The chairman concluded his instruc-
tions to me with a statement to the effect that I was now free to make
any defense in my own behalf that I deemed appropriate. I questioned
Holtgrave and learned that the committee was going to make its final
judgment before we had the opportunity to learn the exact nature of
the charges in the Records Office and none of the signatory judges
would be present at that time to hear our defense. Holtgrave then
turned the hearing over to Silas who quickly stated that over a four-
year period I had falsified entries on job dispatch records to give me
more hours of work than I would have received had I not, in effect,
crowded into line ahead of co-workers during the daily hiring process. I
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countered that his allegations were false. It was my word against his
and the only evidence of my innocence was the forms on which I had
allegedly made dishonest entries. Not surprisingly, they had somehow
been destroyed.
I warned all present that we would not submit to this frame-up
silently. I rose to leave but before I could reach the exit door the assis-
tant PMA attorney called me back. He had a set of questions designed
to get me to say that I considered the discharge action a form of dis-
crimination according to Section Thirteen of the union contract. That
section established an exclusive grievance procedure for anyone who
claimed he had been discriminated against for racial, religious, or other
reasons. The assistant PMA attorney's attempt to curtail our ability to
file suit in civil court failed. During a trial in federal court eleven years
later, this same man would be one of two former PMA attorneys to
testify in the plaintiff's behalf.
On the night of July 11, just three hours after the hearings con-
cluded, President James Kearney called a regular business meeting of
Local 10 to order. He then made a motion which demanded that the
eighty-two men who had been fired for alleged falsification of job dis-
patch sign-in sheets be returned to their jobs at once. Even if finally
proven guilty, thirty or more of the men who had been fired would have
been first offenders. The rules called for discharge only on the third
proven offense. A second motion was immediately made from the floor
by Hal Yanow, a former bodyguard of Harry Bridges. It demanded
that those of the eighty-two men who were fired for paying their dues
late eight times or more during their four years of employment be rein-
stated because there was no rule in existence which made that a disci-
plinary offense. All the men in question had each paid the standard one
dollar fine for each day they had paid late and none were in arrears at
the time of discharge. Many of those sitting in that meeting could
probably have been terminated under this very same rule. The recorded
minutes of the July 11, 1963, meeting show that both motions passed
by an "overwhelming majority."
Kearney presented these motions at the next meeting of the
JPLRC. The PMA contingent voted "nay." Due to the ensuing dead-
lock the motions were passed up to the next organizational level, the
Area Labor Relations Committee, for a decision. A member from each
side of that joint committee was present. They called themselves to or-
der and Local 10's motions were denied. With that vote, Local 10's
short and concerted effort to save us was dead.
About ten days later we lined up in front of the Joint Records
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Office. We wanted to exhaust every possibility for learning specifically
the charges against us. Our efforts produced little more information
than we already had. B List Committee members, one from each side,
were present to confront us with our supposed rule violations and an-
other stalemate ensued. They still were unable to present us with any
evidence of record falsification and insisted on their right to apply ret-
roactively the heretofore unheard of rules that had put us all in double
jeopardy.
Several days later we began to hear conflicting rumors from the
waterfront. We had heard that two of the firings had been rescinded
and that there might be an extension of the appeals procedure. Approx-
imately twenty-five of us gathered to talk over what had happened. As
a result of that meeting we sent a delegation to the PMA headquarters
to learn if any further appeals were possible. The answer was no. This
response and the lack of rank and file support demanded that we make
a decision, either to drop the whole matter and walk away or resort to
the courts. Few of us felt there was really a choice. Most had relatives
still working on the front. We were determined to prove our innocence
and we knew that- without jobs as longshoremen, many of us would be
demoted to poverty level incomes. Before relating a short history of our
seventeen-year legal battle it is necessary to provide some of the histori-
cal background for the discharges and their direct relationship to the
employers' present and planned investments in mechanized and com-
puterized cargo movement machineries.
IL. Historical Background
The first clarification that must be made is that the eighty-two
men fired in 1963 were not members of the ILWU. We worked under
its jurisdiction, but by agreement between the PMA and the union we
were not allowed to join. We were "B" men, part of approximately 750
men who began work on the San Francisco piers in 1959, eventually
known as the '59 men so that differentiations could be made as more
"B" men were brought into the industry in 1963, 1965, 1967 and 1969.
The San Francisco '59 men were the first to enter the shipping industry
in that port without membership in the ILWU since the formation of
the union. In effect, we were second class citizens.
Earlier, in 1934, west coast longshoremen had established the most
complete form of rank and file control over the daily hiring process
known to waterfronts around the world. As a result of an arbitration
award in 1934 by the Franklin Roosevelt administration's National
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Longshoremen's Board, longshoremen in each port took virtually total
control of recruitment in the industry. The local unions, rather than the
shipping companies, began to issue work permits to new longshoremen.
In San Francisco, "permit men" quickly became probationary members
of the union and at the end of a six 'month period they became eligible
for full union membership. After their formal induction into the union,
local union officials applied for and routinely obtained registered status
for them. This procedure involving a substantial form of workers' con-
trol was weakened during World War II and came under full attack in
the 1950s with the introduction of new technology.
In 1952, top military transportation authorities, acting under the
auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, began to urge the na-
tion's ship operators to jettison traditional man-handled or by-the-piece
cargo operations in favor of new methods utilizing large metal contain-
ers moved in and out of new type vessels by giant cranes or on truck
trailers. As the first containership was being introduced in the Pacific
trade by Matson in 1957, the waterfront employers went to ILWU
President, Harry Bridges, with a proposal for a new method of recruit-
ing longshoremen. They wanted a pilot program that would take con-
trol of that process from the rank and file and place it in the hands of
the top officials. After several attempts, Bridges was able to overcome
rank and file resistance to the program and implemented it the follow-
ing year.
During 1958, the appointees to the B List Committee screened
over ten thousand applicants and made selections for employment. In
June and August of the following year, over seven hundred of these
applicants went to work as full time hold-men, those who work inside
the hatches of the ships in port. The conditions of their employment
were new and in many ways consistent with the "B" label. Not only
were they denied membership in the union, but in order to attend union
meetings they had to sit in a segregated section of the balcony in the
meeting hall.
It is hard to imagine a more restrictive definition of "permanent
status" employees than the one applied to us as '59 B men. It did not
matter that our incomes were often less because we got the work that
was left after the A men (union members) took their pick of the jobs
available each day. If we took a second or part time job outside the
industry--or enrolled in a school-we were subject to deregistration.
We received the same basic pay as the A men, but in other conditions
of employment there were substantial dissimilarities. The inability to
participate in the election of union officials, for example, meant that we
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too often worked without the benefit of on-the-job union protection.
This arrangement was formalized by the creation of an especially strin-
gent set of disciplinary rules for governing our conduct. At the same
time, there was no limitation put on the time we had to serve before
getting union membership and A status, even though we had been
promised that "graduation" would occur within a year, at maximum.
The official reason which circulated around the waterfront for the
creation of a B category of longshoremen was that most of the "old-
timers," who were registered prior to 1948, found hold work difficult.
In their advancing middle age they had taken the less physically ardu-
ous jobs on deck and dock. This meant that in the years just prior to
the recruitment of the B workers, most of those doing hold work were
hired off the street on a daily basis. The recruitment of a new cadre of
hold men was a necessity for the employers but there was a problem.
The planned container technology soon to be introduced would elimi-
nate thousands of jobs in a few years. It would be difficult to lay off
"recent hires" if they had a voice in the union. The B list program was
the attempted solution to the employers' dilemma.
The program. had additional dividends for the employers. It per-
formed the function of splitting the work force, which would be partic-
ularly valuable if resistance to the introduction of new technology de-
veloped. There was also another factor which also cannot be
overlooked; on the Pacific Coast waterfronts and around the world,
hold workers are traditionally the most militant section of the labor
force. Not only are they the youngest and most active, they comprise
the tightest unit within the total longshore gang operation because they
work deep in the hatch where entry by supervisors can involve some
risk.
The '59 B men came to the waterfront at the time when the first
mechanization and modernization (M&M) collective bargaining agree-
ment was being negotiated. It was ratified by the A men on a coastwide
basis in 1960 and went into effect in early 1961. Bridges had made a
bargain in which most of the work rules won by the union in the 1930s
were sold in return for the creation of a special money fund. It gave all
A men retiring at age sixty-five a bonus of seventy-nine hundred dollars
or the bonus could be used by those who wanted to take early retire-
ment.1 Thus, the disappearance from the front of the generation which
had built the union was hastened.
1. In the second six-year mechanization contract which went into effect in 1966,
the bonus was raised to $13,600.
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In 1960, the port of Los Angeles was the second larget on the
west coast. Its ILWU Local 13 organized the strongest resistance to
this agreement and was the only local whose majority voted against the
contract. The local came under hard attack. A popular business agent
was fired after representing men involved in a stop work action. Bridges
negotiated a special and more restrictive version of the mechanization
agreement for that port and subsequently a majority of Local 13 ap-
proved it. Short of waging an all-out rebellion, they had no choice. We
in San Francisco were unaware of any resistance in Los Angeles until
we found ourselves working cargoes originally destined for that port.
In San Francisco, the only group resistance to this agreement,
however modest, came from the B men. During the long negotiation
period, we badgered A men informally on the job about the concessions
that Bridges was making to the employers. The resentment among us
became very apparent in the early months of 1960. True to its word, as
soon as we had put in six months on the job, Local 10 formed its inves-
tigating committee and began to process us for membership. They were
stopped by higher level authority within management and the union.
The freeze on A registrations was rationalized because the automation
of the industry was just ahead. Many jobs would be eliminated and the
jobs of even senior men were in jeopardy in certain ports. The men in
those ports with high seniority had a right to move to ports not yet
"distressed." They took precedence over B men. Our admission to the
union and registration as A men would have to wait until the impact of
containerization was studied on a coastwide basis.
The top officials of the local and many rank and file members ex-
pressed deep doubts about these delays. There was talk that the inter-
national union and the PMA were using automation as an excuse to
encroach upon the rights of the local. Fear of the effects of the coming
containerization was running high but it was hard for many of the
workers to suddenly develop a distrust of Bridges. He regularly came to
local meetings and talked as though the introduction of the new tech-
nology and a resolution of the B men's concerns, was months instead of
years ahead. Over half of the membership of Local 10 were black men.
In vast majority they had come to the Bay area in search of jobs at the
outbreak of World War II. Circumstances had led them into longshore
work. Unlike the experience of many of their friends who entered other
industries at that time, the ILWU did not segregate its black workers
into "colored" locals and for them Bridges symbolized that positive ex-
perience. It was extremely difficult for them to now believe that this
same man was manipulating them.
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Not long after the freeze on A registrations and union member-
ship, the executive board of Local 10 passed an unexpected motion
which urged that the B men elect representatives to the executive
board. At the next B men's meeting, three representatives were elected.
I was one of them. All three of us openly expressed our own feelings,
and those of the men who had elected us, against the mechanization
agreement. We were under full attack the moment we arrived at our
first board meeting. What some members called the "Bridges group,"
led by International Representative William Chester, raised so many
objections to our presence that no business could be conducted. Several
months later two of the B representatives, William Davis Edwards and
Robert Marshall, were fired.
On the first day that the mechanization agreement went into ef-
fect, hold men found themselves working sling loads of hand-handled
cargo that were double or more the weight of those that had been
hoisted in and out of hatches the previous day. Thus, the elimination of
the work rule that had for twenty-five years limited man-made sling
loads to 2,100 pounds was the first change to be felt. Other work rule
losses were experienced in turn. Principally among these was a rule the
longshoremen had won in order to protect the autonomy of each work
gang. The rule denied walking bosses the right to fire individuals from
gangs and make those who replaced them work short handed; thus
eliminating the employer's ability to single out so-called troublemakers.
"If they want to fire one of us they will have to fire us all", had been
the 1930s approach to the problem. The new agreement circumvented
the rule by cutting the number of hold men in a gang from eight to
four. Eight men were still required on hand stowage operations so half
that number were dispatched to the gangs with the artificial label of
"swingmen" who could then be fired singly.
While these changes in the relations between supervisors and
workers on the job were being made there was little change in the na-
ture of cargo handling methods. Despite the negotiation of a so-called
"automation" contract in 1960, the mass introduction of container
technology, as some had suspected, did not occur until the late 1960s.
For half a decade employers were able to run hand-stow and discharge
operations, virtually free of work rules. Production almost doubled.
Thus, the longshoremen were directly subsidizing the purchase of the
very machines that would kill over half their jobs by 1980.2
2. As of 1982, there were less than eight thousand active registered longshore-
men working on the west coast of the United States.
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As productivity climbed, so did accident rates. Between 1958 and
1967, U.S. waterfront employers reported a 92.3 percent increase in
the number of workers' compensation cases "despite efforts to engineer
problems out of the workforce. ' '3 This condition increased their open
lobbying of the A men for entry into'the union, but the long and grad-
ual growth in their boldness was reversed in one night by Harry
Bridges. The founding president of the ILWU addressed a compulsory
meeting for B men in early 1962. His blunt speech climaxed with the
statement that "[we B men] were getting black marks all the time and
not just from the employer side." Minutes later Bridges returned to the
microphone and announced that the B men no longer had any repre-
sentatives of their own because "we are representing you," and added
that if we wanted responsible advice we should seek counsel from a B
man and close friend of his, Pat Tobin (later to become the ILWU
representative in Washington, D.C.). Local 10 vice president Walter
Nelson chaired the meeting and was the only local union official pre-
sent. He heard Bridges totally wipe out the representation of B men on
the local's executive board. The international union had just violated
the local union's autonomy, yet Nelson made no challenge and the
meeting adjourned.
For the next six months there was far less communication between
A and B men on the job. The silence of the B men was so sustained
that probably it was construed as a threat. Informal pressures were
being felt off the job as well as on. Waterfront talk that originated in
official circles had already made it clear that the cargo movement
needs of the war in Viet Nam were sustaining shipping activity at high
levels and that rapid attrition in the ranks of A men had pushed their
average age to fifty-six. Late in 1962, Harry Bridges went to a Local
10 membership meeting to announce that he had a "Christmas present
for the B men." There was applause. Many A men had sons, nephews
or relatives on the B List. Bridges climaxed his speech with the promise
that sometime early in 1963, the B men would be promoted to the A
list. He added that a new B list would be recruited to take their place.
The audience's mild elation disappeared with that last bit of news;
there were groans but no formal objections.
Regardless of the seeming good humor with which Bridges made
the "promotion announcement," the development presented his leader-
3. Paper by T. H. Bryans, "The Australian Waterfront Labor Scene," No.15,
p.14, delivered at the International Container Terminal Operators Conference, Oak-
land, CA. (October 1979).
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ship, its supporters in Local 10 and the employers, with the potential of
a deep threat. Over five hundred new members would enter the head-
quarters port of the ILWU at one time, all with strong voice and vote.
These men had already shown a willingness to attend local business
meetings in large numbers even though they had been relegated to seg-
regated balcony seating. Unlike so many of their elders, they were not
awesome supporters of the union's international president. For almost
four years they had watched Bridges attend meetings in which he per-
sonally frustrated the efforts of rank and file A men to bring B men
into the union. An important and additional crisis factor existed be-
cause the participation of A men in union meetings had dwindled with
their advancing age, to the extent that the meeting quorum was re-
duced to four hundred. Enfranchising the '59 B List meant that all of
Local 10's long-established power relationships were about to be
changed. The men who governed the industry were faced with a whole
series of unknowns. The Bridges leadership and the employers had the
choice of either letting democratic processes naturally determine the
course of change or to intervene. They chose the latter.
Harry Bridges attended another Local 10 membership meeting in
early 1963, during which he announced the near finalization of plans to
open A registrations or "remove the freeze." But he concluded by re-
vealing that there were about a hundred "troublemakers" among the B
men who would have to be eliminated from the industry altogether.
Previously the plan had been to hold any workers who did not meet
existing membership standards in B status for a penalty period. But
this action was not even contemplated since none among the B men was
awaiting disciplinary trial for any alleged infractions. Bridges' proposal
was booed and openly rebutted from the floor. It was probably right
after this rejection of Bridges that the three top officials of Local 10,
headed by James Kearney, made plans to induct the nearly four hun-
dred B men who had already been processed by the local's own Investi-
gating Committee. Two weeks later they did just that over Bridges'
objection. When the ceremony ended, Bridges took the microphone to
state that the A registrations of those just initiated would be held up.
The secretary-treasurer of the local, Reino Erkkila, was outraged and
announced that he had only that day seen, in the PMA offices, the
signed and completed registrations of the men who had just taken oath.
Bridges returned to the podium once more to state that that action
could be "reversed." The next morning the new members of ILWU
Local 10 were dispatched to the job as A men. By noon the word
spread around the front that their registrations had been rescinded.
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The rumor proved true. The next day they were returned to their jobs
as B men.
Bridges went back to the local membership for a second try in
May. He presented a motion that would allow some higher authority to
fire a hundred or so "troublemakers". In support of his own motion he
urged that those present not allow "a few to stand in the way of the
many." Everyone knew what he meant. Over four hundred were to be
denied A status until the membership allowed him to fire four of five
score unnamed but already marked men. The motion passed. Hal Ya-
now jumped to a floor microphone and called attention to the union's
flag in its stand behind Bridges' chair. In six-inch gold letters across its
breadth was the statement: "An injury to one is an injury to all." Ya-
now was one of the handful who understood that there are no
rainchecks in the fight against injustice.
It is doubtful that more than a few longshoremen were yet aware
that the B List Committee was the administrative vehicle for carrying
out Bridges' motion. There was a perception that Bridges now had the
power to fire whomever was on that list and with this came an even
deeper disintegration of on-the-job relationships. Which one hundred
among the more than five hundred B men were on the list? I, for one,
experienced a marked increase in isolation. Not only had I been one of
the B representatives, there was talk that I was handicapped by having
previously held membership in both the Sailors' Union of the Pacific
and the United Auto Workers, both of which were said to have leader-
ships that Bridges held in disrepute for political reasons. As has already
been revealed, I did in fact occupy a place on Bridges' list, but in those
weeks there was hardly a B man who was not examining his past to
find something within it that might now cause his undoing. Given all
the unknowns it is doubtful that many were at peace. Rumors went out
that several workers had begun to go daily to the offices of the interna-
tional union and sit hat in hand waiting for an audience with William
Chester, a union official, who it was said, had the power to launder
them. Even among those who would surely be deregistered, hope ex-
isted side by side with despair. Each of us felt that somehow maybe we
would make it and we outwardly conducted ourselves in postures of
normalcy. There are experiences far this side of "holocaust" which
make the ordinary conduct of European Jews about to enter oven com-
pounds absolutely understandable.
On the same-day that we eighty-two received deregistration let-
ters, the hostage A registrations were released. The survivors of the
"promotion process" entered the union in an atmosphere of defeat. At-
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tainment had come without satisfaction. There was a sense that the
position they occupied was actually closer to A-minus and was possibly
still revocable. It wasn't hard to conclude that anyone could have been
among the deregistered if the new and previously unknown set of disci-
plinary rules had been applied retroactively to his employment record.
"If they want to bad enough, they can get anyone."
The men who governed the industry had won an important victory.
They had conducted an offensive and not once had their opposition
stepped outside the containment of existing collective bargaining rela-
tionships. So successful was their strategy that it was not until 1971
that open rank and file resistance to the mechanization concessions,
though still in established channels, resurfaced. The rebellion took the
form of the longest longshore strike in American history. But the eight
years between 1963 and 1971 gave PMA members the time needed for
the mass introduction of the container moving machineries that are
now being roboticized. In 1964, or one year into that eight year period,
the first real victims of longshore automation on the west coast became
the plaintiffs in Williams v. PMA.
III. The Legal Battle
The Pacific Maritime Association made it relatively easy for us
disenfranchised longshoremen to organize. It is probable that most of
our motivating anger was directed at ILWU officials, but the employers
provided an immediate and practical reason for unification. The PMA,
as reported in Part I, had denied our claims to unemployment benefits.
In order to appeal that denial we were faced with the necessity of hir-
ing a lawyer. The initial step in our self-organizing drive was accom-
plished in the lines at the unemployment insurance office on the Mon-
day following the Friday that we were fired. Late in July, after we had
exhausted all appeals, approximately thirty of us met in San Francisco
at the home of one of our number, Cleo Love. Our informal organiza-
4. Late in 1971, ILWU members voted to strike by a 96 percent majority. After
101 days, a Taft-Hartley Act injunction sent them back to work for the "80 day cool-
ing off period." With that time served, 93 percent voted to resume the strike. The basic
goal of the ranks was to eliminate the employer's right to bypass the hiring hall when
recruiting steady men for container terminal jobs. They twice rebuked their interna-
tional president for refusing to negotiate an end to this concession. After 30 more days
of picketing they accepted the third contract offer brought before them by Bridges but
it too contained the paragraph that had given a large portion of control over hiring
back to the PMA.
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tion and division of labor needed structuring. We formed the Long-
shore Jobs Defense Committee (LJDC) and elected a steering commit-
tee which included James U. Carter, Willie Hurst, Arthur Jackie
Hughes, Willie Jenkins, Jr. and Arthur Winters, with Eathen Gums,
Jr. and me as co-chairs. This committee became the core group that
held the LJDC together for the next seventeen years.
On that first meeting night, after developing a plan to track down
and bring in the others who had been fired, the steering committee was
assigned the task of interviewing attorneys to represent us at the unem-
ployment insurance appeal hearings. We could not find a pro-union la-
bor law firm that was willing to consider taking our case. None could
afford to participate in a suit against a union. We also found that law
firms regularly associated with liberal social reform movements could
not conceive of representing anyone against "a progressive union like
the ILWU." Finally, our search was reduced to tracking down random
leads. We were always treated with courtesy. Many took time out of
their busy schedules to listen carefully to our story but candidly ex-
plained that a case like ours was outside their area of expertise. Others
simply could not afford to take on a case with more than thirty plain-
tiffs who could pay the needed fees only on a contingency basis. We
also met some who felt they could not afford to take on an important
segment of the power establishment in the San Francisco area. We
could understand how easily we could become a liability to our own
counsel.
Within five months after our deregistrations we participated in
hearings before California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
Referee, Donald Gilson. Sidney Gordon, a Los Angeles attorney and
high school friend of mine, represented the LJDC's thirty-three mem-
bers. After hearing fifteen days of argument and testimony from both
sides, Referee Gilson ruled that the claimants were "not subject to dis-
qualification," that the employers' account was to be charged and our
benefits paid. He had been unable to find any "just cause" for our dis-
charge in the explanation given by the PMA.
In the "Reasons for Decision" section of Gilson's ruling he noted
several of the conditions surrounding our deregistration that later
caused the federal courts to hear our case. Among them he listed the
following: we had been subjected to double jeopardy; the JPLRC min-
utes for July 16, 1963 contained statements by the union members of
the committee to the effect that the discharges had been accomplished
by use of a new and previously non-existent set of disciplinary rules
applied on an ex post facto basis, and that there was no evidence that
612 [Vol. 8
131
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Williams v. PMA
we had left the employ of the PMA on a voluntary basis.
The Gilson decision in May 1964 boosted our morale. We had
gone through the long hearing without a traumatic expenditure of en-
ergy and had won with relative ease. The facts of the case were still
fresh in our minds; recounting the story of our discharges had not yet
become routine. The victory raised our hopes for success in upcoming
court battles. A month earlier in April 1964, Attorney Gordon had
filed a complaint6 in federal court on behalf of fifty-six LJDC mem-
bers. It sought relief in the form of job reinstatement as B men, back
wages and six hundred thousand dollars in special damages. In addition
to listing the PMA and ILWU as defendant organizations, individual
defendants were named. Officers of both the employers, association and
the union were designated. James Kearney and Harry Bridges were in-
cluded in the union grouping. While Kearney had tried to save us in his
fashion he had also signed the order for our deregistration.
We fifty-six plaintiffs found it difficult to accept the idea that be-
cause we were B men at the time of the firings, for legal and technical
reasons, we could not seek restitution to jobs that had A status and
union membership. The others on the 1959 B List who had not suffered
discharge for unjust cause were now secure A men. We had to down-
grade our expectations. Victory in the courts could bring only partial
relief. Our desperation made that sufficient reason to go on. Then, too,
there was no other choice. Even the complaint itself had given us addi-
tional tension; our lawyer had not reviewed its contents with us before
submitting it to the court.
Shortly after Sidney Gordon filed his second amended complaint
with the clerk of the district court, the Joint Port Labor Relations
Committee (JPLRC) revealed that they would soon hold a hearing to
decide if we should get another hearing. The committee scheduled a
second set of appeal hearings to take place in March 1965. Our counsel
obtained a restraining order against them but the hearings were con-
ducted even though the order was still in effect. Only one plaintiff ap-
peared, Cleo Love. ILWU counsel Norman Leonard offered to re-
present him. Love had a heated verbal exchange with Harry Bridges
and received yet another affirmation of his discharge. Approximately
5. In the Matter of. James U. Carter, California Unemployment Insurance Ap-
peals Board Case Number SF-3033, San Francisco Referee Office, May 14, 1964, at
11-14.
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six months later the Joint Coast Labor Relations Committee (JCLRC),
on which both PMA President Paul St. Sure and Harry Bridges sat,
held a hearing on the basis of the previous hearing and found us guilty
as charged.
Our case experienced its first full scale internal crisis in mid-1965.
The third amended complaint that had been submitted to the court on
our behalf also failed to make a clear statement of our case. Equally
disturbing, Gordon once again made a series of statements about the
nature of the discharge action without discussing them or his basic the-
ory of the case with us. Frictions grew all the more rapidly because
several of the more needy among us were behind in their monthly pay-
ments to Gordon; payments were being accepted by him without regu-
larly issuing receipts; and we had not yet formulated a method of rais-
ing monies from outside sources. After a disturbing separation from
Gordon by all but three of us, the group once again began looking for
legal representation. Gordon took action to garnish the wages or attach
the belongings of over half of us. We then hired an attorney who spe-
cialized in matters of this sort and the harassment ended.
We were absolutely broke, but had recently armed ourselves with
several hundred reprints of a two-part article about our case which had
appeared in 1964. 7 By using it as a way of introducing ourselves, it
became possible to build a special support group of prominent public
citizens under the auspices of the Workers Defense League (WDL) of
New York. It was then headed by the renowned labor-civil rights attor-
ney, Rowland Watts, and Robert Joseph Pierpont. With the special
help of the late Paul Jacobs, labor and anti-nuclear journalist, the
LJDC-WDL Defense Committee was put together. Jacobs got Bayard
Rustin of the A. Phillip Randolph Institute and organizer of Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s March on Washington to co-chair the committee
with Michael Harrington, author of the epochal book, The Other
America. A dozen more were added to the committee's roster including
novelists Harvey Swados (now deceased); Herbert Gold; Nat Hentoff;
Julius Jacobson; Rev. William Shirley; Phillip Selznick; Daniel Bell;
the late Norman Thomas; Herbert Hill, then Labor Secretary of the
NAACP; Norman Hill, then national secretary of CORE; Herman
Benson, founder of the Association for Union Democracy (AUD); and
Gordon Haskell, then a full time official of the ACLU.
The WDL provided us with the services of Irving Thau of the New
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York and federal bars and famed civil rights attorney Francis Heisler.
Thau came to San Francisco and hired Arthur Brunwasser as co-coun-
sel. Together they filed a fourth amended complaint. It sought relief in
two forms; job reinstatement as B men and payment of all wages lost.
The late Judge George B. Harris was assigned to our case. He ruled
against giving us a trial. He indicated that our complaint had not es-
tablished a solid argument for trial in civil court and that the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was the appropriate agency to ap-
proach for relief.8 In 1967, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in San Francisco remanded our case back to the court of
Judge Harris for trial. An appeal, written by attorneys Brunwasser and
Thau, had successfully turned the tables. Ninth Circuit Judges Pope
Hamley and Merrill gave clear instruction to the lower court:
It should be noted also that the appellants assert the complete
invalidity of the so-called new rules. Some of the affidavits filed on
behalf of the defendants purport to set out what these new rules
were. But, if there were an agreement to such rules, they were not
adopted in accordance with the requirements of the basic collective
bargaining agreement which provided in Section 22: "No provision
or term of this agreement may be amended, modified, changed al-
tered or waived except by written document executed by the parties
hereto." An examination of the text of the so-called new rules dis-
closes that they do not cover or authorize de-registration of Class B
longshoremen; they deal only with the requirements for promotion
from class B to A ...
Some of the affidavits disclose the powers of the joint commit-
tees, referred to, and they indicate the manner in which the plain-
tiffs became registered and they show that the joint committees
found against these plaintiffs and ordered them de-registered. But
the basis of the complaint is that the union representatives on the
joint committees should not have taken such action in that by
agreeing thereto they had failed in their fiduciary duty to all long-
shore employees.
As indicated above, the complaint alleged that these plaintiffs
were in good standing, were guilty of no current infractions, had
corrected all past violations of rules, and were entitled to the as-
signment for work. Nothing in any affidavit negatives the allegation
8. The ruling was preceded by a hearing on our complaint before the court. Our
former counsel, Sidney Gordon, was seated at the defendants' table conferring with the
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these plaintiffs were arbitrarily and capriciously being penalized for
conduct that was not ground for de-registration at the time the acts
were committed; that the de-registration was a retroactive applica-
tion of alleged violations of invalid rules. Furthermore, many of the
assertions made in these affidavits are not entitled to consideration
under Rule 56(e) which provides that affidavits must be made on
personal knowledge, and that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated. None of the affiants would be competent to say
whether any of the plaintiffs were guilty of any misconduct or rule
violation, or that the action of the union members of these joint
committees was anything other than a disregard of the union's duty
of fair representation.9
In the process of instruction, the Ninth Circuit's remand order
cited the precedent set earlier in the year by the United States Su-
preme Court's Vaca v. Sipes1" decision:
The Argument of the Supreme Court is a very cogent one. For
instance, the Court noted that the Board's general counsel had un-
reviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice
complaint. Therefore the injured party having a valid claim based
on denial of fair representation could not be assured of a remedy if
the courts were deemed ousted of their traditional jurisdiction in
such cases. At any rate, this reason given by the trial court for
denying jurisdiction is demonstrably wrong in view of Vaca.11
The employers and the union appealed the Ninth Circuit's reversal
and remand of Judge Harris' summary judgement against us to the
Supreme Court. The high court refused to review their appeal.12 De-
spite our victory at this point, our opposition was soon able to frustrate
again our efforts to obtain a trial. Shortly after we organized the
LJDC-WDL Defense Committee for the purpose of making our case
known to the public and raising monies to cover legal costs, Harry
9. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1967).
10. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
11. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d at 937-8. Five of the men fired
in 1963 had taken their cases to the NLRB. A local San Francisco trial examiner
Herman Marx, ruled that their deregistrations were invalid and that they should be
returned to their jobs as B men. On December 5, 1965, John H. Fanning, Gerald A.
Brown and Sam Zagoria, as general counsel for the NLRB, reversed the Marx ruling
in favor of the PMA and ILWU. Accord, Pacific Maritime Ass'n (Johnson Lee), 155
NLRB 1231, 1234, (1965).
12. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1967).
[Vol. 8
135
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Williams v. PMA
Bridges sued most of the committee's members for libel. Bayard Rustin
was particularly singled out. The action cited a written appeal for
funds sent out by the committee mentioning Bridges' role in the dis-
charges. The suit was withdrawn in 1969, less than a week before it
was to go to trial. 13 It cost us a great deal. Time and serious illness had
elminated attorneys Thau and Heisler from participation in our case.
For some time Arthur Brunwasser had been acting alone on our behalf
and the libel suit made it impossible for him to devote time to the main
case. In 1965, all the plaintiffs signed individual contracts with him. He
was to receive payment for his efforts only if we won. In the interim we
were to pay all legal fees and expenses. In 1969 he had already worked
for us for four years without compensation. The libel action had cost us
more than a year's time at that point for it would be three years before
we would again be able to raise the money necessary for trial in the
district court.
In the years just prior to our 1974 trial before Judge Harris, our
case came under a unique handicap. The attorneys for the PMA and
ILWU went before the court and were successful in getting an order
that struck the names of individual defendants from our complaint. At
the same time the international union established that ILWU Local 10
was a third responsible party of their side. Thus the membership was
obligated to pay a share of the legal costs incurred, and if we prevailed,
a portion of the settlement. We not only needed the support of the rank
and file upon our possible return to the docks, but during the period of
legal battle as well. Additionally, a majority of us still had relatives as
well as friends working the ships. This all added up to increased strain
in the case. Before the litigation was over, longshoremen in locals up
and down the west coast would be assessed for the legal costs incurred
by the union defendants because of the Bridges' leadership.
Time and polarization of differences on national political issues in
the late 1960s and early 1970s had caused a disintegration within the
LJDC-WDL Defense Committee. It was reorganized. We got James
Baldwin, Kay Boyle, Staughton Lynd, Phyliss Jacobson, Hal Draper,
Clancy Sigal, Dan Georgakas, Stanley Aronovitz and others to fill the
vacanices created by the deaths of Norman Thomas, Harvey Swados,
and San Francisco civil rights leader Dr. Thomas Burbridge. A new
fund drive was successful. The time for trial preparation had arrived.
13. See Weir, The Retreat of Harry Bridges, NEw POLITICS (Winter 1969) re-
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Early in the long depositions period, the book, Harry Bridges: The
Rise and Fall of Radical Labor in the United States, was published
and immediately received prominent display in San Francisco book
stores. Its author, Professor Charles Larrowe of Michigan State Uni-
versity, was already considered an authority on the ILWU because of
an earlier book comparing daily longshore hiring systems on the east
and west coasts of the United States. 4 The later book on Bridges con-
tained a ten page discussion of our case. Despite Larrowe's statement
that I had been victimized by Bridges for political reasons, the entire
section was filled with part-truths that made it totally misleading, a
tool that could only misinform people who had no way of checking the
accuracy of his reporting. Worst of all, he dressed his discussion of the
other men who were fired in just enough fact (given him by ILWU
staff) to give it the ring of an informed source. His assessment of the
firings ended with the sentence, "[i] n almost all of these cases, the men
admitted the charges and accepted the verdict."15 Regardless of inten-
tion, the statement that any of our men confessed to the allegations
against them fails to reflect reality. In truth, some of our men, for ex-
ample, had not only admitted late payment of dues, but had confronted
their accusers with a counter-offensive: "How is it that lateness of dues
payment for which I have already paid the fine has suddenly become a
rule, a rule that can be retroactively applied and a rule whose violation
brings unappealable discharge?"
Let us take another example, that of Willie Hurst. During his first
year of employment on the waterfront a banana dock walking boss
fired the entire gang in which Hurst was working, for drinking on the
job. Before being cited by the Port Labor Relations Committee, Hurst
went to Local 10 president James Kearney and explained that the gang
had been fired for the remainder of the day because of the drunkenness
of one man. Kearney easily confirmed that Hurst was a lifetime "teeto-
taler," but advised him not to testify to the facts when the case was
heard. If Hurst were to accuse the particular A man in question of
being drunk, and the cause of the firing, he would probably never get
promoted to A status. Kearney was right. Hurst was given the penalty
for first offenders, thirty days off the job without pay and was told to
avoid further violations. He served his time and heeded the warning.
Almost three working years later, in 1963, he was penalized a second
14. C. P. LARROWE, THE SHAPE-UP AND THE HIRING HALL, (1955).
15. C. P. LARROWE, HARRY BRIDGES: THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICAL LABOR
IN THE UNITED STATES, 364 (1972).
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time for the same incident, but this time he was given the sentence
reserved for three time offenders, discharge. Yes, in a sense he did ad-
mit the charges, but only if one is operating without regard to context.
And, in no way did Hurst or the others accept the verdict. Larrowe's
book served to obscure the entire question of the new rules and the
escalation in the punishments connected with old rules often twice
applied.16
Our federal case, Williams v. PMA,17 came before the court sit-
ting without jury on January 14, 1974, and continued until July 3rd,
with more than sixty days of live testimony. The trial revealed a num-
ber of facts in the case that startled us. One such example occurred
when PMA officials testified that the special rules by which we were
discharged did not originate in any of the joint PMA-ILWU commit-
tees, but in a separate session of top officers and legal staff. It was then
that testimony revealed how the special rules were not adopted by the
Joint Coast Labor Relations Committee until after the appeal hearings
in July 1963, and remained in effect only a few short weeks. To this
date they have never been revived.
Judge Harris sat through testimony of this sort as well as routine
procedural matters without any reaction. We hoped that this was part
of his professional demeanor but it was about this time that a number
of the plaintiffs began to wish that the case had been heard by a jury.
It also bothered us that Judge Harris seemed to be in awe of head
ILWU counsel Richard Gladstein. Harris had been one of the judges
involved in the early post-World War II (McCarthy) era during which
the federal government made several "witch-hunt" attempts to deport
Harry Bridges. Gladstein was Bridges' main counsel when the bulk of
San Fransicso's power elite still considered the ILWU president a
threat. We plaintiffs wondered what effect the past might have now
that Bridges was in great favor as a "labor statesman" and member of
the Port Commission.
For me, one of the greatest shocks at trial was supplied by the long
opening statement given by head PMA counsel Richard Ernst. The
opening statement of our lawyer, Arthur Brunwasser, had focused on
16. For further detail see the review of Larrowe's book by Clancy Sigal, then a
stranger to the case, in The New York Times Book Review, January 7, 1973, at 3; the
discussion by Bridges, The New York Times Book Review, February 18, 1973, at 32;
followed by my own discussion, The New York Times Book Review, May 13, 1973, at
34.
17. Civil suit No.42284 in the court of Judge George B. Harris.
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the specifics of the discharges and the absence of all fairness in the
process. Ernst laid a foundation for the case on grounds vastly different
from Brunwasser's. He took an openly political approach. He recounted
how, in 1919, the waterfront employers had broken the waterfront un-
ions, initiating a fifteen-year period of oppressive experience by long-
shoremen. The strikes of 1934 re-established the union and ushered in
a fourteen-year period of militant confrontation between the union and
employers. After the strike of 1948, Ernst pointed out, the employers
embarked on the "third period." They saw that the union was maturing
and so began an era of increased trust and collaboration. Around 1958
they felt that the union had made so much progress that its members
could participate in the process of selecting new men for the industry.
Four years later the witnessed development of maturity within the
union caused the employer to involve the union in the firing process as
well. He then pointed out that we plaintiffs were the first product of
both maturity-proving developments.
Ernst's opening statement developed full direction on January 23
and continued, with routine interruptions, over several days. He made
the logic of his case absolutely explicit; if the judge ruled for the defen-
dants he would be in the company of a long list of great social engi-
neers such as Wayne Morse and Clark Kerr who -helped structure an
intricate and operational working arrangement between a large em-
ployer and union in a vital industry. If, on the other hand, the judge
ruled for the plaintiffs he would be destroying labor peace. Contrary to
my first impression, the counsel for the PMA was not wide of the
mark, he was right on it. He was operating on the premise that had
increasingly directed the development of labor policy in all three
branches of our government since passage of the Taft-Hartley Act: the
promotion of "labor peace" through containment of the work force via
collaborative contractual arrangements which essentially substituted
arbitration for any concerted action by the workers. According to
Ernst, our deregistrations symbolized such an accomplishment and it
should not be tampered with.
The last shocking segment of the trial, possibly for all participants,
came on the last day testimony was presented. Attorney James A.
Carter, former PMA lawyer and legal staff member of the Port Labor
Relations Committee (JPLRC) at the time of the 1963 deregistrations,
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I had heard28 that Mr. Weir was one of the persons that was being
deregistered; that it was very definite that he should be deregis-
tered; and there was simply no doubt in my mind, and I believe in
the minds of the other people who worked on the case, that the
feelings were very strong that Mr. Weir should be
deregistered ...
Well, what I heard was that Mr. Weir was opposed to the M
and M agreement, that he wanted to make work for people and
stop the use of labor saving devices and things; that he was inter-
ested in more longshoremen, et cetera; and that that ran counter to
the prevailing views of Mr. Bridges. I think it was more-what I
heard was a philosophical thing-presumably, this lost case had
been made public-that he was philosophically opposed to the con-
cept of M and M; that he was of the old fashioned union school
that felt you ought to have a lot of people out three working, and
you shouldn't have labor saving devices."9
Finally, and only as the trial neared conclusion, the court got its
first opportunity to understand not only the major reason behind the
discharges, but why we were being pursued with such hostility. Earlier
in the trial the court had heard testimony by Curt Johnston, then presi-
dent of ILWU Local 13 (Los Angeles), that a former San Francisco
employee, Robert Hall, had told him how "eighty-two had been fired
just to get Weir." Hall subsequently testified that Johnston had
fabricated the story. Later toward the end of Carter's testimony, an
explanation very similar to Johnston's was offered:
But what I did hear was that the-that a decision was made at a
very high level-and those words may not have been used ei-
ther-but I can read. . .shorthand-but that a decision had been
made to deregister Mr. Weir; and that in order to facilitate that, I
suppose, it was decided to deregister other people at the same
time.20
We had heard this theory several times, twice directly, from
ILWU staff employees who were disillusioned with Bridges, but be-
cause they were still in the employ of the union their depositions proved
18. It had been established in earlier testimony that the source was PMA staff
representatives with whom Carter was working at the time.
19. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Assn, Reporters Partial Transcript, July 3,
1974, at 10-11, 12.
20. Id. at 52.
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fruitless. Nevertheless, to have heard the theory early on had value. It
forced us to think through our own analysis of the ILWU-PMA strat-
egy with greater care. There was probably no way that we would ever
be able to prove or disprove the theory but its persistence showed us the
potential for vindictiveness with which we were dealing. We agreed
with the political analyses put forth by Herman Benson and Gordon
Haskell of the Association for Union Democracy: Bridges represented a
highly developed bureaucratic conservatism that retaliated full force
against even the slightest potential of opposition, no matter how far in
the future it might take to materialize."
On August 31, 1975, Judge Harris ruled for the defendants. The
defendants had won based on the argument that B men were proba-
tionary employees and not union members. Yet, Bridges' handpicked
successor as president of the ILWU, James Herman had become presi-
dent of an ILWU local union in the 1960s as a B man. In a post-trial
meeting for the plaintiffs our attorney told us that the judge had not
even written the decision. Instead, he had taken the closing brief of
PMA counsel Ernst, transferred it to court stationery and applied his
signature. The content of the decision offered an even more detailed
interpretation of the political conflict on the San Francisco waterfront:
43. Factions developed within Local 10 on the subject of promotion
of the limited registration Class B men. One group included Selden
Osborne, Asher Harer, Hal Yanow, Frank Stout, James Kearney
and others; it favored the granting of union membership to the lim-
ited registration class B men and their dispatch with the fully reg-
istered Class A longshoremen, even though this would be in viola-
tion of the contract and the law. Another faction included Harry
Bridges, William Chester, Robert Rohatch, Tommie Silas and
others; it was of the opinion that the union should comply with the
contract with the PMA and promote only on the basis of joint ac-
tion between the ILWU and the PMA 2
There was a quarter truth to Ernst's (Judge Harris') interpretation
of the political fight within Local 10. The first group had all individu-
21. H. Benson, Harry Bridges' Own Witch-Hunt, 13 UNION DEMOCRACY IN Ac-
TION, (Sept. 1964); Haskell, review of Charles P. Larrowe's biography of Harry
Bridges, 4 UNION DEMOCRACY REVIEW, (Summer 1973).
22. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law Lodged by Defendants, PMA, ILWU, Local 10. Civil No.42284 GBH at
14-15 (Mimeograph of original).
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ally, at one time or another, taken the floor of a union meeting to op-
pose our deregistration but they had never operated as a faction. It had
been many years since any who opposed Bridges had felt secure enough
to organize against his ideas in concert. It was rather shrewd of Ernst
to wait until the very end to offer this interpretation and thus leave no
chance that our side might begin to dispute his distinctly political
interpretation.
After the setback at trial, we once more appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, with very different results. The political cli-
mate in the entire nation had changed markedly in the decade since the
appellate court had ordered that we be given a trial. Oral argument on
our appeal took place on February 5, 1979. To get there had taken yet
another fund drive with donations from many well wishers. Once more
we filled the court room to capacity but it did not appear to have any
visual effect on the judges.
The argument took little more than two hours. We left with an
uneasiness we could not shake. We felt it would be impossible for the
judges to do ample research in the more than twenty cases of printed
matter which constituted the record in our case. Even more disturbing,
we had not heard them ask what we considered the substantive ques-
tions in the case.
Judges Duniway, Kennedy and Bonsal handed down their opinion
a year and two days after taking argument.23 Their conclusion was,
We believe that the district court erred in concluding that ap-
pellants failed to exhaust required grievance procedures. We never-
theless affirm on the merits because appellants have not demon-
strated that PMA or ILWU or its constitutent local breached
either a duty of fair representation owed to appellants or the terms
of the Pacific Coast Longshore Agreement.2'
We were sixteen years down the road when hit by this decision.
No longer were we in awe of the court. Underneath their robes these
three men wore pants that they got into one leg at a time just like other
mortals. The gap between the letter of the law and the way life is actu-
ally lived was so wide for them that an "Alice in Wonderland" logic
dictated the terms of their decision. They agreed that the ILWU and
the PMA had denied us due process, but ruled there was no evidence
23. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 617 F.2d 1321, 1334 (9th Cir. 1970).
24. Id. at 17.
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that the union had failed in its duty to represent us fairly. Yet due
process is the forum or vehicle that makes representation possible. The
two are totally interdependent. There cannot be one without the other.
For the justices, unjust means could somehow be used to arrive at a
just end.
From beginning to end, a pivotal area of the law which was ap-
plied to our case was whether or not the acts of the defendants had
been legitimized by the collectively bargained agreement. In 1967, one
of the major reasons for the Ninth Circuit's reversal of Judge Harris'
summary judgment against us was that the new rules used to discharge
us had not been arrived at via the collective bargaining process. Con-
trary to this, Judges Duniway, Kennedy and Bonsai held that the new
rules had been negotiated into existence by the two parties on the Joint
Port Labor Relations Committee (JPLRC). The July 16, 1963 minutes
of the JPLRC cited earlier here were still among the case exhibits.
They revealed that the union members of the committee, who would
have had to be half of the negotiating effort, were protesting our dis-
charges because the new rules had not been adopted by the bargaining
process.
In an example of "doublethink," the decision of the Ninth Circuit
also held that the new rules were actually not new at all. The court
observed that we appellants knew, for example, that our "dues" should
be paid on time and that fact was not changed by the creation of a
new, additional and maximum disciplinary penalty. In fact, the addi-
tion was legitimate for them because the well known Section 9 of the
1958 rules covering deregistration contained an eleventh "or, for any
other cause" rule.
The underlying rationale of the judges on this aspect was not hard
to determine: the new mechanized technology that was being intro-
duced to the industry in the early 1960s demanded the creation of a
"permanent work force" composed of high caliber individuals; by ap-
plying the new rules (or penalties) the employer and the union were
setting the standards necessary to the needs of the new era; the old era
in which all jobs went through the hiring hall was now in the past; the
deregistration of people who had a propensity for unreliability repre-
sented an imperative updating whose correctness and success was indi-
cated by the fact that eighty percent of the 1959 B men met the higher
standards. The final block of reasoning in the stone wall erected against
us by the courts was tragically laughable: because, in a hostage taking
operation, a large number escaped being taken showed them that none
of those taken were hostages.
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On the surface, the court was refusing to see that our discharges
were part of a conflict but, below the surface, other factors were at
work. The unjust decision of the Ninth Circuit unknowingly gave sup-
port to Professor James B. Atleson's thesis on the values underlying
decisions on labor cases by the courts, "[t]he belief in the inherent
rights of property and the need for capital mobility, for instance, un-
derlie certain rules, and some decisions turn on the perceived superior
need for continued production or the fear of employee
irresponsibility. 2 5
We appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. There were two
court decisions against us and only a narrow margin of hope, but the
majority of the plaintiffs needed their jobs back as much then as we did
the day we were fired. Unfortunately, though not surprisingly, it had
become harder to raise the money to cover legal expenses and, by 1980,
six of the plaintiffs had died. Others had moved in order to obtain em-
ployment. Some, like Manual Nereu, were as far away as Saudi Ara-
bia. Mario Luppi had returned home to his family's village in Italy. I
had been living in the Los Angeles harbor area for five years and had
resided in Illinois during the previous eight years. Communication was
more and more difficult to sustain but the necessary mobilization was
made easier when Teamsters for a Democratic Union, Independent
Skilled Trades Council, Union Women's Alliance to Gain Equality,
The Bell Wringer, National Labor Law Center of the National Law-
yers' Guild and Association for Union Democracy offered to file a
friend of the court brief on our behalf.2 6
The brief authored by Burton Hall stimulated new interest. It gave
added emphasis to the arguments made by Attorney Brunwasser. For
example, it showed that the written job dispatch rules provided us until
the day of our discharge ended with the capitalized statement:
"THERE ARE NO OTHER RULES." The brief by attorney Hall
also contained what for us was a new idea; the union's agreement to
deregister us was a bill of attainder:
In 1963, at the time that Local 10 and ILWY agreed to the
new "standards" and agreed, also, to deregister those "B men" who
failed to meet those "standards" because of conduct prior to their
25. J. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssuMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW, 2 (1983)
(Atleson is a professor of law at State University of New York, Buffalo).
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adoption, the identities of those persons who would thereby be de-
registered were either known or were easily ascertainable from
records in the bargaining representative's possession.
Thus it was known or could easily be learned from the records
that Graves had been found guilty of an instance of intoxication in
1960 and had been suspended for 30 days as punishment. It was
known or could easily be learned from the records that Cafeterio
had, however innocently, committed a Low Man Out violation in
1962 of more than ten hours by failing to add hours to his time for
his unavailability on Sunday, August 12.
The decision to deregister the class of persons who were shown
by the records to have committed any violations of the "standards"
was, in short, a bill of attainder.2"
The Supreme Court, in its October 1980 term, denied all briefs
filed for the plaintiffs. We were finished. It felt just that abrupt. The
case had been a central activity half our adult lives and a period of
adjustment was forced upon all participants.
IV. Epilogue
The previous sections represent only one small portion of the Wil-
liams v. PMA story. The events profoundly affected all of our lives.
Some among us were more fortunate than others in rebuilding work
careers and keeping our families together after the discharges. The
story of every man and his family deserves telling and if told would
reveal that anguish can develop strength as well as diminish it.28
27. In the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 1980, Williams v.
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 617 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101
(1981). Motion of Teamsters for a Democratic Union for leave to File Brief as Amid
Curiae in Support of Petition for Certiorari and Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of
Petition for Certiorari, p. 16.
28. The names of all plaintiffs are: George R. Williams, William Jones, Paul
May, Eathan Gums Jr., Edgar J. Dunlap, Walter L. Robinson, Frank Nereu, Louis T.
Lacy, Leroy J. Provost, Roger W. Fleeton, Robert E. Birks, Anthony Melvin Jr., Oliver
Geeter, Antonio S. Cafeteiro, Edward Reed, Albert W. Roberts, Percy Fountain, Wil-
liam J. Hurst Jr., Willie C. Merritt, Mack Hebert, Manuel Neureu Jr., Arthur G.
Winters, Frank Giannino, Stanley L. Weir, Fred Hayes, Willie J. Whitehead, Rhody
Adams, Mario V. Luppi, Arthur L. Hughes, Jeremiah Richards, Cleo Love, Louis J.
Richardson, Charles J. Johnson, Reginald W. Saunders, Willie Jenkins Jr., Willie D.
Palmer, Conway T. Hudson, John T. Leggett, Alfred Straughter, Thomas Nisby,
Timothy E. Carter, James U. Carter, Melvin Kennedy, Henry Imperial, James Lang-
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We surviving plaintiffs make no claim to objectivity, and that ap-
plies as well to the opinions expressed in this article. Like all who are
party to a violent fight, with many casualties, we will never cease to be
partisan. The human costs have been high in many ways. One of the
most oppressive aspects of our experience with the law was our inability
to afford the financial costs. In our view, any legal action in which the
attorneys are to be paid on a contingency basis is in deep trouble if it
lasts more than -a few months. A case with the workload the size of
ours quickly became destructive to our lawyer's personal life and pro-
fessional image. It is true that in the beginning there was gratification
by the very nature of the case. But we witnessed the coming of those
times when other attorneys would loudly call across court building lob-
bies with derisive guffaws: "Hey, you still have that big five (ten,
fifteen) year old law suit?" We watched as our attorneys overworked
without pay. The greater their resentment and our guilt, the more we
felt like charity cases and lost client control over direction of the suit.
This resulted in the destruction of friendships and the development of
deep doubts.2 9
ford, Johnny J. Cherry, Ellis E. Graves, James Green, Ulysses Hawkins, Theodore Tol-
liver, Lawrence Johnson, and Herman Crawford.
29. Over the years substantial changes were made in the theory of our case and
its presentation to the courts. The shift was away from a focus on the political motiva-
tions which had led to the discharge, to a concentration on the lack of just cause-yes,
we had been wronged, but an analysis of why was missing. This weakened and under-
cut the case of the plaintiff who had most been involved in the politics of the industry
as an elected representative of the B men, myself. In turn, all of us felt that this served
to undercut the entire case. The change became documented in our appellants reply
brief to the Ninth Circuit Court: "Similarly, defendants set up a 'strawman' in the
guise of one of the fifty-one of the plaintiffs, Stanley Weir, and emphasize his philo-
sophical musings of defendants' intention." Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 617
F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980). Appeal from a Final Judgment of the United States Dis-
trict Court of the Northern District of California, Appellants Reply Brief No. 77-1398,
at 4, served Oct. 11, 1978.
The "philosophical musing" referred to an explanation of how the fight of the B
men for union representation, while not an organized factional war, was automatically
antagonistic to the mechanization program of Harry Bridges and his eager acceptance
of the employers' automation plans.
When the time came for filing an appeal for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court we gathered together closely once more in the Bay Area. The LJDC
steering committee was again able to hold meetings. About the time that the Teamsters
for a Democratic Union began to develop a brief in support of the issues in our case,
and in reaction to criticism from long time supporter Sam Bottone, we again began to
act like full fledged clients. We realized it was our last shot and that we would have to
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There are several areas in which some generalization of our expe-
rience can be made. We would not have filed suit in 1964, had we
known that the action would take so many years. At the same time, by
1964, the only alternatives to filing suit was to walk away in submis-
sion, and that was unthinkable. That we put up a good long fight is a
source of pride. It is gratifying to hear, as we still do from former co-
workers on the front, that the men of the four B lists recruited after
our discharge got much better treatment from the ILWU and PMA
because of our suit. Another outbreak of resistance after ours, espe-
cially a second lawsuit, might have triggered alliances and the reversal
of bureaucratic victories.
A statement commonly heard among LJDC veterans is that we
stuck together through it all, and, as a result, we formed unusually
strong bonds of friendship and experienced considerable personal
growth by getting an inside look at the way law actually works in our
land. We have seen that labor law is a special segment of the total
body of American common law. In worker-employer-union conflicts,
the worker often does not have due process protection as guaranteed by
the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Labor law legitimizes the loss,
makes it legal and provides a framework for the application of private
government in the workplace by employer rules as modified by em-
ployee resistance.
live with the outcome every bit as much as our attorney. We asked for a meeting with
counsel. After several refusals to even entertain the idea of meeting with us to discuss
any questions we might have, we sent a formal request, by letter, for a meeting. After
all briefs were filed with the court, Attorney Brunwasser sent the committee a twenty-
one page letter with a copy to every plaintiff. It attacked me and made strong inference
that I was guilty of the charges alleged by the employer and union, explaining that
while this had been known for some time it was not brought out because I was the best
fund raiser in the case. Prior to receipt of the letter not a particle of distrust had ever
entered my mind. We of the steering committee had always played the role of liasion
with and defender of our attorney in relation to the rest of the LJDC membership. The
other members of the steering committee immediately responded with a letter that re-
jected any validity in his accusations. In turn, they too were cut off as if for increased
disloyalty and personal affront.
The problem between us clients and our attorney of record got escalated, very
probably without hope of solution, and will ever remain a source of grief and loss. We
have no way of making an accurate unbiased analysis of its causes. But as we look back
to learn what we might have done differently, one thing is certain: over the years we
should have given more recognition to the labors of Arthur Brunwasser while he was in
the process of providing them. Acknowledgment is an essential form of nutrition.
Shakespeare reminds us by exaggeration as the good Kent responds to Cordelia in King
Lear, "[a]cknowledged is o'er paid."
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I agree with the idea expressed in varied contexts by labor attor-
ney Staughton Lynd that the filing of a lawsuit is not by itself an effec-
tive way to fight and often creates an artificial context in which facts
become distorted.30 It is more effective to use the lawsuit as a back-up
action and only as a last resort."1 We could have pursued a return to
our jobs far more effectively with continued organizational support and
with some form of political-organizational support from the general
public, particularly in the Bay Area community. We feel certain our
story would be quite different if we had recevied even the most indirect
support from the membership of ILWU Local 10, and especially if
there had been the development of open resistance to containerization.
In the absence of direct support of any kind, we needed far more back-
ing from public sources than we were able to generate and maintain.
The availability of the documents in our case to public scrutiny
and research is a positive development." Still unnoticed anywhere, for
example, is the fact that by simple self-interest and self-preservation B
men became critical of Harry Bridges because of the conservatism of
his leadership and his eager acceptance of the employers' new technol-
ogy program. Quite logically, those who cast their lot with the B men
or came to their defense both from inside the industry and from the
public, were persons who were viewed as having a more radical world
view than Bridges; probably a very threatening experience for a labor
official whose entire method of operation historically had been based
upon presenting himself as a leftist.
The largest and most important part of the fight continues on the
job in every port. More than half the 15,000 registered longshore jobs
that existed in 1963 have been automated out of existence. We were
the first mortalities in an ongoing liquidation. There is not a day in
30. LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS: YOUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL
CLOSINGS 146-7 (1982).
31. Id.
32. The Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court, Northern Dis-
trict of California, in San Francisco provides access to case files stored in San Mateo,
California. Taped interviews of approximately thirty of the deregistered longshoremen
conducted by Elinor Randall Keeney will soon be deposited with the Regional History
Office of the Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley. This library con-
tains extensive interviews with the late Paul St. Sure, former PMA president. An inter-
view of Stan Weir by Paul Buhle is on file in the Oral History Department, University
of California at Los Angeles. Numerous documents on this case collected by the plain-
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which the remaining seven thousand rank and file west coast
dockworkers do not have to resist. It is they who need allies, primarily
in other industries and unions, but within the informed public as well.
Plans for the "Second Containerization Revolution" by computer con-
trols are emerging from the drawing boards in greater numbers. The
number of options available have diminished for both sides, particularly
for the workers, who now have much less faith in established grievance
solution channels.
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Communications Revolutions and Legal Revolutions:
The New Media and the Future of Law
M. Ethan Katsh*
Introduction
Our age is noteworthy for the development of television and com-
puters, media that transmit information over vast distances at elec-
tronic speed. In the mid-1400s, Gutenberg's invention of printing by
moveable type was perceived to be equally miraculous and quickly be-
came a powerful societal force.' Francis Bacon wrote that "we should
note the force, effect, and consequences of inventions which are no-
where more conspicuous than in those three which were unknown to
the ancients, namely, printing, gunpowder and the compass. For these
three have changed the appearance and state of the whole world." 2 One
rarely-noticed way in which printing changed the world was through its
influence on law. The spread of printing led to fundamental changes in
legal doctrines, legal institutions, legal values and attitudes about law.3
Printing technology helped create the modern legal order and has con-
tinued to be a major influence upon it.
We are living in an era in which the new electronic media are
joining the traditional media of print, writing and speech and taking
over some of their functions. This article is an exploration into the ef-
fects of these new communication technologies on law. Marshall
McLuhan once noted that when "a new technology comes into a social
milieu it cannot cease to permeate that milieu until every institution is
saturated.' The following analysis suggests that, at least as far as law
is concerned, McLuhan is probably correct. The new media can be ex-
pected to be used in ways that will cause a transformation in the legal
order that has developed in the West in the last five hundred years.
To understand the depth of the changes likely to be caused in the
* B.A. New York University; J.D. Yale Law School; Associate Professor, Dept. of
Legal Studies, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
1. E. EiSENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS As AN AGENT OF CHANGE (1979).
2. F. BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM, APHORISM 129 (1620).
3. See Pt. III, notes 35-81 and accompanying text.
4. M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 161 (1964).
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future by the electronic media of video and computers, it is instructive
to pay some attention to the past and to examine how, over the last five
hundred years, the technology of print was a major force in the shaping
of the modern legal order. Such a perspective will provide insight into
the significant differences between print and the new technologies and
provide a conceptual model for understanding how communications in
general are an influence on the legal process. This essay begins with a
discussion of law and of media, in order to bring into a sharper focus
frequently neglected aspects of each that are essential to the analysis to
follow. Several theories which have been suggested to explain how the
form in which a society communicates information can influence the
values and institutions of that society are then discussed. These theories
will then be applied to law, first to the period following the invention of
printing, our last communications revolution, and then to the new me-
dia. The purpose of this endeavor is not merely to identify or predict
specific changes, but to develop a model for understanding the process
of change and how it occurs.
I. A Brief Overview of Law and Communications Research
Several blind men attempt to investigate an elephant. One who
has the trunk says, 'It is long and soft and emits air.' Another,
holding the legs, says 'It is massive, cylindrical, and hard.' An-
other, touching the skin, 'It is rough and scaly.' All are mis-
informed. All generalize from partial knowledge.'
Law, like the elephant, can be viewed from various angles. Unfor-
tunately, research into the influence of communications media on law
has been as myopic as the elephant examination performed by the blind
people. Parts of the relationship have been studied, but other areas re-
main unexplored. As with the various partial examinations of the ele-
phant, the compartmentalized research which has been done has ob-
structed the development of a complete picture of how new
communications technologies can change the nature and functions of
the process of law in a society.
Analyses of law and the new media have focused almost exclu-
sively on the new media's impact on either legal doctrines or legal insti-
5. R. ORNSTEIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 9 (1972).
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tutions.6 The vast majority of such studies, unfortunately, are likely to
reveal only short term or surface changes in law. To identify changes
that are likely to be more long lasting7 and affect fundamental aspects
of the process of law, it is necessary to define law more broadly than is
generally done by communications researchers. As the following brief
discussion indicates, there is more to the process of law than its rules or
its institutions. The deepest change in law is likely to come about by
the new media's impact on legal values, on individual habits of thought
and on the social conditions that make law necessary for the resolution
of conflict.
The initial i mpact of a new communications medium on law will
be in the development of new rules to resolve problems caused by that
medium. Today, "media law" is a growth area because attempts are
being made to control the use of the new media. New modes of com-
munication inevitably create problems and conflicts which the legal sys-
tem is called upon to resolve. Thus copyright law developed after the
invention of printing,8 wiretapping laws followed shortly after the in-
vention of the telephone,9 and laws of privacy were enacted as a result
6. The August, 1983 issue of the Index to Legal Periodicals contains a typical
listing of computer law articles. Of nineteen citations in the "computer" category, ten
concerned legal doctrine, e.g. "Legal Protection of Computer Software," and nine re-
lated to legal institutions, e.g. "New Age of Computers for your Law Office." The
same dichotomy can be found in the "Radio and Television" or "Technology" listings.
7. Kenneth Boulding has reminded us that "predictions into the future, once we
leave the realm of celestial mechanics, are notoriously unreliable. . . .Nevertheless,
predict we must, because all decisions are about the future. When we are considering a
rather stable and slow-moving aspect of society like the law, we have to think about
quite long-run futures." Boulding, Economics, Evolution, and Law, in LAW AND THE
AMERICAN FUTURE 30 (M. Schartz ed. 1976).
8. Copyright did not exist in the age of scribes and manuscripts. "To seek the
origin of Copyright in times prior to the invention of Printing, would partake more of
curious research than of useful investigation." LOWNDEs, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 1 (2nd ed. 1842). The earliest copyright statute is the Statute
of Anne in 1709.
The inevitability of a need for protecting published works after Caxton
introduced the printing press into England in 1476 makes it almost certain
that, in a manner not entirely clear, members of the book trade had devel-
oped some form of copyright prior to receiving their charter of incorpora-
tion in 1557. The grant of a royal charter, however, gave added dignity
and powers which the company used in giving definitive form to its
copyright.
L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (1968).
9. "Within ten years after the invention of the telephone the American press
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of the growth of newspapers. 10 The studies of these developments share
a common approach. They look at or propose new legal doctrines--or
rules of law-and relate these regulatory changes to social or techno-
logical change. They examine court decisions and statutes and attempt
to evaluate the costs and benefits of applying old categories or of gener-
ating new ones.
The second large body of literature concerning law and communi-
cations focuses on the employment of new media within legal institu-
tions.1" Much of this literature describes experiments in which the new
media are used-in some novel way. Some research has attempted to
assess whether these new uses will affect traditional legal policies. 2 In
general, however, very little is currently known about what it will mean
in the future to begin employing the new media in novel and wide-
spread ways within our legal system. 13
featured stories of private telephone tapping to steal stock quotations or newspaper
stories, and police listening-in during criminal investigations." A. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM 338 (1967). In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the
Supreme Court, with Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissenting, held that a wiretap was
not a search and seizure covered by the Fourth Amendment. Forty years later, in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court reversed itself on this issue. The first
federal statute covering wiretapping was section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934.
10. R. SMITH, PRIVACY 3 (1979); See also Warren and Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
11. See supra note 6.
12. See, e.g., Brakel, Videotape in Trial Proceedings: A Technological Obses-
sion? 61 A.B.A. J. 956 (1975).
13. The new media's impact on legal processes is usually looked at both narrowly
and with a short-term perspective and for this reason empirical evidence of dramatic
shifts, even if they were occurring, would not be available. Probably the most discussed
aspect of the new media concerns the use of television cameras in court. Yet, there are
no studies on the effect of television coverage on viewers or how the public perceives
televised news stories about courts. George Gerbner has written "no meaningful re-
search has yet demonstrated the validity of arguments for television trials or the bene-
fits from trials already televised." Gerbner, Trial By Television: Are We At The Point
of No Return? 63 JUDICATURE 418 (1980). More importantly, the cumulative effect of
the use of video technology within the institutions of law has not been a focus of re-
search. What Samuel Brakel noted in 1975 is probably still true today. He wrote, con-
cerning the use of videotape in trial proceedings, that:
The effects are many and of various levels of significance and inevitability.
While the precise ramifications are speculative it is not excessive to say
that the overall impact of the video technology is of potentially revolution-
ary proportions. The fact that proponents or students of the technology
have not identified, let alone examined and evaluated, most of these effects
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The main defect with current research is its narrow conception or
definition of law. Law is more than a set of rules or institutions. Viewed
more broadly, law is a social process with values and philosophical at-
tributes which have evolved into its current form over the course of
several centuries. Law, Professor Harold Berman has noted, must be
looked at "not as a body of rules, but as a process, an enterprise, in
which rules have meaning only in the context of institutions and proce-
dures, values, and ways of thought." ' To understand why law is under
stress and how the new media are contributing to this situation, it is
important to do more than study particular laws or institutions. It is
necessary to attend to fundamental aspects of legal process. As Alvin
Toffier has recognized, "if we are to deal with a legal crisis, it seems to
me we are going to have to probe more deeply. What is happening is
deeper than most of our judges and lawyers, our presidents and our
presidential candidates suspect. For what is happening is not merely
the breakdown of law, but, more importantly, the breakdown of the
underlying order upon which law is based." 5
What is this underlying order or foundation upon which the pro-
cess of law rests?- Iredell Jenkens has written that,
law is very like an iceberg; only one-tenth of its substance appears
above the social surface in the explicit form of documents, institu-
tions and professions, while the nine-tenths of its substance that
supports its visible fragment leads a sub-aquatic existence, living in
the habits, attitudes, emotion and aspirations of men."
It is important, therefore, to determine how the values of the legal
order and the habits of thought underlying the legal order, are influ-
enced by processes of communication. Change which occurs in this
facet of the legal process may occur slowly, but it will also be long
lasting and will affect the subsequent development of both legal rules
demonstrates only the limitations of vision that accompany technological
innovation.
Brakel, supra note 12, at 957.
14. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 11 (1983).
15. Toffier, The Future of Law and Order, ENCOUNTER, July, 1973, at 15.
16. I. JENKINS, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 9 (1980). Frederick
Jackson Turner similarly recognized that "behind institutions, behind constitutional
forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape
them to meet changing conditions." F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY
2 (1920), in Miller, Technology, Social Change and the Constitution, 33 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 17 (1964).
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Our legal system both fosters and reflects liberal legal values such
as equality, privacy and other individual rights. Limiting state power
and protecting individuals from abuses of state power are ideals which
the legal system strives to achieve. What would be the effect on law if
there were to be a substantial shift in public belief in such values? Is
there a connection between the form of communication in a society and
the values of that society? Such values change slowly and the process
of change is often invisible, but such a shift is also more long lasting
than any change in legal doctrine. It is, therefore, a better indication of
a transformation of law than a change in doctrine would be.
Our system of law also requires individuals to have certain habits
of thought, patterns of thinking and personality traits. This is a rarely
noted aspect of law and would not be important unless the new media
opened up the possibility of change here as well. What are these habits
of thought that underlie the legal order? One example might be the
ability to appreciate abstract concepts and engage in abstract thought.
Law is an abstraction and our legal system requires individuals to be
able to apply abstract rules to concrete situations. It requires compre-
hension of nontangible concepts such as "rights," "reasonable men" or
"states of emergency." Similarly, our process of law places a premium
on thinking linearly and on accepting procedural justice as a substitute
for real justice. We assume that it is proper and desirable to treat ev-
eryone the same way, even though in actuality we are all different and
in different circumstances.
Are the habits of thought that are fundamental to our legal cul-
ture undergoing change? Are we becoming more accepting of non-lin-
ear thought, for example, and is this related in some way to our new
media? McLuhan and others have asserted that such change will take
place and it is, therefore, an issue worth pursuing.'7 When new forms
of technology are used in an institution or in a society they become
agents for change. They can affect how individuals think and relate to
other individuals and institutions. 18 While new legal doctrines are being
generated to control obvious effects of the new media, the more subtle
and long term effects may be ignored. The values and habits of thought
of individuals do change over time and can lead to major changes in
17. M. MCLUHAN, supra note 4, at 303; T. SCHWARTZ, THE RESPONSIVE
CHORD (1973).
18. E. HAVELOCK, PREFACE TO PLATO ix (1963); Goody and Watt, The Conse-
quences of Literacy, in LITERACY IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES 55 (J. Goody ed. 1968).
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societal institutions. As will be seen below, such changes probably oc-
curred in the centuries following the introduction of print and contrib-
uted to the evolution of the modern legal order. To understand why
such changes occured, the focus should not be on the doctrines of law
but on the qualities of the new medium of communication, on the adop-
tion of the new medium by legal institutions and on the use by citizens
and groups of citizens of the new media.
II. The Nature of Media
Marshall McLuhan's assertion that "the medium is the message"
brought him considerable publicity but did not increase public under-
standing of the important qualitative differences among media and the
influence these differences may have on society.19 Just as law is falsely
perceived by the public to be a set of rules, communications media are
mistakenly looked at in terms of their content and not in terms of the
influential qualities of the particular medium. How people communi-
cate is usually thought to be much less significant than what is commu-
nicated. Most research on television, therefore, has been concerned
with identifying the nature of the information which is communicated
and the effect of this information on attitudes and behavior.2 0 This fo-
cus on the substance of programs rather than on the process of commu-
nication is a natural outgrowth of the common belief that means of
19. See Wolfe, What If He Is Right, in THE PUMP HOUSE GANG 105 (1968); J.
MILLER, MARSHALL MCLUHAN (1971); MCLUHAN, HOT AND COOL (G. Stearns ed.
1967); Casey, Harold Adams Innis and Marshall McLuhan, 27 ANTIOCH REV. 5
(1967).
20. The depiction on prime time television of most facets of American society
has been studied to see whether the portrayal is accurate. See, e.g., Gerbner, Gross,
Morgan and Signorielli, Health and Medicine on Television, 305 THE NEW ENGLAND
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 901 (Oct. 1981); Gerbner, Gross, Morgan and Signorelli, The
Mainstreaming of America: Violence Profile No. 11, 30 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICA-
TIONS 10 (Summer 1980); Arons and Katsh, How TV Cops Flout the Law, SATURDAY
REVIEW, March 19, 1977, at 11; Morgan and Gross, Television and Educational
Achievement and Aspirations, in TELEVISION AND BEHAVIOR: TEN YEARS OF SCIEN-
TIFIC PROGRESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 80'S (D. Pearl, J. Lazar, L. Bouthilet eds.
1982).
The content of television news programs has been subjected to similar content
analyses. See, e.g., TELEVISION NETWORK NEWS: ISSUES IN CONTENT RESEARCH (W.
Adams and F. Schreibman eds. 1978); W. ADAMS, TELEVISION COVERAGE OF INTER-
NATIONAL AFFAIRS (1982); W. ADAMS, TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE NINETEEN
EIGHTY PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (1983); Katsh, The Supreme Court Beat: How Tele-
vision News Covers the United States Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 6 (1983).
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communication serve a function analogous to that of a moving com-
pany. Their job is to transport messages from sender to receiver. While
they may affect the speed at which something is moved, they will have
no effect on the item itself. Whether a car is shipped by truck, train,
airplane or boat, for example will not change the car. Similarly, it is
thought, whether one sends a message by letter, by telephone or by
television does not affect the content of the message. Under this view,
there is no need to study anything but the content of television pro-
grams. The medium seems to be irrelevant.
McLuhan tried to popularize a contrary point of view. In asserting
that "the medium is the message," McLuhan argued that if one wants
to understand the impact of a communication medium on a society, one
should focus on the means of communication and not on the content of
what is communicated by the medium. 21 For example, McLuhan
claimed, one could have learned much more about post-Gutenberg soci-
ety from looking at the form of the printed page and the impact of
printing on the spread of information, than from knowing that the first
book printed was the Bible. To use the moving company analogy again,
if everything in the United States is shipped by truck, McLuhan might
argue that one could learn more about the society by studying the na-
ture of trucks than by knowing that some trucks carry cars and others
carry television sets. It is quite probable that content has an impact but
it is also true that study of the medium's influential qualities has been
neglected. Until recently, for example, historians gave little attention to
the changes brought about by the shift from manuscripts to printing.22
Similarly, legal literature reveals very little understanding of the pow-
erful influence that the invention of printing exerted upon law and a
high level of unawareness of how the new media are likely to lead to
change.23
21. M. McLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY (1962); M. McLUHAN, supra note
4, at 164.
22. E. EISENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3.
23. Law librarians seem much more sensitive than legal historians to the influ-
ence of printing on law. See Graham, Our Tong Maternall Marvelously Amendyd and
Augmentyd: The First Englishing and Printing of the Medieval Statutes at Large,
1530-1533, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 58 (1965); Graham and Heckel, The Book That
'Made' the Common Law: The First Printing of Fitzherbert's La Graunde Abridge-
ment, 1514-1556, 51 L. LIB. J. 100 (1958); Hendeson, Legal Literature and the Impact
of Printing on the English Legal Profession, 68 LAW LIB. J. 288 (1975).
The most important recent analysis of law and the new media that does pay atten-
tion to the novel qualities of the new media is in a book by Pool. I. DE SOLA POOL,
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The two most ardent proponents of the long term influence of com-
munications media on society have been the late Marshall McLuhan
and his colleague and mentor Harold Innis."' The first theme of Innis'
writings is that the use of a new medium of communication alters the
distribution of information in a society and, as a consequence, its social
structure. The development of writing, for example, led to societies be-
ing more hierarchical, since writing was a skill that only persons in
power were apt to possess.15 Anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss has
noted that writing's first uses were "connected first and foremost with
power. It was used for inventories, catalogues, censuses, laws and in-
struction. In all instances, whether the aim was to keep a check on
material possessions or on human beings, it is evidence of the power
exercised by some men over other men."26 Information in such socie-
ties, therefore, tended to flow down from the top rather than from citi-
zens and groups to other citizens and groups. The invention of printing
and the subsequent spread of literacy caused information to be dissemi-
nated to broader sectors of the population. The change which resulted
from information flowing across classes as well as from the upper class
downward, led to challenges to the traditional social order. It en-
couraged the development of liberal political theories and to increased
demands for the protection of rights and for limits on state power.
The second main theme in Innis' writings is the influence of media
on the concepts of time and space. Innis categorizes both media and
societies as being either time-oriented or space-oriented. Speech, for
example, is a time-oriented medium since it can be used to carry on a
TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983). Pool's perception of the important qualities of the
new media and of the qualitative difference between print and the new media is some-
what similar to my own. His focus however is on first amendment values of freedom of
expression and how the new media have greater potential for increasing free expression.
This article is broader in purpose and is intended to explore the relationship of the new
media to basic facets of the process of law. See also Gibbons, The Relationship Be-
tween Law and Science, 22 IDEA 227 (1982); J. BING AND T. HARVOLD, LEGAL DECI-
SIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1977).
24. H. INNIS, EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATIONS (1950) & THE BIAS OF COMMUNI-
CATION (1951).
25. "The sword and pen worked together. Power was increased by concentration
in a few hands, specialization of function was enforced. . . . The written record signed,
sealed, and swiftly transmitted was essential to military power and the extension of
government." H. INNIS, EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATION 10 (1950).
26. THE FUTURE OF LITERACY 18 (R. Disch ed. 1973) (interview with Georges
Charbonnier).
27. H. INNIS, THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION 61-131 (1951).
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tradition, but is a poor medium for traversing large distances. He ar-
gues, therefore, that oral societies were highly concerned with the local
community and its history, traditions, religion, and culture. Space-ori-
ented media, such as print, by contrast are light and easily transporta-
ble, and, therefore, they encourage expansion over larger areas, leading
to the growth of secular states and a concern for the present and the
future. For Innis, a society's media determines its fundamental values
and forms of organization. Western society, which under this theory
had originally been a time-oriented oral society, began to become
space-oriented with the invention of writing, and became more space-
oriented with the development of printing. The media with the greatest
bias in terms of space are the electronic media. As will be discussed
below, distance is not a limitation for such media.
McLuhan, unlike Innis, sees media more as devices which alter
perceptual habits than as conveyors of information. He speculates that
different media require the use of different senses and that, depending
on which senses are used, individual and, ultimately, societal habits of
thought are affected.28 The tranformation of an oral culture into a liter-
ate one involves more, for McLuhan, than an increase in the amount of
available information. When one talks to someone face to face, all of a
person's senses may be used. Reading, however, uses only the eye. The
effect of this, according to McLuhan, is profound. One who obtains
information from a printed page rather than from another human be-
ing acquires new personality traits.29 He learns to think abstractly, to
"act without reacting," and to confront social issues and problems in a
detached, uninvolved and impersonal way.30 Typography, McLuhan as-
serts, separates the senses and, therefore, thought from feeling.31 These
traits contribute to society which values rationality, uniformity, individ-
uality, and systematic and abstract thought. 2
This effect of typography on personality-and societal characteris-
tics is heightened by the particular format of the printed page. The
pages of the first printed books looked very much like those of manu-
scripts.33 The typeface used was similar to a written script since that
was what individuals were accustomed to reading. After a period of
28. MCLUHAN, supra note 4, at 59.
29. Id. at 33.
30. Id. at 157-8.
31. Id. at 59.
32. Id. at 262.
33. See infra note 63.
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years, however, printed pages began to look different from manuscrpts.
The printed page, like this one, acquired a uniform and orderly look to
it. The societal effect of this change is that
[O]nce a culture uses such a medium for a few centuries, it begins
to perceive the world in a one-thing-at-a-time, abstract, linear,
fragmented, sequential way. And it shapes its organizations and
schools according to the same premises. The form of print has be-
come the form of thought.34
There is one more explanation of the influence of media which is
relevant to a discussion of the new media's cultural influence. This view
holds that different media have different abilities to transmit some
kinds of information and, therefore, affect the kind of information
available in society. Abstract ideas and concepts, for example, are
much more easily communicated in print than in televised form,
whereas for portraying violent conflict or farcical humor, the opposite is
true. Different media have different strengths. Each medium acts as a
filter, letting some kinds of information through easily, some with diffi-
culty, and some not at all. Depending on which media are dominant in
society, certain kinds of information will be communicated more often
and become important in society while others will become less so.
III. The Influence of Printing On Law
The following description of the impact of printing on law is a
model for placing current technological developments in perspective. It
provides insight into which changes will occur first and which later, and
how deeply the institution of law may be affected. Most importantly, it
provides a basis for understanding why the qualities of new communi-
cations media will have an impact on the process of law.
A. The Development of the Legal Doctrines of Censorship and
Copyright
The two most obvious legal doctrines related to the development of
printing were censorship and copyright. 5 The vast increase in the num-
34. Culkin, A Schoolman's Guide to Marshall McLuhan, in MCLUHAN: PRO
AND CON 249 (R. Rosenthal ed. 1968).
35. Id. at 499. Copyright, if it is viewed as a bar on unrestricted publication, is
related to censorship. Indeed the early grants of exclusive printing rights were intended
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ber of books which were printed and circulated in the last half of the
fifteenth century was quickly perceived to be a threat to those in power.
Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool has noted:
Before printing, there had been no elaborate system of censorship
and control over scribes. There did not have to be. The scribes were
scattered, working on single manuscripts in monasteries. Moreover,
single manuscripts rarely caused a general scandal or major con-
torversy. There was little motive for central control, and control
would have been impractical. But after printing, Pope Alexander
VI issued a bull in 1501 against the unlicensed printing of books."
In 1529, Henry VIII issued a proclamation banning certain books
which were odious to him or to the clergy who advised him.37
Copyright came into being after the invention of printing because
the nature of authorship changed. A thirteenth century Franciscan,
Saint Bonaventure, described four ways of making books:
A man might write the works of others, adding and changing noth-
ing, in which case he is simply called a 'scribe' (scriptor). Another
writes the work of others with additions which are not his own; and
he is called a*"compiler' (compilator). Another writes both other's
work and his own for purposes of explanation; and he is called a
"commentator' (commentator). . . . Another writes both his own
work and others' but with his own work in principal place adding
others' for purposes of confirmation; and such a man should be
called an 'author' (auctor).3 8
Completely original works are not even part of this scheme. Elizabeth
to protect the state and church from unwanted publications. In England in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries,
the legitimate book trade, like other trades in the middle ages, was put
under the regulation of a city company, the stationers, while enforcement
lay with the Privy Council, the Star Chamber, and (for theological mat-
ters) the High Commission, which took the view that all printing, however
innocent, was crime unless the work had been previously licensed. Con-
versely, the government would sometimes give monopoly rights of printing
works which it considered meritorious or useful, and in this way the begin-
nings of copyright appear.
Id. See also, L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHt IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 6-7 (1968).
36. I. DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 14 (1983).
37. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 498 (1956).
38. E. EISENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 121-22.
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Eisenstein has noted that "until it became possible to distinguish be-
tween composing a poem and reciting one, or writing a book and copy-
ing one. . .how could modern games of books and authors be
played?" 9 Printing grew rapidly because it was possible to make
money doing so. Authorship became important and protection of the
author's work was made possible through copyright.4 °
The legal rules which developed as a response to the new medium
of printing are interesting but they do not provide great insights into
the subsequent development of law. In some countries, censorship laws
were avoided or ignored by the printers. Numerous attempts in many
countries to ban and censor texts, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth
century, were often not successful because enforcement mechanisms
were ineffective. In France, for example, book dealers and publishers
did not encounter "too many risks because they knew how to take pre-
cautions and to secure themselves the necessary protection. There was
no police force, legal procedures were very complicated and the King
himself was not always inclined to act harshly. ' 41 When harassment
was successful, printed works were smuggled in from outside the coun-
try. Febvre and Martin's study of the French book trade, for example,
showed that
[florbidden tracts and pamphlets were smuggled into France with
ease, even into the goals where the Huguenots were imprisoned.
Everywhere underground organizations formed to trade in illegal
books. Often the officials of the Booksellers' corporations whose job
it was to inspect imported crates" of books were accomplices in the
trade. In practice they took action against smugglers only when
they had no choice in the matter. How, in any case, particularly
given the administrative limitations of the governments of the pe-
riod, could one hope to put a stop to the smuggling of books, which
were slhall objects and easily concealed? Consequently the prime
outcome of the policy of rigorous offical censorship was the estab-
lishment, around the French borders in the 18th century, of a series
of printing businesses producing pirated editions and editions of
banned books in complete freedom. The works of the philosphes
were printed by these firms. Sometimes indeed the Chancellor had
39. Id.
40. As noted earlier, control over publication prior to enactment of the Statute of
Anne in 1709 was given to the printing company and the publisher, therefore, held the
copyright. The Statute of Anne for the first time allowed for copyright to be in the
name of the author. L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIvE 5 (1968).
41. L. FEBVRE & H. MARTIN, THE COMING OF THE BOOK 300 (1976).
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the disagreeable surprise of discovering his coachman bringing per-
nicious books to Paris concealed in his own carriage. Soon, under
Malesherbe's influence, the officials in charge of censorship sought
to relax the regulations, granted tacit permission for the publica-
tion of certain books and were tolerant in other ways. It is evident
that official censorship as it was then understood had proved to be
ineffectual.42
What the history of censorship laws suggests is that during the
early period when censorship laws were common, the power of the
state, as embodied in these laws, was struggling with the power of the
medium. Focusing merely on the laws provides little basis for predict-
ing future changes, such as the development of first amendment values,
whereas a focus on the qualities of the medium, on the behavior of the
printers, and perhaps on the law enforcement process, might suggest
the course of future developments. The sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
tury nation state was dealing with a medium that was to prove to be
more powerful than it was.
B. Printing and Changes in Legal Institutions
Less noticeable but more important were changes that occurred in
legal institutions. The almost immediate affinity between law and print
and the willingness of the law to employ the technology of print, is
striking. William Caxton printed the first book in England in 1476.4 3
Five years later the first law books were printed and in 1485 the print-
ing of parliamentary session laws began. 4 The first printing of law
books began a process that was to make the printed law book a central
feature in the modern paradigm of law. The printing of law books
42. Id. at 246-7.
43. Graham, supra note 23, at 58.
44. Id. In France, religious works comprised the largest category of books
printed before 1500. This was not surprising since most readers were clerics. In the first
decades of the sixteenth century, however, the percentage of religious works declined,
and the proportion of classical and legal texts increased. An analysis of who owned a
library during this period suggests the effect of printing not only on law but on the
secularization of society:
Lawyers Churchmen
1480- 1500 1 24
1501 - 1550 54 60
1551 - 1600 71 21
L. FEBVRE & H. MARTIN, supra note 41, at 263.
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gradually turned the law library into as central a legal institution as
the courthouse.45 The printed book gradually became the repository of
law and, in this country at least, the library became the heart of the
modern law school. Christopher Columbus Langdell, the founder of
modern legal education, was very sensitive to this point when he noted
that "law is a science, and that all the available materials of that sci-
ence are contained in printed books. . .law can only be learned and
taught in a university by means of printed books. . .printed books are
the ultimate sources of all legal knowledge."" 6
Printing technology, through the creation of case reporters, has
dominated legal education in this country for the past one hundred
years. It has prompted the analysis of and reliance upon precedent in
ways not previously possible. One could simply not have had a system
of precedent in a society that relied solely on writing. In a study of one
of the earliest printed digests, Howard Jay Graham and John Heckel
stated:
The earliest digesters, with their printers, are the prophets and
unsung heroes of the Common Law. It is strange more has not
been made of their role and achievements. We can see very clearly
today that it was in part because Nicholas Statham, Sir Anthony
Fitzherbert, and later, Sir Robert Brooke, abstracted the "cases of
the yeres," roughly ordered them by subjects, reduced practition-
ers' colloquies to procedural guides and principles, that English
lawyers got to searching their books for rules, thinking more and
more in terms of judicial precedent rather than in the old terms of
judicial consistency, writs, cases and forms of actions. Fortui-
tiously, printing made these first crude digests widely available at
the very time English law was undergoing its heaviest challenge
from the Continent. It doubtless would be an exaggeration to say
that the Common Law was "saved" by printing. But certainly the
Common Law as device, symbol, and system was in considerable
part a product of its own compilation, ordering and improved dis-
tribution. During the crucial early Tudor period, in particular,
printing and simpler indexing gave reader access, coherence and
form; they accelerated future growth no less than did practice and
45. Christopher Columbus Langdell wrote that "We have also constantly indi-
cated the idea that the library is the proper workshop of professors and students alike;
that it is to us all that the laboratories of the university are to chemists and physicists,
the museum of natural history to the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists."








C. The Influence of Printing on Values, Habits of Thought and
Social Change
In her recent work, Printing As an Agent of Social Change, Eliza-
beth Eisenstein asserts that printing made possible the Protestant Ref-
ormation of the sixteenth century,48 the Scientific Revolution of the
seventeenth century49 and preserved the contributions of the earlier
Renaissance in a way that scribes would not have been able to do.5
0
Her analysis, along with the theories of Innis and McLuhan, explain
many of the underlying changes in values which printing caused and
which led to important changes in law.
1. Flow of Information: Challenges to Authority
Printing caused a radical change in the number of books produced
and in the distribution of books. Clapham has asserted that "[a] man
born in 1453, the year of the fall of Constantinople, could look back
from his fiftieth year on a lifetime in which about eight million books
had been printed, more perhaps than all the scribes of Europe had pro-
duced since Constantine founded his city in A.D. 330."51 Other esti-
mates assert that twelve to twenty million books were printed before
1500 and that one hundred and fifty to two hundred million copies
were printed in the sixteenth century. 2 This was a revolutionary
change compared to what had existed previously. Equally important, it
made possible the spread of information in previously unforeseen
47. Graham and Heckel, supra note 23, at 101. There are substantial differences
between modern and medieval attitudes toward precedent, some of which can be re-
lated to differences between writing and print. For a discussion of how the authority of
prior cases has changed over the centuries, see T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW (1956); A. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW (1966); C.
ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (1964); V. CAENEGAM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH
COMMON LAW (1973).
48. E. EISENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 303-13.
49. Id. at 453-516.
50. Id. at 163-302.
51. CLAPHAM, Printing, in A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY FROM THE RENAISSANCE
TO THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 377 (C. Singer, E. Holmyard, A. Hall, and T. Wil-
liams eds. 1957).
52. L. FEBVRE & H. MARTIN, supra note 41, at 262.
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ways.5"
Legal information, too, began to circulate in new ways. In Eng-
land, in the mid-1500s, "[t]he crucial acts of the reformation parlia-
ment were not only printed, published and proclaimed, but posted in
every parish. .. .
Literate Englishmen now had what learned judges and serjeants
even had lacked in Fortescue's and Littleton's time: ready access
and reference to the texts of statutes on which their cases and
problems turned. To encounter and reread Professor Plucknett's
shocking account of what the scarcity of manuscript copies of the
statute law had meant in the fourteenth and fifteenth centures is to
grasp something of the Tudors' excitement, relief, and sense of
wonder, at the Great Books: 300 years of the reigns, councils, Par-
liaments, statutes, in full sweep. In English, tabled by chapters.
Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest "thirty times corn-
firmed," as Coke later would observe in an extraordinary under-
statement. (Actually the number was 44 and the reconfirmations
become strikingly evident, even in Redman's Tabula.) The Great
Boke and The Boke of Magna Carta thus were powerful factors in
creating the Tudor image and tradition of consti-
tutionalism. .. "5
Martin Luther's challenge to the authority of the Catholic Church,
which was fostered by print, was later followed by a secular challenge
to authority, also encouraged by print. The increase in the spread of
53. When Luther proposed debate over his Ninety-Five Theses his action
was not in and of itself revolutionary. It was entirely conventional for
professors of theology to hold disputations over an issue such as indul-
gences and 'church doors were the customary place of medieval publicity.'
But these particular theses did not stay tacked to the church door (if in-
deed they were ever really placed there). To a sixteenth century Lutheran
chronicler, 'it almost appeared as if the angels themselves had been their
messengers and brought them before the eyes of all the people.' Luther
himself expressed puzzlement, when addressing Pope Leo X six months
after the initial event:It is a mystery to me how my theses, more so than
my other writings, indeed, those of other professors, were spread to so
many places. They were meant exlusively for our academic circle
here. . . .They were written in such a language that the common people
could hardly understand them. They. . . .use academic categories. . ..
E. EISENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 306-7.
54. Graham, supra note 23, at 77.
55. Id. at 93.
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information provided access to information and promoted consciousness
of rights and other ideals of the liberal legal order. 6
2. Time and Space: Preserving and Distributing Information
The Lutherian example indicates that print was more successful
than writing in overcoming problems of distributing information over
wide areas. "Printing made it possible for the first time to publish hun-
dreds of copies that were alike and yet might be scattered every-
where."' 57 Print also had considerable advantages in preserving texts
over time. This was very different from scribal culture "where every
copy was unique, with its own variations. 58 In such a culture, it was
impossible to be certain what the original author had written. The
more a book was copied, the less authentic it became.5
How did printing preserve the past? Thomas Jefferson once wrote:
Very early in the course of my researches into the laws of Virginia
I observed that many of them were already lost, and many more on
the point of being lost, as existing only in single copies in the hands
of careful or curious individuals, on whose deaths they would prob-
ably be used for waste paper. . . .How many of the precious works
of antiquity were lost while they existed only in manuscript? Has
there ever been one lost since the art of printing has rendered it
practicable to multiply and disperse copies? This leads us then to
the only means of preserving those remains of our laws now under
consideration, that is, a multiplication of printed copies.6 0
Thus, printing preserved the past and created continuity by making
valuable data public, rather than secret. This "ran counter to tradition,
led to clashes with new censors, and was central both to early modern
science and to Enlightenment thought." 6' The more permanent quality
of print fostered notions of stability, consistency and predictability.
These values, in turn, can be related to belief in the concept of rights.
As Eisenstein notes,
56. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
57. SARTON, The Quest for Truth: Scientific Progress During the Renaissance,
in THE RENAISSANCE: Six ESSAYS 66 (1962).
58. I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 23, at 213.
59. PRINTING AND THE MIND OF MAN, xix (J. Carter, P. Muir eds. 1967).
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[i]n France, also, the 'mechanism by which the will of the sover-
eign' was incorporated into the 'published' body of law by 'registra-
tion' was probably altered by typographical fixity. It was no longer
possible to take for granted that one was following 'immemorial
custom' when granting an immunity or signing a decree. Much as
M. Jourdain learned that he was speaking prose, monarchs learned
from political theorists that they were 'making' laws. But members
of parliaments and assemblies also learned from jurists and printers
about ancient rights wrongfully usurped. Struggles over the right to
establish precedents became more intense, as each precedent be-
came more permanent and hence more difficult to break. 2
Most importantly, by creating identical standardized copies that
could be available everywhere, printing fostered notions of equality. In-
dividuals in different places could be aware of treatment that others
were receiving in fairly distant places. Particularly as court decisions
began to be printed and distributed, pressures arose for national uni-
formity and equal treatment regardless of place. This kind of uniform-
ity could not be expected when manuscript copies were few and the
copies that did exist were often slightly different from one another. In
summary, the ability of printing to both expand the spatial distribution
of information and preserve the past, gave print many advantages over
writing. These qualities created new patterns of information flow, fos-
tered liberal legal values and led to the development of the legal insti-
tutions with which we are familiar.
3. Changes in Perceptual Habits
Printing not only affected the flow of information but changed the
image one perceived while reading.63 The first printed books looked
very much like manuscripts. The typeface used was similar to a written
62. Id. at 119.
63. The earliest incunabula looked exactly like manuscripts. The first
printers, far from being innovators, took extreme care to produce exact
imitations. The 42-line Bible for example was printed in a letter-type
which faithfully reproduced the handwriting of the Rhenish mis-
sals .... How could they have imagined a printed book other than in the
form of the manuscripts on which they were in fact modeled? And would
not the identity of the book and manuscript be the most obvious proof of
their technical triumph, as well as the guarantee of their commercial
success?
L. FEBVRE & H. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 77-8 (1976). See also, E. GOLDSCHMIDT,
THE PRINTED BOOK OF THE RENAISSANCE 37 (1966).
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script. After a period of years, however, printed pages began to look
very different from a page of manuscript. Communications theorist
John Culkin illustrated the impact of this new uniform image on the
perceptual habits of readers:
While lecturing to a large audience in a modern hotel in Chicago, a
distinguished professor is bitten in the leg by a cobra. The whole
experience takes three seconds. He is affected through the touch of
the reptile, the gasp of the crowd, the swimming sights before his
eyes. His memory, imagination, and emotions come into emergency
action. A lot of things happen in three seconds. Two weeks later he
is fully recovered and wants to write up the experience in a letter to
a colleague. To communicate this experience through print means
that it must first be broken down into parts and then mediated,
eyedropper fashion, one thing at a time, in an abstract linear, frag-
mented, sequential way. That is the essential structure of print.
And once a culture uses such a medium for a few centuries, it be-
gins to perceive the world in a one-thing-at-a-time, abstract, linear,
fragmented, sequential way. And it shapes its organizations and
schools according to the same premises. The form of print has be-
come the form of thought."
It is, unfortunately, impossible to prove whether or not the new uniform
image of the printed page has a major influence on thought and behav-
ior. McLuhan, the most famous advocate of this theory, was an in-
sightful, provocative and witty writer, but was not always historically
accurate in the examples he provided in support of his thesis. There is,
nevertheless, something striking about the theory for anyone interested
in the history of law. Some of the main qualities of printed words, such
as their uniformity and repeatability, and the values that Culkin and
McLuhan closely tie to a print based society, such as rationality, objec-
tivity, and consistency, are also central ideals of the liberal legal
tradition.
The appeal of this argument is made even stronger by looking at
other changes involved in the shift from the written to the printed
word. Changes occurred not only in the appearance of the page, but in
the organization of books. Printers were much more involved in index-
ing, cataloguing and cross-referencing works than were scribes:
64. Culkin, A Schoolman's Guide to Marshall McLuhan, in MCLUHAN: PRO
AND CON 249 (R. Rosenthal ed. 1968).
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The systematic arrangement of titles; the tables which followed
strict alphabetical order; the indexes and cross-references to accu-
rately numbered paragraphs all show how new tools available to
printers helped to bring more order and method into a significant
body of public law. Until the end of the fifteenth century, it was
not always easy to decide just 'what a statute really was' and con-
fusion had long been compounded concerning diverse 'great' char-
ters. In 'Englishing and printing" the 'Great Boke of Statutes
1530-1533' John Rastell took care to provide an introductory
'Tabula': a forty-six page 'chronological register by chapters of the
statutes 1327 to 1523.' He was not merely providing a table of con-
tents; he was also offering a systematic review of parliamentary
history-the first many readers had ever seen. 5
4. The Communication of Abstract Ideals
Print is an ideal medium for fostering both the habits of thought
and the values of a liberal legal order. As noted earlier, different media
have different strengths and abilities to communicate information of
various kinds. Print is the most suitable medium for communicating
law's abstract ideals and for encouraging abstract thought. The ab-
stract concepts of law, while they originated in verbal thought, have
been preserved and communicated in print. For citizens to accept law
as a legitimate power requires, as political scientist Adelaide Villmoare
has noted, "an underlying faith that the arbitrariness of humankind
can be constrained to some degree by the rule of law." '66 Thus, what
most people mean when they say that they believe in law or in the rule
of law is that they believe that abstract and intangible rules can deter-
mine the outcome of individual disputes. They assume that when con-
flict occurs, already-existing rules can be consulted and used to resolve
the dispute. Conversely, this means that if disputes are settled on a
totally ad hoc basis with no reference to rules, the process of conflict
resolution would be different from law. Theoretically, the legal model
requires that "if a decision is to be rational it must be based upon some
rule, principle, or standard. If this rule, principle, or standard is to
make any appeal to the parties it must be something that pre-existed
the decision."'67 Alternative systems might rely on custom, compromise,
65. E. EISENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 105.
66. Villmoare, The Judiciary in the Context of the State, 4 ALSA FORUM 9
(June 1979).
67. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in THE LEGAL PROCEss 421
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discussion, force, or any technique other than reliance upon pre-ex-
isting rules. They might or might not create more desirable outcomes
than law. What is certain, in theory at least, is that they would be
distinguishable from law as we know it today.
Respect for this idea of law is so traditional in our society that it is
often forgotten what habits of thought and beliefs are required before a
legal order can develop. One of these is belief in the power of abstract
rules. For a society to have a legal system, one scholar has written,
there must be a "belief in the power of certain words, put certain ways,
to bring about certain effects denominated as legal. This kind of magic
is necessary if law is to work." ' This "kind of magic" can only occur if
the words have been put in tangible form, either in writing, or, more
effectively, in print. As Robert Pirsig has noted,
in this culture, a court of law can ask a witness to tell 'the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God,' and
expect the truth to be told. But one can transport this court to
India, as the British did, with no real success on the matter of per-
jury because the Indian mythos is different and the sacredness of
words is not felt in the same way." 69
The differences between writing and print suggest a major trans-
formation in law during the centuries following the introduction of
printing. In addition to the examples just provided of changes in the
fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a brief look at the analy-
sis in Roberto Unger's Law in Modern Society"0 provides additional
confirmation of the link between printing and law. Although Unger
makes no mention of the invention of printing or its impact on legal
thought or institutions, his central thesis can provide an excellent con-
text for ascertaining some of the links between law, printing, and other
communications media.
Unger contrasts three forms of law. The first, "customary," is in-
formal.7 1 Individuals in a group interact with one another guided by
common expectations about what kind of conduct is proper and desira-
ble. There is no separate body whose only function is to make rules.
(H. Hart and A. Sacks eds. 1958).
68. Berman, The Background of the Western Legal Tradition in the Folklaw of
the Peoples of Europe, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 563 (1978).
69. R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 344 (1974).
70. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976).
71. Id. at 50.
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The group as a whole develops understandings about proper standards
of behavior. There is no written code. The second form of law, "bu-
reaucratic," has "explicit rules established and enforced by an identifi-
able government." 72 Law, in the bureaucratic society, is "deliberately
imposed by government rather than spontaneously produced by soci-
ety.""3 Unlike customary law, a bureaucratic society has a centralized
authority which has most of the power in the society.
Unger's third concept of law is labeled the "legal order. '7 4 Like
the bureaucratic form, it is characterized by the existence of an identi-
fiable centralized government that establishes and enforces explicit
rules. In addition, however, law in the legal order is both general and
autonomous. It is general in the sense that legal equality is presumed to
exist among citizens. The law is "expected to address broadly defined
categories of individuals and acts and to be applied without personal or
class favoritism."7 5 The law is autonomous in that there is a body of
rules which is more than a "mere restatement of any identifiable set of
non-legal beliefs of norms, be they economic, political, or religious. 7 6
The law is secular, with special institutions to resolve disputes and in-
terpret law, and a separate legal profession.
The "legal order," according to Unger, developed for the first time
in history in Western Europe during the last few centuries. Its emer-
gence became possible, he argues, because for the first time two social
conditions existed:
1. Society was pluralistic, with no group having any assumed right to
rule.77 Competition existed among social and economic groups and
there was a dwindling sense of community among the society's
members. As a result, there was continuing level of societal
instability.
2. A belief existed in a "higher universal or divine law as a standard
by which to justify and to criticize the positive law of the state."78
Systems more just than the existing order were believed to be
possible.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 51.
74. Id. at 52.
75. Id. at 53.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 66-76.
78. Id. at 66.
1984]
172
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss3/12
654 Nova Law Journal [Vol. 8
These two forces created the basis for a legal system which balanced
competing interests and limited the power of the majority.79 In this new
system, citizens could make claims on the state through formal special-
ized institutions. The law, which was made by humans, could now be
challenged and changed by them.
For a variety of reasons, it is not surprising that the emergence of
the "legal order" paralleled the development and spread of printing.
First, printing helped create some of the political and social conditions
Professor Unger thought necessary for the development of a liberal le-
gal order. For example, the spread of printing quickened the develop-
ment of national languages and spurred the formation of nation
79. Professor Harold Berman's recent study of the origins of the Western legal
tradition, LAW AND REVOLUTION (1983), has a different emphasis from Unger and
from the analysis presented here. Berman asserts that, "in the West, modern
times-not only modern legal institutions and modern legal values but also the modern
state, the modern church, modern philosophy, the modern university, modern literature,
and much else that is modern-have their origin in the period 1050-1150. . ." Id. at 4.
In the late eleventh, the twelfth, and the early thirteenth centuries a fun-
damental change took place in Western Europe in the very nature of law
both as a political institution and as an intellectual concept. Law became
disembedded. Politically, there emerged for the first time strong central
authorities, both ecclesiastical and secular, whose control reached down,
through delegated officials, from the center to the localities. Partly in con-
nection with that, there emerged a class of professional jurists, including
professional judges and practicing lawyers. Intellectually, western Europe
experienced at the same time the creation of its first law schools, the writ-
ing of its first legal treatises, the conscious ordering of the huge mass of
inherited legal materials, and the development of the concept of law as an
autonomous, integrated, developing body of legal principles and
procedures.
Id. at 86. The cause of this revolution was Pope Gregory VII who, in the 1070s, pro-
claimed the legal supremacy of the Pope over all Christians and over all secular
authorities.
Berman's focus is on the centuries before printing and, while he recognizes that
transformation in law was caused by later events, such as the Reformation, he traces
the seeds of change to the earlier period. In terms of the analysis and perspective
presented here, the most unfortunate omission in Law and Revolution is the lack of
recognition given to the limitations of writing. The revival of law in the eleventh cen-
tury centers around a discovery of a manuscript of Justinian's code and the develop-
ment of law in the centuries following is derived from analysis and study of this text.
Berman may be correct that the seeds of Western law were planted in the late eleventh
century and he provides a great deal of interesting information on scribal culture. Ulti-
mately, however, further change would have been impossible, as the limitations of writ-
ing as a form of communicating information were reached. Id.
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states.80 Printing also assisted the democratization of knowledge and
political institutions. As Daniel Boorstin has noted, because of printing,
"the knowledge of the few became the knowledge of the many, with the
effect, as Carlyle observed, of 'disbanding' hired armies, and cashiering
most kinds and senates and creating a whole new democratic world." 81
The level of political instability which made a liberal legal order seem
desirable occurred in part as a result of the spread of information
which printing made possible. Unger's analysis is important because it
emphasizes that law today is very different from what it once was. The
bureaucratic form of law became the legal order as a result of several
changes in societal values and institutions. If similarly fundamental
changes are occurring today, it is important to understand why they
are taking place, see how they are related to the new communications
technologies, and assess whether a new form of law is likely to develop.
IV. The Influence of New Media on Law
The foregoing analysis suggests that both law and society under-
went a broad transformation following the invention of printing.
Changes in rules, institutions and values led to a tranformation that
might be labeled revolutionary.8 2 Are comparable large scale changes
80. S. STEINBERG, FIVE HUNDRED YEARS OF PRINTING 117 (1955).
81. Address by Dr. Daniel Boorstin, Dedication of the National Humanities
Center at North Carolina Research Triangle Park (April 16, 1977).
82. Clearly, the "revolution" was not violent and, therefore, falls outside the defi-
nition of "revolution" that is often used. Berman, for example, states that:
The history of the West has been marked by recurrent periods of violent
upheaval, in which the preexisting system of political, legal, economic, reli-
gious, cultural, and other social relations, institutions, beliefs, values, and
goals has been overthrown and replaced by a new one. There is by no
means a perfect symmetry in these periods of great historical change; yet
there are certain patterns or regularities. Each has marked a fundamental
change, a rapid change, a violent change, a lasting change, in the social
system as a whole. Each has sought legitimacy in a fundamental law, a
remote past, an apocalyptic future. Each took more than one generation to
establish roots. Each eventually produced a new system of law, which em-
bodied some of the major purposes of the revolution, and which changed
the Western legal tradition, but which ultimately remained within that
tradition.
H. BERMAN, supra note 79, at 19. The transformation discussed in this essay is a "si-
lent revolution." Kenneth Boulding has written that such revolutions
are not to be confused with those storms on the surface of history generally
called 'revolutions' which raise a great deal of dust and cause a lot of
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likely to occur in our society due to the introduction of the electronic
media? The following discussion is intended more to identify critical
areas and issues which must be addressed than to predict specific
changes. Our era, like that following the invention of printing, may be
one of "seeming continuity with radical change,"' 3 where important de-
velopments may be unnoticed. Some of the outcomes suggested below
are admittedly speculative, and some will be influenced by policy
choices that our society will make. To make the wisest decisions in
these areas, it is important to be aware of the underlying reasons for
change.
A. Changes in Legal Doctrine
Changes in traditional legal doctrines are the least important indi-
cator of future change. They are usually responses to the first uses of
the new medium. They often occur with little understanding of the
qualities of the new media or of likely future uses that will be different
from the initial use.84 Copyright law is the clearest example of an area
of law that is fighting for its continued existence and is destined to lose.
Copyright is a technique of regulation that is ideally suited to a me-
trouble but which generally end up with the same old things called by a
new set of names. The ecological revolutions in society are the silent revo-
lutions, often taking centuries to accomplish their course. They are the
revolutions in ideas, in ideals, in techniques, which carry a society from
one way of life to another.
K. BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION xxvii (1968). See also T. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 136 (1970), E. HAVELOCK, supra note
18, at ix.
83. E. EISENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 51.
84. Ithiel de Sola Pool has summarized the legal system's understanding of the
new media as follows:
In each of the three parts of the American communications system-print,
common carriers, and broadcasting-the law has rested on a perception of
technology that is sometimes accurate, often inaccurate, and which
changes slowly as technology changes fast. Each new advance in the tech-
nology of communications disturbs a status quo. It meets resistance from
those whose dominance it threatens, but if useful, it begins to be adopted.
Initially, because it is new and a full scientific mastery of the options is not
yet at hand, the invention comes into use in a rather clumsy form. Techni-
cal laymen, such as judges, perceive the new technology in that early,
clumsy form, which then becomes their image of its nature, possibilities,
and use. This perception is an incubus on later understanding.
I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 23, at 7.
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dium such as printing where the location of making the copies can be
identified.8 5 Copying machines and videotape recorders have presented
the most publicized threats to copyright law86 but the computer, which
will essentially provide each household with a copying machine, will
provide the final blow to the copyright system of regulation. Yet, the
demise of copyright,87 or, for example, the recent rise in privacy legisla-
tion 8 in response to the new media, do not really help us in our search
for what the role of law will be in the future. To understand whether
law will be more or less important in the future as a tool for resolving
conflict, the focus needs to be elsewhere.
B. The Effect of New Media on Legal Institutions
The effect of the new media on legal institutions will be visible less
quickly than the impact on legal doctrine. In addition, the most quickly
visible changes may not be the most important ones. For example, the
struggle over whether television cameras should be allowed into the
courtroom has received much attention but may be less important than
other uses of video technology, such as the use of videotaped testimony.
85. Established notions about copyright become obsolete, rooted as they
are in the technology of print. The recognition of a copyright and the prac-
tice of paying royalties emerged with the printing press. With the arrival
of electronic reproduction, these practices became unworkable. Electronic
publishing is analogous not so much to the print shop of the eighteenth
century as to word-of-mouth communication, to which copyright was never
applied.
Consider the crucial distinction in copyright law between reading and writ-
ing. To read a copyright text is no violation, only to copy it in writing. The
technological basis for this distinction is reversed with a computer text. To
read a text stored in electronic memory, one displays it on the screen; one
writes it to read it. To transmit it to others, however, one does not write it;
one only gives others a password to one's own computer memory. One
must write to read, but not to write.
I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 23, at 214.
1 86. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (D.C.
Cal. 1980), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, Sony Corp of America v. Uni-
versal City Studios, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984); Encyclopedia Britannica Ed.
Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
87. I hope it is clear that changes in copyright law do not mean the end of re-
ward for creative effort. Copyright will be replaced gradually by another form of regu-
lation that is more in tune with the nature of the new media.
88. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 522; Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. § § 1681-1681(t).
1984]
176
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss3/12
Nova Law Journal
Will the trial as a face-to-face coming together of the parties become
even more rare than it is today? Print never completely replaced the
trial or oral argument. Will these forums, which rely on our original
medium of speech, be modified by video without an exhaustive analysis
of what such a change implies?89
More basic, perhaps, is the effect of computerization of library re-
sources90 on precedent and the notion of the common law. Computer-
ization of case reporters has occurred at a point in time when the
growth of reporters threatens to become unmanageable.9 1 A system of
precedent will not function effectively when there are too few cases be-
ing decided and it also will not work when there are too many cases. In
the past, the nature of printing technology imposed some limitation on
how many cases could be printed and how quickly they would be pub-
lished. The digest system made the whole process manageable. Where
there are too many prior cases in an area and where cases are added to
the data base much more quickly than in the past, unpredictability and
instability will be the result. This will pose a challenge to the idea of
precedent and to the foundation of the common law. Whereas print
89. See supra note 13.
90. Taylor, Legal Information Centers: The Electronic Law Libraries of the Fu-
ture, in CONFERENCE ON LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE 1980's 82 (1981).
91. Law Libraries and Miniaturization, 66 LAW LiB. J. 395 (1973). It is inter-
esting that the West digest system was developed at the end of the nineteenth century
at a time when "there was a feeling that the multiplication of law reports would one
day destroy the law as it was known." Young, A Look at American Law Reporting in
the 19th Century, 68 LAW LIB. J. 294, 304 (1975). The number of volumes of Ameri-
can case reports had increased from 18 in 1810 to 473 in 1836 to 3,800 in 1885. One
commentator in 1882 wrote that
[t]he ratio of increase in the published volumes is constantly accelerat-
ing. . . .That the number of courts whose opinions are being reported and
the numbers of judges writing opinions are constantly increasing, is beyond
doubt. . . .There are now two hundred and ninety-eight state and territo-
rial judges, and eighty-two Federal judges,-in all, three hundred and
eighty,-whose opinions are being regularly published. . . .And
yet,. . .the system of law reporting may be said to be in its in-
fancy. . . .Unless some means shall speedily be devised of checking this
appalling number of publications, it is perhaps within the bounds of mod-
eration to assert that lawyers now in practice at the bar may live to see the
number of volumes. . . [in English] exceed twenty-thousand.
High, What Shall Be Done With The Reports, 16 AM. L. REV. 429, 434-35 (1882).
The digests not only provided a solution to this problem but probably also subtly
shaped the attitudes of generations of lawyers and law students about the degree of
order and orderliness that existed in the legal system.
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fostered the development of the idea of precedent, the use of computers
may signal the erosion of this model of law.
The basic question is whether the computerization of cases and
other material will ultimately reduce the authority of prior decisions
and modify the idea of precedent. Common law attitudes toward prece-
dent are not accepted in most of the world's legal systems and took
several hundred years to develop in England. It is important to note
that modern systems of precedent require two things: that we think in
terms of being consistent with prior cases and that what is written by
the judge in the printed decision by itself has authority to determine a
later decision. The evolution of the common law involved the develop-
ment of a system where prior cases become important and also a sys-
tem, such as exists today, where the printed decision is important in
itself. The authority of the printed decision, however, came much later
than the idea of taking prior cases into account and involved a shift of
thought in terms of what the prior case would stand for. In the early
days, prior cases provided evidence of custom and it was custom that
was considered most important. As Plucknett writes, "[ifn the Year
Book period cases are used only as evidence of the existence of a cus-
tom of the court. It is the custom which governs the decision, not the
case or cases cited as proof of the custom." '92 As we place more and
more cases in the computer data base, and do this much faster than
printing technology allowed, will what is retrieved have the same status
and authority and be perceived in the same way as printed judicial
decisions, which are retrieved from those fairly dignified looking books
called reporters?
In answering this question, several other qualities of computers, in
addition to the differenece in appearance between the book and com-
puter, need to be considered. First, opinions are being added to the
data base in greater and greater quantity. In future litigation, there
will be more and more decisions on both sides of an issue, providing
even more opportunity than there currently is for every party to a case
to construct a legal argument supported by a host of cases. Second,
cases are being added more quickly. Pressure will be exerted to use new
cases, to continuously modify and to add to arguments in pending
cases. At some point in this process the "myth of certainty"93 will be-
come more obviously a myth and the system's allegiance to precedent,
a fragile house of cards, may disintegrate. Can the computer provide
92. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 347 (1956).
93. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 3-13 (1963).
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an antidote or solution to prevent this from occurring? Can programs
be developed to evaluate and reduce the amount of data that is re-
trieved from the data base? On one level, programs can assist the user
to narrow the search for cases to something that is manageable for the
user. But, since computers are capable of more impressive feats, pro-
grams will be designed to do more, to apply some rule to cases the
program identifies as relevant.94 In other words, if the model of storing
decisions in a central data base continues, attempts will be made to
employ the data manipulation function of the computer. At that point,
when the process moves away from the current print model, some
change in the law's attitude toward precedent will begin to change as
well.
Third, computerization of law materials will probably broaden the
range of materials users will come in contact with. Print made cases
the center of the law collection and the digest system made the cases
useable. Print has not dealt as efficiently with statutory or regulatory
material. 5 They are more difficult both to locate and retrieve. These
areas are increasingly important areas of law and the computer data
bases can be expected to include them and make them as accessible as
judicial decisions. This broadening of the reach of the legal researcher
involves much more than a change in research techniques. It has the
potential for creating competition for the case as the building block of
the legal system.
Although the image of cases as the heart of the library may re-
main for some time, the fact is that the computerized law library is
already quite different from the print library, and the differences will
grow more noticeable as time passes. Although LEXIS and
WESTLAW began by storing cases, they have greatly broadened the
information accessible from their terminals. In addition to cases, for
example, the LEXIS library includes access to DIALOG, a collection
of 150 databases covering science, medicine, social science, current af-
fairs and humanities, the National Automated Accounting Research
System, and NEXIS, a full-text library of general and business publi-
cations. It is as if a variety of non-law libraries have been moved into
the law library. As these sources of information are discovered, they
94. Tyree, Fact Content Analysis of Case Law: Methods and Limitations, 22
JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1981); Tyree, Can a 'Deterministic' Judge Overrule Himself? 7
RUTGERS J. OF COMPUTERS, TECH. AND L. 381 (1980); D'Amato, Can/Should Com-
puters Replace Judges? 11 GA. L. REV. 1277 (1977).
95. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973).
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will begin to be used more than they are today and, along with the
regulatory and statutory material that will become accessible, will
change the image and authority of the judicial decision.
Ithiel de Sola Pool notes a fourth aspect of computerizing informa-
tion that is worth considering.
One change that computers seem likely to cause is a decline of
canonical texts produced in uniform copies. In some ways this
change will signal a return in print to the style of the manuscript,
or even to the ways of oral conversation. . . .A small subculture of
computer scientists who write and edit on data networks like the
Arpanet foreshadow what is to come. One person types out com-
ments at a terminal and gives colleagues on the network access to
the comments. As each person copies, modifies, edits and expands
the text, it changes from day to day. With each change, the text is
stored somewhere in a different version."
The kind of future Pool envisions may portend a new attitude toward
the authority or finality of decisions and toward the process of making
decisions. The appearance of decisions in printed form, particularly Su-
preme Court decisions, emphasizes the idea that decisions are end
points. Actually the decision is only an end point for the parties in-
volved in the case. For the rest of us, every decision is a stopping point
in a travel that includes the present case and future cases. It is a jour-
ney that never really ends. We perceive decisions as end points because
it is convenient to do so and gives them authority they might not other-
wise have. We should not assume that how we perceive decisions is
inevitable. Rather, it is a culturally-based phenomenon that is partly
related to print. If the method of recording cases, storing them and
retrieving them changes, then the way they are perceived may change
as well..
C. The New Media and Its Influence On Values, Habits of
Thought and Social Change
1. Flow of Information
Assuming the existence of fairly unrestrictive governmental poli-
cies toward the new media, new patterns of communication between
citizens and groups of citizens will begin to occur. The telephone and
96. I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 23, at 213-14.
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the postal service allow communication between two individuals. Com-
puters allow for the sharing of information among much larger num-
bers of individuals in ways that are not now possible. New networks of
communication will be created with information obtained by citizens
being communicated to other citizens. Unlike broadcasting, which is a
mostly hierarchical form of communication, microcomputers allow
communication horizontally to other individuals or groups with similar
interests. Until now, "[tihere has been no means for a group of people
to adequately exchange information among themselves and reach deci-
sions, other than to meet frequently face to face and talk it out."9 This
kind of change in the flow of information promises to lead to increased
demands on the state to satisfy aggrieved parties and newly-formed in-
terest groups. New "classes" can now be identified, whether they are
owners of 1982 Chevrolets or purchasers of Cabbage Patch dolls. As
grievances are identified and publicized, pressures for satisfying griev-
ances will increase. There will be increased pressure to resolve such
problems quickly. 8 The speedup of information thus poses a threat to
the procedurally-oriented, methodical quality that is at the heart of
law.
The analysis presented here leads to several conclusions that are
different from most popular perceptions about the computer. Orwell's
1984 portrayed the technological era as one in which the state could
control information and restrict the flow of information among citizens.
The earliest uses of computers, which could be afforded only by govern-
ments, corporations, or other large groups and institutions, reasonably
led to this conclusion. Fairly soon, however, this model will probably be
outmoded. The computer is unlike a telephone, which was always a
device for communicating between two individuals. Computers. allow
each individual to make his or her ideas available to others, to "pub-
lish" ideas in ways that were not previously possible. The model of the
97. S. HILTZ AND M. TUROFF, THE NETWORK NATION: HUMAN COMMUNICA-
TION VIA COMPUTER XXV (1978).
98. A taste of the future is provided by the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC)
agreement with General Motors to turn one of its largest consumer injury cases over to
volunteer arbitrators of the Council of Better Business Bureaus. The case involved
200,000 owners of General Motors' cars and trucks, suspected of having defective
parts, who had spent $100,000,000 on repairs. The FTC, which was criticized by con-
sumer groups for abandoning a practice to seek a single solution to a common con-
sumer problem, stated that "the alternative to the agreement would have been at least




et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Communications Revolutions
future is one in which information will be moving around the country,
if not the globe, faster than ever before among individuals and groups
who could not previously communicate with each other. States, corpo-
rations, and other societal institutions will indeed be able to collect in-
formation about individuals and organize it in ways that were not pre-
viously possible. Yet, individuals too will be able to collect, manipulate
and communicate information in new ways. Orwell's fear was reasona-
ble for the first stages of the computer revolution, perhaps, but not nec-
essarily for later stages.
What impact will this have on traditional values? This analysis
leads to the conclusion that it is not necessarily freedom that is in dan-
ger but values and concepts that we relate to freedom. The spatial bias
of the electronic media, the emphasis on the present, and the quicken-
ing of the process of change pose a threat to the model of law which is
slow,9 methodical and relies on precedent. Print fostered the model of
procedural justice, and of equal rights, but not of substantive equality.
The pressures of the new media will be to demand actual equality. Law
was often used to defuse conflict. Grievances were channeled into an
institution that applied rules and appeared to be neutral. This model
may be less satisfactory or workable in the future as "rights," "rules,"
and "neutrality" become less acceptable concepts.
Another effect of the speed with which information can now travel
concerns privacy and its alter ego, secrecy. Privacy, as a concept, does
seem endangered.100 But privacy is also a fairly recent concept. It was
not a concept that was familiar in oral cultures where everybody knew
everyone else. Attempts to protect privacy, like attempts to maintain
copyright, seem ultimately doomed to failure. The most that law might
be able to achieve is to prevent the use of inaccurate information about
individuals, but this is not the same as protecting an individual's pri-
vacy. The lack of privacy has a governmental counterpart in the lack of
secrecy. Government officials have complained that it is almost impossi-
ble to keep a secret. It is, therefore, both individual and govenmental
99. For an interesting consideration of law as theater and the problem of speed-
ing up trials, see Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts
Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STANFORD L. REV. 81 (1975).
100. Miller, Privacy in the Modern Corporate State, 25 AD. L. REV. 231
(1973); Miller, Privacy in the Corporate State: A Constitutional Value of Dwindling
Significance, 22 J. OF PUB. L. 3 (1973); Linowes, Must Personal Privacy Die in the
Computer Age? 65 A.B.A. J. 1181 (1979); Washburn, Electronic Journalism, Com-
puters and Privacy, 3 COMPUTER L. J. 189 (1981); Gordon, The Interface of Living
Systems and Computers: The Legal Issues of Privacy, 2 COMPUTER L. J. 877 (1980).
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information that is accessible and not easily controlled. This analysis
suggests that it is not necessarily true that governmental power will
increase as a result of the new media. What does seem likely is that
demands for justice and social change will increase and, as a result, the
level of social conflict will increase as well. 101 The legal mode of dealing
with such a state of affairs seems dated and outmoded, not very well
suited to social conditions of change and instability that are not even
contained within the boundaries of the nation-state. 'As a result, new
modes of conflict resolution can be expected to be developed to take
their place alongside law.
2. Time and Space
The new media would, in Harold Innis' terms, have a very strong
space bias.102 Their strength is in communicating information over vast
distances. Conversely, they are also relatively impermanent. These
qualities too, will ultimately have important legal and social conse-
quences. For example, the electronic media are able to tell us what is
happening in some distant place and it does this very quickly. Our
frames of reference have become expanded beyond national boundaries.
As information flows across national boundaries in such quantity, some
101. Goody and Watt's assessment of the differences between oral and literate
cultures suggests a related reason for an increase in social conflict:
The literate mode of communication is such that it does not impose
itself as forcefully or as uniformly as is'the case with the oral transmission
of the cultural tradition. In non-literate society every social situation can-
not but bring the individual into contact with the group's patterns of
thought, feeling and action: the choice is between the cultural tradi-
tion-or solitude. In a literate society, however, and quite apart from the
difficulties arising from the scale and complexity of the 'high' literate tra-
dition, the mere fact that reading and writing are normally solitary activi-
ties means that in so far as the dominant cultural tradition is a literary
one, it is very easy to avoid; as Bertha Phillpotts wrote in her study of
Icelandic literature:
Printing so obviously makes knowledge accessible to all that we are
inclined to forget that it also makes knowledge very easy to avoid. .... A
shepherd in an Icelandic homestead, on the other hand, could not avoid
spending his evenings in listening to the kind of literature which interested
the farmer. The result was a degree of really national culture such as no
nation of today has been able to achieve.
Goody & Watt, The Consequences of Literacy, in LITERACY IN TRADITIONAL SOCIE-
TIES 59-60 (J. Goody ed. 1968).
102. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
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kinds of new institutions will be necessary to mediate demands and
problems. While printing assisted in the creation of the modern nation
state,10 3 the electronic media will likely lead to new institutions that are
international in nature. One already clear example of an institution
whose foundation is the ability of the computer to conquer distance is
the multinational corporation. 0 Administering a corporate enterprise
that has parts in -distant places is now possible. While attempts are still
made to treat such entities as if they were creatures of a single state or
nation.10 5 some new conception and treatment of the multinational cor-
poration will ultimately evolve. As contact between individuals and
groups in different countries increases, due to the capability of the com-
puter to conquer distance, new relationships will evolve and experi-
ments in structuring these relationships will develop. For example, the
class of people injured by some product will quickly be identified as
consisting of individuals living in different countries. The new "classes"
of interest groups may also be international in nature, such as protes-
tors for a nuclear freeze, and create new national and international
pressures for approaches to resolving problems. Some of these ap-
proaches may be legal in nature. While traditional international law
and legal tribunals have not been overwhelming successes, it may be
that the necessary communications infrastructure for an effective inter-
national legal institution simply has not yet ever existed.
The impressive ability of the electronic media to conquer distance
diverts attention from its main weakness, a quality of impermanence
and tendency to focus on the present. Law is, of course, a process that
insists on maintaining links with the past, with fostering continuity,
consistency and predictability. Print played a pivotal role in developing
a system with such values. The spatial bias of the new media will em-
phasize uniformity over space and should foster demands for equality
over large areas. Print encouraged this, too, but could never do it as
effectively as the electronic media are able to do. The effect of this
change in focus will be to create additional pressures to change the
traditions and goals of law.
103. S. STEINBERG, FIvE HUNDRED YEARS OF PRINTING 117 (1955).
104. R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 26 (1974).
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C. The Visual Image
Video and computer technology share the qualities already men-
tioned but differ in one major way. Video relies on pictures and the
spoken word while computers still rely on reading. While both may use
a television set to communicate information, the path from the set to
one's brain is different. In his valuable book, The Responsive Chord,
media consultant Tony Schwartz described the television image and the
brain processes necessary to watch television:
In watching television, our eyes function like our ears. They
never see a picture, just as our ears never hear a word. The eye
receives a few dots of light during each successive millisecond, and
sends these impulses to the brain. The brain records this impulse,
recalls previous impulses, and expects future ones. In this way we
'"see" an image on television.
Film began the process of fracturing visual images into bits of
information for the eye to receive and the brain to reassemble, but
television completed the transition. For this reason, it is more accu-
rate to say that television is an auditory-based medium. Watching
TV, the brain utilizes the eye in the same way it has always used
the ear. With television, the patterning of auditory and visual stim-
uli is identical. 106
Television can effectively communicate enormous amounts of in-
formation. The issue being raised here, however, concerns whether cer-
tain values are more difficult to transmit via television and whether cer-
tain forms of thought are conditioned merely by the frequent act of
watching television. Print has acted as a catalyst and contributor to-
ward the development of conceptual knowledge and allowed the seem-
ingly unarbitrary categorization of knowledge, people, and actions by
the legal system. The "myth of certainty,"'10 7 and the belief that law
can be consistent, stable and predictable, are, as described earlier, to
some extent functions of the fact that these ideas are generally learned
from books. Acceptance of this model of law, it would seem, may be
more difficult for a person whose
mode of thinking is now in sync with his mode of perceiv-
ing. . . .When print dominated our communication environment,
men sought conceptual knowledge about the world. To achieve this,
106. T. SCHWARTZ, THE RESPONSIVE CHORD 14-16 (1973).
107. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 3-13 (1963).
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sensory information had to be translated into a linear, cognitive
mode. In our electronic communication environment no translation
is necessary. A young person perceives sensory information a milli-
second at a time, and he experiences life as a continuous stream of
fleeting, millisecond events. In this way of life, involvement has
greater value for young people that conceptual knowledge about
the world.108
Recent psychological research on perception and behavior lends
additional support to the movement away from print and toward a dec-
ibel culture." 10 9 Professor Robert Ornstein has written that "one of the
most basic differences between individuals is between those who tend to
employ the linear, verbal mode and those who are less verbal and more
involved in spatial imagery."X1 0 Law emphasizes linear, verbal abilities.
108. T. SCHWARTZ, supra note 105, at 111.
109. G. STEINER, IN BLUEBEARD'S CASTLE 116 (1971).
110. R. ORNSTEIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 39-40 (1972). Ornstein
further explains that there is a neurological basis for these different modes of
consciousness:
The difference between the left and right sides of the body may pro-
vide a key to open our understanding of the psychological and physiologi-
cal mechanisms of the two major modes of consciousness.
The cerebral cortex of the brain is divided into two hemispheres,
joined by a large bundle of interconnecting fibers called the "corpus cal-
losum." The left side of the body is mainly controlled by the right side of
the cortex, and the right side of the body by the left side of the cortex.
When we speak of left in ordinary speech, we are referring to the side of
the body, and to the right hemisphere of the brain.
Both the structure and the function of these two "half-brains" in some
part underlie the two modes of consciousness which simultaneously coexist
within each one of us. Although each hemisphere shares the potential for
many functions, and both sides participate in most activities, in the normal
person the two hemispheres tend to specialize. The left hemisphere (con-
nected to the right side of the body) is predominantly involved with ana-
lytic, logical thinking, especially in verbal and mathematical functions. Its
mode of operation is primarily linear. This hemisphere seems to process
information sequentially. This mode of operation of necessity must under-
lie logical thought, since logic depends on sequence and order. Language
and mathematics, both left-hemisphere activities, also depend predomi-
nantly on linear time.
If the left hemisphere is specialized for analysis, the right hemisphere
(again, remember, connected to the left side of the body) seems specialized
for holistic mentation. Its language ability is quite limited. This hemi-
sphere is primarily responsible for our orientation is space, artistic en-
deavor, crafts, body image, recognition of faces. It processes information
1984]
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The need to develop these abilities explains the absence of photographs
in legal casebooks and may also explain some of the resistance to
clinical legal education. Television, on the other hand, provides one pos-
sible explanation for Dean Walter Probert's statement that "something
about these times makes legalistic conditioning more difficult in law
schools."'
V. Conclusion
Television is new and law is old. But it is a serious mistake to
think of law as an ancient phenomenon that exists now as it has always
existed. Law has ancient roots, but much of its contemporary form and
values would be unrecognizable and unintelligible to persons who lived
two or three thousand years ago. Most of the processes and values of
law have changed as new societies and cultures have evolved.
The model of law which has prevailed in the West for the last few
centuries-the liberal ideal of a system of abstract rulei-is under
great stress. It is expected to perform many functions, but its inherent
power is not nearly as great as the public believes. Contrary to its por-
trayal on television, law is not all-powerful. Unlike the stone edifices
which have been built to house its institutions, law is quite fragile.
When it works, it is often only because it has been barely powerful
enough to achieve its purpose. Evidence of its frequent failure and
weakness-from criminal violence to continuing racial and sex discrim-
ination-is provided daily. Given these conditions, it is vitally impor-
tant to understand the influence of any new, important cultural devel-
opment. I have suggested several points of contact between law and the
new communications media which are such a development and which
have, until now, been ignored. I hope that the framework presented
here will lead to further studies of this subject and will expand the way
in which the relationship between law and communications is
perceived.
The theme running through this article has been that as new forms
of communication develop, the model of law which prevails in a society
more diffusely than does the left hemisphere, and its responsibilities de-
mand a ready integration of many inputs at once. If the left hemisphere
can be termed predominantly analytic and sequential in its operation, then
the right hemisphere is more holistic and relational, and more simultane-
ous in its mode of operation.
Id. at 51-3.
111. W. PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 18 (1972).
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will change. The process of law probably began when the primary
group lost control, a period which coincides with the introduction of
writing. As psychologist Julian Jaynes has noted, "by 2100 B.C. in Ur,
the judgments of the gods through their stewards began to be recorded.
This is the beginning of the idea of law." '112 Liberal legal ideas became
prominent and believable with the invention and spread of printing,
even though law often worked in ways opposite to these ideals. The
paradigm of law which now exists is not an endpoint but rather a stage
in the continuing evolution of forms of social control and dispute reso-
lution. The new media are one of the forces which must be considered
in any discussion of the future of law. The thesis of this article is that
in various ways, the message of the new media is anti-law. This may be
one reason why "the law is becoming more fragmented, more subjec-
tive, geared more to expediency and less to morality; concerned more
with immediate consequences and less with consistency or con-
tinuity."'1 3 Yet, the effect of the new media is not necessarily authori-
tarian. It is just as possible that the new institutions which develop to
resolve conflict will be more egalitarian, more participatory and, in the
end,, more just.
It should also be emphasized that the new media will not make
printing or books disappear. The new ways of communicating will not
cause the printed word to be obsolete, just as the invention of printing
did not make writing disappear and the development of writing did not
stop people from speaking to each other. The creation of new media for
communicating will, however, affect the frequency with which printing
is used. Some information which is now communicated through print
will be transmitted much more quickly through different media in the
future. It is impossible to predict what the nature or the mix of media
will be, but it will inevitably be quite different from what it is now. We
may, as a result, be "working our way, painfully, through a develop-
ment of some new workable image for lego-political processes, where
law-as-rules will appear just a little silly."'"14
112. J. JAYNES, THE ORIGINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE
BICAMERAL MIND 198 (1976).
113. H. BERMAN, supra note 79 at 39.
114. W. PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 58 (1972).
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A Challenge to Workers' Rights
Anthony Chase*
This symposium issue of the Nova Law Journal on workers' rights
and the new technologies has, I think, several important points of refer-
ence. First among these is the recent special issue of democracy dealing
with technology's politics'-an issue which included the International
Association of Machinists "Workers' Technology Bill of Rights."2 A
* B.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Wayne State University; LL.M., Harvard
Law School; Associate Professor, Nova University Center for the Study of Law.
1. DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RENEWAL AND RADICAL CHANGE
(Spring, 1983) [hereinafter cited as DEMOCRACY]. The most important essay in the
issue is Noble, Present Tense Technology DEMOCRACY 8-24 (Spring, 1983). See also
the author's essential introduction to the relation between American history and mod-
ern technology-which he regards as a form of "social production": D. NOBLE,
AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITAL-
IsM (1977).
2. For proposals which parallel in important respects the IAM legislation, see
Conyers, Jr., Social Reform and Law Reform: Toward an Economic Bill of Rights,
1983 DET. C. L. REV. 1121, 1125-26:
The nature of work and production is changing dramatically as a re-
sult of computers, robotics, and the general downsizing of products of all
sorts which require less and less labor input. As one example, thirty years
ago several thousand telephone operators handled a million long-distance
calls. Ten years later, several hundred operators accomplished the same
task, and today only a dozen are needed. Technological displacement of
labor in itself is nothing new. After all, from 1920 to 1980 the ranks of
United States farm workers dropped from eleven to under three million.
Yet, during this period, industrial expansion absorbed much of the dis-
placed farm labor. The novel feature today is the pervasive force-of new
technologies which threatens to displace workers across manufacturing and
service industries alike, unless counteractive labor-saving policies such as a
reduced workweek are enacted. Job growth also will be curtailed by the
rising tide of imports. The decision of Atari to close down its computer
operation in California and to shift 1,700 jobs to Taiwan reveals the extent
to which even high-tech mass production can be handled less expensively
and with a comparably skilled workforce overseas. . ..
What is needed today is a restructuring of the relationship between
the private economy and government, a closer integration between public
and private decision-making, and a new social contract and economic bill
of rights which protects workers, upgrades human resources, promotes full
employment, safeguards the economic base of communities, and ensures
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second point of reference is the series of recent law review symposium
that federal action is responsive to the basic needs of citizens.
Along with economists, policy specialists, and community leaders, I
am developing new legislation which is tentatively titlkd, "The Recovery
and Full Employment Planning Act," and which I hope to introduce in
Congress next year. Professor Bertram Gross, Emeritus Professor of Public
Policy at Hunter College, who has authored every piece of full-employ-
ment legislation since the original concept in 1944, including drafts of the
Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978,
is coordinating the project.
Ford, Plant Closing Legislation, 1983 DET. C.L. REv. 1219, 1219:
The economy of the United States is undergoing profound changes as
it responds to rapid technological innovation and growing international
competition. As one result of these changes, every state and region of the
country is suffering from the effects of massive, sudden plant closings
which wipe out hundreds or thousands of jobs in a single blow, leaving
communities and workers unprepared for widespread unemployment and
unable to make orderly adjustments. Neither the common law of the
states, the National Labor Relations Act, nor any other federal statute,
allows the affected workers or government any meaningful voice in busi-
ness investment or disinvestment decisions that can mean financial ruin for
them. Consequently, disinvestment decisions are usually undertaken with-
out any consideration for the communities they affect.
I have introduced legislation in the House of Representatives, entitled
the National Employment Priorities Act, H.R. 2847, which will grant new
rights to the workers and communites affected by plant closings and pro-
vide for a more equitable sharing of the benefits and costs of economic
change.
In their introduction to the IAM "Workers' Technology Bill of Rights," the
editors of DEMOCRACY cite testimony before a United States House Subcommittee by
IAM President William W. Winpisinger concerning the effects of the new technology
on skilled labor. In a discussion on the relative merits of various American labor lead-
ers, historian David Montgomery provides this interesting note on the head of the
IAM:
These endeavors have thrust William ("Wimpy") Winpisinger into the
limelight as the most highly placed champion of what might be called the
respectable Left within the AFL-CIO. Under his leadership the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists has vigorously supported the Democratic
Socialist Organizing Committee (as if the union had rediscovered its politi-
cal orientation of 1911), and Winpisinger has confronted George Meany
with the first consistent and principled opposition from within the execu-
tive council since the formation of the AFL-CIO. Although Winpisinger
shies away from both the Old Left and the New, and has dissociated him-
self from Sadlowski's workplace confrontation with the bosses, and al-
though he campaigns only for issues which are already to be found in the
official program of the AFL-CIO, his prominence is important for two rea-
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issues concerning conflicts which overlap with workers' rights and the
new technologies: Industrial Relations Law Journal's forum on critical
labor law theory,3 University of Pennsylvania Law Review's symposium
on the public/private distinction,4 New York University Review of Law
& Social Change's colloquium issue on the labor movement at the
crossroads,5 and Texas Law Review's special critique of rights issue.'
Finally, of course, the critical reference point is social reality itself:
the emerging synthesis of law, labor, and technological transformation.
This synthesis-and what it may portend for the future of American
social relations-is dramatically illustrated by the recent closure of in-
dustrial manufacturing facilities which, according to their owners, are
no longer competitive and cannot be rebuilt where they are while ex-
ploiting current technologies of production. Commenting on the now
well-known 1980 federal case of Local 1330, United Steel Workers v.
United States Steel Corporation,8 Jay Feinman remarks that
[tIhis case, in the words of Chief Judge Edwards of the Sixth Cir-
cuit, 'represents a cry for help from steelworkers and townspeople
sons. First, he calls incessantly for popular mobilizations, which both acti-
vate the labor movement and unite it with other social forces. "We need to
set aside our knee-jerk reaction to other groups," he explains. Second, he
bases his campaign to "fire Meany" explicitly on the premise that labor
must repudiate "the economic ground rules of big business," and on the
frequent declaration that he is a socialist. But the Wimpy phenomenon
exists only because of the rebellion at the base, and that insurgency has
also produced its indigenous forms of struggle, which are very different
from national conferences or Washington lobbying.
D. MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
WORK, TECHNOLOGY, AND LABOR STRUGGLES 172-173 (1979).
3. Forum 4 IND. REL. L.J. 449 (1981).
4. Papers from the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium on The
Public/Private Distinction Held at the University of Pennsylvania on January 23, 1982
130 U. PENN. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
5. Colloquium: The Labor Movement at the Crossroads, 11 N.Y. UNIV. REV.
OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1982-83).
6. 62 TEx L. REV. 000 (1984).
7. See P. DECARVALHO, PLANT CLOSINGS AND RUNAWAY INDUSTRIES: STRATE-
GIES FOR LABOR (1981); S. LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS (1982); Lynd,
What Happened in Youngstown. An Outline, 15 RADICAL AMERICA 37-48 (No.4,
1981); Management Prerogatives, Plant Closings, and the NLRA 11 N.Y. UNIV. REV.
OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 83-124 (1982-83).
8. See Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.
Supp. I (N.D. Ohio 1980); Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel
Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
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in the City of Youngstown, Ohio who are distressed by the prospec-
tive impact upon their lives and their city by the closing of two
large steel mills . . . operated (in Youngstown) by (U.S. Steel)
since the turn of the century'. One of the arguments advanced was
under contract law: the doctrine of promissory estoppel barred U.S.
Steel from closing the plants because of representations made by
company officials that the company would not close the plants if
the employees' efforts rendered the plants profitable. This argu-
ment was rejected by the district court and the court of appeals
because the elements of promise and reliance stated in section 90 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts had not been met.9
The district court also rejected the steelworkers' contention that
they had developed a property right in the nature of an easement 0
which should prevent United States Steel from abandoning Youngs-
town. Nevertheless, the court did imply that the steelworkers had
presented a strong case for their having a moral right, if not a legal
remedy, to keep the company in Youngstown. "This Court," asserted
District Judge Lambros,
has spent many hours searching for a way to cut to the heart of the
economic reality-that obsolescence and market forces demand the
close of the Mahoning Valley plants, and yet the lives of 3500
workers and their families and the supporting Youngstown commu-
nity cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. United States Steel
should not be permitted to leave the Youngstown area devastated
after drawing from the lifeblood of the community for so many
years. Unfortunately, the mechanism to reach this ideal settlement,
to recognize this new property right, is not now in existence in the
code of laws of our nation.1"
The cause of the crisis facing the steelworkers, according to the court,
was "obsolescence and market forces" and the basic problem was the
absence, "in the code of laws of our nation," of an existing legal rem-
edy. Could the solution to this problem, and similar ones raised by the
9. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L.REv. 829, 858
(1983).
10. See Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.
Supp. 1, 9-11 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
11. Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp.
1, 10 (N.D. Ohio 1980), quoted in Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States
Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1266 (6th Cir. 1980).
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generation of new and innovative technologies of production, be the ap-
proach to workers' rights proposed in the IAM legislation?
The threshold issue is whether democratic social change in gen-
eral, or the interests of workers in particular, can be advanced through
the production and promotion of rights. Resistance to the traditional
progressive notion (generated within nineteenth-century working class
social movements) 12 that worker emancipation and workers' rights go
hand-in-hand has developed as a tendency within the critical legal stud-
ies movement: 13 a tendency to which I refer as "postmodernism."' 4 The
12. See J. KUCZYNSKI, GESCHICHTE DER LAGE DER ARBEITER UNTER DEM
KAPITALISMUS (40 Vols., 1960-1972); E.J. HOBSBAWM, LABOURING MEN (1964); W.
ABENDROTH, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS (1972); S. AND
B. WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1897); P.S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (6 Vols., 1947-1982); H. GUTMAN, WORK, CUL-
TURE, AND SOCIETY IN INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA: ESSAYS IN WORKING-CLASS AND
SOCIAL HISTORY (1976); L. FINK, The Uses of Political Power: Toward a Theory of
the Labor Movement in the Era of the Knights of Labor, in WORKING-CLASS
AMERICA: ESSAYS ON .LABOR, COMMUNITY, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (M. Frisch & D.
Walkowitz, eds. 1983); N. SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST
(1983).
13. See THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys, ed. 1982);
Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1982). See also Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radical-
ism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L.REv. 1103, 1202 (1983) (characterizing rad-
ical utopianism through the work of critical legal scholars such as Roberto Unger,
Duncan Kennedy, and Mark Tushnet):
The utopianism of the democratic radical suggests even less defensible
conclusions about rights and the institutions ultimately needed to protect
them. If democratic radicalism's theory of human nature were correct, in-
stitutional structures would not play a significant role in the protection of
rights. People in the community would develop shared values and, in mak-
ing democratic choices, would respect any worthy rights. The democratic
radical identifies aspects of individuality that a community ought to pro-
tect and longs for the day when face to face communities will internalize
those aspects with such tenacity that institutional safeguards will not be
necessary to protect substantively valued rights. This perspective is not
confined to judicial review or fundamental rights. The democratic radical
yearns for the community where shared values will replace law.
Id. Although Shiffrin effectively identifies the same tendency within critical legal stud-
ies that I will be analyzing, he confuses that tendency with the totality of democratic
radicalism. Apparently Shiffrin's reading of democratic radicals fills a very short shelf.
Cf., Chase, The Left On Rights: An Introduction, 62 TEX. L.REv. 000 (1984); and, for
the most important recent work on the relation between rights and democratic radical-
ism, see C. FRANQUI, FAMILY PORTRAIT WITH FIDEL (1984). See also Bobbio, Are
There Alternatives to Representative Democracy? 35 TELOS 17 (Spring, 1978); Cas-
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postmodernist analysis of rights is a response to what Joel Whitebook
toriadis, Socialism and Autonomous Society, 43 TELOS 91 (Spring, 1980); Cohen, Be-
yond Reform or RevQlution? The Problem of French Socialism, 55 TELOS 5 (Spring,
1983).
14. See H. Foster, Postmodernism: A Preface in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS
ON POSTMODERN CULTURE ix (H. Foster, ed. 1983):
Postmodernism: does it exist at all and, if so, what does it mean?. . .Craig
Owens and Kenneth Frampton frame its rise in the fall of modern myths
of progress and mastery. But all the critics, save Jurgen Habermas, hold
this belief in common: that the project of modernity is now deeply prob-
lematic. . .In short, modernism, as even Habermas writes, seems 'domi-
nant but dead.
Id. It is relatively easy (and appropriate) to assimilate to what Foster (and many other
cultural critics) call "postmodernism" that radical utopian tendency within critical le-
gal studies (identified above by Shiffrin) which sometimes designates itself as "Irratio-
nalist"; see Debates About Theory Within Critical Legal Studies, LIZARD 3, 4 (Jan. 5,
1984) (on file at the Nova Law Journal):
The irrationalist wants to unfreeze the social structure of meaning, to free
up the possibilities for new ways to think and act in the world. In this
view, law is merely an instance of social mythologizing. And it's not that
there is some way of 'reasoning' that is immune to the critique; there is no
'true' analysis that comports with the way things really are, because there
is no hard social reality separate from our social construction of meaning.
Id. "Postmodernism" is a better label than "Irrationalism" since hostility to reason
(and thus the Enlightenment), as well as a natural receptivity toward the work of
Michel Foucault, constitute but one representative aspect of the ensemble of values and
intuitions presented to society by the critical legal studies postmodernist tendency. Out-
right opposition to structure and organization, "scientific Marxism," economism, in-
strumentalism, what Robert Gordon would call "large-scale theories of historical inter-
relations between states, societies, and economies," and, special antipathy toward indi-
vidualism and rights, rounds out the general image of postmodernist attitudes within
critical legal theory; see R. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys, ed. 1982); Boyle, Opposition,
Splits, and Tensions, 8th NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: IN-
FORMATION PACKET & READINGS 35-38 (March 16-18, 1984) (on file at the Nova Law
Journal).
While critical of hierarchical social relations and the alienation which they pro-
duce, the postmodernists would probably agree with Fred Dallmayr that ". . .the mal-
aise of modern and contemporary life can be traced, either directly or indirectly, to its
anthropocentric and subjectivist thrust or its focus on the thinking subject; according to
some the malaise has already reached a crisis stage with the result that the 'end' or
'death of man' is imminent (if not an accomplished fact). Spokesmen differ as to the
nature of proposed antidotes or substitutes for modern subjectivity and individualism;
but a preferred (though not uniformly endorsed) remedy consists in a radical shift of
attention, aimed at dislocating or 'decentering' man in favor of overarching structures
or systemic relationships." F. DALLMAYR, TWILIGHT OF SUBJECTIVITY: CONTRIBU-
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calls the "crisis of modernity":
Three different responses to the crisis of modernity can be dis-
tinguished. The first two, anti-humanism and the counter-enlight-
enment, are alike in so far as both maintain that modernity is irre-
deemably aporetic; the crisis of modernity cannot be resolved from
within, but requires a holistic transformation of the modern pro-
ject. The positions differ with respect to the alternative directions
they advocate. The third position, of which Habermas is the pri-
mary exponent, maintains that the crisis can only be resolved by
completing, rather than abandoning, the modern project. As he
asks, "should we try to hold on to the intentions of the Enlighten-
ment, feeble as they may be, or should we declare the entire project
of modernity a lost cause?" The modern project is not aporetic, but
only at odds with itself. The crisis of modernity, as he sees it, re-
sults from the absolutization of instrumental reason and the con-
comitant suppression of practical reason. He therefore seeks to re-
habilitate the Enlightenment's tradition of practical reason and
assert it against its tradition of instrumental reason in order to cor-
rect that imbalance. It is thus with respect to practical reason that
he wants to "hold on to the intentions of the Enlightenment." 5
TIONS TO A POST-INDIVIDUALIsT THEORY OF POLITICS 11 (1981). Dallmayr thus helps
to explain the postmodernist appreciation of Foucault and Derrida as well as the paral-
lel commitment to application of structural and deconstructionist techniques within the
study of American law; see E. KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF STRUCTURALISM: LEVI-
STRAUSS TO FOUCAULT (1980); M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED IN-
TERVIEWS & OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977 (C. Gordon, ed. 1980); J. DERRIDA, WRIT-
ING AND DIFFERENCE (A. Bass, trans. 1978); M. RYAN, MARXISM AND DECONSTRUC-
TION: A CRITICAL ARTICULATION (1982); C. NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1982); P. BURGER, THEORY OF THE AVANT-GARDE (M. Shaw, trans. 1984);
C. NORRIS, THE DECONSTRUCTIVE TURN: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC OF PHILOSOPHY
(1983).
The relation between modernism and postmodernism both inside and outside criti-
cal legal theory is fascinating and complicated. See MODERNISM, 1890-1930 (M. Brad-
bury & J. McFarlane, eds. 1976); THE ANTI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN CUL-
TURE (H. Foster, ed. 1983); M. BERMAN, ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR (1982);
J. LEARS, No PLACE OF GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN CULTURE, 1880-1920 (1981); Rajchman, Foucault, or the Ends of Modern-
ism, 24 OCTOBER 37 (Spring, 1983); E. BRUSS, BEAUTIFUL THEORIES: THE SPECTACLE
OF DISCOURSE IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM (1982); J. BURNHAM, THE STRUCTURE
OF ART (1973); S. GABLIK, PROGRESS IN ART (1976).
15. Whitebook, Saving the Subject: Modernity and the Problem of the Autono-
mous Individual, 50 TELOS 79 (Winter, 1981-82).
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Rights in general, and rights for workers in particular, constitute
part of the achievement which Habermas conceives having an essential
role to play in the resurrection of "practical reason" and the elabora-
tion of an authentic socialist democracy.'" If it is Habermas' intention
to complete, rather than abandon, the Enlightenment, it remains never-
theless the purpose of the counter-enlightenment-here the
postmodernists within critical legal studies-to secure a "holistic trans-
formation of the modern project.' 1 7 And that means, first of all, a sys-
tematic interrogation of the ideology of rights. Peter Gabel and Paul
Harris, for example, argue that
[t]he point is not simply that rights-consciousness inherently im-
plies the necessity of social antagonism (since rights are normally
asserted against others). It is rather that this very way of thinking
about people involves a bizarre abstracting away from one's true
experience of others as here with us existing in the world. An alter-
native approach to politics based on resolving differences through
compassion and empathy would presuppose that people can engage
in political discussion and action that is founded upon a felt recog-
nition of one another as human beings, instead of conceiving of the
political realm as a context where one abstract 'legal subject' con-
fronts another. A genuinely socialist politics would presumably be
based on such a view of group life, but many lawyers on the left
insist that the use of rights-rhetoric remains necessary for effective
political organizing today.18
To conceive of social progress in terms of rights enhancement, ac-
cording to Gabel and Harris, is to poison the whole project in advance
by embedding the vision of a better world within a politics whose cen-
tral categories, by definition, reproduce the alienation of the individual
from the community and of men and women from themselves. This
general postmodernist rights analysis has so far only found one location
of concrete application: labor law. Karl Klare, for example, argues that
whatever social improvements may have been gained through the es-
tablishment and then extension of workers' rights, have been undercut
by the capacity of labor law ideology to "legitimate and justify unnec-
16. See Chase, supra note 13.
17. See Whitebook, supra note 15.
18. Gabel and Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal The-
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essary and destructive hierarchy and domination in the workplace." 9
Without intending to demean "the heroism of American workers, '"20
Klare argues that post-New Deal labor law has induced "organized
workers to consent to and participate in their own domination"21 and
indicates that "liberal collective bargaining law is itself a form of polit-
ical domination. 22 Referring to the "legislative analogy" (collective
bargaining is disguised as a kind of legally neutral and politically equi-
table process) ,23 Klare suggests that the ideology of labor law has
helped workers to actually buy the notion that the system is democratic
and encourages "worker acceptance of the supposedly 'inevitable and
eternal separation of industrial men into managers and the man-
aged.' "24
Agreeing with Klare's critique of rights as cooptation and with his
analysis of the ideological power of labor law, premier postmodernist
Duncan Kennedy25 regards post-World War II labor law "as a mecha-
nism that coopts the working class and defuses class struggle. 26 How
does this "demobilizing ideology" 27 bring class struggle to a standstill?
"The justifications offered for the rules" of labor law, asserts Kennedy,
"disguise their repressive function in the language of industrial peace
or workplace democracy. ' 28 Apparently deceived by such ideological
manipulation, the ideology of labor law causes workers to abandon
their initial militancy and, worse, ". . .the working class itself, directly
and through its intelligentsia, has been deeply implicated in the devel-
opment of the rules and the elaboration of the justificatory ideology. '2 9
There are two initial observations which should be made regarding
the Gabel and Harris, Kare, and Kennedy ideology of rights thesis as
applied within the labor law context. First, the critical labor jurispru-
19. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective
Bargaining Law, 4 IND. REL L. J. 450, 452 (1981).
20. Id. at 481-482.
21. Id. at 455.
22. Id. at 452.
23. Id. at 458-59.
24. Id. at 459.
25. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries 8 BUFFALO L.
REv. 205 (1979).
26. Kennedy, Critical Labor Law Theory: A Comment, 4 INDw. REL. L. J.
503, 503 (1981).
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dence seems to be quite uncharacteristically instrumentalist in nature.
Labor law is pictured somewhat one-dimensionally, primarily through
its deployment as an ideological instrument for more or less hammering
the workers into shape. These critical legal theorists have generally
been in the vanguard of opposition to the notion that law performs
merely instrumental functions within society.30 It would appear that an
absolute hostility toward instrumental interpretations of law and soci-
ety does not represent a defining characteristic of postmodernism
within critical legal studies."
Second, the critical labor jurisprudence is concerned with labor
law primarily in order to help explain the general paralysis, as these
postmodernist theorists see it, of the American labor movement. The
political choices made by American workers over the last half-century,
however, may not have been in any significant way the result of labor
law ideology-at least according to some of America's most interesting
labor historians. The portrait of American labor history projected onto
the social canvas by the critical legal scholars is rather different from
the one drawn by the labor historians.32
Explaining the development of American trade unionism, the labor
historians tend to emphasize (1) "the two-party system" of American
politics where neither party was a labor party;33 (2) "the universally
held belief in the major tenet of private property";34 (3) "the continued
division of the American working class into separate ideological, ethnic,
30. See, e.g., Gabel and Harris, supra note 18, at 369 n.1; Klare, Law-Making
as Praxis, 40 Telos 123, 128-133 (Summer, 1979); Kennedy, Legal Education as
Training for Hierarchy, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40, 46-50
(D. Kairys, ed. 1982).
31. See supra note 14.
32. See, e.g., D. MONTGOMERY, supra n.2; D. MILTON, THE POLITICS OF U.S.
LABOR: FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION TO THE NEW DEAL (1982); F. Fox PIVEN & R.
CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL
(1977); D. BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY STRUGGLE (1980); R. KEERAN, THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE AUTO
WORKERS UNIONS (1980); A. MEIER & E. RUDWICK, BLACK DETROIT AND THE RISE
OF THE UAW (1979); P. FRIEDLANDER, THE EMERGENCE OF A UAW LOCAL, 1936-
1939: A STUDY IN CLASS AND CULTURE (1975); WORKERS' STRUGGLES, PAST AND
PRESENT: A "RADICAL AMERICA" READER (J. Green ed. 1983); B. COCHRAN, LABOR
AND COMMUNISM: THE CONFLICT THAT SHAPED AMERICAN UNIONS (1977); WORK-
ING-CLASS AMERICA: ESSAYS ON LABOR, COMMUNITY, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (M.
Frisch & D. Walkowitz, eds. 1983).
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and religious groupings"; 35 (4) "the ideology of nationalism" where
"nationalism historically has had a long record of success in subduing
ideologies based on class struggle"; 6 (5) the willingness of most Ameri-
can Communists to subordinate the interests of American workers to
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union which led to a separate peace
with Roosevelt and business unionism during World War II;11 (6) the
anti-Communist inquisition in post-World War II America which deci-
mated the leadership ranks of radical labor as well as the rest of Amer-
ican social and cultural life, irrespective of actual political party affilia-
tion;38 (7) the material, rather than ideological, consequences of labor
laws such as the Taft-Hartley Act (1947) which "emasculated the
Wagner Act" and "banned mass picketing, secondary boycotts, and
sympathy strikes, all associated with the tactics of the social movement
35. Id.
36. Id. at 113.
37. Id. at 135-138. But ef. R. KEERAN, supra note 32, at 226:
During the 30 years since World War II, a conventional view of the war-
time experience of Communists in the auto industry has developed largely
through the work of such labor historians as Joel Seidman, Irving Howe,
B.J. Widick, Art Preis, and most recently Bert Cochran, all of whom have
written from a Trotskyist or Social-Democratic perspective. The conven-
tional view holds that the left-wing caucus in the UAW, the caucus of the
Communists and Secretary-Treasurer George Addes, lost influence during
the war because the Communists and their allies sacrificed the immediate
interests of the workers for the cause of victory over fascism. In this view
the Communists made themselves unpopular by their ardent advocacy of
incentive pay and the no-strike pledge. The conventional view also holds
that the main reason the Communists were so willing to sacrifice the im-
mediate interests of workers was because the 'prime allegiance' of the
Communists was not to the workers but to the 'needs of the U.S.S.R.'
Consequently, the right-wing caucus led by Walter Reuther, who opposed
incentive pay and vacillated on the no-strike pledge, gained sufficient influ-
ence during the war to elect Reuther president of the UAW at the union's
first postwar convention in 1946. The conventional view simplifies a com-
plex and contradictory history in two major respects ...
Anyone wishing to write about the "complex and contradictory history" of the Ameri-
can labor movement during the past half-century (including the critical legal scholars)
might well adopt Keeran's rigorous methodology.
38. See R. KEERAN, supra note 32; D. MILTON, supra note 32; B. COCHRAN,
supra note 32. See also D. CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE
UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (1978); S. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION:
JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN THE COLD WAR (1982); A. KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE
ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE'S LAWYER (1983); M. ROGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS AND MC-
CARTHY: THE RADICAL SPECTER (1967).
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of industrial unionism identified with the CIO; ' '3 9 (8) a labor leader-
ship crisis where "the vast majority of labor leaders accepted the sys-
tem of corporate state capitalism"40 and where "orientation of the un-
ions toward management was facilitated by the severing of union
leadership from dependence on the rank and file, first through their
reliance on the federal government for membership gains, and then
through the dues check-off"; 4'1 (9) "dependence of the unions for their
organizational ability on the well-being of the industry"42 accompanied
by "a widespread erosion . . in union membership and power"; 3 (10)
that to "think only in terms of work relations . . and union bureau-
crats is to ignore the centerpiece of the game: the awesome power
which a company wields over its employees."44
A methodological distinction between the critical labor theory's
explanation of American worker "demobilization" and that carefully
riveted to the social experience of the American working class by the
labor historians is that the legal scholars seem to ignore history-or at
least the historians-altogether.4 5 None of the contributing factors to
39. D. MILTON, supra note 32, at 159; See also D. MONTGOMERY, supra note
32, at 166-167; F. Fox PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 32, at 168-170; W.A. WIL-
LIAMS, AMERICANS IN A CHANGING WORLD 391-392 (1978).
40. W.A. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 391.
41. F. Fox PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 32, at 160.
42. Id. at 159.
43. A.H. Raskin, noted labor journalist, quoted in D. BRODY, supra note 32, at
254-255.
44. D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 156.
45. Given their confidence that American workers are familiar with and coopted
by the ideology of labor law, it is unfortunate that Klare and Kennedy ignore the writ-
ing of such workers-turned-historians as Stan Weir of San Pedro, California; see supra
text; see also Weir, Conflict in American Unions and the Resistance to Alternative
Ideas from the Rank and File, in J. Green, ed. supra note 32, at 251, 256-257
As soon as the employers accept collective bargaining as a fact of life and
their signatures are put on contracts that they do not intend to break in
other than a piecemeal way, the top labor leadership particularly must un-
dergo a full change in attitude. For a time they may remain bitterly angry
at some or all of the employers or their representatives, but they must now
show concern about the employers' competitive position. . . .The open
and total conflict relationship of the precontract days has to go. . .The
ranks, however, do not share the change in attitude of their leaders. They
too want to retain and maintain the contracts, but they see no reason for
pulling back from a struggle to win a grievance that is legitimate. Their
method for fighting a grievance is one of continued battle until won or lost.
For moments at a time in the meetings down at the union hall it is possible
[Vol. 8
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the shaping of the American labor movement mentioned above or the
hisorical work from which the list is drawn are explored in the
postmodernist critique of workers' rights and where they have led. Why
should that be so?
I believe that the methodology deployed by the critical labor theo-
for them to see the logic of their leaders on the necessity to keep the com-
pany in business. That reason is destroyed the moment they physically or
mentally return to work. The attitude of the company toward them is one
of total antagonism and disrespect whenever the production process is in
motion. Schizophrenia cannot live in a reality where there is so much im-
mediate pain and unhappiness. (latter emphasis added).
See also comments made by Robert Gordon in an "unpublished summary of a first
draft" at the 1979 national conference on critical legal studies in Madison, Wisconsin
(on file at Nova Law Journal):
[I]t is perfectly reasonable to respond (as, for example, Duncan Kennedy
and J.G.A. Pocock both do) that there is much basic work still to do in
simply describing basic structures of thought and their transformations;
and that such work is prerequisite to connecting the structures to the ma-
terial world. But one can't help feeling that under this program the task of
connection (especially given the fondness of law trained people for doc-
trine) is likely to be indefinitely postponed and that in the meantime ten-
dentious connections (like those of the instrumental schools) will continue
to be assumed. Id. (emphases added).
See also comments by intellectual historian Felix Gilbert in Gilbert, Intellectual His-
tory: Its Aims and Methods,100 DAEDALUS 80, 94 (Winter, 1971):
Intellectual history cannot claim to be the true or only history; modern
intellectual history arose after belief in the control of events by ideas had
collapsed. It exists only in connection with, and in relation to, the sur-
rounding political, economic, and social forces. The investigation of sub-
jects of intellectual history leads beyond the purely intellectual world and
intellectual history per se does not exist.
Id. (emphasis added).But see contra Klare, supra note 19, at 452 n.6: "It must be
acknowledged that an important limitation of the critical labor law approach is its
relative neglect, thus far, of the important task of drawing out empirically the interre-
lationships and connections between the intellectual history of collective bargaining
law and the social history of the post-World War II labor movement." Id. (emphasis
added).
Finally, it is instructive to observe the contradictory relation between Duncan
Kennedy's sophisticated and enormously compelling portrait of the forces shaping
American law student (and legal professional) consciousness with his critique of organ-
ized labor consciousness; See D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUC-
TION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983). The equivalent of Ken-
nedy's analysis of labor law ideology within the law school context would be the
assertion that law students are politically demobilized primarily by the ideology of stu-
dent honor codes. Avoiding such errant reductionism within the law school context,
Kennedy drives home a critique literally unmatched anywhere by anybody.
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rists has not been to systematically study the history of American la-
bor-then labor law-and come to the conclusion that the importance
of labor law ideology in "demobilizing" the working class has been in-
sufficiently emphasized by other labor scholars. On the contrary, the
purpose of the critical labor jurisprudence seems to be the advancement
of the postmodernist critique of law generally and rights in particu-
lar-rather than an elaboration of the historical structure of material
as well as ideological forces shaping the American labor movement.
Thus the disinterest in existing American labor historical research be-
comes easier to understand.
This does not mean, of course, that the postmodernists within criti-
cal legal studies are without some fascinating insights. As long as "us"
is understood to mean no one in particular, it is appropriate to argue
that the critical labor jurisprudence shows how "[b]y inducing us to
believe that existing institutions and patterns of social thought are nat-
ural, rational, or necessary, legal discourse inhibits our ability to per-
ceive the contingency of present arrangements-the extent to which
they are created and sustained by human choice."'46 But this general
theoretical achievement is not the same thing as a demonstration that
identifiable members of the organized working class see themselves and
their struggles primarily through the optic of labor law ideology. None
of the postmodernist critique of law has yet proved that workers should
46. Note, Subjects of Bargaining Under the NLRA and the Limits of Liberal
Political Imagination, 97 HARV. L. REV. 475, 475-476 (1983). At one point, the au-
thor suggests that "[a]s we invent ever more sophisticated stories to delimit the spheres
of state power and individual freedom, we (judges, lawyers, scholars, student note-
writers) reproduce a social meaning system that obscures and denies the complex,
dense textures of social life." Id. at 493 (emphasis added). Entirely without fanfare,
Klare's and Kennedy's "demobilized" working class has become an ideologically mes-
merized ensemble of lawyers and law professors. It would appear that the victims of
labor law ideology according to the latest version of the critical labor jurisprudence no
longer include longshoremen like Stan Weir or the rest of the American working class
either (unless labor law judges are now seen as a kind of "new working class"). Unless
the postmodernists are prepared to develop a social theory of the intelligentsia, they
should return to the "workers as victims" version and (as Klare indicates) start talking
about American "social history." See M. Meisner, The Defection of the Intellectuals
in MAO'S CHINA: A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1977); M. MEISNER, Li TA-
CHAO AND THE ORIGINS OF CHINESE MARXISM (1967); G. KONRAD AND I. SZELENYI,
THE INTELLECTUALS ON THE ROAD TO CLASS POWER: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN SOCIALISM (1979); A. GOULDNER, THE FUTURE OF
INTELLECTUALS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW CLASS (1979).
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not pursue a systematic expansion of their legal rights--or why Ameri-
cans should not press for adoption of the IAM bill of workers' rights."'
47. Really damaging opposition to workers' rights comes, of course, not from
postmodernism within critical legal studies but from capital in the social world. See M.
GIBSON, WORKERS' RIGHTS (1983); P. SIMON, REAGAN IN THE WORKPLACE: UNRAV-
ELING THE HEALTH AND SAFETY NET (1983); Reagan's NLRB: Crisis in Labor Law, 7
GUILD NOTES 3 (Nov.-Dec. 1983); Aronowitz, Two, Three, Many Greyhounds?, NA-
TION 624 (Dec. 17, 1983); Mann, Workers and Community Take on G.M., NATION
145 (Feb. 11, 1984); Schmiechen, et. al., Waking from the American Dream, NATION
241 (March 3, 1984); Egan & Noble, The Lab Worker's Lonely Victory, NATION 350
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An Examination of Issues in the Florida Sentencing
Guidelines
I. Introduction
Reformers have reshaped the theory of sentencing in the United
States during the last decade,' responding to the realization that reha-
bilitation as a primary goal of sentencing is not realistic.' Prior to the
1970s, rehabilitation was seen as the ultimate aim of the penal system.
Rehabilitation involves the use of sentencing to isolate and reform of-
fenders, thereby reducing crime.3 But "correctional institutions" did
not rehabilitate, and the rehabilitation goal began to lose favor among
commentators around 1970.5 Extremely overcrowded surroundings,
brutality, intra-inmate violence, filthy conditions, lack of medical atten-
tion, and negative psychological effects from long term incarceration
are among the reasons for prisons' failure to rehabilitate.6
1. A. SUNDBERG, A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE. STATEWIDE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW (1982); See generally AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); W. RICH, C. SUTTON, T.
CLEAR, M. SAKS, SENTENCING BY MATHEMATICS: AN EVALUATION OF THE EARLY AT-
TEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES xvii (1982); C. SIL-
BERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 502-74 (1978); R. SINGER, JUST
DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979); A. VON HIRSCH, DO-
ING JUSTICE (1976); G. CAVENDER, The Philosophical Justifications of Deteriminate
Sentencing, 26 AM J. JURIS. 157 (1981); and Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing
Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Excessive Punishment Before and After Rum-
mel v. Estelle, DUKE L. J. 1103 (1980).
2. N. KITTRIE and E. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 49-
54 (1981); Greenberg and Humphries, The Cooptation of Fixed Sentencing Reform,
CRIME & DELING., April 1980, at 206 [hereinafter cited as Greenberg].
3. Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment:
Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, DUKE L. J. 1103,
1199(1980).
4. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 1, at 504. Silberman quotes the 1967 Crime Com-
mission: "Indeed, experts are increasingly coming to feel that the conditions under
which many offenders are handled, particularly in institutions, are often a positive det-
riment to rehabilitation." Id.
5. See Gardner, supra note 3, at 1103, Greenberg, supra note 2, at 207 and R.
SINGER, supra note 1, at 1-10.
6. Crump, Determinate Sentencing: The Promises and Perils of Sentence Guide-
lines, 68 KY. L.J. 1, 28-33 (1977-80). C. SILBERMAN, supra note 1, at 502-74.
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Prisoner unrest caused by blatant disparity in sentencing addition-
ally contributed to the need for reform. Criminals with similar records
who commited the same crime received greatly varied sentences.'
Moreover, uncertain sanctions created a sense of anxiety in the prison-
ers. "[I]t becomes increasingly apparent that the very indeterminacy of
indeterminate sentences is a form of psychological torture." 8 The reha-
bilitative model utilized an indeterminate sentencing system in sentenc-
ing the offender, where the parole board controlled an inmate's future
by determining his release date based on his behavior. Under this sys-
tem, the sentences necessarily covered a broad period of time. For ex-
ample, a typical indeterminate sentence would be five to twenty years.
Given this latitude, the parole board could select the 'magic moment'
when a criminal [was] rehabilitated." 9 However, the task of ascertain-
ing that moment, if that moment ever occured at all, was almost impos-
sible.10 The Federal Parole Commission frankly admits that accurately
selecting the critical moment when a prisoner is ready for release is
beyond their capabilities."
The rehabilitative system somehow allowed the "inequalities of
wealth and power"' 2 to determine sentences more than the defendant's
blameworthiness or the moral turpitude of the crime itself.13 The crimi-
nal justice system's over-optimistic rehabilitative ambitions resulted
from and was perpetuated, in part, by sentencing uncertainty and dis-
parity. Since there are financial obstacles and practical complications
inherent in revising the penal system toward effective rehabilitation,
legislators and judicial officials opted to alleviate one aspect of the
problem by restructuring sentencing procedures and policies. A shift
from a rehabilitative philosophy to one of "just deserts"' 4 resulted. Just
7. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1. at 72-74; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 208.
8. Alshuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent
Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 UL. PA. L. REV. 550, 553
(1978). See also Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Parole Release Guidelines, 51 U.
COLO. L. REV. 237,237 (1980); GARDNER, supra note 3, at 1109; and von Hirsch,
Constructing Guidelines for Sentencing: The Critical Choices for the Minnesota
Guidelines Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164. 176-77 (1982).
9. Alschuler, supra note 8, at U. COLO. L. REV. at 238.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 208.
13. Id.
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deserts, or retribution, as a purpose for sentencing entails the theory
that the offender has violated "societal rules and must be 'punished" in
order that he or she receives just deserts.""a
The Florida Sentencing Guidelines are based on this philosophy.16
The guidelines 17 took effect on October 1, 1983. The greatest change
from the old system of sentencing was the seemingly shorter sentence
lengths. This reduction resulted from the abolition of parole release,
and the imposition of sentences decreased only by gain time.18 Rather
than lengthy sentences determined by a judge and subject later to the
Parole Commission's discretion, a felon's "composite score"19 is calcu-
lated, based on the offenses at conviction, prior record, legal status at
the time of the offense and extent of victim injury, where pertinent.20
This score determines a narrow range of "presumptive sentences" 21
which are "assumed appropriate" 22 for the offender. Provision is made
for departure from the guidelines at the judge's discretion, but such
departures require written explanation.23 The guideline sentences apply
to all felonies, excluding capital offenses and those with mandatory
sentences, committed after October 1, 1983 .24 Felons sentenced after
that date whose crimes were committed prior to it, may affirmatively
choose to have the guideline sentence imposed.25
This note summarizes and critiques the philosophy and formula-
tion of the Florida Sentencing Guidelines, their strengths and some po-
tential problems. It analyzes circumstances under which departures
from the presumptive sentences are allowed. It addresses the question
of the Guidelines' constitutionality, raising and predicting the probable
outcome of various challenges. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
served in part as a prototype for Florida's Guidelines.26 Because of the
15. N. KITTRIE and E. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS -
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 14 (1980).
16. In re Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sentencing Guidelines), 439 So. 2d 848
(Fla. 1983).
17. FLA. R. CRIM. P.. 3.701 and form 3.988.
18. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(5).
19. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(8).
20. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.988(a)(i).
21. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(8).
22. Id.
23. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 370.1(b)(6) and (d)(11).
24. Sentencing Guidelines, 439 So. 2d 848.
25. Id.
26. The motivation for the final stages of the construction of the Florida Sentenc-
ing Guidelines was described by Robert Wesley, Staff Counsel for the Florida Sentenc-
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similarities between the two, this note will present a survey of the cases
interpreting that state's guidelines, so as to aid in understanding the
effects these new Florida guidelines will have.
II. Development of the Guidelines
A. Early Interest
Florida's sentencing reform began in January of 1978 when the
Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court appointed a committee "to
examine the extent and causes of sentence disparity and to explore the
variety of sentence alternatives available-judicial, legislative, and ad-
ministrative-to reduce unreasonable sentence variation."2 This sen-
tencing committee consisted of judges, professors and legislators, to en-
sure a thorough examination of the repercussions of change in the
criminal justice system.28
The primary goal of the committee was "to devise a system where
individuals of similar backgrounds would receive roughly equivalent
sentences when they commit similar crimes, regardless of the different
penal philosophies of legislators, correctional authorities, parole author-
ities, or judges." '29 The committee examined the various reforms emerg-
ing in the country and the felony sentencing practices in use in the
state.30 In its Interim Report, 1 the committee recommended,
in principle, the exercise of judicial discretion in the sentencing
process. However, in order to achieve a greater degree of consis-
ing Guidelines Commission, as coming from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
These guidelines bear many similarities to the completed Florida guidelines. See gener-
ally von Hirsch, supra note 8, for a complete description and analysis of the Minnesota
Guidelines.
27. Sundberg, Plante and Palmer, A Proposal for Sentence Reform in Florida, 8
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1980). This reform was spurred by the current reform in
the United States in general and by several sources specifically. Among these specific
influences was L WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON, J. CALPIN and A. GELMAN,
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION, REPORT TO THE FEA-
SIBILITY STUDY (1976) cited in A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 42 n.l.
28. Sundberg, Plante & Palmer, supra note 27, at 2, 3.
29. Id. at 3.
30. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 3.
31. Id. at 4, 44 & n. 12, citing Interim Report of the Sentencing Study Commit-
tee to the Florida Supreme Court (1978) (available from the Office of the State Courts
Administrator at the Florida Supreme Court).
690 [Vol. 8
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tency and fairness in the sentencing process throughout the state,
the committee recomend[ed] the development of structured sen-
tencing guidelines in combination with a sentencing review panel
that would operate within the sentence parameters prescribed by
the Legislature.32
B. Multijurisdictional Sentencing Guidelines Project
In 1974, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice33 (NIJ) and the Law Enforcement Asistance Administration
(LEAA) funded a study to determine the feasibility of drafting and
utilizing sentencing guidelines. 34 The resulting study encouraged an ex-
tension of the project on a multijurisdictional level. Four years later,
Florida became part of the project.3 5 Four Florida judicial circuits were
specifically selected as sites for the pilot program. The specific circuits
were chosen for several reasons, including: 1) the availability and com-
32. Id. Sentencing guidelines are inherently different from other forms of sen-
tencing reform. States such as California, Maine, Illinois, and Indiana now use "deter-
minate sentencing" schemes, which involve little or no judicial discretion. There are
three basic types of determinate sentencing schemes: mandatory or minimum-
mandatory sentencing, flat time sentencing, and presumptive sentencing. Guidelines are
most similar to the presumptive model (though often the distinctions between all cate-
gories are blurred), in that the trial judge has a limited range of sentences from which
to select, and aggravating or mitigating factors can vary the range. The difference be-
tween the to lies in the greater amount of discretion the judge has under sentencing
guidelines. Whereas a presumptive system merely provides a judge with a new pre-
sumption in the presence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the guidelines
allow a judge total freedom in administering the sentence, once he determines that such
a circumstance exists. The judge using guidelines may also deviate for reasons relating
to the defendant, rather than only to the offense itself, as he would be restricted under
most presumptive systems. This greater amount of discretion can be viewed as either
good or bad, depending upon one's confidence or skepticism in judges' ability to judge
fairly. Id. at 2, 3 and accompanying notes.
33. Now the National Institute of Justice, A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 44,
n.13.
34. Plante, Abernathy, Salokar and Kern, Judicial Sentencing - Help is on the
Way, FLA. BAR. J. 536, 537 (1981).
35. Together the NIJ and LEAA awarded $270,000 to the Office of the State
Court's Administrator for testing the Guidelines in four of Florida's twenty Circuits.
The circuits tested were the 4th (consisting of Clay, Duval, and Nassau Counties) the
10th (Hardee, Highland, and Polk Counties) the 14th (Bay, Calhoun, Gulf, Holmes,
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pleteness of sentencing records, 2) the relationship between presentence
investigation reports and sentencing decisions, 3) the mixture of rural
and urban areas, 4) the variety of political and social values reflective
of the state as a whole and 5) the judges' agreement to cooperate with
and participate in the one-year implementation period.36 An advisory
board from each circuit oversaw the progress of the project. The boards
consisted of the chief judge (or his representative) and eight other
members from each of the four jurisdictions, reflecting a desire for a
diverse group of experts.37
C. The Historical Model
In the initial formulation of the guidelines, the past sentencing
practices of Florida judges served as a basis for determining sentence
ranges for various crimes. This historical approach resulted in a model
which represented what sentencing had been, rather than what it ought
to be. Advisory boards were provided with a sampling of felony cases
concluded during the three previous years, thus insuring a variety of
judges' decisions, and encompassing a broad range of cases. 38 In all,
15,613 cases were sampled, consisting of 194 different criminal of-
fenses. Some offenses occurred far more frequently than others with
sixty-five statutes making up eighty-five percent of the felony caseload.
These sixty-five statutory offenses were categorized into six groups, by
similarities among "offense and offender characteristics. ' 39 Statutory
violations not occurring within this eighty-five percent portion were not
analyzed further.40
36. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1,at 5.
37. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, MULTIJURISDICTIONAL SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES PROJECT, FINAL REPORT 3 (1982) [hereinafter cites as FINAL
REPORT].
38. Id. at 4.
39. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 6, 7.
40. Id. at 7. One hundred twenty nine statutes comprised the remaining 15% of
the felony cases. The advisory board felt the infrequency of these occurences demanded
the individualized attention of the trial judge and chose to leave it entirely to his discre-
tion. Id. at 7 & n.18. The offense categories were: Category 1: Murder, Manslaughter,
Kidnapping, Lewd and Lascivious Assault; Category 2: Aggravated Assault, Aggra-
vated Battery, Battery of Law Enforcement Officer; Category 3: Burglary with Assault,
Burglary of an Occupied Dwelling, Structure or Conveyence, Robbery; Category 4:
Armed Robbery, Burglary of an Unoccupied Dwelling, Structure or Conveyence; Cate-
gory 5: Grand Larceny or Theft, Dealing in and Receiving Stolen Property, Forgery,
Worthless Checks; Category 6: Possession, Sale, Delivery, Importation of a' Controlled
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From the eighty-five percent group, a random sample of 6,826
cases was taken, of which 5,100 were coded and analyzed."' Informa-
tion variables were compiled and statistically analyzed to identify deci-
sion making factors historically used by judges.42 The advisory boards
then qualitatively analyzed these factors, to prevent the continued use
of undesirable and inappropriate variables from being factored into the
guidelines. 3 The remaining sentencing factors were used to develop a
mathematical model for explaining the sentencing practices historically
used in the four jurisdictions.44
This process of eliminating inappropriate or undesirable factors
constitutes something of a compromise in the underlying rationale or
policy of the guidelines. The Florida Sentencing Guidelines, though
similar in many ways to the Minnesota guidelines, 45 do not adhere to
Substance. Id. at 8.
41. Id. at 9. Problems in locating files and the files' incompleteness precluded
using the other 1726 cases.
42. Id. at 10. The records used for this information included pre and post sen-
tence investigation reports, prison admission documentations and criminal history
records, or "rap sheets."
43. Id. at 11. Among the factors eliminated were: "Lack of Remorse" and "Ex-
tent of Victim Scarring or Disfigurement". These factors were deemed highly subjec-
tive and too difficult to quantify in a general fashion. They may properly influence a
judge, but must do so on a case by case basis. "Victim's sex" should not make any
difference in sentencing, but the relative sizes and physical appearances may be consid-
ered. See Id. at 12-14. "Number of Dependants" was characterized as "having no
place in the sentencing process", and the "Type of Victim", whether an individual,
business, or government... should not make a difference." Id. at 16, 17.
44. Id. at 19. For a description of the model see id. at 19, 20. Cf W. RICH, C.
SUTTON, T. CLEAR, M. SAKS, supra note 1, at 33-89.
45. Both Minnesota and Florida have provisions prohibiting the use of factors
related to offenses for which convictions have not been obtained. Both delete first de-
gree murder from the guidelines because of a statutorily mandatory sentence. The
statements of purpose of each run along similar principles: the first in each requires
that "[s]entencing should be neutral with respect to. . .race, gen-
der. . .social. . .economic status", Florida's 3rd and 4th principles and Minnesoata's
2nd provide that punishment should increase with the severity of the offenses and the
offender's criminal record. Florida's 6th principle and Minnesota's 4th provide that the
guidelines prescribed sentence should be imposed unless exceptional ("clear and con-
vincing" in Florida, and "substantial and compelling" in Minnesota) circumstances ex-
ist. Florida's 7th and Minnesota's 3rd principles provide, "[b]ecause the capacities of
state and local correctional facilities are finte, use of incarcerative sanctions should be
limited to those convicted of more serious offenses or those who have longer criminal
histories. To ensure such usage of finite resources, sanctions used in sentencing con-
victed felons should be the least restrictive necessary to achieve the purpose of the
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Minnesota's ultimate decision to completely reject the historicist ap-
proach.46 There, the Sentencing Commission considered analyzing past
practices of judges to develop the guidelines, but they determined that
the mere elimination of inappropriate factors would distort the relative
weights to be assigned to the more appropriate relevant factors.4
Moreover, the strictly historical approach was seen as evading such im-
portant issues as why certain crimes are punished more severely than
others, and whether more severe punishment is warranted. Minnesota
therefore adopted the policy of taking an active role in deciding which
sentencing considerations should be taken into account, how much
weight to assign to each consideration, which sentencing aims should be
targeted4 8 and, perhaps most importantly, the seriousness of different
offenses.49
This last task of evaluating offenses reflects a major difference be-
tween Florida's original guidlelines, as used in the pilot program, and
Minnesota's guidelines. Minnesota's Commission utilized rating tech-
nique based on its own personal and collective judgments, to determine
the seriousness of various crimes. The Minnesota Commission thereby
reevaluated crime categories and rated them accordingly. Such rating
reflects an important step toward making a reasoned judgment about
the relative moral turpitude of various classifications of crimes. To his-
torically analyze legislative or judicial decisions would sacrifice a con-
sistent and express rationale. Similarly, reliance upon a public poll
would risk maintenance of a haphazardly and ill-founded tradition
which lacks a reasoned coherence °
In the Florida pilot program guidelines, this sacrifice was indeed
made. Thus, the severe sentences of notoriously controversial crimes,
such as possession or sale of small amounts of marijuana or cocaine,
remained virtually untouchbd by the guidelines. Reliance upon purely
historical data, and only deleting "variables deemed inappropriate for
use in sentencing"51 maintained the underlying qualitative evaluation
of offenses for which the defendant was charged. Therefore, although
the guidelines "represent[ed] a prescriptive model of what factors
sentence." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701 and MINN. STAT. app. § 244 (1983).
46. von Hirsch, supra note 8, at 175.
47. Id. at 174.
48. Id. at 174, 75
49. Id. at 175, 197, 198,
50. Id. at 197, 198.
51. S. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 11.
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'should' be considered in the sentencing process, '5 2 the benefit of criti-
cally reevaluating those sentencing practices as they relate to the dis-
tinct substantive areas of crime was forfeited.
With the aid of the historical data, a mathematical model was
used to construct six separate guidelines, one for each offense category.
After training seminars were held for members of the bar and bench,
clerks and probation personnel,5" these guidelines were used in the pilot
program in the four jurisdictions." Florida Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice Sundberg and the staff 5 visited the participating jurisdictions dur-
ing the pilot program."' The committee made 'evisions accordingly 57
and analyzed the guidelines "scoresheets." 58
The committee then recommended the creation of a "sentence re-
view panel" 59 to review sentences outside the guidelines. Nonetheless,
during the pilot program, the sentences imposed were not subject to
any formal review.60 Direct review of sentences was not part of Flor-
ida's appellate system and appeals could not be allowed in only four
jurisdictions.61 However, the committee felt sentence review was a "key
52. Id. at 20.
53. FINAL REPORT, supra note 37. at 23-25.
54. In addition to the concerns mentioned above, other criticisms included: 1) the
sentences were either too harsh or too lenient, 2) the decrease in disparity was undesir-
able in that the variation is merely an expression of local mores, 3) the judges may not
be able to use enough discretion, 4) the defendant's prior record was not given enough
attention, 5) mitigating factors needed to be identified and 6) the guidelines were too
"negative[ly]" oriented. Id. at 25, 26.
55. The guideline staff consisted of Donna L. Braziel and Kenneth J. Plante,
Project Directors, Susan K. Wilson, Data Entry Supervisor, and Doris Puffer, Secre-
tary. Id. at second unnumbered page.
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. at 23-25. The "scoresheets" are used to determine the presumptive sen-
tence range. "Points are assigned for various offense and offender related characteris-
tics and total score calculated. This score is then used to enter a one-dimensional ma-
trix with score ranges correlated to sentences. The median sentence figure is
recommended, accompanied by a minimum and maximium range which may be im-
posed at the discretion of the Court." Id. at 21.
58. Id. at 22. For a complete description of this process, including project data,
graphs and charts, see Sundberg, Plante, and Braziel, Florida's Initial Experience with
Sentencing Guidelines, 11 FLA. ST. L. REV. 125 (1983) and FINAL REPORT, supra note
37.
59. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 31-36.
60. FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 21. But see, Layton v. State, 432 So. 2d
195 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
61. FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 21
1984]
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element in the entire concept of sentencing guidelines." 2 Therefore,
the finalized guidelines recognize departures from the guidelines as a
ground for appeal by either the state or defendant.6"
D. Florida Sentencing Guidelines Commission
Chief Justice Sundberg recommended creation of a sentencing
commission to develop and periodically revise statewide guidelines."
Accordingly, the legislature enacted section 921.001 of the Florida
Statutes on April 7, 1982 approving his recommendation. 65
The Commission created by this statute was not required to report
on the "exact mechanism/methodology used to develop and implement
the guidelines, 66 so that most of the changes from the original guide-
lines used in the pilot program are left unexplained. For example, the
finalized guidelines have nine offense categories, as opposed to six in
the pilot program.6 7 Apparently the Committee saw the need to rede-
fine these categories more specifically to correct overbroad classifica-
tions of offenses.6 8 Although the minutes of the Commission meetings
reflect these changes, no particular reasons are cited to explain the al-
terations. In the finalized guidelines, many of the same procedures for
determining sentences were used as in the original guidelines. As in the
originals, statistical analysis was employed to develop a mathematical
model for the guidelines. 69 The Commission then developed the guide-
lines by utilizing the statistical data provided by the project as to past
sentencing practices.
62. Id.
63. FLA. STAT. § 921.001(2) and (3) (1983) (amending FLA. STAT. § § 924.06
and 924.07 (1983).
64. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 36-41.
65. FINAL REPORT, supra note 37 at 34 and text of bill at Appendices a, A-1 -
A-3.
66. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 39.
67. Cf. supra note 40 and FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.988(a)-(i).
68. The compliance rate for certain categories was much lower than others. See
A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at Appendix C.
69. The Commission randomly selected 3,977 felony cases from 58,000 convic-
tions filed in 1981. Criminal history records, or "rap sheets," pre- and post- sentence
investigation reports an admission summaries were used to code 233 variables. The
staff then analyzed these variables to determine which ones accounted for the length
and type of sentence. Introduction to FLORIDA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION,
GUIDELINES MANUAL (1983) [hereinafter cites as MANUAL].
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III. The Florida Sentencing Guidelines
A. Philosophy
In July 1983, the Sentencing Guidelines Commission released
drafts of the finalized guidelines, including a statement of purpose,
committee notes, and comments.70 A draft was published in the Florida
Bar News, 71 and was later approved by the Florida Supreme Court72
after final modifications. The Commission adopted a retributive philos-
ophy in fashioning the guidelines: "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing
is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation and other traditional consider-
ations continue to be desired goals. . . but must assume a subordinate
role."'73 Additionally, the guidelines provide for harsher punishments
for recidivists than for first offenders. The more numerous and severe in
nature the past convictions, the more severe incarcerative sanctions will
be.74 Practical considerations were also woven into the guidelines, by
making an a priori decision to extend the scope of the guidelines to
"serve as a mechanism for dealing with prison overcrowding. .... ,,7
The commission recognized that "[b]ecause the capacities of state and
local correctional facilities are finite, use of incarcerative sanctions
should be limited to those persons convicted of more serious offenses or
those who have longer criminal histories. To ensure such usage of finite
resources, sanctions used in sentencing convicted felons should be the
least restrictive possible." '
The policy of including prison capacity as a consideration for de-
signing the guidelines is another point where the Florida Commission
followed the lead of the Minnesota guidelines.7 7 Although some author-
ities contend that this policy is an ethical consideration, since it is "sim-
ply wrong to sentence people to overcrowded prisons," 78 the ethical
problem results from an economic dilemma. The problem of over-
crowded prisons can be solved in several ways, including building more
70. Id.
71. 10 FLA. B. NEws 14, 5-7. See also accompanying article Orrick, Court Re-
ceives Sentencing Guidelines, Id. at 1, 7-9.
72. Sentencing Guidelines, 439 So. 2d 848.
73. MANUAL, supra note 69, at 3.
74. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(4).
75. MANUAL, supra note 69, at Introduction.
76. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(7).
77. See von Hirsch, supra note 8 at 176-80.
78. Id. at 176.
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prisons, incarcerating fewer people, or releasing more prisoners by pa-
role. However, authorities meet with difficulties regarding the first op-
tion; they are faced with political factions unwilling or unable to con-
vince the public that more funding needs to be appropriated for more
prisons.7 9 Once this alternative has been eliminated because of mone-
tary concerns, it becomes a matter of ethics to decide who is most in
need of incarceration, and who society should continue to have in its
midst. Ethical considerations necessarily involve reevaluating the
blameworthiness of various classifications of substantive crimes. The
Commission therefore incorporated ethical and practical concerns into
the finalized guidelines.80 Controversial crimes such as prostitution,
drug offenses, and other victimless crimes, were deliberated at length
and reappraised on a normative level. Hence, the decision to base
sentences on the "length and nature of the offender's criminal his-
tory,"' the "severity of the convicted offense,"82 as well as the capacity
of prisons 3 manifest moral and economical considerations. A brief in
opposition to the guidelines filed with the Florida Supreme Court
before their final approval criticized the Commission for considering
prison capacity in sentencing. "We maintain that the safety, and emo-
tional and physical well being of our society must be paramount to
concerns about jail overcrowding."84
79. More importantly, even if funding were appropriated, it is doubtful whether
this would solve the problem. Florida is already the "most incarcerative state in the
nation, imprisoning a greater percentage of its population than any other state."
Lohman, Florida's Overcrowded Prisons, too little space or too many people?, FLA. B.
J., April 1983, at 199. Twelve major prisons have been built since 1974. Id. Nonethe-
less, this high rate of incarceration apparently has no deterrent effect on the commis-
sion of crime. Id. at 201.
80. von Hirsch, supra note 8, at 179.
The Minnesota Commission made the existing prison capacities decisive of
the aggregate use of imprisonment under the Guidelines. The normative
questions, for the Commission, were those of allocation: with classes of
convicted prisoners, for how long, and for what reasons, should be allo-
cated to this prison bedspace? The aggregate use of imprisonment was
thus decided on the basis of what facilities were in fact available. The
Commission did not make a normative judgment about how much, apart
from the availability of resources, the state ought to rely upon the prison
sanction.
Id. (Emphasis in original.)
81. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(4).
82. Id. at (b)(3).
83. Id. at (b)(7).
84. M. Satz, R. Stone, E. Whitworth, K. Zuelch, J. Appleman, R. Eagan, J.
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The guidelines are intended to serve as a standard to aid the sen-
tencing judge in the decision-making process.8 5 "However, while struc-
turing judicial discretion, the guidelines are sufficiently flexible to per-
mit the judge to tailor the sentence to the individual offender." 86 This
standard should then "eliminate unwarranted variation in the sentenc-
ing process by reducing the subjectivity in interpreting specific offense-
and offender-related criteria and in defining their relative importance
in the sentencing decision."187 The sentencing judge is thus provided
with a narrow range of recommended sentences from which to choose.
B. Judicial Discretion to Depart from the Guidelines
To depart from a guideline-imposed sentence, the circumstances of
a case must clearly and convincingly warrant aggravating or mitigating
the sentence.8 There is no defined list of appropriate aggravating or
mitigating factors;8 9 consequently, judges are free to read the entire
record and develop their own reasons to shorten or lengthen the sen-
tence beyond the guidelines' range. The Committee comment states
that each criminal case is unique, so that a comprehensive list of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances is not given. 90 However, by ex-
cluding specific factors, the Commission risks allowing judges to stray
from the policy of the guidelines and create a judicial doctrine different
from the guidelines' underlying purpose."' A judge need only make a
written statement explaining why he departed from the guidelines. 92
Such a statement becomes part of the record, and should be specific
enough to inform all parties and the public why departure was neces-
sary." This written statement need not be a lengthy discussion--often
two or three words will suffice to explain. Allowing the procedure to be
simple, however, increases the opportunity for discretion. The sentenc-
ing study committee commented:
Gardner, D. Modesitt and C. Golden, Petitioners Brief in Opposition, Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure (Rule 3.701) Sentencing Guidelines, Case No. 63,962, at 5 (1983).
85. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b).
86. MANUAL supra note 69, at Introduction 2.
87. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b).
88. Id. at (b)(6) and (d)(11).
89. MANUAL, supra note 69, at 10, comment to 11.
90. Id.
91. See von Hirsch, supra note 8, at 205.
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Although the purpose of sentencing guidelines is the reduction
of unwarranted sentence variation, the need for some variation is
recognized and is indeed promoted. It is anticipated that that from
15-20% of the sentencing decisions will routinely fall outside of the
recommended range. At no time should sentencing guidelines be
viewed as the final word in the sentencing process. .... The spe-
cific circumstances of the offense may be used to either aggravate
or mitigate the sentence within the guideline range or, if the of-
fense and offender characteristics are sufficiently compelling, used
as a basis for imposing a sentence outside of the guidelines.94
Predictions have proved to be correct; 81.1% of the cases in the
pilot program were in fact within the sentence range recommended by
the guidelines.95 There is no evidence of how representative this compli-
ance rate will be because of changes in the guidelines and implementa-
tion throughout the entire state. Factors such as the willingness and
commitment of the judges in the pilot program to cooperate with the
guidelines project, the knowledge that appeals were not possible in the
pilot program, and restructuring of the new guidelines themselves96
may affect compliance on a statewide level.9 7
The fear that the just-deserts policy of the guidelines woud be con-
travened by not supplying aggravating and mitigating factors to judges
was recognized and acted upon by Minnesota.98 There, the guidelines
include a non-exclusive list of reasons appropriate for departure,99 as
well a a list of factors inappropriate to justify departure. 100 Appropriate
reasons for departure go to the nature of the offense itself, rather than
to the offender; inappropriate reasons for departure relate specifically
to the offender's personal and social status.101
Minnesota's reasoning seems consistent with its choice to advocate
94. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 22.
95. FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 30.
96. For changes from the pilot program to the final guidelines, see supra notes
64-69 and accompanying text.
97. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 30 and Appendix F for compliance
rate information.
98. von Hirsch, supra note 8, at 205-07.
99. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 II. D. 2(a) and (b) (West Supp. 1982), reprinted
in 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 395 (1982) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES, HAMLINE].
100. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 II D. l(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1982). See also
GUIDELINES, HAMLINE, supra note 99.
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a "modified just-desert"10 2 rationale as opposed to one of rehabilita-
tion.10 3 Given the just-desert/incapacitative philosophy, factors such as
employment history, the impact of the sentence on occupation or pro-
fession, and marital status are deemed irrelevant to the retribution that
should be made for a particular offense. 4 This policy offends many
peoples' sense of compassion and mercy. A hard-working person with a
family to support, who will lose his job because of a jail sentence,
seems less culpable than one who has no family or community ties,
drifts in and out of jobs and burdens society for his support. While
some of these factors may be "manipulable" by offenders who would
marry, take a job, or become a parent as a ploy,105 it seems unwise to
abandon centuries of almost universally accepted values because of this
possibility. Surely judges are aware of the potential for abuse, and fac-
tor it into their sentencing decisions.
Although rehabilitation is no longer a primary goal for the crimi-
nal process generally, factors predicting the potential for rehabilitation
continue to be proper sentencing considerations. A sentencing philoso-
phy which treats all crimes alike, without regard to differences between
those who commit them, "is dehumanizing and has grave and dehu-
manizing implications for all of society." 1 6 It is important for reform-
ers to look beyond the theoretical differences in philosophies and retain
basic humanitarian concerns.
Florida reformers appear to have done this. By not prescribing a
list of factors which must be referred to for justifying departure, the
Commission seems to have endorsed use of the defendant's personal
characteristics in sentencing. Apparently, the fear of allowing too much
discretion to the judges was outweighed by the realization that more
than a mathematical formula is needed when dealing with individuals'
lives.
To limit discretion, albeit with use of some provisions already
102. von Hirsch, supra note 8, at 182. The term "modified" indicates the fact
that the just desert philosophy is blended with an incapacitive one as well. Id.
103. Id. at 206, citing a letter from Andrew von Hirsch to Dale G. Parent (Oct.
8, 1979).
104. GUIDELINES, HAMLINE, supra note 99, at 411.
105. "Manipulability" is the reason the Minnesota Guidelines Commission ex-
cluded employment as a sentencing consideration. Id. at 412, Comment II. D. 101.
106. D. POINTER, C. ROSENSTEIN, and M. KRAVITZ, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERMI-
NATE SENTENCING: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY, 3 (1982) (summarizing B. Alper and
J. Weis, MANDATORY SENTENCE - RECIPE FOR RETRIBUTION, V 41, N. 4 FED. PROBA-
TION, 15-20 (December 1977)).
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mandated by the Constitution, the Commission provided direction by
noting that "[s]entencing should be neutral with respect to race, gen-
der, and social and economic status."107 These factors are precisely the
kinds of considerations which unfairly bias judges and result in unwar-
ranted disparity in sentencing.
C. The Standard for Departure
1. A Last Minute Change
The July 1983 draft of the Florida Sentencing Guidelines provided
that "substantial and compelling" 10 8 circumstances were needed to jus-
tify departures from the guidelines. The "substantial and compelling"
standard was derived from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.10 9 In
Minnesota, where the "substantial and compelling" test controls depar-
tures, it proved to command a fairly strict adherence to the presump-
tive sentences of the guidelines. 10 However, the final guidelines which
were adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in September, 1983, pro-
vide that "clear and convincing reasons" ' are necessary for the trial
court to deviate from the presumptive guideline range.1
The reasons for the Commission's decision to change the standard
for departure are not explicit. The switch occured on August 26, 1983,
at the Commission's final meeting, following the receipt of suggestions
and comments spurred by the proposed rule's publication in the Florida
Bar News earlier that summer. After the Commission considered these
suggestions and comments several changes were made, one of which
was the test for departure. The reason for favoring the "clear and con-
vincing" standard may be that it does appear in several other areas of
Florida law,113 whereas the "substantial and compelling" test is only
107. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(1).
108. MANUAL, supra note 70, at 3, Principles 6 and 10, comment 11.
109. GUIDELINES, HAMLINE, supra note 99, at 395.
110. Note, Minnesota Supreme Court Cases, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 319, 332
(1982). "[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently upheld the basic tenets of
the Sentencing Guidelines and has demonstrated that it will require the trial judge to
subordinate their own view about the sentencing process, and act according to the stip-
ulations of the Guidelines." Id. at 332.
111. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(6) and (d)(11).
112. Id.
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used in the context of constitutional challenges based on fundamental
rights. In these cases, the state must prove it has a "substantial and
compelling" interest to justify the challenged classification, and that
the means used to achieve the legislative end are "necessarily and pre-
cisely drawn." 114
The Florida Supreme Court has characterized that test as "almost
always fatal in its application, imposing a heavy burden of justification
upon the state. .. ."15 Therefore, it appears that the greater familiar-
ity with the "clear and convincing" standard alone may not entirely
account for the Commission's decision to adopt it. The real reason for
the change may have been pressure from prosecutors who felt that
judges would need a more lenient standard to depart from the guide-
lines. State attorneys have criticized the guidelines' sentences for being
too short. Broward County State Attorney Michael Satz is typical of
the prosecutors who say that the new sentences are too short, and that
criminals will not be getting what they truly deserve.116 In response to
that criticism, however, Senator Crawford, drafter of the original Sen-
ate Bill, counters that the old sentencing system was a "fraud" against
the media and the public."' "The judges' sentences are often ignored"
and have "become meaningless."" 8 The fraud Crawford refers to ex-
isted because the actual term served as determined by the Probation
and Parole Commission, which often resulted in sentences being re-
duced by over one half.119 Because the guidelines effectively eliminate
the early release of prisoners by parole,120 the sentences are much
shorter than the ones Florida has imposed in the past. Nevertheless,
state attorneys from at least ten Florida circuits oppose the guidelines
because "the sentences listed are entirely too lenient, and. . .the ranges
allowed for deviation are entirely too small."12 ' Other criticisms of the
114. In Re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla.), dismissed 67 L.Ed.2d
610, 101 S. Ct. 1475 (1980).
115. Id. at 43.
116. Pellegrino, New Sentencing Plan Finds Few Allies, Fort Lauderdale News/
Sun Sentinel, June 12, 1983, at A 12 col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Allies].
117. Hillstom, New 'Truth in Sentencing' Rules begin Oct. 1, Miami Herald,
Sept. 11, 1983, at D 1, col. 2, 3. The term used in the title here is not to be confused
with "real offense sentencing" discussed infra, text accompanying notes 163-171.
118. Id. at D 2, col. 1.
119. See Chart at Allies, supra note 116, at A 12.
120. FLA. STAT. § 921.001(8) (1983).
121. M. Satz, R. Stone, E. Whitworth, K. Zuelch, J. Appleman, R. Eagan, J.
Gardner, D. Modesitt and C. Golden, Petitioners Brief in Opposition, Rules of Crimi-
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test attack its potential for creating an unconstitutional assumption by
the court "through its rule making power of legislative authority to en-
act substantive law.' 22
With such vocal opposition to the "substantial and compelling" re-
quirement, it is not surprising that the Commission struck it from the
guidelines and replaced it with the less stringent "clear and convinc-
ing" standard. It is questionable, however, how much of a concession
this actually is. The new test may act as a two-edged sword, because
defense attorneys can also request downward departures from the
guidelines for defendants, judged by the same test. Whatever the rea-
sons for the change, the fact remains that "clear and convincing," not
"substantial and compelling" reasons are necessary.
The change may be merely rhetorical and not lower the standard
for departure whatsoever. In Minnesota, where the language for depar-
ture remains "substantial and compelling," it has arguably been
equated with "clear and convincing." In State v. Olson,12 3 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court stated: "[s]ubstantial and compelling evidence at
the Sentencing Hearing with respect to the overall excellent back-
ground and character of the defendant had been received, and [was]
"clear and convincing."' 24 The two tests stand side by side in this case,
apparently without conflict. If this language does not make the tests
synonomous, it at least raises considerable doubt as to which is more
stringent.
The terms of the tests themselves seem to be somewhat correlative.
A "substantial" reason is likely to be a "clear" reason, and vice versa,
and a "compelling" reason is likely to be a "convincing" reason. How-
ever, the terms do not seem to be identical: it is possible to have a
convincing reason which is not compelling. In that regard, perhaps the
"substantial and compelling" test is more rigid. Whatever the relation-
ship of the tests, a review of the cases in Minnesota may provide a
sense of the kinds of issues that may be raised on appeal in Florida. If
"substantial and compelling" is indeed a more rigid test, the reasons
which have withstood appellate review there will certainly pass muster
under Florida's test.
nal Procedure (Rule 3.701) Sentencing Guidelines, Case No. 63,962, at 10 (1983).
122. J. Reno, Comments Regarding Porposed Sentence Guidelines, In re Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Proposed Rule 3.710, [sic] Regarding Sentencing Guidelines,
Case No. 63,962 at 2 (1983).
123. 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982).
124. Id. at 15.
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2. Minnesota Cases
The first Minnesota Supreme Court case interpreting that state's
guidelines manifested a strong support of them. In State v. Garcia,125
the parties had negotiated a plea in an attempt to shorten the guide-
line-prescribed sentence. This plea was rejected by the trial court, and
the Supreme Court upheld that decision. The Court reproved, "[o]nly
the court, acting in accordance with the Guidelines, and not the par-
ties, has the authority to determine the appropriate sentence. ' 12 Under
the Florida Sentencing Guidelines, plea bargaining will still exist, but it
will take on a new character. Much of the negotiation will be over the
charge at conviction itself, and the points assigned for variables such as
"victim injury" rather than on the length of the sentence.
The Minnesota cases that followed Garcia continued to scrutinize
the trial courts' decisions very closely, and to insist upon a careful read-
ing of and compliance with the guidelines. Among the factors which
were rejected by the Supreme Court of Minnesota as not being "sub-
stantial and compelling" so as to warrant an upward departure from
the guidelines were: the trial court's belief that the defendant was dan-
gerous and that he had taken drugs during the offense,1 7 the trial
court's speculation that the morphine stolen in an aggravated robbery
of a pharmancy would be distributed in the future, 2" the fact that the
defendant was driving without a license during the offense, his "lack of
candor," the inadequacy of facilities available in the community to re-
habilitate him, and his alleged continued prostitution.12 9 Generally, the
court flatly refused to uphold departures based on factors which were
already figured into the offense's guideline prescribed sentence, such as
criminal history record whether good or bad. 30 In a few cases, reversal
of the trial court's departure rested on the simple grounds that no valid
arguments for departure were given. 131
Factors which were found to warrant an aggravated departure
125. 302 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 1981).
126. Id. at 647.
127. State v. Magnan, 328 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 1983).
128. State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 1981).
129. State v. Barnes, 313 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 1981).
130. Magnan, 328 N.W.2d at 149 (an upward departure), and State v. Cizl, 304
N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 1981) (a downward departure).
131. State v. Nelson, 326 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. 1982), State v. Johnson 314
N.W.2d 229 (Minn. 1982); State v. Leibfried, 309 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1981); and
State v. Bellanger, 304 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1981).
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were generally those which are specifically listed in the Minnesota
guidelines.' 32 For instance, "victim vulnerability,"' 33 due to infancy or
old age, was frequently upheld as a reason for an upward departure
from the guidelines. "[P]articular cruelty" to the victim, that is, cru-
elty "of a kind not usually associated with commission of the offense in
question,"' 1 4 was also cited often as an appropriate aggravating fac-
tor.'35 Other proper reasons for an upward diviation include: infliction
of an injury, 36 intruding upon a victim's zone of privacy by assailing
the victim in his/her own home,3 7 and neglecting the medical needs of
the victim after the infliction of injury. 38
In addition to deciding whether a departure was warranted, the
court also ruled as to whether departures were excessive. A basic prin-
ciple was set down in State v. Evans. 39 There the court ruled that,
"generally, in a case in which an upper departure in sentence length is
justified, the upper limit will be double the presumptive sentence
length."' 4 This tenet sets only the upper limit, however, and was not
intended to be the rule for all departures, nor is it an iron-clad rule that
sentences cannot exceed the doubled limitation. "[T]here may be rare
cases in which the facts are so unusually compelling that an even
greater degree of departure will be justified."''
132. See supra notes 90-94, and accompanying text.
133. State v. Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1983); State v. Jones, 328
N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1983); State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. 1983); State v.
Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 1982); State v. Partlow, 321 N.W.2d 886
(Minn. 1982); State v. Stumm, 312 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. 1981).
134. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d at 487.
135. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 187; Jones 328 N.W.2d at 736; Norton 328 N.W.2d
at 142; Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d at 633; Partlow, 321 N.W.2d at 886; State v. Marti-
nez, 319 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1982); Stumm, 312 N.W.2d at 248; State v. Evans, 311
N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1981); State v. Fairbanks, 308 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1981).
136. Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d at 634.
137. Id. at 635; Jones 328 N.W.2d at 738.
138. Stumm, 312 N.W.2d at 249.
139. 311 N.W.2d at 481.
140. Id. at 483.
141. Id. In Stumm, 312 N.W.2d at 248, and Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d at 633,
the court upheld sentences exceeding the doubled presumptive sentences. The Stumm
court held that the "absolute vulnerability of the helpless victim," who was a two year
old child, justified an extreme departure, Stumm, 312 N.W.2d at 249. In Van Gorden,
the combination of the 66 year old victim's age, the aggravated nature of the miscon-
duct, permanent injury to the eyes resulting in vision loss, three distinct sexual penetra-
tions invading the privacy zone of the victim's home, and dragging the victim outside
her home, thereby increasing her fright, warranted the departure, Van Gorden, 326
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A case which presented a blatant disregard of the guidelines by
the sentencing judge was State v. Bellanger.142 The Minnesota Su-
preme Court quoted the trial court as stating, "there is a great deal too
much made of regularity and conformity in sentencing."'143 The su-
preme court flatly reversed the upward departure, admonishing,
"[g] eneral disagreement with the Guidelines or 'the legislative policy on
which the Guidelines are based does not justify departure.91 44
This survey of the Minnesota cases concerning the guidelines dem-
onstrates the effect of the "substantial and compelling" standard. Ad-
herence to the presumptive sentence is the rule, and departure clearly
the exception. How close to this result the Florida cases will be is a
matter of speculation at this point, because of inherent differences be-
tween the two sets of guidelines, the standard for departures, and the
two states' laws in general. However, because of the great similarities
in the two Sentencing Guidelines Commissions' intents and goals, and
because of the absence of case law directly on point in Florida, these
cases may provide some direction for the courts here.
3. "Clear and Convincing" in Florida
The "clear and convincing" standard has been used in Florida in a
variety of legal settings. It is the proper standard of proof for the estab-
lishment of entitlement to a trust, 45 the introduction of hypnotically
refreshed testimony,14 6 civil commitment,1 47 disbarment, 48 actual mal-
ice in defamation cases,1 49 permanent commitment of an adopted child
to the new parents, 150 establishing that Miranda warnings were
N.W.2d at 634, 635.
142. 304 N.W.2d 282 (1981).
143. Id. at 283.
144. Id.
145. Hiestand v. Geier, 396 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied,
407 So. 2d 1103 (1981).
146. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 91 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1983).
147. In Re Preer Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 488 (Fla. 1977); Gorchov v. State,
354 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
148. The Florida Bar v. Rayman, 238 So. 2d 594, 598 (Fla. 1970); Abstract and
Title Corp. of Florida v. Cochran, 414 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
149. Lampkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc. 408 So. 2d 666, 669 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), reh. denied, 103 S. Ct. 838, dismissed 74 L. Ed. 2d 44, 103 S.
Ct. 29. Gibson v. Maloney, 263 So. 2d 632, 637 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 984.
150. In Re the Adoption of J.G.R., 432 So. 2d 735, 735 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
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given, 151 the voluntariness of a confession to criminal charges,'152 the
reformation of a contract, 5 and the impeachment of service of pro-
cess. 54 A thread of similarity runs through all of these situations.
There is no perceived need for the criminal standard of "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt," yet each controversy seems to demand more than a
mere preponderance. This need stems from either the seriousness or the
finality of the disputed matter's impending judgment. Prior to sentenc-
ing proceedings, a criminal defendant's guilt will have been proved "be-
yond a reasonable doubt." The sentence imposed under Florida's sen-
tencing guidelines has been approved through the appropriate channels.
The "clear and convincing" standard only applies to decisions to devi-
ate from the prescribed sentence. The imposition of a criminal sentence
being quite a serious matter, however, a standard more strict than "a
preponderance" was deemed appropriate.
It may seem surprising that, even though applied in a number of
areas, the term "clear and convincing" had not been satisfactorily de-
fined by Florida courts until recently. 55 In State v. Graham,'56 the
problem of defining the standard was described as follows:
Wigmore went to the heart of the matter: 'The truth is that no one
has yet invented or discovered a mode of measurement for the in-
tensity of human belief.' We communicate with words rather than
numbers in the legal profession, and this forces us to verbalize
standards for the subjective feeling of probability engendered by
evidence. Broadly, we say that the measure of persuasion in crimi-
nal cases is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while civil cases re-
quire the lesser measure of proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Wigmore, however, recognizes that a 'stricter standard,' in
some such phrase as 'clear and convincing proof' is commonly used
to measure the necessary persuasion in certain matters.157
In April of 1983, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida
1983); In the Interest of T.C., a child, 417 So. 2d 775, 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
151. State v. Graham, 240 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
152. Id.
153. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Vanater, 297 So. 2d 293, 298 (Fla. 1974).
154. Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
155. Id. at 799.
156. Graham, 240 So. 2d at 486.
157. Id. at 490.
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went to great lengths to define the standard in Slomowitz v. Walker:158
[C]lear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be
found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must
be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be directly
remembered; the testimony must be precise and explicit and the
witness must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The
evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the trier of fact
a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established.Y59
This definition is presumably as good as any, given the nature of
the concept. What is important to realize is that "clear and convinc-
ing" is a phrase which is normally used to determine the quantum of
evidence or proof necessary to establish the truth of a disputed matter
for the finder of fact. In the sentencing guidelines, however, "clear and
convincing" is a descriptive phrase modifying the rationale accompany-
ing a departure from the prescribed sentence. It is not the quantum of
evidence necessary to prove that the reasons exist. Therefore, the mean-
ing of the term becomes even more elusive. Hopefully, any reason a
judge would have for sentencing a convicted felon to one term rather
than another would be a valid one and therefore "clear." And presuma-
bly, any reason for imposing a sentence outside the guidelines would be
"convincing" to the judge that it is a valid reason to depart. The ques-
tions that remain to be answered are how the interpretation of the
"clear and convincing" standard will affect departures from the guide-
lines, and the direction that the new body of case law will take.
D. The End of "Real Offense Sentencing"' °
"Reasons for deviating from the guidelines shall not include fac-
tors relating to prior arrests without conviction. Reasons for deviating
from the guidelines shall not include factors relating to the instant of-
fenses for which convictions have not been obtained,"' 61 "This state-
158. Slomowitz, 429 So. 2d 797.
159 Id. at 800.
160. This term was used in NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT (Approved Draft 1978),
located in 10 UNIFORM LAWS ANN., (master ed. West 1974) (Supp. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL ACT].
161. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(11). The Sentencing Guidelines Commission
presented recommendations for changes to the Florida Supreme Court which included
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ment in the Florida's guidelines represents an attempt by the Commis-
sion to end the practice of "real offense sentencing,"' 6 2 sanctioned by
the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act. Real offense sentencing re-
quires the court to ignore the charge at conviction and to base the sanc-
tion on the defendant's "actual offense behavior. "163 Criticisms of the
practice in general and the Model Act's advocacy of it "range from the
constitutional to the principled to the practical.' ' 4
The primary objection, however, is that real offense sentencing
simply does not seem fair.6 5 A defendant should be sentenced for the
charge at conviction, and not for prior dismissed charges or acquittals.
Moreover, where plea bargaining is utilized in fixing the offense, defen-
dants must be sentenced according to their negotiated pleas. In return
for the guilty plea and the waiver of the right to a jury trial, the prose-
cutor promises immunity from the imposition of the more serious
charge and its sentence. The judge can not ethically consider his own
conclusions as to the "real offense" when sentencing.'66 Despite the ob-
jection that real offense sentencing is not equitable, there is evidence
that this injustice arises all too frequently. The practice has been de-
scribed as "antithetical to our basic notions of individual worth and fair
play.' 6 7 The real concern is that "[miost courts now operate on a real
offense system; they simply don't admit to it."' 68
The provision in the Florida Sentencing Guidelines should put an
end to this unfair practice. The judge is now forced to articulate and
record the reasons for departure so that reasonable review of the case is
possible. This ensures that the offense at conviction is the one by which
defendants are sentenced, and promotes certainty in sentencing.
this new language. The court approved the changes and commented as to this revision
that it was "revamped to replace the cumbersome language in the [original] rule." 9
FLA. L.W. 169 (May 11, 1984) (No. 19).
162. See supra, note 160.
163. M. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and Corrections
Act, 72 J. CRIM L. CRIMINOLOGY 1550, 1550 (1981).
164. Id. at 1556.
165. Id. at 1568. Tonry suggests that the practice of "real offense sentencing" is
"institutionalized deceit." Id.
166. Id. at 1568-71.
167. Id. at 1564. "Real offense sentencing undermines the importance of the sub-
stantive criminal law, nullifies the law of evidence, and is irreconcilable with the notion
that punishment can be imposed only in respect to offenses admitted or proven."
168. Id. at 1586.
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III. Constitutionality
It should be noted that Minnesota's guidelines have withstood all
constitutional attacks.""9 Because of the similarities between Minne-
sota's and Florida's guidelines, the Minnesota decisions may serve as
persuasive authority in the initial challenges in Florida. Possible attacks
in Florida may rest on various grounds, including the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment, due process vagueness, equal protection,
or separation of powers. Though it is impossible to foresee the precise
circumstances of a constitutional attack, relevant case law will be ex-
amined in order to predict the outcome of such a challenge.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In a challenge based on the prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the state17 0 and federal 17 1 constitutions, the guidelines
would be sustained, as will be illustrated. First, it is essential to note
that the guidelines do not control capital offenses;1 72 therefore, the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty, as addressed in Gregg v. Georgia,73
will not be an issue. This is evidenced in Rummel v. Estelle, 74 where
the petitioner received a mandatory life sentence pursuant to a Texas
statute requiring such a penalty for all third time felony convictions.
All three convictions were minor property offenses with an aggregate
value of approximately $230. Despite the penalty's apparent harshness,
the statute was upheld. The United States Supreme Court noted that
[b]ecause a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of
imprisonement, no matter how long, our decsions applying the pro-
hibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases are of
169. State v. Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1983); State v. Olson, 325
N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982); State v. Fields, 311 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 1981).
170. FLA. CONST. art. I, §'17 provides: "[e]xcessive fines, cruel or unusual pun-
ishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable de-
tention of witnesses are forbidden."
171. U.S. CONsT amend. VIII provides: "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
172. FLA STAT. § 921.144 (1982) provides for sentencing proceedings for capital
felonies "to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life im-
prisonment as authorized by § 775.082." This procedure remains unaffected by the
guidelines.
173. 428 U.S. 238 (1976).
174. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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limited assistance in deciding the Constitutionality of the punish-
ment meted out to Rummel.
Outside the context of capital punishment, successful chal-
lenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been ex-
ceedingly rare .... I'l
Like the line dividing felony theft from petty larceny, the
point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the
necessary propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist
will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discre-
tion of the punishing jurisdiction.17 1
Gregg also adds weight to the high degree of deference the Court
affords state legislatures in determining sentences. The Florida Su-
preme Court, in Hamilton v. State,17 7 relied in part on Gregg in up-
holding a sentence imposed for sale and possession of cannabis man-
dated by section 893.13 of the Florida Statutes.
[I]n assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected
legislature against the Constitutional measure, we presume its va-
lidity. We may not require the legislature to select the least severe
penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhu-
mane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy bur-
den rests on those who would attack the judgment of the represent-
atives of the people.
This is true in part because the Constitutional test is inter-
twined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the leg-
islative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards. In
a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to re-
spond to the will and consequently the moral values of the
people. '7
In applying this principle to an attack on a sentence imposed pur-
suant to the Florida guidelines, it is apparent that as long as the actual
sentence received falls within the statutory mandate, it will be upheld.
Indeed, the guidelines are designed to avoid precisely the disproportion-
ate sentences that the cruel and unusual clause proscribes. In Banks v.
State,17 9 the Florida Supreme Court held that a life sentence with a
175. Id. at 272.
176. Id. at 285.
177. 366 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1979).
178. Id. at 11 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174-75).
179. 342 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1977) (affirming a conviction for involuntary sexual
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minimum of twenty-five years imprisonment prior to parole eligibility
did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. It stated that it had
"no jurisdiction to interfere"18  because the sentence was within the
limits set by the legislature."8
The guidelines' purpose is to limit judicial discretion by "estab-
lish[ing] a uniform set of standards to guide the sentencing judge," 182
thus minimizing unwarranted disparity in sentences. As long as the
sentences are within the guidelines, a cruel and unusual punishment
challenge will undoubtedly fail. However, sentences which are harsher
than the guideline's presumptive range because of "clear and convinc-
ing" 183 reasons, may pose a separate issue of whether the degree of
departure from the guidelines is warranted by the circumstances of the
crime.1 84 If not, the constitutional question of whether the deviation
violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause may be presented,
with less clear-cut results than where the sentence is within the guide-
lines. The outcomes of challenges presenting these questions will de-
pend on individualized analyses of the facts of each case. Because it is
conceivable that a court of appeals could find an abuse of discretion in
the judge's sentence, an extreme departure from the guidelines could
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. However, this finding would
only affect that particular sentence, and not the constitutionality of the
guidelines as a whole.
The weakness of a cruel and unusual punishment attack is further
evidenced by the guidelines' subordination to mandatory sentences. The
guidelines provide that "[f]or those offenses having a mandatory pen-
alty, a scoresheet should be completed and the guideline sentence cal-
culated. If the recomended sentence is less than the mandatory penalty,
the mandatory sentence takes precedence. If the guideline sentence ex-
ceeds the mandatory sentence, the guideline sentence should be
imposed."1 85
Mandatory minimum sentences were upheld in McArthur v.
battery).
180. Id. at 470.
181. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1).
182. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b).
183. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(6) and (d)(11).
184. See supra nn.139-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the permis-
sible extent of departure from guideline sentences in Minnesota. The standard for de-
parture in Florida is discussed supra, notes 145-59 and accompanying text.
185. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(9).
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State18 and State v. Benitez.18 7 In McArthur, the petitioner argued
that the statute, which mandated a twenty-five year sentence before
parole eligibility for first-degree murder constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. He asserted that "it operate[d]without regard to the cir-
cumstances of individual defendants or the crimes for which the defen-
dants have been convicted."'18 8 Regarding the federal Constitution, the
Florida Supreme Court distinguished this case from ones involving the
death sentence, 8 ' relying on Woodson v. North Carolina:9 0 "the pen-
alty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long."''1 In Woodson, the court noted that "the prevailing
practice of individualized sentencing determinations generally reflects
simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative."2
Thus, the penalty passed muster under the federal Constitution.
As to the Florida Constitution, the McArthur court relied on
O'Donnell v. State 93 which upheld a thirty year mandatory sentence
for kidnapping.9 That case reiterated the principle espoused above;
that any sentence within the statutory scheme's limits was not violative
of the Florida Constitution. 95 In State v. Benitez, 98 the Florida Su-
preme Court again rejected the argument that the elimination of judi-
cial discretion in mandatory minimums violates the cruel and unusual
clauses. 97 Relying on McArthur, the court upheld the mandatory
sentences for drug trafficking.'" 8
Since the mandatory minimum sentences are constitutional, the
guidelines' sentences would only be suspect in instances where they ex-
ceed the mandatory minimum and are imposed pursuant to the guide-
lines.199 However, the guidelines allow for more individualized sentenc-
ing than the mandatory minimum sentences. For instance, a
186. 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977).
187. 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1981).
188. McArthur, 351 So. 2d 972, 975.
189. Id.
190. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
191. Id. at 305 (as cited in McArthur, 351 So. 2d at 975).
192, Id. (Emphasis in original).
193. 326 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975)
194. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(a) (1973).
195. McArthur, 351 So. 2d at 975-76.
196. 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1981).
197. Id. at 518.
198. Id.
199. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(9).
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defendant's record, victim injury, and the defendant's legal status at
time of conviction are all factored into the guideline sentence. Thus,
the guidelines are more proportionate to the seriousness of the crime
and therefore less likely than mandatory sentencing schemes to consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, guideline sentences
exceeding statutory maximums may not be imposed. In the case of
such a conflict the statutory maximum sentence takes precedence. This
further illustrates the intent of the legislature to generally reduce sever-
ity of sentences thus contradicting any cruel and unusual punishment
argument.
B. Due Process Considerations
Perhaps the most likely due process argument would be a vague-
ness challenge. In Benitez, petitioners argued that the definition of a
defendant who is eligible for lenient treatment under Florida Statutes
section 893.135 was impermissibly vague and thus violated the due pro-
cess clauses of the Florida 00 and federal 201 Constitutions.2 0 2 In statutes
proscribing certain activity as criminal, the test for vagueness is "lan-
guage that is definite enough to provide notice of what conduct will
constitute a violation. ' 202 However, the statute challenged in Benitez
and the guidelines do not prohibit behavior as criminal; rather, they
determine penalties for existing substantive crimes. In Benitez, the
court stated that, "[b]eing a description of post-conviction. .. form of
plea bargaining rather than a definition of the crime itself, the phrase
'substantial assistance' can tolerate subjectivity to an extent which nor-
mally would be impermissible for penal statutes." 204 The court held
that the contested phrase was "susceptible of common understanding in
the context of the whole statute," 20 5 and therefore did not violate due
process.20 6
200. FLA. CONST. art. I § 9.
201. U.S. CONsT. amend. V and XIV.
202. 395 So. 2d at 518.
203. State v. Ashcraft, 378 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 1979). The text continues:
"[i]f the language is definite enough, when measured by common understanding and
practice, to apprise ordinary persons [of common intelligence] of what conduct is pro-
scribed, the statute is not vague." Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 448 (1927);
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
204. Benitez, 395 So. 2d at 518 (emphasis in original).
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It is difficult to predict which, if any, language in the guidelines
may be subject to a vagueness attack. In a Minnesota case, State v.
Givens,207 the defendant attacked the constitutionality of that state's
standards for departure from the guidelines. The Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld the guidelines concluding that the vagueness challenge
was "misplaced in this context. '20 8 Relying on reasoning similar to that
enunciated in the cruel and unusual punishment arguments, the court
distinguished the application of a vagueness challenge in death penalty
cases from sentences controlled by the guidelines. Relying on Godfrey
v. Georgia20 9 and Gregg, the court noted that crimes punishable by
death must be defined in a way that "obviates standardless sentencing
discretion. 210 Since Givens was not sentenced to death or subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment, the court refused to extend the doctrine
to his situation: "[t]he application of vagueness argument to more rou-
tine sentencing decisions - those not including the death sentence, is not
contemplated by the Gregg and Godfrey decisions."2 Before conclud-
ing that the vagueness argument was "misplaced,"2 12 however, the
court expressed its support for the guidelines, apparently rejecting the
defendant's challenge on the merits despite its inappropriateness.
Three points must be made before analyzing the constitutional
merit of defendant's claim: (1) the guidelines not only list aggra-
vating factors - such as race, sex, employment - which may not be
used as a basis for a sentencing departure:..(2) the trial court ap-
plied only specified aggravating factors, and (3) this court is in the
process of fleshing out the guidelines in an ongoing series of judi-
cial decisions. Counsel for defendant and the state acknowledged at
oral argument that the guidelines represent a salutory step forward
in controlling sentencing discretion, with an ultimate objective of
achieving greater uniformity in sentencing statewide, consistent
with fitting punishment to the particular nature of the crime
committed." 3
This defense of the guidelines seems to anticipate the possible ex-
207. 332 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1983).
208. Id. at 190.
209. 446 U.S. 420 (1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919, reh'g denied 456 U.S.
1001 (1982).
210. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 190, (citing Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428).
211. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 190.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 189.
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pansion of the Godfrey and Gregg decisions. It anticipates an approval
of the degree of definiteness the guidelines possess in case of the need
for such justification in the future. The Florida guidelines may not be
able to meet this type of challenge so ably. They specify no aggravating
or mitigating factors for use in departing from the guidelines. However,
they do prohibit the consideration of race, gender, social and economic
status, 214 or "factors relating to prior arrests without conviction" or
"factors relating to the instant offense for which convictions have not
been obtained. 21 5 General goals in the Statement of Purpose will also
provide guidance to the sentencing judge. 16 Whether these provisions
will be sufficient to save the guidelines from a vagueness attack is un-
certain, but seems probable. As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in
Givens, the guidelines represent a "salutory step forward in controlling
judical discretion,' 2 17 and at least assure more definiteness in sentenc-
ing than was guaranteed before the rules' inception. Thus, inasmuch as
the broad discretion allowed in indeterminate sentencing practices of
the past were never held unconstitutionally vague, it is doubtful that
the Florida guidelines will fall to a vagueness challenge.
C. Equal Protection
Another potential ground for attack is the denial of equal protec-
tion of the law in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution and article I section 2 and section 9 of the Florida
Constitution. Because of the high degree of discretion given a state leg-
islature218 in devising statutory categories, this challenge will place a
heavy burden on the petitioner.21
It is difficult to foresee the delineations of the challenged clasgifi-
cation, but several possibilities exist. A broad classification could sim-
ply include all convicted felons subject to sentencing under the guide-
lines. A more narrow class might include all felons convicted and
sentenced pursuant to one of the nine offense categories in the guide-
lines. Whatever the demarcation of the class the test of constitutional-
ity will be whether there exists a "[rlational basis for the classifica-
214. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(1).
215. Id. at (d)(1 1). As discussed supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text, this
provision should end the practice of "real offense sentencing". Supra note 160.
216. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b).
217. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 187.
218. Hamilton v. State, 366 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1979).
219. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1910).
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tion. . .or whether this classification is arbitrary and, therefore,
unconstitutional. 220
In ordinary equal protection challenges where no suspect class or
fundamental right is involved, there is no constitutional mandate that
the law operate without any inequality. "A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is
not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality. ' 221 Therefore, it would not be enough to show that
some offenders are treated somewhat differently than others who,
though apparently similarly situated, somehow were not included in the
class. Furthermore, "[w]hen the classification in such a law is called in
question, if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted, must be assumed. 222 Given this test, which is highly deferen-
tial to the legislature, a challenger should be skeptical of the possibility
of success. Surely the state could conceive of some reasonable justifica-
tion for the delineation of the challenged class. Basis for such justifica-
tion could be found in the legislative history of the bill, or in the statis-
tical data gathered by the Sentencing Commission. Unless the
challenger can show that the guidelines classification "does not rest
upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary,"2 23 the challenge
will fail.
In Minnesota, an equal protection challenge of the guidelines
failed even when the defense attempted to bolster its chances of success
by claiming that the guidelines, as applied, were racially discrimina-
tory.224 The defense premised this claim on statistical data showing
that blacks received disparate sentences for the same crimes as
whites.225 If the finding of intentional racial discrimination had been
made, the standard of review would have been elevated from mere ra-
tionality to strict scrutiny.228 The court rejected the contention that ra-
cial discrimination was the reason for defendant's sentence departing
upwardly from the guideline range.
Disparity of sentencing based upon race has no place in our justice
220. Hamilton, 366 So. 2d 8, 10.
221. Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78-79.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 191.
225. Id.
226. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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system. The guidelines specifically reject race as a sentencing fac-
tor in sentencing decisions. Whatever disparity exists, discrimina-
tion was not the fact [sic] in this case. The absence of bias by the
jury is demonstrated by the verdict acquitting defendant of the
first-degree murder and criminal sexual conduct charges. And
more importantly with regard to sentencing bias, counsel for de-
fense explicitly acknowledged that the trial court was in no way
motivated by racial bias.227
The Florida guidelines also specifically mandate that "[s]entincing
should be neutral with respect to race.""28 Therefore, unless it could be
proved that a particular sentence was imposed solely as a result of ra-
cial discrimination, an attack like the one in Givens would also fail in
Florida.
D. Separation of Powers
Another potential Constitutional argument rests on the Separation
of Powers doctrine. Article II § 3 of the Florida Constitution sets forth
the principles in the following language: "[the powers of the state gov-
ernment shall be divided into legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the other branches unless provided herein."
Article V section 2 provides that "[tihe supreme court shall adopt rules
for the practice and procedure in all courts. . . ." An attack might be
formulated charging that the legislature, in passing section 921.001 of
the Florida Statutes, which proposed the rule implementing the guide-
lines, encroached upon the rule-making authority of the supreme court.
However, the supreme court's adoption of the rules in September, 1983
renders this argument moot.
E. Double Jeopardy
Finally, a challenge based on double jeopardy grounds may be
posed. The state is authorized to appeal from "[a] sentence imposed
outside the guidelines."229 This provision may be grounds for a broad
attack on the constitutionality of this power in that it subjects the de-
fendant twice to jeopardy of life or limb.
227. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 191.
228. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(1).
229. FLA. STAT. § 924.07 (1983).
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However, this issue was already resolved in United States v.
DiFransesco.2 30 where the United States Supreme Court upheld the
government's right to appeal a sentence. DiFransesco was convicted in
federal district court of racketeering offenses. He appealed his convic-
tion to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the govern-
ment appealed the sentence received under a particular charge.231 The
court of appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions but dismissed the
government's appeal to increase his sentence.232 The court held that "to
subject a defendant to the risk of substitution of a greater sentence,
upon an appeal by the government is to place him a second time 'in
jeopardy of life or limb.' "233 The United States Supreme Court, upon
a grant of petition of certiorari, reversed, explaining that the "Double
Jeopardy Clause is not a complete barrier to an appeal by the prosecu-
tion in a criminal case. '234 Because the appeal did not pose the risk of
a successive prosecution, but merely made possible a greater sentence,
it did not offend double jeopardy principles.23 5 "The Double Jeopardy
Clause does not provide the defendant with the right to know at any
specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will
turn out to be." '23 6
In dicta relevant to the guidelines, the Court noted that "sentenc-
ing is one of the areas of the criminal justice system most in need of
reform" 231 The Court acknowledged that the "basic problem" in the
criminal system is "the unbridled power of sentences to be arbitrary
and discriminatory. '23 8 The Court then concluded that "[a]ppellate re-
view creates a check upon this unlimited power, and should lead to a
greater degree of consistency in sentencing. '23 9 This language implic-
itly lends support to the principles and purposes of the guidelines, and
indicates approval of the type of reform the guidelines attempt to
230. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
231. U.S. v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (1979), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070,
rev'd, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
232. Id. at 783.
233. Id.
234. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 122 (emphasis in original).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 137.
237. Id. at 142. The Court cites M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, LAW
WITHOUT ORDER (1973) and P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN and D. CURTIS, TOWARD A
JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM (1977).
238. M. FRANKEL, supra note 237, at 49. cited at DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 143.
239. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 143.
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implement.
The Minnesota Guidelines also allow the state to appeal from a
sentence. In State v. Cizl,2 40 the defendant challenged the constitution-
ality of this power, and the court relied on DiFrancesco with virtually
no discussion.241 In Florida, a similar double jeopardy attack will likely
be dismissed on the same grounds.
It is clear that the guidelines will be challenged in various areas of
constitutionality; however, based on this survey of the case law, it may
be concluded that no strong arguments exist. In any event, the perime-
ters of the attacks must be confined to precedent, thus it appears un-
likely for a successfull challenge to be posed.
IV. Conclusion
The guidelines have already caused great controversy in Florida's
judicial and political forums. No one can predict the aggregate impact
of their implementation with great accuracy. The consequences of abol-
ishing early release through parole, the effects on plea negotiation, and
changes the newly proclaimed philosophy of just-deserts will produce
are issues which only time will clarify. The judiciary's implementation
and the Commission's monitoring of the guidelines will determine the
direction of sentencing for the future. The guidelines are not the pan-
acea of the criminal justice system, but merely a modification which
may provide the needed structure to accommodate future
improvements.
Rebecca Jean Spitzmiller
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Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax
Board: Florida Imports the Unitary Tax
I. Introduction
In Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board,,1
the Supreme Court for the first time2 approved the application of the
unitary method of state taxation3 to the worldwide operations of a mul-
tinational business. The decision permits states to use a method of tax-
ation different from that used by the federal government and most for-
eign governments.
Emboldened by the decision in Container, the Florida Legislature
adopted a tax on multinationals similar to that approved by the Court.
This comment presents a background for understanding the Container
decision, an analysis of that decision, as well as Florida's legislative
response, Florida -businesses' negative reaction, and federal Executive
action. The states hav6 demonstrated a preference for the unitary
method when imposing an income tax on multinational businesses. To
understand this preference, this comment begins with an examination
of state taxation of multijurisdictional businesses.
1. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
2. In two cases argued together last term, the Court failed to reach the issue
decided in Container. In both cases the Court held that the business operations of the
domestic corporation and its foreign subsidiaries were not unitary; therefore, it was
unnecessary to decide whether the unitary tax method could be applied to the world-
wide operations of a multinational business. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't,
458 U.S. 354 (1982).
See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), in which the
Court held that dividend income received by a nondomiciliary corporation from its sub-
sidiaries could be taxed by a state using the unitary method. See generally Comment,
State Taxation of Foreign-Source Income: Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 805 (1980).
3. The unitary method taxes multinationals based on the percentage of their
worldwide income attributable to the in-state activities of the business. For a more
complete discussion of the unitary tax, see infra notes 10-36 and accompanying text.
4. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. SEss. LAW SERV. 4848 (West)
(effective Sept. 9, 1983).
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II. State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Businesses
A. Development of the Unitary Tax
A domestic corporation whose operations are multistate or mul-
tinational may be subject to income tax in more than one jurisdiction.
Because a state may not tax income earned outside its borders, 5 the
state requires corporations to allocate a portion of their total taxable
income to that state. Three methods have evolved for allocating the
income of a corporation to a particular state: (1) separate or arms-
length accounting; (2) formula apportionment; and (3) specific
allocation.
The arms-length method used by the federal government and most
foreign governments allocates income on a geographic basis.' The in-
come-producing activities of a corporation in one jurisdiction are
treated as separate and distinct from those outside the jurisdiction.
Often, however, income earned by a corporation may be generated "by
a series of multistate transactions beginning with manufacturing profit
in one state and ending with sales profit in other States."'7 The income-
producing activities of a multijurisdictional corporation may be so in-
terrelated (unitary) that it is a fiction to allocate income among juris-
dictions based on artificial geographic boundaries. Indeed, proponents
of formula apportionment contend that businesses use the arms-length
method to hide income or shift it to jurisdictions where it will be sub-
ject to less tax or no tax at all.8 Income may be shifted to other coun-
5. See e.g., Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80-81
(1983). See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
6. P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 252
(1981). See also Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept In the Allocation of In-
come, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42-3 (1960).
7. P. HARTMAN, supra note 6, at 522. In one case, for example, all the manufac-
turing of a multistate business was performed in Connecticut. However, the corporation
allocated only three percent of its net income to Connecticut based on separate ac-
counting. The Court, recognizing that the manufacturing process is responsible for a
substantial portion of the income earned in other states, approved a one-factor (prop-
erty) apportionment of income to Connecticut. Since 47% of the company's property
was in Connecticut, 47% of its income was apportioned to the state. Underwood Type-
writer Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
8. Cappetta, State Tax Harmonization and the Multistate Tax Commission,
38TH ANNUAL N.Y.U. INST. § 44.02[3] (1980). The Court acknowledged this conten-
tion, noting "that closely related corporations can engage in a transfer of values that is
not fully reflected in their formal ledgers." Container, -_U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at
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tries as well as other states. "[O]ver one-third of revenues, operating
profits and assets of the top 150 [domestic] companies are other than
United States revenues, profits and assets."9
In order to assure a more accurate division of income, all states
which impose a corporate income tax 0 have adopted the formula ap-
portionment method of taxation."1 The formula method 2 attributes in-
come to a particular state "based on the assumption that the total in-
come of a business enterprise results from certain income-producing
factors, such as property, payroll, [and] sales .... ,,13 The in-state
value of each factor is first divided by the total value of that factor for
the corporation. The average of the factors is then multiplied by the
total corporate income to determine the income taxable by the state. 4
For example, suppose a multinational business has sales of $300, pay-
roll of $25, and property of $100 in State A. The corresponding
worldwide figures are $1000, $250, and $500. The standard three-fac-
tor formula' 5 would be applied as below:
2953.
9. Cappetta, supra note 8, at § 44.06[1].
10. Washington, South Dakota, Wyoming, Texas and Nevada are the only states
that do not impose a corporate income tax. See ST. TAX GUIDE, ALL STATES (2d. ed.
CCH), Table of Rates, at 1031.
11. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, KEY
ISSUES AFFECTING STATE TAXATION OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CORPORATE INCOME
NEED RESOLVING 5 (1982) (hereinafter cites as KEY IsSuES).
12. The formula method is described in P. HARTMAN, supra note 6, at 523.
13. Id. At the federal level, Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the
Internal Revenue Service to intervene between the controlling and controlled interests
of a taxpayer to assure proper allocation of income between such interests. "The stan-
dard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's
length with another uncontrolled taxpayer." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1962). In
addition, Section 994 of the Code provides rules for inter-company pricing of Domestic
International Sales Corporation's (DISC). A DISC is a business which derives most of
its gross receipts from exports. See I.R.C. § 992 (a)(1) (1983).
14. KEY ISSUES, supra note 11, at 3.
15. The standard three-factor formula is based on the UNI. DIV. OF INCOME FOR
TAX PURPOSES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 91 (1978).
Primary support for formula apportionment comes from the Multistate Tax Com-
mission, the administrative arm of the Multistate Tax Compact. Cappetta, supra note
8, at § 44.01[2].
The Court upheld a one-factor (sales) formula in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437
U.S. 267 (1928), and a one-factor (property) formula in Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
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300 + 25 + 100
1000 250 000 = .3 + .1 + .2 = .6 = .2 or 20%
3 3 3
Twenty percent of the combined net income of the unitary multina-
tional business would be apportioned to State A and subject to its cor-
porate income tax.
The standard three-factor formula is applied to mercantile or
manufacturing enterprises because sales, payroll and property are the
prime income-producing factors of such businesses. However, the stan-
dard formula may not be appropriate for industries such as banking,
insurance, retail sales or transportation. A different mix of factors, such
as payroll and receipts for banking, may provide a more accurate pic-
ture of a business' in-state activities.'" Florida imposes a franchise tax
on banks and savings associations rather than the unitary tax.17 Insur-
ance companies may use a one-factor formula based on direct premi-
ums written.' 8 Transportation services companies may use a one-factor
formula based on revenue miles.' 9
In contrast to the formula method, the arms-length method often
results in a lower tax burden20 on multinationals precisely because it
ignores the interrelationship (and profitability) of the worldwide activi-
ties of a business. For example, Container paid $72,0002" less in taxes
using the arms-length method for the period 1963-65 than it would
have had the three-factor formula method been used.
Specific allocation, the third method of allocating income, assigns
certain types of non-operating income to a specific jurisdiction because
the source of the income is closely related to a particular location. In-
cluded are such items as rent, capital gains and losses, and interest.2
Specific allocation is often used in conjunction with the apportionment
method. First, non-business income is deducted from total corporate in-
16. Levinson, Interstate Taxation and Apportionment of Bank Income, 34
NAT'L TAX J. 447 (1981).
17. FLA. STAT. § 220.63 (1981). The franchise tax is a 5% tax on adjusted fed-
eral income, as defined in FLA. STAT. § 220.13 (1981).
18. FLA. STAT. § 214.72(1) (1981).
19. FLA. STAT. § 214.72(2) (1981).
20. However, the arms-length method does not always result in a lower tax bur-
den. See infra text accompanying note 131.
21. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., - U.S. 103 S. Ct.
2933, 2945 n.l1-12 (1983).
22. See Keesling & Warren, supra note 6, at 42. See also P. HARTMAN, supra
note 6, at 524.
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come and allocated entirely to the state. The remaining corporate in-
come is then multiplied by an apportionment formula. The state may
then impose a tax on the income of the corporation which has been
specifically allocated to the state and also on income apportioned to it
by means of the apportionment formula.23
Initially, apportionment formulas were used only when a business
was a single corporation;24 eventually they were applied by many states
to "group[s] of separate corporations performing different func-
tions. . .in different States but engaged in the same unitary busi-
ness .. ."I The term "unitary tax" now generally refers to the appli-
cation of formula apportionment to multicorporate entities. Twenty-
four states apply the unitary tax to related corporations which operate
within the United States.26 Twelve of those states also apply the uni-
tary tax to related corporations which operate both within and outside
the United StatesyarThis version of the unitary tax is also known as the
worldwide combined reporting method. 8
The preceding discussion on the theory supporting formula appor-
tionment leads inevitably to the question of when the formula should be
applied. Constitutional considerations require a state to determine that
the activities of a multicorporate entity are "unitary" before the state
may impose its apportionment formula on that entity. "[T]he linchpin
of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary-
business principle."2 9, However, there is no bright-line test for what
constitutes a unitary business.30 The Court in Container provided this
23. KEY IssuEs, supra note 11, at 4.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The twenty-four states using the unitary method of taxation are: Alaska, Ari-
zona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and West Virginia.
Unitary Taxes: Netherlands Says Decision of Supreme Court Threatens Overseas U.S.
Investment, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 9, 1983, at G-6, 7.
27. The twelve states which apply the unitary tax to the worldwide operations of
a business are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon and Utah. Id.
28. State Taxes: Conable, Mathias Re-Propose Ban on Worldwide Combined
Reporting System, Daily Tax Report, May 6, 1983, at G-1.
29. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980).
30. There is considerable debate over the proper definition of a unitary business.
See Hellerstein, The Basic Operations Interdependence Requirement of a Unitary Bus-
iness: A Reply to Charles E. McLure, Jr., 18 TAX NOTES 723 (1983)(WESTLAW,
1984]
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rather vague definition: "[T]here [must] be some sharing or exchange
of value [between related corporations] not capable of precise identifi-
cation or measurement-beyond mere flow of funds arising out of pas-
sive investment or a distinct business operation-which renders formula
apportionment a reasonable method of taxation."3 1 Other definitions of
a unitary business include the following: (1)"[A]ny business which is
carried on partly within and partly without the taxing jurisdiction;"32
(2) "[E]ither an interstate business which is so integrated as to make
separate accounting impossible or as an interstate business in which the
in-state activities contribute to the out-of-state business and the out-of-
state activities contribute to the in-state business; '33 and (3) There
must a unity of ownership (usually fifty percent ,or more), operations
(staff functions), and use (line functions). 4
Florida defines a unitary business group as follows:
[A] group of taxpayers related through common ownership whose
business activities are integrated with, are dependent upon, or con-
tribute to a flow of value among the members of the group. When
direct or indirect ownership or control is 50 percent or more of the
outstanding voting stock, the group shall be considered to be a 'uni-
tary business group' unless clearly shown by the facts and circum-
stances of the individual case to be a non-unitary business group.
When direct or indirect ownership or control is less than 50 percent
of the outstanding voting stock, all elements of the business activi-
ties shall be considered in determining whether the group qualifies
as a 'unitary business group.' 5
Florida's statutory definition presumes a unitary group when there is
common ownership of fifty percent or more of the outstanding voting
stock. While unity of ownership is an important factor, it is only one of
several factors that should be considered in determining whether a bus-
FTX-TN database)(Professor Jerome Hellerstein's response to an article by Professor
Charles McLure which advocated a centralized management test for a unitary
business).
31. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2940.
32. Keesling & Warren, supra note 6, at 46.
33. Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Con-
cept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REv. 171, 184 (1969).
34. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 678, 11 P.2d 334, 341 (1941),
a f'd, 351 U.S. 501 (1942).
35. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. Sass. LAW SERV. 4848, 4853, §
220.03(1)(aa)(West).
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iness is unitary. Perhaps in recognition of this, the Florida Department
of Revenue allows "[the] presumption [to] be overcome by the facts of
the specific case which clearly show the business is not unitary.""6 In
Florida, as in other states, the determination of whether a business is
unitary will have to be made on a case-by-case basis.
States prefer the unitary tax over the arms-length method because
the unitary method will more accurately reflect income earned by the
in-state activities of a multijurisdictional business. In addition, many
states now apply the unitary tax to the worldwide operations of mul-
ticorporate entities. The question of whether the operations of a busi-
ness are in fact unitary is one of constitutional dimension.
B. Constitutional Dimension of the Unitary Tax
The unitary tax is vulnerable to constitutional attack through both
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 3 and the com-
merce clause.3 8 The restrictions placed upon state taxation of interstate
business by the two clauses are similar and are invoked interchangeably
by the courts.3 9
Under the due process clause, a state may not impose an income
tax on "value earned outside its borders."4 Thus, before a state may
tax extraterritorial business income, there must be "a 'minimal connec-
tion' between the interstate activities of the taxing State, and a rational
relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intra-
state values of the enterprise. '41 If the commerce clause is relied on,
the reviewing court must determine whether the tax is "applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly appor-
i
36. DEP'T OF REVENUE, STATE OF FLORIDA, No. F-106, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIL-
ING UNDER THE UNITARY METHOD 4 (Aug. 1983); Weissman, A Primer on Florida's
Unitary Method of Corporate Taxation and Capitalizing on its Idiosyncrasies, FLA. B.
J., Jan. 1984, at 42. See generally Oppenheimer, Legislators Hear Unitary Tax Sys-
tem Debated, The Miami Herald, Oct. 25, 1983, at 5D col. 2 (Arthur England criticiz-
ing the presumption).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. P. HARTMAN, supra note 6, at 12.
40. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
41. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980). The due
process concept of a "minimal connection" between the in-state and out-of-state values
of a business enterprise is analogous to the "minimum contacts" required before a
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tioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly
related to the services provided by the state."42
The unitary business concept and formula apportionment of in-
come have been upheld repeatedly by the Supreme Cour 3 and have
been struck down only as applied to a particular business." In
Container, the Supreme Court, for the first time, was faced with the
question of whether a state could bring the foreign subsidiaries of a
domestic corporation under the unitary umbrella.
III. The Container Decision
A. Facts and Issues Presented
Container Corporation of America (Container), a Delaware corpo-
ration headquartered in Chicago,45 manufactures and distributes paper-
board packaging.48 While Container's operations were "largely domes-
tic, 14 7 during the years in question48 it owned a controlling interest in
twenty foreign subsidiary corporations.49
42. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 443 (quoting Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
43. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil
Oil, 445 U.S. 425, Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 425 (1978); Butler Bros. v.
McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ldt. v. State Tax Comm'n,
266 U.S. 271 (1942); and Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113
(1920).
44. ASARCO, 458 U.S. 307; F.W. Woolworth v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't,
458 U.S. 354 (1982); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979);
and Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
45. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., - U.S. 103 S. Ct.
2933, 2939, (1983).
46. Brief for Appellant at 2, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., -
U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15, No. 8,
Part I.
47. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2943.
48. The years in question were 1963-1965. Id.
49. Brief for Appellant at 2, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., __
U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15, No. 8,
Part 1. The percentage ownership of the subsidiaries ranged from 67%-100%.
Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2943. The subsidiaries were located in Colom-
bia, Venezuela, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and Holland. An Austrian subsidiary was in-
active. A Panamanian subsidiary was a holding company, with no property, payroll, or
sales. Under separate accounting, however, it "was assigned $1.5 million in net income
annually .. " Brief for Appellee at 7, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
[Vol. 8
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Container was subject to California's corporate franchise tax be-
cause of its activities within the state.5 0 The franchise tax is based on
income. Container did not include income from any of its foreign sub-
sidiaries when it calculated its income subject to tax in California.51
California's Franchise Tax Board (FTB) audited Container's returns
for the years in question and determined that Container "should have
treated its overseas subsidiaries as part of its unitary business rather
than as passive investments. '52 Following the audit, the FTB issued ad-
ditional assessments against Container.53 Container paid the assess-
ments and then sued in state court for a refund." The court of appeal
upheld a superior court decision denying the refund,55 and Container
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
In a five-to-three56 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, framed the issues as follows: 57 (1)
Was it "proper" to characterize Container and its foreign subsidiaries
as a unitary business?; (2) If so, was it "fair" to apply the standard
three-factor formula to Container?; (3) Alternatively, was California
obligated by the foreign commerce clause5" "to employ the 'arms-
length' analysis used by the federal government and most foreign na-
tions in evaluating the tax consequences of inter-corporate
relationships?"59
- U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15, No.
8, Part 1.
50. Container "had approximately $30 million in sales, $10 million in payroll
and $15 million in property in California ... " Brief for Appellee at 6, Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., - U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in
BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15, No. 8, Part 1.
51. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2944. Container also did not inf-
dlude the payroll, sales, or property of the subsidiaries in the apportionment formula.
Id. at 2945.
52. Container, - U.S. at ___, 103 S. Ct. at 2945.
53. Id. Container's California tax liability increased $72,000. Id. at _, 103 S.
Ct. at 2945 nn.11-12.
54. Container, - U.S. at _, 103 S. Ct. at 2945.
55. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 173
Cal. Rptr. 121 (1981).
56. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision. Container, - U.S. at _, 103
S. Ct. at 2957.
57. Container, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2939.
58. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
59. Container - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2939.
1984]
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B. The Court's Analysis
1. Test for Unitary Business: Flow of Goods v. Flow of Value
The Court first considered Container's challenge to the characteri-
zation of its relationship with its foreign subsidiaries as that of a uni-
tary business. For its attack to be successful, Container had the "dis-
tinct burden of showing by 'clear and cogent evidence' that
[California's apportionment tax] result[ed] in extraterritorial values
being taxed."60 To aid it in meeting this burden, Container urged the
Court to adopt a "bright-line" test in making its determination whether
Container's business was unitary." Container's suggested test required
"a substantial flow of goods"'6 2 between mercantile or manufacturing
enterprises before a business could be characterized as unitary.63
Container, not surprisingly, failed to meet the requirements of its
own test. Container's sales to its subsidiaries constituted "only about
1% of the subsidiaries' total purchases;"8 4 and Container bought no
goods from its subsidiaries.6 5 Thus, Container argued that its foreign
subsidiaries should not be considered as part of a unitary business.
60. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2945 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 221 (1980). Taxation of extraterritorial values would violate
the Due Process Clause. See supra text accompanying notes 40-1.
61. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2947. See also Brief for Appellant
at 47, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2933
(1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15, No. 8, Part 1. Container, based on
the Court's decision in F.W. Woolworth v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354
(1982), also argued that the Court of Appeal had used the wrong legal standard. In
Woolworth, the Court said that the New Mexico Supreme Court had erred in finding a
unitary business based on "the potentials of the relationship between Woolworth and
its subsidiaries. . .," rather than the actual relationship. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 363
(emphasis added). See also Brief for Appellant at 43, Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in, BNA's Law
Reprints, Vol. 15, No. 8, Part 1. The Court was not persuaded by this argument be-
cause, although the lower court alluded to the potential for control by Container, it
based its decision on acutal control. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2946.
62. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2947 (quoting Brief for Appellant
at 47, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2933
(1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15, No. 8, Part 1).
63. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2947.
64. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2943.
65. Brief for Appellant at 4, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., -
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While acknowledging that a substantial flow of goods is a relevant fac-
tor, the Court reasoned that it should not be solely determinative.66
Rather, the Court looked primarily to the "flow of value" between
Container and its subsidiaries to establish the "substantial mutual in-
terdependence" necessary to the finding of a unitary business. 67
The Court then enumerated the factors relied upon by the lower
court to find a unitary business.68 The lower court found that Container
was involved with its subsidiaries in the following areas: (1) making
and guaranteeing loans, (2) major policy review, (3) obtaining equip-
ment, (4) filling personnel needs, (5) corporate expansion, and (6) tech-
nical assistance. The Court considered two of these factors to be partic-
ularly significant.6 9
First, Container made substantial loans to its subsidiaries and
guaranteed loans made to them by third parties. The annual balance of
loans outstanding from Container to its subsidiaries was $7.7 million in
1963, $7.2 million in 1964 and $3.2 million in 1965." The rate of re-
turn on these loans ranged from .003% to .018%.71 Loans guaranteed
by Container accounted for approximately one-third of the loans made
by third parties to Container's subsidiaries, "or between $2.8 and $3.7
million."' 72 While the existence of the loans "and the resulting flow in
value"73 was significant, the fact that Container failed to show that any
of the loans were made at market interest rates7 4 appeared to be the
conclusive factor.
Second, while "a unitary business finding could not be based
merely on 'the type of occasional oversight. . .that any parent gives to
66. Container, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2947. The Court also noted, how-
ever, that one scholar has recommended the flow of goods test and some courts have
adopted it as a bright-line test. Id. at _, 103 S. Ct. 2947 n. 17.
67. Container, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2947 (quoting F.W. Woolworth v.
Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354, 371 (1982).
68. Container, - U.S. at _ 103 S. Ct. at 2947.
69. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. 2948 n.19.
70. Brief for Appellant at 2, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., __
U.S. ., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15, No. 8,
Part 1.
71. Brief for Appellee at 25 n.7, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
- U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15, No.
8, Part 1.
72. Id. at 25.
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an investment in a subsidiary,' ,,15 the extent of "the managerial role
played by appellant in its subsidiaries' affairs"' was considerable.
Container took no part in the daily operations of its subsidiaries, how-
ever, "major policy decisions of the subsidiaries were subject to review
by [Container]."7 Container had assumed a management position over
its subsidiaries that was "grounded in its own operational expertise and
its overall operational strategy. '78 The Supreme Court found the com-
binatiQn of these factors sufficient to uphold the finding of the lower
court that Container and its foreign subsidiaries constituted a unitary
business. 9
2. Was the Three-Factor Formula Fairly Applied to
Container?
The Court next considered the question of whether there was a
"rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and
the intrastate values of the enterprise,"80 as required by the commerce
clause. Container again had the burden of proof, having to establish
that such "rational relationship" did not exist."' To meet this burden,
Container had to prove "that the income apportioned to California
under the statute is 'out of all appropriate proportion to the business
transacted [sic] in that state.' "82
Container argued that the three-factor formula, when applied to a
unitary business that included its particular mix of foreign subsidiaries,
would allocate more income to California than was properly attributa-
ble to its in-state operations."8 This distortion would occur because
wage rates, but not productivity, are lower in the countries in which the
subsidiaries are located.84 Since payroll is a factor in the apportionment
75. Id. (quoting F.W. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 369).
76. Id.
77. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 998,
173, Cal. Rptr. 121, 127, (1981).
78. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2948 n.19
79. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2948.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 125
(1931)).
83. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. 2948-9.
84. Brief for Appellant at 15-18, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
- U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15, No.
8, Part 1. Container also argued that a higher cost of sales contributed to the shift of
[Vol. 8
250
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss3/12
Unitary Tax
formula, including foreign subsidiaries as part of the unitary business
would artificially shift income to California."5 Container supported this
argument by showing that formula apportionment allocated an average
of $32.1 million of inbome to the United States, while separate ac-
counting allocated an average of $28.1 million for the same period.8"
Justice Brennan correctly dismissed this showing as "precisely the sort
of formal geographic accounting whose basic theoretical weaknesses
justify resort to formula apportionment in the first place. 87 The Court
previously stated this basic proposition: "[W]e need not impeach the
integrity of that [separate] accounting system to say that it does not
prove appellant's assertion that extraterritorial values are being
taxed. '88 The Court also noted that since Container's business was in
fact unitary, it was likely that part of the California payroll was con-
tributing to production by the foreign subsidiaries.8 "
The Court acknowledged that formula apportionment is imperfect,
correctly noting that; (1) the one-third weighting of the factors is arbi-
trary; (2) there are more income-producing factors than just property
payroll and sales, and (3) the relationship between the three factors
and income is only approximate. 90 However, the Court found that
Container had failed to impeach "the basic rationale behind the three
factor formula."91
3. Foreign Commerce Clause: Need to Apply Arms-Length
Analysis
Because California's unitary business was international in scope,
the Court had to consider two additional factors "beyond those articu-
lated in [the doctrine governing the commerce clause] ... . These
two factors were derived from Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Ange-
income to California. Id. at 18.
85. Id. at 16-18. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
86. Brief for Appellant at 17, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
U.S. ., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15, No. 8,
Part 1.
87. Container, - U.S. at ., 103 S. Ct. 2948.
88. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942).
89. Container, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2949.
90. Container, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2949 n.20.
91. Id. at _, 103 S. Ct. at 2949.
92. Id. at ., 103, S. Ct. at 2951 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979)).
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les.93 The first factor was "the enhanced risk of [international] multiple
taxation." 4 In Japan Line, since there was double taxation in fact the
Court did not decide "under what circumstances [the] mere risk of
double taxation would invalidate a State tax. . . ."" Second was the
"'possibility that a state [would] impair federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential."9 6 In order to uphold California's
worldwide apportionment tax, the Court had to distinguish Container
from Japan Line.
In Japan Line, the Court struck down a California property tax
imposed on the shipping containers of a Japanese firm, in part because
there was multiple taxation. The Court conceded there was also multi-
ple taxation present in Container.97 The Court noted, however, that the
multiple taxation in Container, unlike that in Japan Line, was not "in-
evitable." Multiple taxation was inevitable in Japan Line because the
property taxed in California was subject to tax on its full value in Ja-
pan. 98 The multiple taxation in Container, on the other hand, was not
the inevitable result of applying the worldwide combined reporting
method of taxation. Rather, it was "dependent solely on the facts of the
individual case"99 and could have resulted in a lower tax bill.1"0 .
The Court also found that even if California had adopted the
arms-length method there was no guarantee the risk of multiple taxa-
tion would be eliminated, 01 because of variations in the way the arms-
length method is applied in different countries. Definitions and methods
of computing income, deductions and credits are not uniform among
countries: "The record shows no such identical tax laws between any
two countries .... "102
Finally, the enterprise being taxed in Japan Line was foreign
93. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
94. Container, - U.S. at -. , 103 S. Ct. at 2951 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S.
at 446).
95. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452 n.17 (emphasis added).
96. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2951 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S.
at 448).
97. Container, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2951.
98. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2952.
99. Id.
100. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2952 n.25.
101. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2954.
102. Brief for Appellee at 118, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
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owned, and Container is a domestic corporation. In the Japan Line de-
cision, the Court specifically left open the issue of taxation of "domesti-
cally owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce.' 0 3
The Court next considered0 4 whether formula apportionment,
when imposed on an international business, interferes with federal uni-
formity in foreign commerce, an area which "is pre-eminently a matter
of national concern."105 This occurs when a state tax: (a) involves mat-
ters of foreign policy, or (b) contradicts a mandate of the federal
government.10 8
The Court, distinguishing Container from Japan Line, briefly dis-
cussed three reasons why the tax in Container would not implicate
matters of foreign policy. First, Container was a domestic corporation,
while in Japan Line the business was located and organized in a foreign
country.0 7 Second, the Japan Line decision was influenced by the fact
that the United States and Japan were signators to a pact that allowed
containers from either country to be admitted tax free. 08 Third, be-
cause Container was undeniably subject to tax in California, the same
result could have achieved simply by raising the tax rates. 0 9
The Court also pointed out that the Executive Branch failed to file
an amicus curiae brief opposing the tax in Container. 10 In Japan Line
and Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor (a case similar
to Container and argued the same term),"' the Executive Branch had
filed a brief opposing worldwide application of the unitary tax.", The
majority interpreted the failure to file a brief as evidence that "the
103. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2952 (quoting Japan Line, 441
U.S. at 444 n.7). In Container the Court left open the question of whether a state could
tax "domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign corporations with either for-
eign parents or foreign subsidiaries." Container, - at , 103 S. Ct. at 2952 n.26.
On Jan. 9, 1984, however, the Court upheld California's right to apply the unitary tax
to a foreign parent corporation with domestic subsidiaries. Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 52 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984), aff'g mem. 558 F. Supp.
624 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
104. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2955.
105. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448.
106. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2955.
107. Id.
108. Id. (referring to Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452-53).
109. Id. at 2956.
110. Id.
111. - U.S. ., 103 S. Ct. 3562 (1983), dismissing appeal from the Sup. Ct.
of Ill., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 84 Ill. 2d 112, 417 N.E. 2d 1343 (1981).
112. Container, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2956.
1984]
253
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal
Executive Branch. . .[is] not seriously threatened" ' 3 by application of
the unitary business concept to a domestically based international busi-
ness. Chicago Bridge was dismissed shortly after the decision in
Container "for want of a substantial federal question." 1 4 Container
then filed for a rehearing to allow the Executive Branch to file a brief
opposing the tax as it had in Chicago Bridge,"*5 however, the Executive
Branch did not support the rehearing and it was dismissed.""
Justice Brennan then discussed the lack of a federal mandate re-
quiring the Court to ban California's tax. The United States is a party
to many tax treaties with foreign governments that use the "arms-
length analysis in taxing the domestic income of multinational enter-
prises.""117 These treaties, however, are not applicable to the states, and
the arms-length method is waived when a government taxes its own
corporations."a8 The Court also pointed out that Congress had with-
drawn a ban on worldwide apportionment from a tax treaty with the
United Kingdom. 1 9 Finally, the Court noted the lack of Congressional
action to ban the states' use of worldwide apportionment. 120
C. The Dissent
Justice Powell focused his dissent 21' primarily on the issue of mul-
tiple taxation. Taking issue with the majority, Powell said that multiple
taxation was the inevitable result of the worldwide combined reporting
method of taxation as used by California in Container.12 2 He discussed
113. Id.
114. Supreme Court: Illinois Unitary Tax Case Dismissed, Daily Tax Report,
July 6, 1983, at G-6.
115. State Taxes: Unitary System Threatens Investment in U.S., Japanese Gov-
ernment Warns, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 14, 1983, at G-5, 7.
116. Tax Policy: Administration Sets Up Task Force To Study Worldwide Uni-
tary Tax Method on Firms, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 23, 1983 at G-3.
117. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2956.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. See H.R. 11798, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967); S. 1245, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); S. 2080, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1980); S. 1688, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980) (congressional attempts restricting the
use of formula apportionment by the states). See infra note 194 for current congres-
sional attempts to restrict formula apportionment.
121. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2957 (Chief Justice Burger and
Justice O'Connor joined the dissent).
122. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2958.
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two reasons for his position.
First, he was persuaded by Container's argument that because
wage rates, property values and prices for goods sold were higher'23 in
California than in the foreign countries where the subsidiaries were lo-
cated, formula apportionment improperly shifted income away from
the foreign countries to California. 24 Formula apportionment is based
on the presumption that one dollar of property, payroll, and sales will
produce roughly the same amount of profit in each jurisdiction. When
variations in wage rates, property values and sales prices are dramatic,
income will be shifted to the jurisdiction where the values are high-
est.125 Since the foreign countries used the arms-length method, the in-
come which was shifted to California would be taxed both in California
and the foreign countries. The resulting multiple taxation, Powell con-
tended, violated the first test of the foreign commerce clause articu-
lated in Japan Line. 21 Justice Powell's reliance on this element of
Container's case is misplaced. A comparison of the dollar value of pay-
roll, sales and property required to produce one dollar of net income
showed the United States ranked second, third and third respectively
out of the six countries in which Container operated. 27
Second, although conceding there could be multiple taxation even
if California adopted the arms-length method, 28 Powell was willing to
accept this risk of multiple taxation because it was the result of differ-
ent applications of the same (arms-length) method and thus not "inevi-
table.' 29 On the other hand, Powell felt, multiple taxation was inevita-
ble under the worldwide combined reporting method because of the
"fundamental inconsistency" between the two different methods of allo-
cating income.' 30 As the majority noted, however, application of world-
123. Brief for Appellant at 15-18, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
- U.S. at _-, 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol. 15,
No. 8, Part 1.
124. Container, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2958.
125. J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 538-
539 (4th ed. 1978).
126. Container, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2957-2958. See supra notes 97-
100 and accompanying text.
127. See Brief for Appellant at 18, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reprinted in BNA's Law Reprints, Vol.
15, No. 8, Part 1.
128. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2958.
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wide combined reporting can result in reduced taxes.1 1 For example,
when a parent corporation is making a profit and its out-of-state sub-
sidiaries are losing money (or are merely less profitable), the subsidiar-
ies' operations will reduce the portion of the corporation's total income
subject to the apportionment formula.
Justice Powell also addressed the question of whether California's
tax prevented the government from speaking with "one voice. "132 He
concluded that it did, "because it seriously 'implicates foreign policy
issues which must be left to the federal government.' " 33 Powell failed
to develop fully the reasons for this conclusion. Instead, he speculated
about "sensitive matters of foreign relations"'1 4 and American inivest-
ments in foreign countries.13 5 He also raised the spectre of foreign reac-
tion were California to apply its tax to a foreign parent corporation.136
While this is an interesting question, it was not at issue in Container.
Six months later, however, the Court declined to review a lower court
holding that California could impose such a tax on a foreign parent
corporation.37
Justice Powell also disagreed with the majority over the failure of
the Executive Branch to file an amicus curiae brief.1 38 Powell believed
the failure to file a brief did not imply the government had changed its
position opposing the worldwide application of formula apportionment.
At the time his point was well taken. However, since Container, the
Executive Branch has decided to study the issues surrounding the tax
rather than oppose it.139
IV. Impact of Container Decision
A. Florida's Reaction
Two weeks after the decision in Container, Florida became one of
131. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. 2952 n.25.
132. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2959.
133. Id. (quoting the majority at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2955).
134. See Id. (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 456.)
135. Container, - U.S. at _ 103 S. Ct. at 2959.
136. Id.
137. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
138. Container, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2960. See supra notes 110-16 and
accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
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twelve states140 to extend the unitary tax to the worldwide operations of
a business."" The tax was enacted at special session under the pressure
of a school budget clash between Governor Graham and the legislature.
The Governor initially vetoed the school budget approved by the legis-
lature because, at $3.6 billion, it was $283 million below his recommen-
dations. 142 Faced with the prospect of a school system unable to pay its
bills, an agreement was reached to raise the additional funds sought by
the Governor.143 In addition to modifying the unitary tax, the legisla-
ture increased property and alcohol taxes as part of a $233 million
package designed to fund the new state education budget. 144 There is a
disagreement, however, over how much additional revenue the unitary
tax will actually raise. Revenue collections are $30 million less than
anticipated after two months under the unitary tax. 45
The legislature has been criticized for the hasty manner in which
the complex unitary tax provisions were adopted. 48 Business had no
opportunity to provide input on (or lobby against) a matter which has
direct impact on their interests. Responding to negative business reac-
tion to the unitary tax, Florida Secretary of State George Firestone
called for a special legislative session to repeal the tax. The Governor's
cabinet defeated Firestone by a vote of five-to-one.1 47 Lt. Governor
140. Unitary Tax: Netherlands Says Decision of Supreme Court Threatens
Overseas U.S. Investment, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 9, 1983, at G-6, 7.
141. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. SESS. LAW SERV. 4848 (West).
Governor Graham signed Senate Bill 3C on July 19, 1983. FLORIDA LEGISLATURE,
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, SPECIAL SESSION C, at 1-2.
142. Ollove, Graham Vetoes Schools Budget: Will Fight for Dramatic Tax In-
crease, The Miami Herald, July 1, 1983, at IA, col. 4.
143. Ollove, Graham, Leaders Near Pact on New Taxes for Schools, The Miami
Herald, July 7, 1983, at IA, col. 2. Senate President Curtis Peterson (D., Lakeland)
agreed to support the tax increase for education after the governor agreed to restore
funding for the Miss Teenage America Beauty Pagent in Lakeland. The governor's
aides, however, insisted the timing was just a coincidence. Ollove, Beauty of a Coinci-
dence Leaves Graham, Peterson Sitting Pretty, The Miami Herald, July 9, 1983, at
IA, col. 1.
144. Ollove & Doig, School Taxes Survive Final Battle, The Miami Herald,
July 13, 1983, at IA, col. 1. This article reports the total tax package at $237 million.
Later accounts placed the figure at $233 million. Oppenheimer, Save-Way Threatens
to Leave State, The Miami Herald, Aug. 5, 1983, at I E, col. 2.
145. Birger, Abolishing Unitary Tax to be Business Priority, The Miami Herald
(Business/Monday), Jan. 16, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
146. Sundberg, State Business Tax Climate Went from Sunny to Bleak, Ft.
Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel, Nov. 27, 1983, at 5E, Col. 1.
147. Doig, 4 Cabinet Members Back Governor on Unitary Tax, The Miami Her-
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Wayne Mixson also advocated repeal.148 To make up for revenue lost
by repeal of the tax, Firestone suggested increased fees for drivers li-
cense, death certificates, occupational permits and corporate char-
ters.149 Governor Graham, however, has said he will oppose repeal un-
less business-related taxes or fees make up for revenue lost by repeal of
the unitary tax.150 Florida Representative John Cosgrove (Coral Ga-
bles) has pre-filed a bill for the 1984 legislative session that would ef-
fectively repeal the unitary tax. 51 Cosgrove's Coral Gables district has
over one hundred multinational businesses. 52 In response to criticism
of the new tax and perhaps to quiet those advocating its repeal, the
Governor appointed a commission to study the issue.153 Robert Lanzil-
lotti, Dean of the University of Florida's College of Business Adminis-
tration, was appointed chairman of the commission. 5 Two months af-
ter Lanzillotti's appointment the commission voted to repeal most of
the tax because of negative business reaction. 55 However, it is unlikely
that Florida's 160 legislators will be able to agree on an alternative
source of funding to replace the revenue generated by Florida's version
of the worldwide combined reporting method of taxation." 6
aid, Oct. 19, 1983, at 8A, col. 1.
148. Prendergast, Graham, Mixson Butting Heads on Merit of New Tax, Ft.
Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel, Oct. 8, 1983, at IA, col. 2.
149. Firestone Seeking Review of Tax Laws, The Miami Herald, Oct. 17, 1983,
at 6B, col. 5.
150. Doig, Graham Issues Warning on Unitary Tax, The Miami Herald, Jan. 5,
1984, at 9D, col. 2.
151. H.B. 1, Fla. Leg. 1984 (proposed bill for April, 1984 legislative session).
152. Askari, Battle Begins Over Florida Multinational Tax, The Miami Herald,
July 12, 1983, at ID, col. 2.
153. Anderson, Panel to Study Tax on Business, Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun-Sen-
tinel, Nov.12, 1983, at IB, col. 5.
154. Bellew, UF Business Dean Named to Unitary-Tax Panel, The Miami Her-
ald, Nov. 12, 1983, at 4B, col. 2.
155. Birger, Governor's Panel Votes to Dump Unitary Tax, The Miami Herald,
Feb. 18, 1984 at 9D, col. 2. The commission recommended retention of that portion of
the unitary tax which ended the exemption on overseas sales. Id. at col. 3. See infra
note 160 and accompanying text.
156. Oppenheimer, Senator Says Unitary Tax Will Stand, The Miami Herald,
Feb. 24, 1984, at 1 B, col. 2. Governor Graham has recently indicated he would support
the elimination of the worldwide income portion of the tax. If the legislature follows
the governor's suggestion, which seems likely, the major objection to the tax of interna-
tional businesses would be eliminated. The loss of revenue to the state would be ap-
proximately $15 million. Graham Changes Stand on Unitary Tax, The Miami Herald,
Mar. 24, 1984, at 4B, col. 2.
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In adopting the worldwide combined reporting method of taxation,
the Florida Legislature amended eight existing sections 157 of the tax
code and created two new sections. 8" The majority of the tax increase,
however, was accomplished by changing only four of the code sections.
First, Florida effectively adopted worldwide combined reporting merely
by redefining the terms "state" and "everywhere" to include any for-
eign country." 9 Second, the deduction for income earned on overseas
sales was disallowed.160 Florida had been the only state which excluded
all foreign source income for state corporate tax purposes.,'6 Third,
Florida became the twenty-eighth state6 2 to adopt the "throwback"
rule.16 3 The throwback rule allows taxation of a sale by the origination
state (Florida) if the destination state does not tax the sale. Generally,
sales of tangible personal property are taxed in the state the property is
delivered or shipped to, the destination state. Fourth, non-business in-
come (net rents and royalties, capital gains and losses, interest and div-
157. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. SEss. LAW SERV. 4848, 4857-
64 (West). Five sections of the tax code were amended in addition to those discussed
infra notes 159-166 and accompanying text. First, § 220.131 was amended to conform
provisions dealing with the adjusted federal income of affiliated groups to the rest of
the tax code. Second, § 220.14(3) was amended to permit only one exemption to mem-
bers of a unitary group. Third, § 220.15 (4) was amended by deleting refund provi-
sions. Fourth, § 220.63(5) was amended by deleting a cross reference which had al-
lowed a deduction from net income for international banks. Fifth, § 220.64 was
amended to make certain portions of the new tax applicable to banks.
158. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. SESS. LAW SERV. 4848, 4858-
61 (West). The first new code section, § 220.135, requires all members of a unitary
business group to use the unitary method and sets out the procedures which must be
employed. The second new code section, § 220.16 relates to the allocation of non-busi-
ness income.
159. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. SESS. LAW SERV. 4848, 4853,
4859 (West). The term "state" is defined in § 220.03(1)(t). The term "everywhere" is
defined in § 220.15(3). Section 220.15 relates to the apportionment formula and the
apportionment of adjusted federal income to Florida.
160. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. SEss. LAW SERV. 4848, 4856
(West). Parts (a)(b), and (c) of § 220.13(1)(b) were deleted.
161. Fesperman, New Tax Law Stings Multinational Firms, The Miami Herald
(Business/Monday), Aug. 18, 1983, at 4, col. 1.
162. See GOV'T. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL, KEY ISSUES AFFECTING STATE TAXATION OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CORPORATE
INCOME NEED RESOLVING 165 (1982) (hereinafter cited as KEY IssuES).
163. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. SEss. LAW SERV. 4848, 4852,
§ 214.71(3)(a)(West). The statutory basis of the throwback rule is contained in the
UNIF. Div. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 91 (1978). For a more
complete discussion of the throwback rule see Cappetta, supra note 8, at § 44.02[1].
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idends, and patents and copyrights)16 4 is no longer subject to apportion-
ment. Instead, it may be allocated entirely to Florida. Whether a
particular item of non-business income is allocable to Florida varies
with the nature of the item. For example, interest and dividends are
allocable to Florida only if the corporation's commercial domicile in
located in Florida.16 5 Previously, Florida was one of only eleven states
which apportioned all or nearly all of a corporation's income.1 66
The international business community strongly opposes Flor-
ida'snew tax.16 7 They argue that because of the increase in taxes on
multinationals, new businesses will not settle here and existing busi-
nesses might leave or at least not expand their operations in Florida. 6 8
Senator Paula Hawkins' office has released a list of twenty-four compa-
nies threatening such action 69 and at least twenty business organiza-
tions have joined together to oppose the tax.17 0 Because no business
wants to pay additional taxes, opposition by multinationals to the new
tax is predictable.17 1 However, the way the new tax is perceived is also
important. Opponents of the tax claim that the perception of Florida as
164. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. SEss. LAW SERV. 4848, 4861,
§ 220.16(West).
165. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. SESS. LAW SERV. 4848, 4862,
§ 220.16(3)(West).
166. KEY IssuEs, supra note 162, at 65.
167. See Doig, 4 Cabinet Members Back Governor on Unitary Tax, The Miami
Herald, Oct. 19, 1983, at 8A, col. 1 (IBM, Motorola, Coca Cola, American Cyanamid,
Sony, and the Insurance Exchange of America testify against the new tax at hearing);
Birger, Graham Gets Pressure to Repeal Unitary Tax, The Miami Herald (Business/
Monday), Oct. 17, 1983, at 3, col. 1 (Windmere Corp. reduces Florida inventory; Mul-
tinational Firms Hire Miami Lawyer to Fight Unitary Tax, The Miami Herald, Oct.
15, 1983, at 4B, col. 5 (Arthur England, former Justice of the Florida Supreme Court,
hired to represent 29 mulitnationals - including Aluminum Co. of America, Gulf Oil,
Honeywell, Texaco, TRW and Xerox): Sony Blasts Florida's Unitary Tax, The Miami
Herald, Oct. 14, 1983, at IE, col. 2 (Sony reconsiders investments in Florida).
168. See Oppenheimer, Study Fuels Banks' Drive Against New State Tax, The
Miami Herald (Business/Monday), Sept. 19, 1983, at 54, col. 1; Oppenheimer, Inter-
national Bankers Fear Unitary Tax, The Miami Herald, Sept. 15, 1982, at IC, col. 2;
Fesperman, New Tax Law Stings Multinational Firms, The Miami Herald (Business/
Monday), Aug. 18, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
169. Unitary Taxes: Hawkins Bill Would Speed Recommendations of Adminis-
tration Task Force, Daily Tax Report, Nov. 1, 1983, at G-2.
170. Oppenheimer, Groups Banding Together to Seek Repeal of New Tax, The
Miami Herald (Business/Monday), Aug. 1, 1983, at 12, col. 2.
171. See generally Cappetta, supra note 8, (for a more detailed analysis of cor-
porate opposition ot the unitary tax method).
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a state with a favorable business climate has been severely damaged."7 2
"What is true for a corporation is not reality, but perception, and the
perception of this is bad.1' 73
The impact on Florida's business growth resulting from any nega-
tive perception (or the reality of a tax increase) is difficult to measure
because of conflicting signals. IBM and Pratt & Witney have said they
will not move out of the state174 and reports of new businesses coming
to Florida continue despite the unitary tax.175 For example, Evans
Products Company, with annual sales of $1.5 billion, is planning to
move its headquarters to Miami. 76 In addition, IBM recently an-
nounced plans to double expenditures in 1984 for new construction and
equipment for its Boca Raton, Florida-based Entry System Division. 77
On the other hand, IBM also recently announced plans to sell two
thousand acres of land near Gainesville, Florida because "the state is
an unattractive place to build factories."1' 7 Furthermore, Save-Way In-
dustries has threatened to leave the state because it estimates its tax
bill will increase from $20,000 in 1982 to $180,000 in 1983.179 These
conflicting signals have led to confusion over the impact of the unitary
tax.
Confusion over the economic impact of the unitary tax may be
illustrated by the response to IBM's recently announced cancellation of
172. Lawrence, Unitary Tax Killing Business, C of C Told, The Miami Herald,
Nov. 30, 1983, at 8D, col. 2.
173. Doig, Corporate, State Officials Square Off on Unitary Tax, The Miami
Herald, Nov. 3, 1983, at 15C, col. 1. A cartoon accompanying a commentary by for-
mer Florida Supreme Court Justice Alan Sundberg reflects the purported negative per-
ception: Two workers are putting up a roadside billboard which reads "Keep Out!" On
the ground is the sign they have just take down; it reads "Welcome to Florida." Sund-
berg, State Business Tax Climate Went From Sunny to Bleak, Ft. Lauderdale News/
Sun-Sentinel, Nov. 27, 1983, at 5E, col. 1.
174. Fesperman, supra note 168, at col. 5.
175. An analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta forcasts a bright eco-
nomic future for Florida and notes "[h]igh growth, high-technology companies are
flocking to the state. . . ." Koch, Whigham & Steinhauser, Florida Expecting a
Boom, EcoN oMIc REV., Feb. 1984, at 20.
176. Russell, Evans Will Bring its Main Office to Miami, The Miami Herald,
Jan. 20, 1984, at IE, col. 4.
177. Askari, IBM Division Plans to Double Spending, The Miami Herald, Mar.
16, 1984, at 1E, col. 3.
178. Askari, IBM Blames Unitary Tax for Sale of Land, The Miami Herald,
Feb. 2, 1984, at 5C, col. 2.
179. Oppenheimer, Save-Way Threatens to Leave State, The Miami Herald,
Aug. 5, 1983, at lE, col. 1.
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further expansion in Boca Raton. Newspaper accounts cited the unitary
tax as the primary reason for the cancelled expansion.180 The unitary
tax, however, was not the primary reason for the cancellation: "I can
understand someone finding an issue and publicizing it as the reason we
did it, and I'm not saying [the unitary tax] isn't a reason, but it is not
the only reason."1 In 1983 IBM experienced substantial growth in the
Boca Raton/Delray Beach area. The local workforce increased from
6,300 to 7,800 and its facilities increased by 800,000 square feet to 3.6
million. Anticipating further expansion, builders approached IBM
about leasing additional space. A routine management review, however,
indicated it would be prudent to curtail expansion for three reasons: (1)
The change in Florida's business climate resulting from the unitary tax;
(2) Concern that over-expansion of its South Florida operations would
have a negative impact on the manageability of those operations; and
(3) The impact on community services of further growth in an area
where its facilities are already expansive. IBM's decision may cost
Florida jobs and property tax revenue. The extent of any loss is difficult
to quantify because part of the expansion was designed to relieve ex-
isting congestion, however, IBM has no plans to expand its South Flor-
ida operations in another state in lieu of Florida.8 2 Indeed, two months
after the widely publicized cancellation of its expansion plans, IBM an-
nounced plans to increase expenditures at its Boca Raton facilities be-
cause of the success of the IBM Personal Computer.8 3 Whether this
confusion is by design or by accident, one point is clear: complex busi-
ness decisions of this nature are not made soley on the basis of one
factor.
While a state's corporate income tax structure is an important
consideration in the choice of one state over another, it is by no means
the only factor. Even if Florida's tax climate has changed there are
several other factors in its favor, including; low labor costs, a sparsely
180. IBM Decision Shows Why Florida Should Void Tax, Ft. Lauderdale
News/Sun-Sentinel, Jan. 21, 1984, at 22A, col. 1; Stemle, Unitary Tax Causes Project
Cancellation, The Monday Paper (Delray Beach), Jan. 16, 1984, at 3A, col. 1; Askari,
IBM Shelves Expansion Plans, Cites Unitary Tax, The Miami Herald, Jan. 14, 1984,
at 4B, col. 2; De George, IBM Scraps S. Florida Expansion Plans, Ft. Lauderdale
News/ Sun-Sentinel, Jan. 14, 1984, at IA, col. 1.
181. De George, supra note 180, at col. 4 (quoting Dan Scherer, IBM Informa-
tion Manager in Boca Raton, Florida).
182. Telephone interview with Dan Scherer, IBM Information Manager in Boca
Raton, Florida (Jan. 20, 1984).
183. Askari, supra note 177.
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unionized workforce, easy access to international markets, high popula-
tion growth rate, and favorable weather conditions. Florida's corporate
tax rate of five percent is one of the lowest in the nation1 84 and is man-
dated by the state constitution."8 5 Additionally, Florida does not impose
a tax on personal income. Indeed, a recent report by the federal Com-
merce Department ranked Florida forty-ninth out of fifty states in the
percentage of personal income taken by state and local taxes. 8 6 All
these factors will continue to make Florida attractive to business.1 87
While the impact of the tax on Florida's economic growth is de-
batable, the version of the tax adopted by Florida is subject to valid
criticism on at least three points. First, instead of using an equally
weighted apportionment formula, Florida is one of only four states 18 to
assign a weight of fifty percent to sales and twenty-five percent each to
payroll and property.8" Altering the standard formula in this manner
distorts the apportionment of income among the states.190 Second, for-
eign members of a unitary group are not allowed to deduct net operat-
ing losses, net capital losses, or excess contributions. 19' Third, Florida
presumes a unitary business group when common ownership is fifty
percent or more of outstanding stock.192 While this presumption may
184. Only three states have a lower corporate income tax rate than Florida:
Michigan - 2.35%, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.31(1)(West Supp. 1982);
Oklahoma - 4%, OKLA, STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2.355(c); (West Supp. 1983); Utah - 4%,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-13-3 (Supp. 1983).
185. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5(b). The Constitution would have to be amended
or revised to change the corporate tax rate.
186. Tax Burden: State by State, U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 26, 1983-
Jan. 2, 1984, at 18.
187. See generally Oppenheimer, More Foreign-Owned Firms Building Plants
in Florida, The Miami Herald (Business/Monday), July 25, 1983, at 38, col. 1. As
evidence of the attractiveness of the state for multinational businesses, "the number of
foreign-owned manufacturing plants has almost doubled [to 203] in the past 3
years. . . ." Id.
188. KEY Issues, supra note 162, at 62. Two other states modify the standard
apportionment even further: West Virginia employes a two-factor (payroll, property)
formula and Iowa uses a one-factor (sales) formula. Id.
189. FLA. STAT. § 220.15(4)(1981).
190. See Cappetta, supra note 8, at § 44.02[l].
191. Taxation-Multi-State Businesses, 1983 FLA. Snss. LAW SERV. 4848, 4856,
§ 220.13(1)(b)(1)(d)(West). Deductions under Internal Revenue Code §§ 170(d)(2),
172, 1212, and 404 are denied to foreign members of a unitary group.
192. See supra notes 35-6 and accompanying text.
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be overcome, control alone should not be sufficient to raise it in the first
place.193
B. National Reaction
Even before the decision in Container, legislation was introduced
in the Ninety-Eighth Congress to ban states from using the worldwide
combined reporting system.' The proposed legislation is based on the
concern over multiple taxation and opposition to the taxing method by
foreign governments.'95
The Administration is under intense pressure from those who favor
the tax and those who oppose it. Multinational businesses and foreign
governments want Container overturned or legislatively overruled,' 98
while the states and proponents of states rights 97 want Container left
intact. President Reagan responded to the pressure by refusing to seek
Supreme Court review of the Container decision, an act interpreted as
a victory for the states.'98 Instead, the President formed a task force to
193. Weissman, A Primer on Florida's Unitary Method of Corporate Taxation
and Capitalizing on its Idiosyncrasies, FLA. B. J., Jan. 1984, at 42. See supra notes
35-6 and accompanying text.
194. S. 1225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S. 6145 (1983). H.R. 2918,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H. 2697 (1983). The two bills were introduced in
May 1983. See also State Taxes: Conable, Mathias Re-Propose Ban on Worldwide
Combined Reporting System, Daily Tax Report, May 6, 1983, at G-1.
195. State Taxes: Conable, Mathias Re-Propose Ban on Worldwide Combined
Reporting System, Daily Tax Report, May 6, 1983, at G-1.
196. See Unitary Taxes: Netherlands Says Decision of Supreme Court Threat-
ens Overseas U.S. Investment, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 19, 1983, at G-6 (Netherlands
asks United States to strike down worldwide application of the unitary tax); State
Taxes: Unitary System Threatens Investment in U.S., Japanese Government Warns,
Daily Tax Report, Sept. 14, 1983, at G-5 (Japan asks Unites States to abolish the
unitary tax); Tax Policy: Administration Unitary Tax Position Undergoing Close Cab-
inet Scrutiny, Daily Tax Report, Aug. 16, 1983, at K-1, 4 (Great Britain asks the
United States to join Container's petition for rehearing).
197. House Minority Leader Michel (R-Ill.), in a letter to President Reagan,
expressed his opposition to any Administration interference with the Container deci-
sion. Tax Policy: Administration Tax Position Undergoing Close Cabinet Scrutiny,
Daily Tax Report, Aug. 16, 1983, at K-I, 3.
198. Lyons, Reagan Elects Not to Continue Legal Fight Against 'Unitary' Tax,
The Miami Herald, Sept. 24, 1983, at 4B, col. 2; Bacon, Reagan's Delay on Unitary
Tax is Victory For States but May Spark Trade Problems, Wall St. J., Sept. 26,
1983, at 8, col. 2.
[Vol. 8
264
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss3/12
Unitary Tax
study issues surrounding the worldwide combined reporting method.1 19
Major issues to be considered by the task force include the proper defi-
nition of a unitary business and how to apply the three factor formula
to international businesses.200 As a result of the President's response,
legislative action is unlikely at the next session of Congress201 and the
task force is no longer considering federal legislation as a course of
action.20 2
Pressure from international business and foreign governments may
eventually lead to some modification of the worldwide combined report-
ing method. However, because estimates of additional state revenue
from the tax ra nge from $600-$900 million annually,203 a Congres-
sional ban on the tax is unlikely.
V. Conclusion
In Container, the Supreme Court upheld the right of states to em-
ploy the worldwide combined reporting method of taxation. By dis-
missing a similar case after reaching its decision in Container, the
Court sent a clear message that any action against the use of this
method of taxation is a matter for Congress and the President, not the
Court.
The President has temporarily side-stepped the issue by appointing
a task force to study the matter. This move effectively precludes Con-
gressional action, placing the issue on the back burner while adopting a
199. Unitary Tax: Reagan to Seek Global Task Force to Solve Problem of
State Use of Unitary System, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 22, 1983, at G-4.
200. Tax Policy: Administration Sets up Task Force to Study Worldwide Uni-
tary Tax Method on Firms, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 23, 1983, at G-3, 5. The task
force is now known as the Worldwide Unitary Tax Working Group. Unitary Taxes:
Treasury Announces Members of Reagan's Working Group, Daily Tax Report, Oct.
28, 1983, at G-2.
201. Tax Policy: Administration Sets Up Task Force to Study Worldwide Uni-
tary Tax Method on Firms, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 23, 1983, at G-3, 6. A Mathias
assistant is quoted as saying "[tfhey've killed our bill ... " Id. See generally supra
note 194.
202. Unitary Tax: Reagan Panel Hosts First Meeting, Appoints Staff-Level
Task Force, Daily Tax Report, Nov. 2, 1983, at G-5.
203. Tax Policy: Administration Sets Up Task Force to Study Worldwide Uni-
tary Tax Method on Firms, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 23, 1983, at G-4. California alone
earns $500 million from the tax. Id. If additional states adopt the tax, pressure against
any Congressional action banning the tax would necessarily increase.
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wait-and-see attitude on any foreign retaliation.0 4 If none is forthcom-
ing, there is little chance of any federal action banning the use of the
tax by the states.
In Florida, the potential for action against the tax is a much closer
call. Multinationals may have the political support to attempt repeal of
the tax at the next legislative session. If they can substantiate their
claims of negative economic impact, and at the same time offer an al-
ternative business source for funding the state education budget, they
may succeed in their drive to repeal the tax. Florida would once again
be a tax haven for multinationals.
The unitary tax should not be repealed, unless an alternative busi-
ness-related source of funding the education budget can be established.
Florida's international business community will directly benefit from a
better educated workforce from which to draw employees and thus
should assume more of the burden of educating that workforce.
Even if the unitary tax is not repealed the legislature should ad-
dress the three primary criticisms of Florida's version of the tax. 5
First, Florida should employ an equally weighted apportionment
formula rather than the current sales-weighted formula. Second, Flor-
ida should permit foreign members of a unitary group to deduct certain
losses currently disallowed. Finally, a unitary business group should not
be presumed solely on the basis of fifty percent or more common own-
ership of outstanding stock.
Scot Simpson
204. An analysis by the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations
(ACIR) of 12 states using the unitary method showed "no noticeable retaliations from
foreign governments or a drop in foreign investment." State Taxes: Bipartisan Com-
mission Opposes Ban on Worldwide Combined Reporting System, Daily Tax Report,
May 31, 1983, at G-4, 5. But see Tax Policy: Administration Sets Up Task Force to
Study Worldwide Unitary Tax Method On Firms, Daily Tax Report, Sept. 23, 1983,
at G-3 ("several investment projects. . .cancelled").
205. See supra notes 188-193 and accompanying text.
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